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What a wonderful book! This long-needed, impressive, and sophisticated volume is a must read for
development analysts, who should know their economic history, and for economic historians, who should
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History, historians and development policy: A necessary dialogue points to the clear fact that while the
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history has been selective, narrowly-focused, and often superficial. This book will hopefully open up new
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This is a hugely important and valuable book. Historical experience, especially of successes both large
and small, whether in (now) rich countries or poor, represents a rich seam of 'new' ideas on
development, and yet it is all too often ignored by the mainstream.
Duncan Green, Head of Research, Oxfam UK
History matters for development. This book is a thoughtful and long overdue exploration of the ways in
which history – understood both as the past and methods for its interpretation – and historians can and
should contribute to development. A set of engaging dialogues between practitioners of the two fields of
study provide insights on how changing interpretations of history can upset assumptions held by those
seeking to change the present. Development practitioners and donors should read this book. One hopes
also that it will encourage historians to engage more actively in contemporary debates on development.
Sarah Cook, Director, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
If history matters for understanding key development outcomes then surely historians should be active
contributors to the debates informing these understandings. This volume integrates, for the first time,
contributions from ten leading historians and seven policy advisors around the central development
issues of social protection, public health, public education and natural resource management. Where did
the policy ideas underpinning these sectors come from? How did certain ideas, and not others, gain
traction in shaping particular policy responses? How did the content and effectiveness of these
responses vary across different countries, and indeed within them? Answering these questions requires
incorporating historical sensibilities into development policy deliberations in ways that take seriously the
importance of context, process, and contestation. Achieving this is not merely a matter of seeking to
‘know more’ about specific times, places and issues, but recognizing the distinctive ways in which
historians rigorously assemble, analyze and interpret diverse forms of evidence. Doing so gives rise to
policy conclusions rather different to those emerging from prevailing analytical approaches.
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Preface and acknowledgements
This volume grew out of the seemingly straightforward presumption that if
history matters for development policy, as most people agree it does, then
perhaps historians – and not only economic historians – might have something
important to contribute. Too often, it seemed to us, the substantive and method-
ological contributions of professional historians to development policy debates
was marginal, whether because of the dominance of economists or the inability
(or unwillingness) of historians to contribute. As a result, our view was that
significant opportunities for interdisciplinary dialogue were being lost, and that
development policy itself was ultimately the poorer for this. As a step in a more
positive direction, we decided to commission a series of papers by leading histo-
rians on four core development policy issues – social protection, public health,
public education, and natural resource management – and to solicit feedback on
them from people working directly at the nexus of scholarship and policy. The
result is the volume before you: an introduction, nine substantive chapters and
five commentary pieces that we hope exemplifies the fruitful and distinctive
outcomes that can emerge when history – understood as both the past and the
discipline – is taken seriously in contemporary development policy debates.
This volume emerged out of the engagement of three of us (Rao, Szreter and
Woolcock) in the World Development Report (WDR) 2006, which was on the
theme of equity and development. These Reports are the annual flagship
document of the World Bank, and as such have a relatively large global impact on
development policy and debate. As part of the various follow-up initiatives
launched in the wake of WDR 2006, we decided to capitalise on the fact that the
Report had opened up an important space for thinking historically about the
emergence and consolidation of different types of ‘institutions’ in particular
places. But how exactly would that space would be filled, by whom, and on what
basis? The answers to these questions seemed to us to be sufficiently consequen-
tial as to warrant expending considerable effort to ensure that the skills and sensi-
bilities of professional historians were included. To this end, we sought out the
Bayly 00_Tonra 01  21/06/2011  10:14  Page xi
wisdom and input of Chris Bayly, who became an eager companion on this
venture. Bayly and Szreter, as the two bona fide historians on our team, identified
the historians we might approach to contribute to this volume, and collectively
we sought to fashion topics and papers that would simultaneously showcase
exemplary historical research and speak constructively to contemporary devel-
opment policy debates.
The initial and final rounds of funding for this project came from the World
Bank (its Research Support Budget and trust funds provided by the government
of Sweden). The middle phases of the project, including an author’s workshop,
were generously funded by the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University
of Manchester. The assistance of Laura Partridge is especially acknowledged. We
are extremely grateful to both organizations for making this project possible, and
for themselves demonstrating that academic and applied organizations can work
together to generate outcomes that neither could alone. 
The overriding objective throughout has been to demonstrate that
responding to inherently complex issues – such as institutional development,
organizational design, service delivery and ‘governance’ – requires engagement
with a diverse assortment of ideas and evidence. In this regard, the contributions
of economists and historians (and other social scientists) are largely comple-
ments, not substitutes. It is in this spirit that we invite readers, no matter what
their disciplinary training or professional background, to engage with the
various chapters, each of which demonstrates in a practical, thoroughly
evidence-based manner, and in relation to a specific development policy pre-
occupation, how much can be gained by development policy practitioners taking
seriously historians’ knowledge of context, process, contestation and indigenous
agency in the places where they operate. The chapters show how those involved
in designing or implementing significant policy interventions, in the name of
‘development’, need to understand that they are attempting, usually with
relatively minute instruments and blunt tools, to influence, alter and modify the
course of a vigorous, living, flowing river – the metaphor we have adopted for a
country’s or a nation’s ongoing history. Those involved in development policy are
attempting to insert themselves and their projects, at a particular point of entry,
into one of these many currents of history, as it continually negotiates its way
from the present into the future, drawing on the resources of its past. They are
making a bid to become part of that current and to have some influence over it.
To do so most effectively, it would be well to spend considerable time consulting
those who are best placed to understand the features of the riverbed and the
river’s course, the rhythms of the water’s ebb and flow, the most propitious
points of entry from the river bank and the varied forms of life it contains and
sustains.
C. A. Bayly, Vijayendra Rao, Simon Szreter, Michael Woolcock
September 2010
Preface and acknowledgementsxii
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How and why history matters 
for development policy1
Michael Woolcock, Simon Szreter and Vijayendra Rao
Study history, study history. In history lies all the secrets of statecraft. 
Winston Churchill
Getting history wrong is an essential part of being a nation.
Ernest Renan
[M]odern social science, policy-making and planning have pursued a model of
scientism and technical manipulation which systematically, and deliberately, neglects
human, and above all, historical, experience. The fashionable model of analysis and
prediction is to feed all available current data into some notional or real super-
computer and let it come out with the answers … [S]uch a-historical or even anti-
historical calculation is often unaware of being blind, and inferior to even the
unsystematic vision of those who can use their eyes.
Eric Hobsbawm 
1  Introduction
There is now a broad consensus across the social sciences and among develop-
ment policy-makers that ‘institutions’ matter, indeed that they ‘are a key deter-
minant of the wealth and poverty of nations’ (Hoff 2003: 205). Logically,
considering where much of the empirical support for this consensus comes
from, the next step in this inferential chain has been to conclude that ‘history’
matters (Nunn 2009). Any attempt to understand contemporary institutional
performance is bound to identify when, where and why given institutions came
to take their particular form, and how these have changed (or not) over time
(North 1990, 2005). These debates now play out at the highest policy levels. For
example, two recent flagship World Development Reports from the World Bank –
on markets (World Bank 2001) and equity (World Bank 2005) – have explicitly
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4 History, historians and development policy
sought to incorporate a historical sensibility into their discussions of the origins,
structure and persistence of institutions, the better to help understand how they
help or hinder broader development trajectories and outcomes. This is to be
welcomed and encouraged.
In arguing that institutions and history matter, however, the development
policy community has largely failed to take the third (seemingly logical) step,
which is to recognize that historians – and the discipline they represent – might
matter. Selected economic historians working within the confines of economics
departments (e.g., Stan Engerman, Kenneth Sokoloff, Peter Lindert, Ronald
Findlay, Kevin O’Rourke, Jeffrey Williamson) have certainly been influential in
these discussions,2 as have some innovative economists who have turned their
theories, methods and quest for data to the past, most notably Daron Acemoglu,
Simon Johnson, James Robinson (for present purposes we shall call them histor-
ical economists). Certain authors of influential ‘big picture’ development narra-
tives (e.g. Diamond 1997, de Soto 2000) have also invoked a reading of the past
to make their case.3 However, a great many professional historians of particular
countries, regions, periods or thematic issues have been conspicuous by their
absence from these deliberations, especially in policy circles.4
While historians hardly speak with a single voice or from a unified perspec-
tive, we believe it is unfortunate that most historians and their discipline are
absent from development policy debates, despite everyone putatively agreeing
that ‘history matters’: at best it leads to lost opportunities to enrich the quality of
scholarship and policy responses; at worst it results in all manner of instances in
which partisans erroneously or selectively invoke ‘history’ in support of their
cause (see MacMillan 2009). Needless to say, it is almost impossible to imagine
the reverse situation, namely a prominent policy issue on which there was a
consensus that economics matters but that economists were somehow not
consulted.5 This volume seeks to provide some constructive examples of the
kinds of studies by historians which can provide the basis for establishing a more
constructive space in which historians, social scientists (especially economists)
and policy-makers can more fruitfully engage one another around core develop-
ment issues (cf. Szreter 2005). We do not claim to be the first to attempt such an
exercise; rather, building on Neustadt and May (1986) and the especially
insightful collection published in Cooper and Packard (1997) – works largely
preceding the contemporary policy ‘consensus’ regarding the importance of
institutions and history – we seek to extend and fortify the bridge connecting
historians and development policy-makers.6
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section two clarifies key terms and concepts,
and explores the basis on which historical scholarship – or ‘thinking in time’
(Neustadt and May 19867) – can potentially help to enrich the quality of
contemporary development policy. It also provides a brief overview of the
arguments and evidence that underpin the prevailing consensus among develop-
ment economists and policy-makers that ‘institutions’ and ‘history’ matter.
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Section three focuses on the different theoretical and methodological underpin-
nings of contemporary historical scholarship as it pertains to comparative
economic development, arguing that in order for non-historians to engage more
substantively and faithfully with the discipline of history, they must make a
sustained effort both to understand historiography and appreciate anew the
limits of their own discipline’s methodological assumptions. Being a historian is
not just a matter of ‘knowing more’ about a particular time, place or issue than
others, but acquiring an entire sensibility about how to compile, assess and
interpret evidence, substantiate causal claims, and understand complex (often
interdependent) processes. Section four outlines some of the distinctive types of
general principles and specific implications that can be drawn from historical
scholarship, and considers their relevance for contemporary development policy.
Section five provides a summary of the substantive chapters presented in this
volume, while section six concludes with suggestions for how the evolving
dialogue between historians and development policy can be enhanced and
sustained.
2  Thinking in time revisited: can the past guide the present?
This introduction considers how and why, in general terms, history matters for
contemporary development policy. For present purposes, we deploy the term
‘history’ to refer to both ‘the past’ and to the academic discipline of history. As
such, we are concerned with drawing upon the deep reservoir of historical schol-
arship about the past (events and their interpretation) to help provide a more
comprehensive body of theory and evidence for wrestling with contemporary
development policy concerns.8
We acknowledge from the outset that many reasonable people contend that
it is naïve, foolish or even positively dangerous to expect history (either ‘the past’
or ‘the discipline’) to speak to contemporary policy problems, especially those
pertaining to highly controversial concerns such as ‘development’. The basis for
such a stance includes beliefs that (a) ‘history’ does not and cannot provide such
‘lessons’ (i.e., it contains no teleological or Hegelian imperative), (b) that each
time and place is unique (i.e., there are inherently qualitative differences between
‘then’ and ‘now’, and/or ‘here’ and ‘there’9), (c) that only those acting with great
hubris imagine that ‘the future’ can be effectively guided by the deployment of
human reason, or (d) that any such actions inevitably unleash – no matter how
seemingly noble the initial intention or diligent the implementation – potentially
harmful and irreversible unintended consequences. In this regard, historians are
also conscious that (e) many of the twentieth (and previous) century’s most
infamous tyrants (Stalin, Hitler, Pol Pot) justified their actions on the basis that
they were acting in accordance with, or to actively fulfil, a destiny or mandate
borne of historical necessity.10 Similarly, (f) historians may distance themselves
from policy discussions because of a concern that their hard-won research
5How and why history matters for development policy
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findings – sobering, nuanced and finely crafted as they are likely to be – are
either ‘unactionable’ through prevailing policy instruments or may be used for
purposes (whether by dictators or by well-meaning bureaucracies wielding only
the crudest of decontextualized policy tools11) that they find distasteful and/or
for which they wish to bear no responsibility. Finally, (g) large international
development agencies, formed as they were during the height of modernization
theory’s influence, contain an inherent imperative to embrace, implicitly if not
explicitly, presumptions that there is a ‘single’ or ‘best’ path to modernity
(embodied in the ubiquitous language of ‘best practices’), a notion most
contemporary historians reject.12 These are all legitimate concerns, which we
address below. 
A more strident (but to our mind, unpersuasive) critique of our project
would dismiss the very possibility that historical scholarship can be, even if it so
desired, a basis for informing contemporary policy choices. For many students of
post-modernism and cultural studies (see Jenkins 1991), for example, both the
content and the epistemological underpinnings of orthodox ‘history’ are suspect
at best, since (for these scholars) such history is merely a series of hegemonic,
ex post rationalizations propagated by powerful elites, the accounts of the past
reimagined by ‘winners’ in the present to ensure their status remains unchal-
lenged (and, in its most complete form, unchallengeable) by the ‘losers’
(Trouillot 1995). According to this view, ‘development’ is among the most
egregious of subjects for historical inquiry (see Rist 2009), since its very logic
perfectly embodies, enables and justifies attempts by powerful countries,
companies and social groups to provide narratives about the virtuous factors
(thrift, diligence, intelligence, innovation, courage) that underpinned their
economic success while simultaneously obscuring the less savoury aspects of that
process (slavery, colonialism, exploitation, suppression, theft).13 Moreover, they
argue, as part of this obfuscation, the mantra of ‘development’ enables the rich to
lecture the poor about their putative political, cultural and moral failings, doing
so as a pretext to encouraging (if not forcing) them to buy goods and resources
(by going deeply into debt) and/or to adopt policy measures, institutional
reforms and behavioural traits that they are told will surely correct these failings
(but in fact will most likely serve only to further advance and consolidate the
interests of the wealthy). These are not idle matters: several high-profile graduate
programs in development studies (most notably in Europe14) are informed,
implicitly if not explicitly, by these notions; not surprisingly, engagement by the
leaders (and graduates) of such programs with policy-makers, practitioners and
staff of international development agencies – to the extent it occurs at all – is
often characterized by deep suspicion. 
In distancing ourselves from this view, we are nonetheless mindful that some
post-modernist historians, such as those from Subaltern Studies, have taught us
a great deal about issues that are at the heart of contemporary development
concerns. Extending the longer tradition of ‘history from below’ exemplified by
History, historians and development policy6
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the work of E.P. Thomson, Subaltern scholars have demonstrated, among other
things, that colonial subjects developed intellectual traditions and movements
that often ran counter to the dominant colonial discourse (Sarkar 1983), and that
this laid the foundations of movements for social change.15 They have shown, in
kinship with Scott (1985), that persistent inequalities cannot be understood
without acknowledging that they are often accompanied by modes of resistance
that demonstrate the agency of the oppressed (Guha 1983). As we argue below,
understanding the dynamics behind ideas such as these lie at the heart of what
we believe historians can contribute to development policy.
It is clear, then, that the relationship between history and development policy
is often a contentious one, a cautionary opening note that needs to be registered
against the prevailing view in policy circles that, as we shall see, offers a remark-
ably ‘clean’ story in which the desire to incorporate history into development
policy is largely preoccupied with the search for the key structural ‘variables’ or
‘factor endowments’ – property rights, disease vectors, press freedom, popula-
tion density, types of natural resources, labour scarcity – that were associated
with the origins and consolidation of institutions that promoted (or precluded)
productivity growth, and expanded (or restricted) economic opportunities and
political liberties in the pasts of today’s developed economies and societies. 
We believe the rich historical scholarship on comparative economic develop-
ment has much to offer contemporary development policy, indeed that the
quality and usefulness of such policy deliberations is much the poorer for its
failure to be informed by a sustained engagement with historians. We recognize
the concerns raised above regarding the potential dangers this engagement
entails, are conscious that how we make sense of the past is itself an evolving
exercise,16 and concede that some historians may recoil at their inclusion in this
project. Nevertheless, we argue that judicious efforts to ‘think in time’ – i.e., to
take seriously the scholarly research that specializes in disentangling complex
interdependent processes as they have played themselves out in particular
contexts across decades and even centuries – are a desirable and potentially
fruitful basis on which to try to enhance the quality of the responses to some of
the contemporary world’s most urgent policy problems. Much of this work is
entirely complementary to the work of economic historians and ‘historical
economists’, but much of it is also significantly different, not least with respect
to the types of evidence and arguments it brings to bear. More immediately,
historical sensibilities can also help to ‘deconstruct’ popular (and often very
powerful) myths pertaining to a development organization’s origins, mandate
and approach, showing how, at key junctures, particular options among several
came to prevail.17
The strongest argument for the importance of bringing history into dialogue
with policy and policy-making, however, is that history is already there, all the
time: the only question is what kind of history is going to be used. Without the
explicit input of critical and reflexive professional historians, the ‘history’ which
How and why history matters for development policy 7
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policy-makers use is likely to be naïve, simplistic and implicit, often derived from
unconscious assumptions or vague memories; as such it is likely to be highly
selective, used to suit predetermined purposes, and to be largely unverified.18The
(ab)use of history in this form not only represents a problem of commission but
also of omission, in that it both invokes a defective and distorted rendering of
history but also denies the policy process the vast reservoir of imaginative
resources available from professional historians’ research. We continually deploy
historical memory in all forms of activity, often as unarticulated, framing
premises. It is the role of the discipline of history to attempt to keep that memory
sharp and rich, vital and challenging, not complacent and forgetful of the more
awkward aspects of the past.
‘Institutions matter’: a brief intellectual and policy history 
If historians and their discipline can help provide useful and distinctive insights
into contemporary development policy, it is instructive to examine the
arguments and evidence put forward by those who have done the most to
establish the contemporary ‘consensus’ regarding the importance of institutions
and history for development policy – i.e., the ‘new’ institutional economists (see
Harriss et al. 1995). If historians are to demonstrate their value to this discussion,
we need to be clear about the current state and terms of that discussion.
In many respects, the study of institutions and their contribution to develop-
ment is as old as economics itself (see Bardhan 1993). Adam Smith, in both The
Wealth of Nations and The Theory of Moral Sentiments, repeatedly stressed the importance
of what we would now call political, legal and social institutions for making
possible spectacular gains in productivity and exchange, and institutions of
various kinds featured prominently in the accounts of ‘development’ offered by
Marx and Weber in the nineteenth century. From the late nineteenth century until
the late twentieth century, however, the mathematical turn in economics saw
institutions recede from centre stage in that discipline. In the late twentieth
century it was primarily the pioneering work of Douglass North (1982, 1990)19
– and the subsequent availability of vastly greater computing power and more
comprehensive datasets on institutional quality and economic performance –
that enabled first the idea of ‘institutions’ and then the measurement of them to
re-enter economic theory and the practice of development (see Lin and Nugent
1995). The initial empirical studies by, among others, Putnam (1993), Shleifer
and Vishny (1993), Knack and Keefer (1995) and Mauro (1995) inspired
literally hundreds of follow-up efforts to expand and refine economists’ under-
standing of how institutions shape (and in turn are shaped by) economic
growth, poverty reduction and all manner of other development outcomes (e.g.,
conflict).20 Institutions, and their operational counterpart of ‘governance’, are
now (back) at the centre of the development enterprise. This is as it should be.
In its simplest terms, these studies have yielded empirical support for the
importance of institutions of various kinds, but most especially ‘property 
History, historians and development policy8
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rights’, characteristically defined as the exclusive capacity of those (individuals
or collectives) possessing intellectual, physical and natural assets to use, transfer
and realize the economic value of those assets, usually through access to clear and
legally enforceable titles. The presence in a given country of independent judici-
aries, mechanisms for constraining corruption and abuse of executive authority
(‘the rule of law’), ensuring the non-repudiation (or at least predictability) of
contracts, and procedures for ensuring the non-violent transfer of political power
are all now standard referents for what is meant by ‘institutions’ (Clague 1997).
In development policy circles, these items are usually grouped together as part of
a broader discourse on the importance of ‘good governance’. In conjunction
with, indeed fuelled by, the comprehensive expansion and refinement of efforts
formally to measure institutions,21 these renderings (or variations thereof) are
now thoroughly embedded into everyday development research and policy
debates; it is in this sense that we now have a ‘consensus’ on their importance.
Our concern, however, in this volume is with better understanding the processes
and mechanisms by which any of these ‘institutions’ in the abstract (e.g.,
‘property rights’) came to take specific concrete forms in particular times and
places, how political and social processes of institutional change were encour-
aged and/or thwarted in attempting to design and implement them, and what
such understandings might tell us about contemporary policy efforts to
‘improve’ institutions in settings often far removed (geographically, culturally,
politically) from aggregate quantitative data sets, or the contexts in which those
understandings were generated.
For all the attention garnered by the impressive quantitative studies
documenting the importance of institutions for understanding contemporary
economic performance,22 by the early 2000s the prevailing policy discourse was
recognizing that institutions themselves clearly had not arrived overnight; they
must have ‘evolved’ over time, whether they were now consolidating unhappy
outcomes (e.g., high inequality, slow growth, civil war) or encouraging more
virtuous ones (poverty reduction, service delivery, participatory democracy). The
key empirical and policy questions then became: Under what conditions do
‘good’ and ‘bad’ institutions emerge?23 If countries find themselves with ‘bad’
institutions, what can be done, and by whom, to move things in a more
constructive direction?
Into this conceptual and policy space stepped an array of impressive studies
by economic historians and historical economists that were both intuitively
appealing and empirically novel. Engerman and Sokoloff (2002, 2008; see also
Sokoloff and Engerman 2000), addressing these phenomena in a comparative
analysis of the divergent fortunes of North and South America, argued that the
key lay in the types of natural resource endowments, since in both regions land
was abundant and labour was scarce. Where the climate was conducive to the
cultivation of crops that required large amounts of labour in order to be
profitable, such as sugar, colonists resorted to the subjection of local populations
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(in Latin America) and/or the importation of slaves (the southern states of North
America, Central America and the Caribbean islands and the northern region of
South America), in the process institutionalizing laws and social relations consol-
idating high inequality and elite dominance; where profits could be optimally
gained by other means – that is, where the climate supported different kinds of
crops or industries requiring different kinds of skilled labour (in the northern
states of North America) – then colonists sought instead to attract immigrants
and put in place more equitable legal, political and socio-economic arrange-
ments. In these general terms, divergent ‘paths of development’ were thereby set
in motion, which, over several centuries, culminated in two qualitatively
different development experiences in the Americas.24
These debates accelerated considerably in terms of both scale and policy
impact with the arrival of a series of seminal papers by Acemoglu et al. (2001,
2002, 2005), who provided both a seemingly neat empirical solution to the
enduring problem of establishing a causal link (courtesy of a new dataset on
settler mortality) between institutional quality and development performance,
and an explanation for what they termed the ‘great reversal’ – the fact that
countries that were viewed as having the greatest potential for prosperity in 1500
were now amongst the poorest today, and vice versa.25 The explanation given for
this was that the colonizing powers encountered vastly different environmental
settings, which shaped the length and terms of their engagement with local
populations and natural resources; this in turn gave rise to very different incen-
tives to erect particular forms of institutions. Colonial settlers established a legacy
of ‘good’ (inclusive, prosperity-enhancing) institutions in places where they
committed to settling in large numbers for long periods, in the process enacting
and upholding private property rights; they did this in places where they were
engaged in tasks where land was abundant and that required relatively little
labour, and (most importantly) where disease burdens were low (Australia, New
Zealand, Canada, northern and western United States). ‘Bad’ (exclusionary,
prosperity-stifling) institutions, on the other hand, were established in less
hospitable environments, where the goal became one of enabling a small popula-
tion of foreign transients to extract natural resource wealth as quickly and
cheaply as possible; in such places, institutions – especially those pertaining to
land ownership, civil liberties and conflict management – emerged that greatly
concentrated political power in the hands of a powerful, dynastic elite, a process
that, over time, led initial inequalities to accumulate and perpetuate, and broad
growth processes to be thwarted (Latin America, Africa, the southern US states).
In subsequent work, this general story has been refined and updated to account
for (among other things) the persistence of sub-optimal institutions in the face
of considerable gains to implementing ‘better’ ones; for example, institutional
changes that could potentially generate economic expansion for large sectors of
the population get blocked in those countries where political elites fear such
change will lead to their replacement.26
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We stress again our respect for this work and our appreciation of the
important contribution it has made (and doubtless will continue to make) in
encouraging economists and development policy-makers to recognize the
important ways in which the past shapes the present.27 Absent such research, it
is unlikely that development agencies would have begun to engage with these
issues as seriously as they have. The acceptance and impact of this type of research
in development policy circles, however, is in large part a function of the fact that
it strongly comports with (even as it imaginatively expands) the canonical
theories, assumptions and methods of mainstream economics research. This is,
of course, absolutely fine if one is working within that epistemological space and
gives greatest credence to research findings emanating from it, but it is not fine if
one believes that, by absorbing such material, one has learned most of what is
important from history and historians about development. The getting of histor-
ical knowledge and understanding is a qualitatively different task, yielding
insights that are in large part a product of different methods, emphases and
theories about issues ranging from processes of social change and the salient
characteristics of context to how one substantiates causal claims and works with
evidence that may number only a single episode.28 To do justice to this range of
material entails a different set of commitments and sensibilities to those gener-
ating the recent influential work from historical economists; without the insights
of these other historians, we argue, development policy is the poorer.
3  The craft of historical scholarship: historiography, context, processes
If much of the recent work by economic historians, ‘historical economists’ and
popular historians inadequately reflects the diversity and distinctive content and
sensibility of scholarship by historians, then what are the defining features of this
scholarship? What implications does it have for development policy? We turn
next to seek some answers to these questions. 
Arguably the primary feature of historical scholarship is its method, or its
historiography (see Breisach 2006). ‘The past’ as measured by ‘time’ is not just
another ‘variable’ to be included in a regression to thereby discern its ‘signifi-
cance’ (though of course certain variables can certainly be assessed in this
manner); nor is it a matter of searching for this or that large, measurable variable
(or variables) from the past that can be used plausibly to explain the present.
Rather, historical scholarship is primarily about locating, drawing upon and
integrating different types and sources of material – much of it fragmentary (in
quality and scope), textual and scattered across different domains – in order to
discern coherently the specific processes and mechanisms by which one histor-
ical moment influences another. Even as most historians share with social scien-
tists a commitment to generating and testing hypotheses (i.e., to inductive and
deductive reasoning), and recognize that the veracity of a given explanation is
stronger the larger the number of cases it can explain,29 the canonical skill of
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historians is being able to immerse themselves sufficiently in the full context of
a period or a juncture faced by those in the past that they can recreate the
openness to the alternatives that were available at that time, in the way that our
own future is currently indeterminate to us today. As such, their task is to explore
what other outcomes were plausible, and how particular combinations of actors,
structures and events coalesced or not (for whatever reason or reasons) at a
particular moment to give rise to the outcome that did occur rather than
another.30
Getting oneself in a position to be able to make and defend such declarations
requires not only ‘deep’ immersion in and familiarity with the time, place and
circumstances in question, but a capacity to distil from the array of available
(usually highly imperfect) source material the components of a coherent and
empirically based argument. It is in this manner that historians make – and assess
one another’s – causal claims.31 For many of the episodes under consideration,
the number of available cases may be very few – e.g., there was only one French
Revolution – but this does not mean that historians are unable to identify (or at
least make reasonable assertions about) what ‘caused’ what.32 Needless to say, this
modality of causal reasoning is considerably different from that in econometrics
(and policy deliberations more generally), where statistical power and
(relatively) clear procedural techniques for discerning the effects of an
independent variable, controlling for other variables, on a given dependent
variable constitute the prevailing frame of reference. It is this frame of reference
that, faced with an imperative to recognize that ‘history matters’, finds itself
strongly predisposed to buy into the findings and arguments of the ‘historical
economists’ over those of most other historians. Such frames also preclude taking
seriously the power of ideas, rituals, ideologies and symbols in affecting
outcomes (because they cannot adequately be ‘measured’), and for similar
reasons strongly favours an empirical focus on factors of production (such as
‘property rights’) rather than changes in preferences.33
For development policy purposes, historiography – or, by implication, the
recognition that there is more than one way to make and substantiate a causal
empirical claim, especially as it pertains to time – is only the first of three signif-
icant analytical contributions that history can make. The second is appreciating
the importance of context. This is another idea on which there is increasingly
broad agreement – i.e., few would dispute in the abstract that ‘context matters’
for effective development policy – yet in practice it is largely honoured in the
breach. As Scott (1998) has argued, throughout the twentieth century the kinds
of social and economic knowledge found to be most useful to the imperatives of
state-sponsored planning (or what he terms ‘bureaucratic high modernism’) for
‘development’ purposes has been knowledge that takes a decontextualised form.
Indeed, there has been a sense in which only forms of knowledge (including
theories) which appear to be able to predict outcomes, regardless of local
contexts, can be considered sufficiently ‘scientific’ and powerful as to be relied
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upon for guidance by decision-making funders, officials and ministers. But this
creates a self-defeating problem: such forms of context-free policy science are
severely handicapped as detailed guides to practical action in any particular
context because the knowledge needed to speak to that context’s specific condi-
tions and history has been excluded by design from the policy model (Szreter et
al. 2004: 12–13). It is thus a form of knowledge strongly predisposed to
favouring either technocrats (i.e., a few smart people, usually called ‘experts’34)
or standardized, uniform procedures; by contrast those decisions in development
policy – and they are legion – that require instead both large amounts of highly
localised expertise (discretion) and numerous people-based transactions (i.e.,
those that require a careful response to the idiosyncrasies of local contexts) are
inherently more complicated (Evans 2004, Pritchett and Woolcock 2004, Rao
and Walton 2004). Giving more than lip service to the importance of ‘context’
requires not just an anthropological focus in the present but a historical sensi-
bility regarding how the present came to be what it is, and how in turn policy
actions in the present might shape future trajectories. Similarly, given that
implicit and/or explicit historical claims are routinely invoked to explain
contemporary development problems (and justify corresponding policy
solutions), the incorporation of serious and critical historical scholarship can
help to sort out the sense and nonsense in such claims.
The third significant analytical contribution that history can make to devel-
opment research and policy is helping better to understand process concerns. As
with context, scholars and policy-makers appear to be giving increasing impor-
tance to this issue – e.g., by stressing the importance of ‘getting inside the black
box’ to address the mechanisms by which cause gives rise to effect, and by slowly
giving space to ‘process evaluations’ in considerations of project effectiveness –
but actually doing so is largely precluded by the dominant methodological
practices in econometrics. For historians, taking process issues seriously is not a
matter of compiling time series or panel data sets (though these may be useful
in their own right) to track changes over time, but rather exploring in detail the
specific contingencies by which the dynamics of an evolving set of actors, events
and institutions come to coalesce (or not) at a particular time and place, and
thereby shape future action35 (indeed, how such social and political activity can
shape the salience of actions and events, actual or imagined, in the past). The most
consistent ‘lesson’ from historical research on the study of processes is not just
methodological (i.e., how to do it carefully and defensibly) but substantive – that
is, that certain policy intentions usually give rise to a host of different outcomes,
some intended and some unintended, and, conversely, that observed outcomes
can themselves often be a product of multiple factors (intended and unintended,
observable and unobservable, known and unknown).36
Finally, historical research can also help alert development practitioners to the
fact that the shape of the ‘impact trajectory’ that policy interventions take over
time – especially in matters pertaining to social and political reform – is often
Bayly 01_Tonra 01  21/06/2011  10:15  Page 13
likely to be anything but monotonically increasing and linear37 (which is the
default assumption in contemporary development policy debates, especially
those pertaining to impact assessment).38 Discerning empirically the likely non-
linear trajectory of women’s empowerment initiatives, for example, or political
and legal reform, and the manner in which they are influenced by scale and
context, may not be tasks for which one would immediately hire an academic
historian, but it is the absence of a serious historical sensibility among develop-
ment policy administrators that contributes to normative expectations strongly
favouring development projects whose impacts are large, immediate, knowable,
predictable and positive, and (preferably) independent of scale, duration and
context (i.e., they should be social technologies).39
If attention to methods, contexts and processes are the key analytical contri-
butions that historians can make to development research and policy, then it is
instructive to consider concrete examples of research by historians that exemplify
these characteristics and that can, in conjunction with the deeper wellspring of
research by historians over the centuries, be the basis for a more specific articu-
lation of principles that historians can contribute to development policy deliber-
ations. A central challenge of social science and development policy –
measurement – provides one such instructive example.
Lessons from a brief history of measurement
History repeatedly reminds us that policy interventions can lead to significant
change in ways intended by the policy-maker, but can sometimes have
thoroughly unexpected consequences. Take the imperative to count and measure
human beings. In sixteenth-century Britain, Thomas Cromwell, Henry VIII’s
vicar-general, introduced a system of identity registration that required all births,
deaths and marriages to be recorded in parish registers. He said that this was ‘for
the avoiding of sundry strifes and processes and contentions arising from age,
lineal descent, title of inheritance, legitimation of bastardy, and for knowledge,
whether any person is our subject or no’ (cited in Elton 1972: 259–60). As
Szreter (2007) shows, this resulted, for the first time in Britain’s history, in
citizens having an enforceable right over their identity. It was used by individual
citizens to verify their property and inheritance rights and by local communities
to verify social security claims. This facilitated the effective functioning of a
nationwide social security system (the Elizabethan Poor Law discussed in more
detail in Richard Smith’s Chapter 3 in this volume) and a mobile market in both
labor and capital, contributing to Britain’s pioneering process of economic devel-
opment. Seemingly small-scale institutional change, in short, can have significant
unintended consequences that can contribute to shifting a country’s destiny. 
Another example of this is found in the chapter by David Vincent (Chapter
7), which shows how measurement mattered in generating improvements in
literacy in Victorian England.40 The idea that literacy could be measured came
from the realization by a man of letters (who had been appointed registrar-
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general) that simply counting the number of people in the population who could
sign their name was an effective measure of the ability to write. Since all marriage
registers required signatures, these data were immediately available and utilized
to measure spatial and class disparities in literacy. While the limitations of the
measure were also recognized, the low levels of literacy led to demands from the
bottom, via the radical press, to equalize the supply of education. The data were
analyzed to comment upon its link with violence, ‘moral health’ and the ‘rational
enjoyment of blessing’. This led to improvements in both the demand and supply
of education, to the extent that in the nineteenth century each successive gener-
ation was on average twenty per cent more literate than its predecessor, a pattern
that is also currently evident in many developing countries. It was, at the same
time, recognized that having one literate family member was often sufficient to
confer a high level of benefits. The rise in literacy was thus not just the result of
efforts in public education but the widespread market for private schools with
untrained, unofficial instructors. It was not until 1880 that all parents were
required to send their children to ‘inspected’ classrooms with compulsory atten-
dance, with a simultaneous increase in public funding for education. The experi-
ence of the UK, where the concept of public education was largely developed,
shows, therefore, that the partially serendipitous creation of measurement tools
and consequent identification of different literacy rates within the population
was important in establishing a social compact to ensure that basic education was
made universally available.
On the other hand, Cohn (1984) and Dirks (2001) have argued that when
caste identification was introduced into the Indian census for the first time in
1871 by British administrators, the process of translating the fluid local dynamics
of caste into a finite number of standardized quantitative census categories
hardened the caste system and ‘created’ a new form of caste, one that was
amenable to quantification, less fluid, and easier for policy-makers to ‘manage’.
It changed, in other words, the very nature of caste. This had the unintended
consequence of sparking lower caste social movements because low-caste social
reformers were made aware of their large proportions in the population and they
used the new categories to mobilize disadvantaged groups against discriminatory
practices and towards greater rights. The policy imperative to ‘measure’ thus can
lead to powerful social and economic changes, sometimes intended and
sometimes unintended. As Susan Bayly (1999) has shown, this process of catego-
rization and recategorization of caste has been part of the political economy of
India, dating back to at least the sixteenth century, when local caste structures
were modified every time a new ruler arrived and imposed different systems of
tenure and revenue generation. This process continues today (see Rao and Ban
2007), with the caste structures influenced by processes as diverse as affirmative
action, social movements and local politics. (Hirsch 2005 documents a similar
process in the construction of the Soviet Union.)
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4  How and why history matters for development policy
There are broadly three ways in which history matters for development policy.
The first, as outlined above, is through its insistence on the methodological
principles of respect for context, process and difference when addressing the
study of societies and policy efforts to bring about change in them. History views
change as a complex causal process requiring a diversity of forms of knowledge,
and a corresponding variety of methods for acquiring and interpreting that
knowledge. Second, history is a resource of critical and reflective self-awareness
about the nature of the discipline of development itself, its current preoccupa-
tions, why those preoccupations (and not others) have come to take their present
form, and how they differ from past motives and aims, along with the crucial
issue of how particular sources and forms of evidence are rendered salient. Third,
history brings a particular kind of perspective to development problems (such as
poverty; see Jones 2004) – it is a vantage point for framing and viewing the
nature of development which is relatively long term and comparative, while also
paying full attention to, not shying away from, critical issues of power, contesta-
tion and conflict.
Beyond these three broadly defined contributions which history can offer,
one can identify eight more specific ways in which engagement with history –
both the past and the discipline – matters for contemporary development policy. 
First, recent work by social historians has centred on understanding the ways
in which institutions come to take their prevailing form. Their analyses of these
processes have stressed the significance of ‘hybridity’, which refers to the variety
of sources of ideas, borne of intense two-way interactions between colonies and
rulers (and others), that coalesce to inform the distinctive content of institutions
(Bayly 2004; see also Benton 2002). These interactions characteristically emerge
through a political process of contestation, and thereby have a content and legit-
imacy they would (and could) not have had if they had been singularly
‘imported’ from elsewhere. In this sense, even if the end-state form of the insti-
tution in question happens to be similar to that of one elsewhere, it will nonethe-
less be qualitatively different for having been forged through a domestic political
process. Such a process certainly does not ensure that prevailing institutions are
equitable or optimal – clearly many such institutions are the antithesis of this –
but it does require researchers and policy-makers alike to take seriously the
recognition that the details of institutional design matter, and that these details
are a product of idiosyncratic exchange processes, often involving political
contestation. Key mediators of the indigenization of ideas have been called ‘peer
educators’ (Rao and Walton, 2004; see also Harper, chapter 8 this volume); these
are people who transform the meaning of the idea – often in the past this has
been via a nationalist imperative – to make the idea their own and then transmit
it within a country. ‘Investing’ in peer educators should thus be a central
component of institution-building and reform efforts in development policy
today.
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A prime example of hybridity is the Muhammadiyah, a modernist Islamic
movement that arose in Indonesia as a response to Dutch rule and which was at
the forefront of the democratization process. It clearly had an important
influence on institutions (in North’s sense of institutions as comprising ‘the rules
of the game’ (North 1990)) that came to influence the concepts of private
property, normative beliefs in commercial and market relations, and ‘the rule of
law’. These each took on the variant and hybrid forms they did in Indonesia
partly as a result of the influence of the Muhammadiyah movement (Heffner
2000); similarly, the Dalit movement in India, which led to the rise of lower
castes competing effectively within democratic structures, is also an important
hybrid institution (Omvedt 1994). Hybrid institutions, which have been central
to development processes in Indonesia and India (and elsewhere), also served as
indigenous mechanisms of accountability, and a key part of developing indige-
nous capacity is to look outside western frames. In many societies, for instance,
religious organizations are a central part of civil society, i.e., as both service
providers (schools, hospitals) and potentially part of the social accountability
process. Such a rendering may complicate our very understanding of what ‘insti-
tutions’ are, but too often in contemporary development policy circles our
deployment of this term – as in discussions about the centrality of ‘property
rights’ – belies the historical reality of the many and varied ways in which
prevailing institutions came to be (Portes 2006), comprising a mix of distinctive
colonial (British, French, Spanish etc.) and diverse indigenous influences.
Second, in order to be cognizant of hybrid processes and to build indigenous
capacity, it is important to understand how, why and through whom such
processes come about (or not) (Bayly 2004). The role of elites is central here
because they lead the process of hybridity and indigenization. Peer educators are
drawn from their ranks, and effective development strategies cannot be imple-
mented without the support of such commercial, entrepreneurial or professional
groups. Elites also play an important role in forming a free press, civil society
organizations, and other important elements of an indigenous public sphere that
form a ‘critical public’ which, in turn, constitute indigenous mechanisms of
accountability. As Chris Bayly points out in Chapter 2, development is partly a
‘morale-raising’ process, and ‘people need to believe that they can succeed and
that their own societies are essentially benign’ (p. 51). However, history also
suggests that broad-based and enduring improvements in living standards are
facilitated when greater equality and empowerment is wrested from elites (cf.
World Bank 2005); this process can be gradual and peaceful and/or mired in war
and revolution. This reiterates the importance of forging accessible feedback
mechanisms and legitimate political channels through which dissent can be
aired, and its remedy identified, before getting out of control.
Third, as Bin Wong demonstrates in Chapter 4, development demands a
constant exchange between the centre and the periphery – that is, between the
capital city and provinces, between central and local governments, even at times
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in the past between colonizers and colonies. This is a key system of accountability, 
particularly in non-democratic contexts; because of demands for spatial equity, it 
is key to learning via the transfer of lessons from information and experimenta-
tion, and (of course) to facilitating hybridity and peer education. This strongly 
suggests that multilateral and bilateral donors should rely more on learning from 
innovations in their client countries rather than focus on a unidirectional trans-
mission of ‘knowledge’ or ‘conditions’ from donors (see also Rodrik 2007). 
Fourth, going along with the temporal realism lesson, history teaches the 
non-linearity and conflictual nature of economic development.41 History clearly 
shows that nothing is so disruptive and dangerous to the health of the mass of 
the population in the short run as economic growth, particularly the transformative 
kind associated with initial stages of what (later) proves to be national economic 
development (Szreter 1997, Easterlin 2004, esp. Chapter 7). Similarly, wresting 
power from entrenched elites is highly likely to result, in the short run, in 
periods of conflict and stagnation before sustainable and equitable growth can be 
achieved (Bates 2009).
Fifth, the historical perspective and associated research can frame our under-
standing of development problems in ways that would not be obvious in the 
absence of such knowledge. For instance, historical research can reveal long-term 
shifts in tastes, ideologies and beliefs, issues which economists, despite recent 
advances, abstract away from (see de Vries 2008). Shifts in ‘preferences’ are 
embedded within economic, political and social transitions, and understanding 
what drives them could help give us a more complete understanding of devel-
opment processes. More significantly in this respect, history can uncover 
important aspects of the past development history of today’s developed 
economies that have been overlooked or are being unjustifiably ignored by devel-
opment theorists or practitioners today. An example here would be Ha-Joon 
Chang’s (2002) insistence on recalling that virtually all of today's leading 
economies – including the United Kingdom and USA as well as more well-
known cases, such as Germany, France and Japan – operated protectionist regimes 
to protect or promote young industries when they were in their infancy in terms 
of national economic development, as did Korea, China, Japan and other high-
growth countries. Of course, the Gershenkronian principle suggests that this does 
not necessarily mean that this is a valid policy for all late industrializers, but a 
more complete historical awareness would make it incumbent on development 
policy-makers to articulate the positive case for making such infant economies 
open to free trade today when they were not in the past, rather than simply 
assuming that free trade is always and everywhere the right policy to foster their 
economic development. More generally, following Gerschenkron (1962), there 
were a range of economic, geographical and politico-cultural reasons why some 
parts of the world industrialised first or earlier than others – this in itself also 
ensured that those coming later to the feast of economic growth had to do it 
differently. As such, a primary lesson of history about development is that there
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are necessarily as many different national pathways to development as there are
national economies.
Sixth, if all development policy-makers and practitioners had to read serious
scholarly accounts by historians of successful national economic development in
the past they would come to a sobering realisation of the kind of time-scale they
should be envisaging for their polices and plans to come to fruition. They would
realise that units of time of approximately a half-century and certainly at the very
least a quarter-century are required. Policy horizons of five years and even of ten
years are, frankly, painfully and unrealistically short to anyone acquainted with
economic history (see Blanning 2007). 
Seventh, history can provide development studies with an historical under-
standing of its own history as a discipline and of the field of development in
which it has been operating. History can provide the discipline and practitioners
with an important memory function of its own rich store of past successes and
failures, of productive and unproductive ideas. What history can offer is an
independent, professional, critical and thoroughly researched record of the disci-
pline’s past, not a set of anecdotes or the preferred history of a few powerful
figures in the field, which is the kind of amateur understanding of a discipline
which circulates without proper historical enquiry and which almost always
simply conveniently reinforces the prejudices and perpetuates the blind spots of
the present generation. Development is certainly not a science, so yesterday's
now-discarded or forgotten ideas are not necessarily entirely obsolete. An
example here would be Lewis’s seminal paper (Lewis 1954) on the problems of
attempting to promote economic development with unlimited supplies of
labour. Indeed, this paper is doubly significant for the historical memory of the
discipline of development studies since it arguably founded the sub-discipline of
development economics. It is intriguing, therefore, to note that Lewis’s profound
sense of the importance of history was foundational for the discipline, since
Lewis’s 1954 thesis was formulated as a resolution to an economic conundrum
which had perplexed him concerning the early stages of the industrial revolution
in England. Given the conditions prevailing in most of the world's poor countries
and in many mega-cities today, an historical sensitivity would identify an analogy
(certainly by no means a perfect one) between these present circumstances and
those prevailing in the agrarian economies of poor countries when Lewis was
thinking of these problems in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Historians can
provide development with a continual ongoing critical dialogue with its own
past, as they are more than willing to enter into active and profitable debate with
the great thinkers of the past; indeed, the whole, highly respected sub-field of the
history of political thought or ‘intellectual history’ does this all the time. 
As we demonstrate in the examples above, part of the self-critical historical
awareness which history can offer to development policy is to be aware of the
ways in which the data it frequently uses has been constructed through histor-
ical processes and negotiation in the recent or even quite distant past of several
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decades ago. All empirical material, most especially statistical data, are classified,
categorised and constructed; sometimes it can be very important to know how
and why it was rendered into the form we now use. All the quantitative data used
in economic and other social science models have to be constructed, often by
government agencies. There is, in all cases of data construction, a complex history
behind this of exactly how that data are produced in the way that it is (Szreter
1984, 1993, Tooze 2001). This inevitably feeds various biases, and filters into the
way in which economists and those working on development problems can see
the problems they are working on. Data collection is not a neutral activity; it can
mobilize social movements and spark important social changes.42
Finally, eighth, in relation to the pressing problems of the environment –
problems integral to world economic development for which neither economics
nor policy-makers themselves have any simple solutions – history should also be
investigated as one among many resources with which to think imaginatively
about this challenge.43 History has many episodes of environmental degradation
to investigate, some of them very carefully documented, such as the evil of
‘mining’ estates in the early modern period, deforestation throughout western
Europe, and desertification (see McNeil 2000, Kula 2001, Burke and Pomeranz
2009). Perhaps more hopefully, it also furnishes examples of environmental
degradation which was successfully reversed through political action (Szreter
2005, ch. 7).44
5  Chapter summaries
In their own way, each of the nine substantive chapters and five policy commen-
tary notes in this volume speaks directly to and embodies these themes. In
Chapter 2, Chris Bayly explores the broad theme of the institutional origins of
economic development, focusing on the cases of nineteenth-century India and
Africa. Certain institutions endorsed by the British colonial authorities –  respect
for the law, western-style property rights, newspapers and statistical analysis –
played an important part in the emergence of Indian public and commercial life
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These institutions existed in the
context of a colonial state that was extractive and yet dependent on indigenous
co-operation in many areas, especially in the case of the business class. In such
conditions, Indian elites were critical in creating informal systems of peer-group
education, enhancing aspiration through the use of historicist and religious
themes, and in creating a ‘benign sociology’ of India as a prelude to develop-
ment. Indigenous ideologies and practices were as significant in this slow
enhancement of Indian capabilities as transplanted colonial ones. 
A key implication of this argument and evidence is that contemporary devel-
opment specialists would do well to consider the merits of indigenous forms of
association and public debate, religious movements and entrepreneurial classes,
and to recognize how such organizations emerge as products of – and in turn
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contribute to – extensive interaction (and often contestation) between multiple
actors, some of whom may be separated by considerable distance of space,
language, resources and political power. As such, it is important to invest in peer
educators and others who can help mediate these distances. Over much of Asia
and Africa, the most successful enhancement of people’s capabilities has come
through the action of hybrid institutions of this type.
In Chapter 3, Richard Smith demonstrates that recent scholarship on the
origins of industrialisation in England in the late eighteenth century suggests a
gestation reaching back some two hundred years prior to this time, a period
during which a series of social institutional innovations were pioneered and
extended to most citizens of England. One such institution was the so-called Old
Poor Law, which from 1598 offered two basic forms of assistance to the poor:
‘indoor’ support, which included orphanages and hospitals for unmarried
mothers; and ‘outdoor’ support, which took the form of cash payments and food
subsidies. Entitlement was governed by parish membership, facilitated by an
identity registration system. Together and cumulatively over time, these innova-
tions in social assistance gave the poor access to resources that were ‘portable’
(i.e., they could avail themselves of it across the nation, thereby freeing up labour
markets) and progressive (in principle, if not always in practice), preventing not
only needless death (especially among infants) and misery but enabling an entire
citizenry to engage, potentially, in innovative economic behaviour, freed of the
fear that failure would result in destitution.
Such findings are significant not only for scholarly understandings of the
origins of the industrial revolution, but for development policy today, where in
too many countries the poor continue to be denied access to basic social protec-
tion, or where the provision of such services is deemed to be a ‘luxury’ that will
receive serious attention only once a certain level of economic development has
been attained. To the contrary, these findings suggest that social protection for the
poor should be designed as part of a coherent development strategy, one that, like
the Old Poor Law of England c.1598–1834, is done for both intrinsic (moral,
ethical) reasons and – as we are now coming to appreciate – instrumental
benefit.
Bin Wong, in Chapter 4, examines a paradox in China where an emphasis on
human welfare characterized the rule of the eighteenth-century Qing dynasty,
and has been demonstrated in modern-day China’s emphasis on health and
education (notwithstanding the devastating impact of the 1950’s famine),
despite the absence of systems of democratic accountability. While development
of the welfare state in Europe subsequently emerged from electoral accountability
and the development of the public sphere, accountability in eighteenth century
and again in contemporary China seems to come from a need to balance centre-
local relationships, to maintain spatial equity and thus to preserve the polity. 
The Qing did this by having very good information systems about regions,
particularly on prices and food supply, and maintained a balance between the
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various regions with good social policies (water supply, etc.) in contrast to other
regimes which emphasized military spending. In contemporary China, officials
seem to have learned from this by giving local governments considerable tax
autonomy and permitting experimentation, from which nationwide lessons are
drawn. In this sense, path dependency is thus as much about ideas and ‘technolo-
gies of government’ as it is about ‘institutions’. 
Sunil Amrith, in Chapter 5, examines the history of the relationship between
ideology and policy in public health and sanitation in India’s modern history to
show ‘that particular solutions adopted were chosen from a range of possibilities,
greater or smaller in different circumstances; thus revisiting ‘paths not taken’ is
one evident way in which history can inform contemporary development
policy’. In the colonial period, expenditures on public health were severely
restricted, and focused more on keeping epidemics at bay. However, in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century sanitation was largely devolved to
municipal and village governments, which resulted in some real improvements,
such as a significant decline in cholera. But the generally poor levels of public
health services energized nationalists to take it up as a cause, and generated an
active and vibrant set of voluntary groups that worked on improving health
awareness and providing health and sanitation services. Independence brought
great expectations that health services would improve, but Nehru’s ideology of
top-down government and the search for technocratic solutions that dominated
international thinking at the time led to the belief that development was better
served by prioritizing population control, and public health was consequently
neglected. However, large resources were spent on a malaria control program
which had tremendous early success, but began to falter in the 1960s because of
resistance to DDT and anti-malarial drugs. Sanitation was largely ignored with a
de-emphasis of the role of local governments in most of India. The exception was
the state of Kerala, where ‘universal’ campaigns of disease control and eradication
were matched by a sustained, and deeply politicised, effort to build up local insti-
tutions, resulting in much higher levels of health and health care services than in
the rest of India. Today, India is marked by large regional diversity in its public
health and the presence of a large number of untrained, private providers of
medical services because of the high demand for health services that are not
matched by the state’s facilitation of public effort and resources.
In Chapter 6, Stephen Kunitz takes us to a different territory than those
explored by the other chapters in this volume, namely to the poor health of
Native Americans who survived the successful European colonization of North
America. Unlike colonial subjects, they were vastly outnumbered by migrants
and failed to develop indigenous capacities successfully to repel exploitative
policies and ideologies. Consequently, the health services that were made
available to them came more from the efforts of a few benevolent politicians and
bureaucrats in Washington rather than, until recently, an organized effort to
demand rights. Until the early twentieth century, health policy was directed more
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by a Darwinian ideology that high levels of mortality and poor health would
gradually lead to their ‘extermination’, which was the logical consequence of
them being the ‘weaker race’. It was not until the Truman administration, when
responsibility for the health of Native Americans was transferred from the Bureau
of Indian Affairs to the US Public Health Service, that mortality rates began
distinctly to improve. Only in the 1960s did Native Americans, in the spirit of the
civil rights movement, begin to argue for the right to self-determination,
resulting in greater community control of health services. This, however, has led
to inequity across tribal groups. The tribes that have successfully developed
sources of income from casinos, tourism and other sources have vastly improved
health services but those that have not remain inadequately serviced. Thus, the
continued marginalization of Native Americans is arguably the result of the
‘relative lack of influence of American Indians on health and development
policies that affect them’, over a long period of time. While other historians have
noted how ‘good institutions’, resulting in widespread property and citizenship
rights, were established in the United States, enabling development to take off,
Kunitz points out how, through a form of ‘internal colonialism’, the health and
interests of indigenous groups were consistently forgotten and marginalised.
Indeed, it can be argued that the US’s ‘good institutions’ were predicated on the
very destruction and dispossession of indigenous people, not just their margin-
alization.
David Vincent, in Chapter 7, unpacks the origins of public education, with a
focus on the emergency of mass literacy in Victorian England. His chapter has
already been summarized on pages 14–15 above, but his central point is that the
advent of public education followed, not led, a sustained and steady rise in the
household literary rate in England over the course of the nineteenth century. 
In Chapter 8, Tim Harper excavates the processes by which colonial education
was indigenized throughout the several different states of South-East Asia. In the
colonial period, there were subtle indigenous attempts to push nationalist ideas
within colonial educational frameworks. The idea of ‘indigeneity’ was not
something that was ‘out there’; rather, it was constructed from within by various
forces – religious, nationalist, culturalist – resulting in a healthy undercurrent of
‘peer education’ capacities that countered colonial notions that ‘education should
not create aspirations that could not be met’. These undercurrents ultimately were
channeled into nationalist aspirations, and in the post-colonial period state
ideologies were enshrined into the syllabi of formal educational institutions. As
formal education sharply expanded after independence it did not necessarily
create a more democratically minded population because state ideologies were
not necessarily democratic; the focus was much more on ‘national unity’.
However, human capabilities were vastly expanded, and coherent nations forged,
which were largely focused on an improvement in living standards.
Development, therefore, rather than being accelerated by the luck of good
‘colonial origins’, as emphasized by the new institutional analysts of divergent
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fortunes in the Americas, was much more about how local elites created,
constructed and imagined notions of indigenized modernity that provided an
aspiration-enhancing counterpoint to the more subservient mindset that colonial
rulers sought to cultivate.
Paul Warde, in Chapter 9, begins by noting that scholars have assigned
varying importance to the role of natural resources in shaping development
trajectories. Where early theorists regarded natural resources as providing a clear
source of revenue to fund large modernization projects, subsequent writers
focused more exclusively on technology and scientific innovation in underpin-
ning productivity gains; in recent times, some contemporary observers have seen
instead a ‘resource curse’, in which an export base built on a narrow foundation
of extractive industries actively undermines social imperatives for the state to
invest in broader welfare enhancing public programs such as transport, infra-
structure, health and education. Historically, one can find evidence to support all
of these positions, thus implying that no universal relationship between natural
resources and development inherently holds. Warde explores the particular cases
from the eighteenth and nineteenth century of the resource-poor Netherlands
and resource-rich England, showing that very different mechanisms were at work
in shaping their respective paths to prosperity. In the Netherlands (and especially
Holland), its fortuitous location at the crossroads of the sea lanes connecting the
Baltic states and Germany with the UK (and elsewhere) – at a time when there
was high and rising demand for metals and energy (in the form of wood) – saw
it very well placed to capture international transport markets. The structure of this
revenue stream, however, generated few backward linkages from the urban
centres into the rest of the economy and society. Resource-rich England, on the
other hand, also grew prosperous, but did so because of many factors (e.g., its
military and naval strength), only one of which was its abundant natural
resource, namely coal. The real gains in productivity occurred when technical
innovations in steam power, which underpinned the massive expansion of the
railways and in turn radically lowered transport costs, combined to give Britain
the compound advantages of continuous, abundant and cheap energy (‘London
coal prices did not return to their nominal 1800 level until 1947’) and the
extension of economic linkages from the major trade ports into the rural hinter-
lands. Natural resources, in short, are neither inherently good nor bad for devel-
opment in a causal sense, but become so because of a given country’s ‘ability to
control circuits of capital, employ location-specific skills and access to consumer
markets’.
A variant on the resource curse hypothesis is explored in Chapter 10, by Keith
Breckenridge, which examines the particular nature of property rights regimes
that emerged in African economies. Indeed, in Breckenridge’s telling, the virtual
absence of property rights in the relatively weak non-mining sectors, when juxta-
posed with the active pursuit of such rights for resource deposits by (foreign)
investors and African states, is a defining feature of the continent’s development.
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As he puts it, investments in mining in Africa have often ‘consisted of nothing
other than the securing of those rights’. Identifying more precisely how and why
different kinds of property rights regimes came to be forged in different indus-
tries in different African countries – and the conditions under which the rents
thereby derived were used for public or private gain – is thus a major research
question for economic historians. For development policy purposes, the lessons
centre on the importance of understanding the political processes by which
prevailing property rights regimes in a given country came to take the form they
do. This regime is not inherently a direct product of a particular natural resource,
and cannot be assumed to be the same as that seen in even a neighbouring
country with a similar colonial history and endowment of natural resources. By
extension, the challenge is also to ensure that broadly legitimate property rights
regimes are extended beyond the natural resource sector into those aspects of the
economy that actually comprise a much more important share of the everyday
financial lives of Africa’s citizens. This should not be done by borrowing such
regimes from elsewhere, but from working with the prevailing systems to forge
a regime that is more inclusive, accessible and accountable.
6  Conclusion: the past as a foreign country
In matters pertaining to development and national economic growth patterns,
‘path dependency’ has been the concept which has won an enduring acknowl-
edgement among economists and other social scientists signifying that ‘history
matters’. However, ‘path dependency’ can be a profoundly misleading way to
understand the role of history. To the extent that the notion of path dependency
can be invoked to mean that a set of historical events and institutions in a
country’s or region’s past have exerted a deterministic influence upon its subse-
quent history, then this is an a-historicist viewpoint which no professional histo-
rians would wish to endorse. Paradoxically, to invoke path dependency in this
manner merely commits the mirror image fallacy of ignoring history entirely, by
suggesting that certain selected aspects of the historical past are inevitable destiny. 
Historians see the past as constitutive of the present, not determinative of it,
if for no other very important and powerful historiographical reason, namely that
historians believe that it is through the study of the past that we continually
modify our understanding of it and so shift our relationship with it. That is, after
all, the fundamental rationale for the discipline; the past is never finished and
complete. While the discipline of history lives as a practice, it is always subject to
alteration and revision; in this sense, the ‘path’ itself is remade anew by each
generation of historians. To give one extremely important but simple example of
this, we can point to the revolution in our understanding of the nature of the first
ever case of modern economic development on a national scale, the transforma-
tion of the British economy into the world’s first commercial, industrial and
imperial power. As recently as the early 1970s it was still an unchallenged
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orthodoxy that this was essentially a highly compressed episode of explosive
activity taking place between 1780 and 1850, driven by science, technology,
rapid capital accumulation and soaring population growth due to falling
mortality. This led to the fashion of the time for focusing national economic
growth plans on increasing the capital-output ratio. Due to a veritable historio-
graphical revolution, however, since the 1980s an entirely different view has
emerged, which continues to be the orthodoxy driving further historical
research today. This sees British economic transformation as a process which was
occurring across a quarter of a millennium, c.1600–1850, with a wide range of
institutions increasingly seen as each playing a crucial role, such as the character
of the fiscal state, its protectionism, the universal social security system that was
created, and the unusual laws of property and marriage.45 Some of these histor-
ical insights entered into the development literature during the 1990s and 2000s
with the growing interest in the importance of ‘getting institutions right’,
though it is notable, for instance, that England’s precocious national social
security system has not yet generated much serious discussion as a possible
development policy strategy (Szreter 2007).
Rather than a firm path, which only has to be ‘found’ and its course and
contours ‘mapped’, historians view history – the past – more as a flowing river
of fluid and swirling potential, with many eddies and back currents in it. Only
partially knowable at best, it is something moving at deceptively different speeds
in various courses of its travel, with many undercurrents which can be hard to
see and to estimate their power. History as flow is never finished and the present
is not a fixed point at the end of history with everything in the future in a
different space or dimension. Of course the future is even more unknowable and
indeterminate but it is not disconnected from history. A policy intervention,
therefore, is like pouring a chemical or a dye into this flowing stream. It joins,
diffuses, gets diluted and may or may not change the colour of the water in the
intended fashion. In this sense, policy-makers need to be more realistic about the
way in which their policies will mix into the flow of a society’s history and not
simply imagine they will achieve the ‘laboratory’ results they wish for them. This
also means, in extreme circumstances, that some policy interventions should be
abandoned and not applied if, despite their good intentions, a proper historical
and sociological or anthropological appraisal suggests that the way in which they
will be adapted will be counterproductive. In contemporary policy discourse, the
flow of history in a developing society is too often regarded as ‘the problem’, the
embodiment of the inertia, the traditional ways, as something which needs to be
changed or transformed by the application of development policies. More intel-
ligent and realistic policies would start from the premise that the receiving
society and its historical momentum are much more powerful and important
than the applied policies, and the latter only really have a chance to succeed if
they can work with the flow and the momentum of the society’s history to
encourage the desired kinds of selective adaptations. Such adaptations will take
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place; the only question is what forms they will take and whether these will
correspond with the intentions of those attempting to promote development.
The English novelist L.P. Hartley opened his book The Go-Between with the
famous lines: ‘The past is a foreign country; they do things differently there.’46 In
this chapter, we have shown that students of the past also do things rather ‘differ-
ently’ as well: those we have called historical economists are primarily concerned
with resolving identification issues, seeking to build clean mono-causal explana-
tions, while others – historians and some economic historians – strive instead to
understand complex processes, contexts and contests, and the manner in which
selective remembrances of this ‘foreign country’ are invoked to justify actions in
the present. In essence these approaches should be seen as complements, but too
often they are regarded as substitutes, with informed dialogue occurring only
rarely. The residents of and visitors to this foreign country speak different
languages, hold different beliefs, and aspire to different goals; as with other such
manifestations of this problem, the appropriate solution is effective diplomacy
and respectful engagement, not wilful ignorance or hubris.
If institutions and history matter, then historians and their discipline surely
matter also. More and better dialogue between historians and those who oversee
development policy is likely to yield both higher quality responses to some of the
world’s most urgent (if vexing) problems, and more informed critiques of those
who purport to invoke ‘history’ in support of their cause but in fact are more
likely to be speaking on the basis of a partial or flawed understanding of the past’s
continuing influence on the present. As MacMillan (2009: 169–70) wisely
concludes:
If the study of history does nothing more than teach us humility, skepticism, and
awareness of ourselves, then it has done something useful. We must continue to
examine our own assumptions and those of others and ask, where’s the evidence? Or,
is there another explanation? We should be wary of grand claims in history’s name
or those who claim to have uncovered the truth once and for all … [U]se it, enjoy
it, but always handle history with care.
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Notes
1 An earlier version of this chapter was published as Woolcock, Szreter and Rao
(2011).
2 See, among many other publications by these scholars, Sokoloff and Engerman
(2000), O’Rourke and Williamson (2001), Lindert (2004) and Findlay and 
O’Rourke (2007). While it is true that economic historians often find themselves 
caught ‘between two cultures’ (Cipolla 1992) and indeed are something of an endan-
gered species in even (or especially) the most prestigious economics departments, 
the primary training of economic historians is in the prevailing theories, assump-
tions and methods of economics, and it is these tools (and only secondarily those of 
historians trained in history departments) that they deploy to make sense of the past. 
Important recent work by economic historians includes, among many others, 
Pomeranz (2000), Mokyr (2002, 2010), Fogel (2004), Greif (2006), Frieden 
(2007) and Allen (2009). At a conceptual level, North et al. (2009) is perhaps the 
most ambitious ‘big picture’ contribution (though it is a decidedly Euro-centric and 
‘supply-side’ account). 
3 A problem with certain (by no means all) ‘big picture’ histories – space precludes a
more detailed review of this particular genre – is that they are each merely using
history illustratively and rhetorically to demonstrate the validity of the grand thesis
being presented, which claims to be a profound and general truth about economic
development throughout world history during the modern period. Such grandiose
interpretations violate the fundamental, historicist insight encapsulated with
irrefutable logic in Gerschenkron’s (1962) classic essay, where he pointed out that 
no national economy’s pathway of ‘development’ could possibly ever be essentially
the same as any other’s. Once there had been a first mover (Britain’s industrialisation)
this altered the conditions for all subsequent cases, who both had to compete 
with and could learn from the earlier economic development that had occurred; 
and with each further case this was a fortiori true. (See also Swain 2005 and Tilly
2006.)
4 Two exceptions, at least on the issue of globalization, could be Aghion and
Williamson (1998: chapter 3) and Frieden (2007). Tosh (2008) issues a more 
general call to his fellow historians to engage in policy debates, as does Szreter 
(2005). Taking more pragmatic steps, the History and Policy initiative (www.histo-
ryandpolicy.org) has, since 2002, organised a number of seminar events and 
published over one hundred ‘policy papers’ by historians exemplifying ways in 
which historical research and historical perspectives on contemporary policy issues 
can produce constructive and practical new ideas in the policy field or can offer 
equally constructive admonitions. Such efforts to link historical scholarship and 
policy concerns, however, remain the exception, though encouragingly an 
independent History and Policy website has launched in 2010 in Australia: 
www.aph.org.au.
5 Though a parallel case does seem to exist in geography (where there is a correspon-
ding consensus that ‘space matters’); for example, a recent World Development
Report on economic geography (World Bank 2008) contained not a single advisor
or contributing author who was a geographer (see Rigg et al. 2009).
6 Elman and Elman (2001) is a similar exercise seeking to connect historians and
political scientists studying international relations, but with less emphasis on the
implications for policy; see also McDonald (1996) and Sewell (2005) on links
between historians and sociology. Most recently, see Lewis (2009), who correctly
argues that ‘[t]he lack of historical perspective with development agencies stems
partly from the pressures of development work in which activities remain powerfully
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(and understandably) focused on the promise of generating future change, but it is
also part of a broader problem of ideologically controlled managerialism’ (p. 42).
7 See also the related terminology deployed by Pierson (2004) for political scientists.
Pierson (2005) provides a useful discussion on the history of ‘policy development’.
Other political scientists and sociologists writing within the field of ‘historical insti-
tutionalism’ (Thelen 1999, Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, Lange and
Rueschemeyer 2005, Mahoney and Thelen 2009) have also been influential, though
less so in development policy debates.
8 Early calls from economists for such an approach include McCloskey (1976) and
Galenson (1989); more recently, see Hodgson (2001).
9 This historicist position (i.e., that every time and place is unique and thus should be
understood on its own terms) was the view of, among others, A.J.P. Taylor. On histori-
cism, see Tosh (2002: 6–13, 182–5).
10 We are grateful to Dietrich Rueschemeyer (personal communication) for stressing
this point. See also MacMillan (2009).
11 On this issue see Scott (1998).
12 On the history of modernization theory, see Gilman (2003). A fascinating historical
inquiry into the notion of ‘multiple modernities’ is provided by the contributors to
Daedalus (1998, 2000).
13 For a related argument, see Goody (2006).
14 Indeed, though it is rarely acknowledged as such, ‘development studies’ as an
academic field emerged directly out of the managerial and administrative aspects of
the colonial and post-colonial experience (see Kothari 2006 and Duffield and Hewitt
2009).
15 See also Sangari and Vaid (1990) and Rai (2002) on the interactions between
colonialism and gender relations.
16 That is, that what constitutes ‘history’ and how it is invoked to make sense of the
present is itself a subject of ongoing historical enquiry (‘meta-history’); on this see
the extraordinary work of Burrow (2007). See also Sewell (2005) for highly stimu-
lating, honest and vigorous discussions of what is involved in achieving dialogue
between history and social science. 
17 In a more compressed time frame, this is the task undertaken by Porter et al. (1991)
and Mosse (2005) in their insightful analyses of development projects.
18 The broader point here, as Charles Tilly frequently points out (e.g., Tilly 2002), is that
all of us are ‘proto historians’ in that we are inveterate storytellers: every individual,
group, organization and nation must compile a coherent biographical narrative to
make sense of itself to itself and to others (and itself in relation to others). These narra-
tives are also called upon to inform, explain or justify particular ‘policy’ decisions
going forward. Thus one of the useful (if sometimes controversial) contributions that
historians can make to development policy is to help render such narratives explicit
and, where necessary, identify both alternative narratives and the reasons why partic-
ular narratives prevail (and others do not). These are far from trivial issues; as current
events in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Sudan and Kenya attest, they can be the basis of
especially pressing (even deadly) political dynamics. (For numerous other examples,
see Black 2008.)
19 Many would also want to credit the pioneering work of Olson (1965) with inspiring
the revival of interest in institutions, especially as they pertain to the management of
ubiquitous ‘collective action’ problems and the provision of public goods.
20 To cite only a few among hundreds of contributions, see Clague (1997), Rodrik
(2003) and Easterly (2001).
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21 The most visible empirical manifestation of these general features of ‘good gover-
nance’ are the six widely cited measures of institutional quality developed by Daniel
Kaufmann and Aart Kraay (and their collaborators) at the World Bank (for the most
recent elaboration, see Kaufmann et al. 2009). Andrews (2008) provides a powerful
critique of this approach.
22 Most cross-national time-series datasets on institutions and economic performance
begin around 1960, an artefact of when selected UN agencies began to collect (and
coordinate the content of) the relevant figures from national governments. This was
also, not coincidentally, a time when economists began to supplant lawyers as the
dominant figures in public policy (on this see Markoff and Montecinos 1993).
23 Most historians, of course, would refrain from deploying a normative discourse of
‘good’ and ‘bad’ institutions; we use these terms at this point simply because it
reflects how the debate is largely framed in policy discussions.
24 An equally important paper by Sokoloff (1987), though one less influential in policy
circles, sought to explain the divergent paths by which patent laws had evolved in the
US and UK. Though the law in the former was ostensibly modelled on the latter,
markets and social norms in the US proved to be much more open to participation
by the lower classes than those in the UK (and within the US, more open in the north
than the south), over time generating both different laws and different groups of
patentees. Subsequent analysis showed this to be true of laws pertaining to land,
suffrage, education, credit and local government (see discussion in Hoff 2003).
25 See Austin (2008) and Bayly (chapter 2, this volume) for a more extended substan-
tive engagement with these papers; for a methodological critique and alternative
empirical strategy for explaining the Latin American case (using comparative case
study analysis), see Katz et al. (2005). 
26 See Acemoglu and Robinson (2006a), formalizing Gerschenkron (1962), and
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006b), formalizing Moore (1966).
27 A third strand of work pursued by a different group of ‘historical economists’ has
argued that the differences in development trajectories between post-colonial
countries were a function of whether they were bequeathed common law (English)
or civil (Roman) law legal systems – the former seemingly generating more positive
development outcomes than the latter (see La Porta et al. 1997, 2008, Glaeser and
Shleifer 2002) – but this view seems to have gained little policy traction. Even if this
result is empirically correct, it’s not at all clear what the plausible and supportable
policy implications are. Nunn (2009) provides an interesting (if rather too deferen-
tial) review of this strand of the literature.
28 Diamond and Robinson (2010) present a range of interesting historical studies of
development processes, seeking to exploit ‘natural experiments’ more accurately to
identify causal mechanisms. In principle this is a clever and welcome innovation,
though it is unfortunate that the volume is premised (in the Introduction) on a
pejorative claim that historians are weak at mathematics and thus suspect at making
(and substantiating) causal inferences.
29 In this sense, historians have much in common with social theorists (see Tosh 2002,
Chapter 8); it also explains why the work of Polanyi (1944), Moore (1966), Bendix
(1977) and Skocpol (1979) has been so enduringly influential in sociology and
political science.
30 This task is what political scientists call ‘process tracing’ (see George and Bennett
2005). One could also argue that such a task is, in effect, a search for plausible
counterfactuals – that is, what could or might have happened but for the presence of
a particular factor (or combination of factors) at a particular moment. On case study
research methods in particular, see also Gerring (2006).
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31 The changing basis of causal claims is itself, of course, a fascinating subject of histor-
ical enquiry (see Kern 2006).
32 On this point see Goldstone (1998), Mahoney (2000), and Trachtenberg (2006).
Mahoney et al. (2009) provide the most comprehensive overview. See also Mahoney 
(2010a, 2010b).
33 See Rao and Walton (2004) for more on this point.
34 On the role of agricultural ‘experts’ in shaping ‘agrarian doctrines of development’
during British colonialism, see the masterful analysis of Hodge (2007).
35 These considerations go far beyond the now ubiquitous concept of ‘path depend-
ence’, a term originally coined by economic historian Brian Arthur to refer to the
manner in which certain technological choices (the most famous being the QWERTY
typewriter) persisted long after their initial efficiency superiority had been
surpassed, because of the manner in which they had become engrained in education
systems and everyday practices (see David (1985) and the references to Arthur
therein). Putnam (1993) and others popularized the extension of this idea into the
institutional and political analysis of development trajectories, a step too far for many
historians and social scientists (see, for example, Tarrow 1996).
36 The tendency of economists to search for mono-causal explanations is more a conse-
quence of their quest for perfect econometric identification than a result of actually
denying the possibility of multiple causes. However, there is far too little public
acknowledgement that virtually all ‘findings’ in econometric studies are subject to
this.
37 Most economists, importantly, do not rely on linear explanations because they think
they are inherently right; it is just that non-linear econometrics is much harder and
requires vastly more data than is usually available (especially in development
research). The work by Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) is not a linear explanation per
se as much as what is known as a ‘discontinuity’ – i.e., identification of a substantial
break with the past that is used to explain the emergence of a shifting trajectory.
38 Consider, for example, research by Brown (2006) and Hochschild (2006) on efforts
by social reformers to end slavery in the British empire in the early nineteenth
century, which shows how persistent and innovative campaigning (using techniques
that endure to this day) eventually – despite decades of failure, rejection and hostility
– gave way to relatively rapid global reform. What if certain development efforts
today (e.g., post-conflict reconstruction) are on a ‘J-curve’ path like this? How would
we know? It’s hard to name a single development intervention for which there is
clear empirical evidence of its known impact trajectory over time, which is to say, the
development fraternity is conspicuously ignorant of the processes underlying even its
most celebrated interventions, and has little knowledge of how these impacts are
influenced by scale and (different types of) context (see Woolcock 2009).
39 These pressures, solidly reinforced by campaigns such as the Millennium
Development Goals, manifest themselves in calls to ‘scale up’ and ‘replicate’ putatively
successful interventions that have apparently been effective, often in the short-term
and before further unintended consequences become visible and usually in one
particular national, urban or community context.
40 See also Clemens (2004) for a historical perspective on the feasibility of attaining the
education Millennium Development Goal.
41 This is a central thesis of Skocpol (1979) and Moore (1966); see also Joseph
Schumpeter’s (1975 [1942]: 82) oft-cited description of economic growth as a
process of ‘creative destruction’ and Walter Lippmann’s (1982 [1929]: 51) argu-
ments regarding the ‘acids of modernity’.
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42 It should go without saying that this point, and the arguments raised in the chapter
as a whole, should not be interpreted as hostility on our part to quantitative analysis;
far from it. (Szreter 1996, for example, provides an extended critical historical
enquiry into the classification system used in an important policy document,
combined with a willingness to use the same document for further quantitative
analysis.) Our claim, rather, is that quantitative analysis (a) too often assumes an air
of sophistication purely because it is quantitative, and not because it is a product of
serious engagement with contextual realities and idiosyncrasies, and (b) is not inher-
ently a more ‘objective’ mode of inquiry – as we have shown above, it can and does
have unintended political consequences.
43 More generally, it seems that the only time policy-makers and economists voluntarily
turn to history is when they face a crisis which their models cannot address (or may
even have caused), as with the recent global financial crisis, when Mr Benanke was
turned to for his historical analysis of the Great Depression, and Keynes’s work on it
was also being read once again.
44 Also see, for instance, Roodhouse (2007) on the World War II national emergency
responses to severe shortages, especially lessons on how politically and culturally
rationing was ‘sold’ to a democratic populace and compliance and enforcement was
elicited.
45 On this see Erickson (2005a, 2005b).
46 See Hartley (2002 [1953]: 17).
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2
Indigenous and colonial origins of
comparative economic development: 
the case of colonial India and Africa
C.A. Bayly1
In recent years the debate about comparative economic development has
broadened out to take account of work in other major human sciences, particu-
larly anthropology, sociology, philosophy and history. Development specialists
have become increasingly aware of the need to understand the history and
ideologies of the societies within which they work in order to encourage better
reactions to their programs. In the first place, the engagement between develop-
ment economists and anthropologists under the broad aegis of the World Bank
and other international institutions has brought about significant widening of
the range of the debate. Valuable case studies have resulted from the elaboration
of Amartya Sen’s notion of human capacities and capabilities in contemporary
development (Sen 1997). Such studies stress the importance of discussion,
consensus, aspiration and ‘peer educators’ (e.g. Rao and Walton 2004). One
purpose of this chapter is to begin to give this work a deeper historical context.
The new approach that engages with the moral and intellectual, as well as the
purely economic origins of development seems most appropriate even for a
colonial situation such as nineteenth-century India, which provides much of the
material here. Capacities and capabilities often develop only in the very long
term, and they can do so even in most unpropitious circumstances.
Second, recent discussions of the conditions for equitable economic devel-
opment have benefited from the work of economic historians, authorities such
as Douglas North (North 1990), Stanley Engerman, Kenneth Sokoloff (Sokoloff
and Engerman 2000) and others. One recent and highly influential achievement
has been the scholarship of Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James
Robinson (hereafter AJR), especially their article on ‘The colonial origins of
comparative economic development’ (Acemoglu et al. 2001). This work has
found an influential place in the World Development Report 2006 (World Bank 2005).
AJR argue that there is a strong positive correlation between disease regimes,
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successful European settlement, the generation of ‘good’ institutions (accessible
law, secure and general property rights, deliberative bodies, etc.) and contempo-
rary wealth. They do this with sophisticated econometric models. In particular,
they use settler mortality in the long term as an exogenous control on their data.
But they also test for other variables such as the form of different national
colonial projects and the role of religion in economic aspiration as suggested by
the theses of Max Weber. In a complementary article, ‘Reversal of fortune’
(Acemoglu et al. 2002), they nuance this approach, arguing less from an ecolog-
ical perspective than from a demographic one. The areas that were richest circa
1500 (e.g., the Mughal Empire, China, the Aztec Empire) attracted extractive
styles of European colonialism and semi-colonialism and have consequently
become relatively poor over the last half millennium. Those relatively under-
populated or impoverished territories in 1500 (e.g., Australia, New Zealand, the
areas which became the USA or Argentina) required a much greater input of
European capital and labour, and thereby developed ‘good’ institutions. Even
where colonial metropoles attempted to control and exploit such ‘new Europes’,
the sheer dynamism of the settler societies burst through these colonial bonds,
creating more equitable institutions.
For social historians this work represents a revelation and a challenge. It is a
revelation because it represents a way of rigorously testing the very broad claims
made for and against the developmental effects of ‘empire’ and ‘colonialism’ in
contemporary historiography and public polemic. I refer here to a spectrum of
writers from Emmanuel Wallerstein, Andre Gunder Frank and William Easterly to
Bill Warren and Niall Ferguson. But AJR also offer a challenge to the sort of
bottom-up, archive-based, contextualized, regional and local investigations that
are the staples of most historians. This is because the nature and genesis of ‘good’
institutions is inferred from a wide range of secondary literature and statistical
correlations, rather than being tested against contemporary evidence, as social
historians tend to do. Broadly, too, AJR’s major articles might seem to privilege
‘good’ institutions of a north-western European variety and this runs counter to
the cultural relativism which influences most historians of the extra-European
world today. While AJR attribute the ‘reversal of fortune’ of other societies to the
form of European colonialism rather than to intrinsic civilisational inadequacy,
the invocation of ‘good’ colonial institutions has an uncomfortable feel about it
for some. It might seem to revive the language of nineteenth-century classical
political economy pervading the work of writers such as John Stuart Mill and
John Elliot Cairnes. It could be taken to imply that development agencies must
find ways of implanting these institutions in societies that the Victorians would
have considered backward, but are said now to have suffered a ‘reversal of
fortune’. This is not AJR’s intention, but the problem of language points up the
need to examine the issue of indigenous and hybrid capabilities in the history of
development, which is the theme of the present chapter.
Much of the weight of AJR’s analysis falls on the Americas and Australasia, as
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far as the benign aspect of colonial institutions is concerned, and on Sub-Saharan
Africa in respect of their extractive and parasitical dimension. Yet at least eighty
per cent of the global population has always lived in societies stretched across
Asia and North Africa where European settlers were unable to exterminate the
indigenous population or seize resources as in Australasia or America, because
these societies had already developed sophisticated states and economies. What
was the role of these non-European state forms and economic institutions in
comparative economic development? In the middle of AJR’s spectrum that runs
from rich societies with ‘good’ institutions to poor societies with ‘bad’ institu-
tions, there lies a large group of heterogeneous examples. These range from Japan
and wealthy Chinese coastal societies, where Europeans neither settled nor even
established long-lived extractive colonial institutions, to poor parts of the
Ottoman Empire or North Africa which failed to benefit from global economic
expansion in the early modern period, but were only colonized towards 1900. 
Again, even within what became extractive imperial dependencies and poor
post-colonial states, there have been huge variations between different regions.
Dutch-ruled Java may have suffered ‘agricultural involution’, but the Chinese port
cities from Penang and Singapore to the Sulu Sea registered rapid economic
growth in the nineteenth century. Likewise, the Punjab and the princely state of
Mysore in the British Indian Empire were much richer than the province of Bihar.
Many of these cases may well be amenable to AJR’s style of analysis, but only if
indigenous capabilities as well as ‘colonial institutions’ are taken into account.
Finally, it is important to examine historical processes as well as outcomes.
Historians and development specialists need to understand the actual mecha-
nisms by which apparently benign European institutions were transformed and
appropriated – or, for that matter rejected – by people of non-European societies
in the light of their own persisting social organization and aspirations. 
The broad picture
Taken as a whole, the meta-narrative of AJRs’ work remains the ‘rise of the West’
and particularly the north European and North American West. Initially, then, it
may help to pose a broad revision, though not rejection, of this meta-narrative.
The position adopted by this chapter is as follows. While it is difficult to diminish
the critical importance of the rise of the West, as some historians have done
recently, this development needs to be put into the context of dynamic changes
in other world societies, which continued even during the nineteenth-century
‘age of imperialism’. These indigenous, hybrid or heterogeneous institutions
have played a major part in the relative success of economic development for the
bulk of humanity in the middle of the spectrum of cases discussed by AJR.
First, ‘archaic’ and ‘early modern’ globalization from c. 1400–1800 AD saw
interconnected ideological, social and economic development in all major world
societies (Bayly 2004). This produced new state forms, new systems of
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knowledge and the acceleration of what Jan de Vries calls ‘industrious revolu-
tions’ in many parts of the globe and not just in Europe (de Vries 1994, 2008).
Industrious revolutions preceded and did not necessarily lead seamlessly to
industrial ones. They were revolutions of imagination, taste and consumption that
led to the reorganisation of family labour and demand to accommodate new
desires for consumption. One local example of such growth was the status-driven
demand for fine samurai swords and daggers that gave rise to a flourishing metal-
lurgical industry in Tokugawa Japan (1600–1850). This expertise in metal, which
greatly predated European industrialization, played a part in Japan’s later indus-
trial development. Before 1800, a sense of nationality had also emerged in several
parts of the world, and not only in Western Europe – Japan, northern Vietnam
and some Indian regions are cases in point. This development both proceeded
from, and in turn facilitated the integration of regional markets. Factors such as
these have all influenced the historical conditions for modern development,
though in different ways and at different periods. World-level development has
always been multi-centred and interactive, even at the high point of western
colonialism. The period of Euro-American dominance has been, in historical
terms, relatively short.
Second, parts of North Western Europe did, however, gain a great compara-
tive advantage from at least the beginning of the eighteenth century, and in some
fields rather later (Pomeranz 2000). This advantage arose from high productivity
and high yields per acre in agriculture; innovation in large-scale amphibious
warfare in and outside European waters and the control structures that arose
around them; and a vigorous culture of sociability and criticism in the public
sphere that tended to refine the activities of the state and corporate mercantile
bodies. Industrialisation was not generally critical until c.1820, after Europe’s
comparative advantage was well established. But it did reinforce that advantage.
Third, these comparative advantages were not evanescent, but neither were
they permanent. Before the end of the nineteenth century, non-European peoples
had begun to appropriate and adapt European methods and institutions to their
own forms of sociality in order to improve their quality of life and challenge the
extractive colonial state. This indigenous development was materially enhanced
by the need for European and colonial states to off-lay legal, economic, military,
educational and, eventually, political authority onto indigenes in order to
economize on manpower, blood and treasure. 
So the debate about the role of institutions in the modern development might
consequently benefit from a historical investigation of how, when and why
indigenous people appropriated, adapted, absorbed and often totally reconsti-
tuted European-style institutions in the light of their own mental and material
capacities. This chapter, therefore, posits a hypothesis of the hybrid, even hetero-
geneous origins of comparative economic development, as opposed to their
‘colonial origins’. The chapter goes on to consider the case of India and to a lesser
extent, Africa, in the nineteenth century. It seeks to specify the nature of the 
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institutions that seem to have contributed to relatively successful and economic
development in the longer term despite the existence of an extractive state. 
Building social capabilities: the origins of ‘aspiration’ in India
Despite the Bhartiya Janata party, the former right-wing government’s, electoral
propaganda about ‘India shining’ and comparisons with China, India’s GDP
remains modest, about the same level as Russia’s and considerably less than
China’s (though the latter is probably overestimated). Yet India’s growth rate has
speeded up dramatically over the last few decades. Some now argue that India’s
‘knowledge economy’ will give it greater flexibility than China in the longer run.
Its democratic institutions are remarkably robust and it has avoided the state-led
oppression and social trauma that characterized China’s political transition. The
core of the chapter argues that some of the socio-economic capacities of India’s
people that help to explain the present cautious optimism were in the process of
development during the mid-nineteenth century. This was a period when, in the
terms used by AJR, British India remained an ‘extractive state’, while at the same
time some of the benign institutions of settler colonialism to which they point
were appropriated and deployed in processes of ‘improvement’ by indigenous
commercial and intellectual groups. Here then the enhancement of capabilities
could take place even in the context of extraction. These groups melded western
education and legal techniques with Indian patterns of behaviour and thought.
Some of them can be traced back to the political and economic forms of the late-
Mughal Indian and Indian Ocean world. Others were late arrivals, socially
marginal groups, which seized the limited educational and economic opportu-
nities offered by British rule. 
On the face of it, nineteenth-century India, and particularly Bengal, which
provides much of the information for this argument, represents a case of deep
economic dependency. The early nineteenth century saw a deindustrialization of
the artisan cultures of the major centres. The mid- and second half of the century
witnessed continuous and lethal famines occurring throughout the country
along with waves of agrarian unrest, even if railways and the steamship brought
about some economic growth in the port cities and their hinterland (Kumar
1980, Hall-Mathews 2005). The economic nationalist Dadabhai Naoroji’s work
Poverty and Un-British Rule in India (Naoroji 1901) mounted a systematic indictment
of government over-taxation and economic and social neglect. Yet material in
Naoroji’s works and speeches also demonstrate the emergence of new capabili-
ties in Indian society, in Amartya Sen’s sense of the term. These included the
sustaining of outward-looking entrepreneurs, a remarkable flowering of Indian
liberal associations and the development of a vigorous free press, even within the
constraints of colonial censorship. Small groups of farmers and even women
acquired a degree of education and social mobility. 
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The colonial state, labour and elites
For social historians it is important to understand the moral, mental and associ-
ational culture of aspiring groups which determined India’s limited nineteenth-
century ‘improvement’, or development, as it would now be termed. Yet it is also
necessary briefly to discuss three contexts for the argument. First, what was the
nature of the nineteenth-century ‘extractive state’ in India? How far were there
any truly ‘colonial origins’ of Indian development, even in this case? There is a
vast literature on the topic, but economic historians have done little more than
fight for a century or more over what numbers to affix to the basic conditions
outlined by Naoroji. The British rulers did develop India, but only to a limited
extent, and largely in their own interests. India was broadly spared from
internecine warfare that plagued contemporary China and Africa and was unified
by British fiscal and administrative measure (Goswami 2004). Markets were
integrated by the railway, telegraph and steamship, widening merchant horizons.
Legal provisions gave stability to upper landed and commercial elites. On the
other hand, the revenue ‘take’ from an unprotected peasantry was higher than it
had been under indigenous post-Mughal regimes. Much of India’s surplus was
drained off to Britain in interest payments for railway loans, civil servants
salaries, etc. The colonial rulers wasted money on expensive frontier wars. Indian
artisan industry was decimated by imported manufactured goods and India’s
nascent modern industry received little serious tariff protection in the era of free
trade. Indian leaders therefore rapidly adopted Friedrich Lists’s model of a
‘national political economy’.
This is well known. More interesting is the debate about the impact of the
colonial state on ideology and class formation. The colonial state was indeed
extractive, but it was not hegemonic (Guha 1997) in that it did not wholly
dominate the mentalities and ideologies even of India’s emerging entrepreneurial
and clerical class. Neither, however, was it ‘dominant’ across the whole of Indian
society. The state was very weak at its fringes and widely reliant on Indian agency
everywhere. It was often split into competing agencies. This had two conse-
quences. First, it left considerable room for maneouvre to Indian corporate
bodies, kin groups of landlords, self-styled caste associations and other status
groups that had emerged during an earlier period of post-Mughal decentralisa-
tion. The picture in India during the transition to colonialism is in some degree
similar to that outlined by Greif (Greif 2006: 383) for the European later Middle
Ages where the existence of a multiplicity of authorities allowed room for local
empowerment. This helped Indians to build limited capabilities. The colonial state
was forced by its relative weakness to introduce a modicum of public education,
especially higher education. It conceded a limited degree of local self-govern-
ment to Indians by stages in a move that distantly mirrored the contemporary
creation of a democratic franchise in Britain. 
On the other hand, the hypothesis in Greif that a relatively weak state was one
condition that allowed the development of the modern economy from its
History, historians and development policy44
Bayly 02_Tonra 01  21/06/2011  10:17  Page 44
medieval antecedents cannot be too widely applied. Vigorous state action by the
Meiji government against dominant groups – the daimyo and samurai – and even
heavy regressive taxation of Japan’s peasantry allowed the state to build up a
development fund for investment in infrastructure and new industries (Jansen
1989, 2000). This option was not available to the contemporary Qing govern-
ment in China or the British Indian government. The latter, paradoxically in view
of its extractive status, appears to have been a poor government in a poor society,
progressively less willing to encroach on the funds and authority of powerful
rural elites. 
A second framing issue concerns labour supply during the beginnings of
modern economic development. The building of human capacity through
education may, in fact, stand in opposition to the need for modernizing
economies to find cheap and easily controlled labour. Japanese family structures
and pressure on the peasantry drove workers into the factories of the Meiji
period, just as the decline of artisan textile production had driven British workers
into machine industry one hundred years earlier. Today’s China and India also
both seem to have flourished economically, while the conditions of life for some
sections of the peasantry have actually deteriorated. Riots and opposition to state
expropriation in China has been matched recently by mass suicide among
farmers in India. In the nineteenth century, the colonial state in India ensured as
far as possible the existence of a quiescent peasant economy to fulfill its revenue
needs, while at the same time creating an enclaved labour force in areas such as
Chhota Nagpur, Assam and the Bombay Konkan to serve special interests such as
the tea estates and early factories. The hierarchical and segmented nature of
Indian society may, paradoxically, have aided the creation of a labour force and
thus the limited colonial-era industrialization (Chandavarkar 1994). In these
cases, the effort to industrialize and raise the living standards of the ‘middling
people’ tended to militate against equity in the distribution of income and other
social goods. Only ameliorative action by the state and altruistic capacity-
building among the poor by public action could alleviate these conditions. 
This comparison becomes sharper if one considers the African case, where
labour was historically freer. African historians have argued that the ‘exit option’
of African farmers (Hyden 1980) – their ability to migrate to areas where their
labour could find better rewards – was largely determined by the extreme
physical conditions in which many of them worked. The state was once again
weak or non-existent and it is argued that many African societies remained
relatively unstratified by comparison with those of Europe and Asia. The broad
disadvantage for Africa’s historical development appears to be that the emerging
state and later agrarian and urban industry has found it difficult to secure a
reliable tied labour force. Equity and economic development have often,
therefore, often stood in contradiction to each other and here the state must
intervene as an equalising and protective force in a manner that it rarely did
during the colonial period.
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Much of the remainder of this chapter discusses capability-building among
the nineteenth-century professional classes and entrepreneurs of colonial India.
This is partly because the historical data are much fuller for these groups than for
the poor. But a more important reason is that they have always been critical in
forcing social and political change, though this fact has sometimes been lost sight
of with the recent emphasis on the ‘subaltern’, the disempowered underclasses.
The capacity of indigenous ‘middling people’ to adapt to new forms of the state,
master new forms of literacy and communication and pass on these skills to the
wider population was vital both in raising income levels in the longer term and
also in expanding health and education. It may well be that at times, and
especially during the early nineteenth-century, the consolidation of the new
Indian elite actually encompassed the collapse of earlier systems of social
provision, as it did in industrializing Europe. My concern here, however, is with
the medium and long-term building of capacity and the role of specifically
Indian endowments in this process. However inequitable India’s growth may
have been over the last two hundred years, it would have been even more so
without their capabilities. 
Sustaining entrepreneurship
The pre-existence and survival of an indigenous commercial class even during
the period of Euro-American imperialism was one of the conditions discussed by
the modernization theorists of the 1960s and ’70s. It remains critically relevant
to the issue of comparative economic development. Particular reference was
made to the zaibatsu of Tokugawa-era Japan and the manner in which government
policy compelled many of the former samurai class into entrepreneurial activity
(Smith 1969, 1988). This provided one set of arguments for the origins of Japan’s
nineteenth-century ‘escape from economic dependency’. Discussion of entrepre-
neurship has been much less full in work on the origins of development since
the 1970s (Adelman 2001a). Leftist and liberal hostility to ‘exploiting classes’ has
apparently left its mark even on later development theories and businessmen do
not necessarily fit well with the concept of benign institutions. 
Yet indigenous entrepreneurs were vital to development. In India, the entre-
preneurial class had clear indigenous origins, not only in the ancient status
categories of vaishya, but more recently in the cash-based revenue system of the
Mughal and post-Mughal rulers, which was predominantly serviced by Hindu
and Jain mercantile families (Bayly 1983). Many other social groups, including
members of former intelligentsia families, have contributed to India’s recent
economic advance. However, the continuities between the late-Mughal trading
and money-lending class and India’s present business class are quite remarkable.
Most of the industrial and financial leaders who established the first Indian
planning regime in the last stages of the Second World War were from this
background and their descendents remain critical in today’s Indian ‘take-off’. To
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take only two examples, the Birla group, which remains one of India’s industrial
conglomerates (Kudaisya 2003) and Lakshmi Narayan Mittal, the world’s largest
steel producer, both come from the Marwari community, which provided many
of the traders and moneylenders of pre-colonial central and north India
(Timberg 1978). Throughout the colonial period, India’s mahajans (bankers) and
banias (commodity traders) retained control of the bulk of India’s internal trade,
even if some of the most lucrative import-export trades were dominated by
European agency houses. This is one of the clearest examples of the indigenous
origins of comparative economic development. The situation stands in contrast to
Africa, where European and (significantly) Indian or Lebanese traders controlled
the bulk of internal trade or even the Ottoman and Arab lands, where Armenians,
Jews and Greeks were very powerful.
Why did large sections of the Indian business communities survive colonial
rule, when others elsewhere in the world were unable to do so? One answer was
that from the fourteenth century onward such families had developed sophisti-
cated double-entry book keeping and credit note (hundi) systems. Their social
organization and marriage patterns allowed them an all-India reach. They were
able to move money and goods across the vast distances of inland India, up into
Russia and Afghanistan and even across the Indian Ocean to the East African coast
(e.g., Markovits 2000). As suggested, the decentralisation of power during the
late Mughal period and the dependence of the early British state on their
expertise allowed them to flourish. Again, pre-colonial and early-colonial India
benefited from a relatively well-developed network of urbanized places that
could be used as bases and entrepots by the commercial communities. Even
when many larger cities were in flux in the eighteenth century, it can be
estimated that 10 percent of the population lived in places with populations of
5,000 or more and distinctly urban characteristics (Bayly 1983). 
Discussing redistributive conflicts which might impede development, Pranab
Bardhan noted the efficiency of traditional Indian business, but was skeptical of
the extent to which the colonial-era Indian business class could contribute to the
evolution of ‘more complex (impersonal, open-legal rational) rules or institu-
tions (Bardhan 2001: 272). He was writing at the end of the 1990s when
pessimism about India’s development prospects was still pervasive. Irma Adelman
rightly, in my view, contested this position (Adelman 2001b: 293): ‘merchant
capital’ could be, and often was converted into industrial capital, as in the case of
western Indian city of Ahmedabad and Kanpur in north India (Gillion 1968,
Bayly 1983). 
The old Indian merchant class – disparaged successively by British rulers,
Indian nationalists and today’s leftist economists – also played a significant if
unconscious and interested role in the development of political and social capac-
ities in nineteenth-century India. For instance, it was mercantile families (though
in this case from non-vaishya families) who pioneered education in early
nineteenth-century Bengal and Bombay. As an example of the contribution of a
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flourishing entrepreneurial class to wider empowerment, merchant people in
several parts of India are known to have patronized and supported the newspaper
editors and lawyers who became leaders of the early Indian National Congress
and other public bodies (Bayly 1975, Washbrook 1976). In the twentieth
century, the Birlas and other western Indian bankers funded M.K. Gandhi, who
was himself of commercial caste origin, despite his persisting ambivalence to
modern industrial society (Markovits 1985). In development terms one might
draw the inference it is important to locate and enlist the support of commercial
groups.
Agrarian hierarchy and economic capacity
In examining the history of comparative development in the great Eurasian and
North African peasant societies, the role of the peasant farmer as entrepreneur
and food provider is clearly critical. Without a robust peasant-farming sector the
fate of colonized and semi-colonized societies in the early-modern and modern
periods might have been even worse than it actually was. Consequently, the possi-
bilities for late-colonial and post-colonial economic development would have
been even more sharply curtailed. William G. Skinner, for instance, pointed in the
1970s to the continuing buoyancy of peasant-based rural marketing systems in
communist China (Skinner 1977). Even if some peasant communities have
suffered relatively during the contemporary expansion of the Chinese economy,
it is clear that indigenous forms of the peasant family farm have sustained growth
in favoured parts of the rural economy such as the coastal provinces. Equally, the
robust farming traditions of dry inland areas such as Shanzi have preserved them
from even greater decline during periods of drought and war. In Meiji Japan, by
contrast, the flexibility of peasant inheritance systems appears to have guaranteed
a flood of rural labour into the developing towns while sustaining the heavy,
regressive taxation that made possible the first ‘Japanese miracle’ of the 1880s
and ’90s.
The preservation of existing agrarian capabilities and the creation of new
ones in colonial India evidently explain some aspects of the relative development
of different regions of the Indian economy over the last two centuries. Many
commentators noted that the system of peasant proprietorship that prevailed over
much of the Punjab provided a more solid basis for agrarian development than
the zamindari (landlord) system of Bengal where proprietary powers were invested
by the British in a class of rack-renting landlords as early as 1793 in the so-called
Permanent Settlement. AJR allude to the restrictive nature of occupancy rights in
Bengal. Early Indian economic thinkers such as Romesh Chunder Dutt pressed for
a ‘permanent settlement’ between the tenant and the zamindar, which they
thought would leave an investment premium for the cultivator (Dutt 1980). Even
within different regions, tenurial systems – or rather farmers’ exploitation of
tenurial systems – seem to account for differences in prosperity. Thus in United
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Provinces and Oudh (today’s Uttar Pradesh), the relative dynamism of the west
compared with the east of the province was attributed to the greater prevalence
of peasant ownership in the west (Stokes 1978). Even in Bengal itself, the eastern
deltaic areas that were not incorporated into the zamindari system, enjoyed
much greater and more equitable growth than the west of the province, at least
until the late nineteenth century (Iqbal 2004). 
Now it is true that colonial policy – the desire to extract revenue for fiscal-
military purposes – determined the nature of tenurial patterns across India to a
considerable degree. Yet colonial policy itself was working within a much wider
field of social forces. Immediate pre-colonial tenurial systems determined to an
equal extent as colonial policy the actual form of proprietorship under British
rule. It was the triumph of the pre-colonial Sikh movement amongst the predom-
inantly Jat peasant farmers of northern India which gave rise to the particular
type of intensive and balanced cultivation that allowed Punjab to grow in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries while much of Bengal and Bihar remained
economically stagnant. Again, in the case of the Punjab or Gujarat, the broad
status group called Pattidars formed an equally buoyant peasant society that later
diversified into commerce and the professions in both India and East Africa
(Hardiman 1981, Charlesworth 1985). Here again it was Indian actors who
made use of these tenurial advantages. Peasant farmers in the Punjab sent their
sons into the British Indian army, where they learnt transports skills and brought
home development money and land grants. Religious and social movements such
as the Arya Samaj in the Punjab or the ‘monotheistic’ Satya Narayani movement
in Gujarat enhanced local capabilities through education, political mobilization
and social provision during crises. In the post-colonial period, the central Punjab
has been the model for the more prosperous parts of the agrarian economy in
both India and Pakistan. Here again, it is essential to acknowledge the hybrid
nature of comparative economic development and analyze the actual social
processes by which some colonial policies and practices were converted into
benign institutions by Asian and Africans or Latin American people.
Colonial law, ‘benign sociology’ and peer-education
In the AJR model the expansion of rights of property and freedom from expro-
priation are rightly regarded as key aspects of benign development. A historian
would need to ask whose rights and whose freedom? In Asia, as in parts of Africa,
colonial legal systems certainly conferred rights and economic stability on some
of the people some of the time. The division of responsibility between the
executive and judicial, at least in the higher reaches of government, also created
breaches in bureaucratic government through which indigenous legal experts
and their colonial sympathizers could penetrate. Yet in a dependent as opposed to
a settler colonial society, law was often an engine of dominance (Kolsky 2010).
Legislators and judges were largely white. In many colonial situations there was
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no division of powers so that magistrates and judges were the same people.
Justice was expensive and litigation became a vice rather than a virtue. 
Indian liberals, therefore, needed to try to purge the workings of colonial law,
to train Indian munsiffs or ‘under judges’ and to disseminate good information
about the legal process to middle-class townsmen and peasants, who might be
tempted into its orbit. The premium here was on local information. The legal
system itself was a purely neutral machine. It might corrupt or it might lead to
‘improvement’ – development in contemporary speech. Indians, however, were
already attuned to the notion of ‘rights’ and late Mughal lawgivers emphasized
the rights of the peasant against those of the local magnates, who were often
conceived as impediments to royal justice. The notion of representation to an
equal or superior (vakalat) could equally be adapted to the British legal system.
The critical point of change was the development of a class of ‘peer educators’
(Rao and Walton 2004: 9). The following example is taken from the memoir of
a liberal reformer who grew up in the 1840s. Babu Sambhu Nath Pandit, then a
mere legal clerk but later government pleader, settled sometime in the 1840s in
Bhowanipore, a village outside Calcutta where he rented a small, dingy room. He
decided to set up a legal club to help the students of the locality. The account goes
on: ‘[b]rilliant were the legal discussions that were nightly held in that little
room. A stranger entering it could have believed that he had alighted on a sort of
Bengalee Temple Bar [the London law courts].’ Students stood as prosecutors and
defendants. They dissected government regulations to find the principles behind
them (Ghose 1912: 102). 
Not all the boys trained in this way went on to study for the Bar. Two at least
retained the petty government office which they had secured because this
allowed them more free time for their journalistic writing. Indeed the whole of
educated society in Bengal and beyond was saturated with legal notions of
judicial contestation and property rights. Much of this expertise was deployed
simply to make a living. Most reformers, public men and later nationalist politi-
cians were, however, lawyers, so that some of the expertise was employed to
critique the colonial government and fight cases on behalf of poor farmers
oppressed by landlords or moneylenders. Litigation spread rapidly in India after
the 1840s, drawing in small shopkeepers and more substantial peasants. Some
aspects of this, such as extreme litigiousness, were malign. Yet the awareness of
rights became a feature of all levels of Indian society and contributed to the rapid
development of India’s wider critical public sphere discussed below.
Along with awareness of rights, Indians in the mid-nineteenth century began
to develop what I term a ‘benign sociology’, that is an understanding of their
own society in a wide geographical sweep which adapted colonial ethnographic
and statistical models to empower rather subjugate its people. The colonial state
may have attempted to categorise and count its Indian subjects, but it was soon
faced with Indian intelligentsia who collated statistics on the colonial state’s
failings, argued against the view that Indian society was immobilized by caste
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and religion and created for it a glorious civilisational past which would presage
a free and enlightened future. A variety of Indian travelers and ‘auto-ethnogra-
phers’ helped achieve this aim even before the 1870s, notably Dadabhai Naoroji,
R.C. Dutt, Keshub Chunder Sen and Bholanauth Chunder (Chunder 1869). They
stressed India’s traditions of charity, its veneration for family and marriage and
its aesthetic and moral sensibility, all of which were compared favourably with
the west. 
Similar movements to reclaim a sense of self-respect through reversing
colonial stereotypes were seen in other colonized countries. In Egypt this was
achieved by Salama Musa (Musa 1961). In Africa, Jomo Kenyatta’s Facing Mount
Kenya (Kenyatta 1938) created a benign view of Kikuyu society. This amounted to
a kind of developmental morale-raising and its importance in stimulating Indian
nationalism, internationalism and aspirations to improve material life cannot be
understated. For development to occur people need to have the belief that they
can succeed and that their own societies are essentially benign. Many colonial and
some post-colonial agencies supposedly devoted to improvement have helped to
erode rather than raise morale by marginalizing indigenous public sphere insti-
tutions. The activities of international aid agencies after the Asian Tsunami are
only the most recent example of this. 
The Indian ecumene: an indigenous public sphere
Even when, during the period 1960–90, most economists and politicians dwelt
on India’s poverty rather than its entrepreneurial and legal-rational capacities,
almost all lauded the extraordinary resilience of India’s democratic traditions and
culture of public debate. Arguably, this openness has been a critical determinant
of the success of contemporary India’s ‘knowledge economy’ that gives the
country an edge even over China, since poorer areas in South and Southeast Asia
and eventually Africa will in turn challenge China’s industrial predominance. The
culture of openness and public debate also has significant advantages for the
development of capital markets and services, since potential investors and clients
have much easier access to information in India than in much of the rest of the
developing world. 
Amartya Sen has elegantly demonstrated that the ‘argumentative Indian’ has
deep historical roots that possibly stretch back to ancient debates between
Buddhists and Brahmins and the ‘liberal’ policies of the seventeenth-century
Emperor Akbar (Sen 2005). This argument runs the risk of being too general.
What is very clear, however, is that Indian society emerged from the later Mughal
period with a well-developed culture of debate and contestation which centred
on the houses of Indo-Muslim law officers, the dwellings of learned pandits,
debates in market places and an arsenal of forms of protest and representation to
the authorities. I have called this ‘the Indian ecumene’ (Bayly 1999) and have
suggested that it formed a variant of the critical public sphere theorized for
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Europe by Jurgen Habermas (Habermas 1992). These forms of debate and
contestation of the policies of rulers could and did provide some benefits to the
wider political economy in that they were deployed against excessive taxation or
the sequestration of property and goods by the Mughal-successor governments
or by agents of the East India Company. These arenas of debate were sometimes
paralleled at the local level by the old popular institutions of adjudication, the
panchayat or sabha. These were single or multi-caste bodies that aided power-
holders to decide property or criminal cases. There is evidence that this pre-
colonial system continued to operate across large parts of India in the nineteenth
century. But whether panchayats actually persisted into the colonial period or not,
the fact that they once existed provided a powerful myth for the emerging Indian
intelligentsia (Bayly 2007).
I estimate literacy in the broadest sense at about 9 percent of the male
population in the early-nineteenth century. This was comparable with areas such
as Poland or southern Italy at that time, but lower than in contemporary East and
Southeast Asia, where Buddhism helped impart basic education (Bayly 1999:
36–44). Even if literacy rates were relatively low by western European standards,
India was a highly literacy-aware society. This contributed to its potential for
growth and modernization. From the late pre-colonial period, large armies of
bazaar writers wrote letters for literate and semi-literate people. They also copied
pages of newspapers or read them out to people in bazaars or the more urbanized
villages. Wandering teachers and purveyors of news brought information to
ordinary people with extreme rapidity, as the British rulers noticed to their
consternation. Small towns and villages were the scene of debate and discussion,
rather than the stagnant ‘primitive societies’ of Sir Henry Maine. The indigenous
newspapers that circulated in these arenas often drew on the tradition of the
Indo-Persian akhbarat, the newsletter that informed rulers and others of infractions
of good government. Indian villages were neither isolated nor passive. Instead, in
addition to caste and village assemblies, there were, as a newspaper said, the
‘gatherings under the shady banyan tree where village politics was discussed, and
the women’s meetings by the river bank where reputations were made and
unmade’ (Indian People, 10 January 1909). This sort of cultural practice helps to
explain the vigour of Indian democracy in recent times and also the speed with
which information about improvements and new sources of income have
reached the masses of the population. Even if state policies to bring education,
clear water and medicine to villages were largely non-existent before
Independence and flawed thereafter, the capacity to aspire for change was present
in very strong measure and has been rapidly exploited in recent years.
Information and association in the colonial period
Writing of the contemporary poor in Bombay, Appadurai (2004) argues that the
‘capacity to aspire’, to build consensus from the inside and set precedents for
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projects of human flourishing are essential components of social and economic
development. These endogenous factors are as important if not more important
than exogenous ones, such as government aid, cooperative credit and proper
price regimes, etc. This argument also finds support in nineteenth-century India
where it was indigenous elites who built the beginnings of democracy inside the
citadel of colonial bureaucratic power. The critical element here was a semi-free
press, and press freedom remains an important component of development in
the wider sense. The press not only created knowledge communities but, by
raising awareness and concern for national welfare, became a generator of
‘symbolic public goods’ (Rao 2008). Of all Britain’s non-settler dependencies, it
was first in India that a flourishing modern press developed. The first Indian daily
paper was the Calcutta Journal established in 1819 by British radicals and Indians
who attacked the corruption and monopoly of the East India Company, lending
an air of critique, sarcasm and controversy to the Indian press that it has never
lost. 
The development of the Indian press owed much to the growth of British
democracy, pointing indeed to ‘the colonial origins of comparative development’
in AJR’s terms. At the same time, the key factor was the transformation by Indians
themselves of the notion of a critical public. Self-empowerment by ‘peer-
educators’ was again important. For instance, the first generation of English-
knowing boys in the Calcutta Hindoo College began their own in-house journal
in the 1840s. They created ‘a system of manuscript newspapers … these
contained essays and dissertations on literary subjects and other important issues
of the day’ which were circulated amongst friends and relations (Ghose 1911:
34). Later, when they worked in government offices, they were allowed to read
and copy incoming telegrams. They assembled this information in Bengali and
English newspapers which were often harshly critical of the government from
which they derived the information. 
As important as journals and books was the culture of association and debate.
This had colonial origins in the societies established by officials and missionaries
in Indian schools and colleges to carry through the colonialists’ project of
westernizing the Indian elites. Yet here again, Indians appropriated these societies
to ‘argue back’ against the British rulers, using their own battery of indigenous
rhetorical and, soon critical statistical methods. A Calcutta Sociological Society
was established as early as 1862, not long after the science had emerged in
Britain and France. Indian associations pioneered statistical survey methods to
expose peasant poverty. 
Religion, nationalism and social aspiration
By the later nineteenth-century, as Carey Watt (Watt 2005) has shown, India
possessed an extraordinarily sophisticated range of civil society bodies dedicated
to the generation and diffusion of information, public education, national
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independence and social reform. One feature of these associations that should 
be mentioned here is the importance of religious organization in the generation
of social capacities. This has been noted in modern development literature. 
For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the major ‘development
work’ done in India, outside the reluctant and under-funded operations of the
colonial state, was carried out by bodies representing new ‘religions of mankind’:
Hindu, Christian, Muslim, Parsi and other. Neo-Hinduism was essentially 
‘this-worldly’ in Weberian terms, though ironically Weber’s misunderstanding of
India and later economic historians’ misunderstanding of Weber have occluded
this point. These religious movements included the Arya Samaj (Aryan society)
that worked on behalf of peasant communities (Datta 1999) and established itself
among the Indian plantation workers in Mauritius and the West Indies,
attempting to educate them and improve their working conditions. Even earlier
the Brahmo Samaj (Divine Society), seeking to rid Hinduism of what it saw as
polytheism, established schools for the poor and initiated campaigns to improve
the lot of secluded Indian women and widows. At a rough calculation, various
religious societies employed up to a 100,000 full-time or part-time employees
by the end of the nineteenth century. Even moderate nationalist organisations
such as the Servants of India Society drew on traditions of this worldly religion,
in that they drew on earlier ideas of sacred service (seva) and transformed them
into a practice of public service. These volunteers, with their larger number 
of aids and helpers, were active in educational and charitable activities across 
the country. 
Contesting colonial government
The consensus that has emerged from recent applications of historical data to the
experience of development has stressed the importance of building capabilities
and strengthening aspiration. This chapter has used the experience of the intelli-
gentsia of British India to further illustrate this point. AJR’s work, however, uses
British and comparative histories to make a further point. The growth of equality
and empowering institutions has often arisen from a situation where elites,
fearing social disorder, made concessions to the mass of the people. This was the
case with the domestic British constitutional reform after 1867. A balance
between active, centralized government and the ability of popular interests to
mould government policy has proved positive for economic development. Other
examples of change of this sort can be found in Meiji Japan, where the new
ruling groups gave displaced members of the samurai class and merchant groups
an incentive to make the new state and economy work by the distribution of
bonds. 
In a colonial situation such as British India, government proved very
unwilling to surrender power vested in the predominantly European bureau-
cracy. But, under financial and political pressure, it did give up some of its powers
History, historians and development policy54
Bayly 02_Tonra 01  21/06/2011  10:17  Page 54
in a series of constitutional changes that began with the 1883 municipalities act
and broadened out in 1892, 1909, 1919 and 1935. By 1935 a small franchise
existed and Indian political parties constituted government in the provinces,
albeit still dependent on the British Indian civil service. Historians disagree about
the ultimate importance of these moves towards the decentralization of power. It
seems clear, however, that India’s democratic institutions did, to some extent,
develop within and in response to these local electorates. If only in order to
challenge colonial rule, Indian liberals and nationalists extended their organiza-
tion into small towns and rural localities. They enlisted more substantial farmers
and rural entrepreneurs to their cause. It was, nevertheless, indigenous forms of
social connection generated by caste, religious community, bonds of patronage,
and ultimately nationalist aspirations themselves, that made it possible for Indian
public men to create their own style of democratic institution. 
A case study: the Prayag Sugar Company, 1910
This chapter has been arguing that historical evidence would help us to refine
and develop AJR’s term ‘colonial origins’ of comparative development and that
pre-colonial and indigenous societal ‘capabilities’ or ‘capacities’ in Sen’s sense
need to be brought into the equation. A critical issue is how these capabilities and
aspirations were enhanced during the colonial period, both by peer education
and contests with the power of the colonial bureaucracy. One final example of
capacity formation in colonial India brings all these elements together – the
entrepreneurial, the legal and indigenous religion. This was the case of the Prayag
Sugar Company established in Allahabad, United Provinces, India, in 1910 (Leader,
23 January 1910). Under the influence of the increasingly radical swadeshi (home
industry) movement, Indian constitutionalist leaders fronted by Motilal Nehru,
father of Jawaharlal Nehru, and Madan Mohan Malaviya, a key Congress politi-
cian and orthodox Hindu, founded the Prayag Sugar Company, whose title
evoked the holy Hindu bathing place near the city. They enlisted one of the most
important and wealthy of the traditional Indian merchants of the city (Lala Ram
Charan Das) who bought many of the shares. This family had already begun to
prosper in the decentralised conditions of immediate pre-colonial rule. The
company procured machinery for sugar pressing from England, but the aim was
to assemble the more basic apparatus locally. Motilal used his legal contacts with
the local sugar-growers in the surrounding rural districts to guarantee sugar
supplies. Here, then, indigenous people used the forms of colonial legal struc-
tures and corporate enterprise, but brought them together with the aspirations,
connections and sensibilities drawn from Indian society to try to effect change
and to spread its benefits to ordinary people.
We do not know the fate of the Prayag Sugar Company, so an expert on devel-
opment might well ask: ‘but what did all this activity and debate really add up to,
given the inflexibility of the colonial bureaucracy and the poverty and famines
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which wracked colonial India?’ The answer can be give both in the medium and
the long term. In the medium term, the culture of debate and the moral insur-
gency of the Indian elite and its British interlocutors did, in fact, improve the
social, economic and political conditions of the Indian populace. The Bengal
government acceded to the campaign against indigo planters in 1871 and
accorded limited rights to tenants in the 1880s. Constant agitation and
campaigns in the Indian and British press was one factor that caused British
Liberal and Labour governments to concede a very limited degree of local self-
government to India after 1883. This nourished the emerging Indian democratic
culture and went a little way towards improving primary education and the
distribution of relief in the countryside during bad seasons. Constant harassment
by the press and emerging Indian public opinion made some in-roads into what
would otherwise have been the impermeable autocracy of the India Office. In the
longer run, it is difficult to imagine the emergence of contemporary India’s
vibrant public culture and information economy without some of these initial
steps. The issue was not so much the ‘colonial origins’ of Indian development as
of colonized Indians development of social capacity and their maintenance, in
adverse conditions, of an entrepreneurial and critical spirit.
African comparisons and contrasts
Historians of Sub-Saharan Africa make four key claims about the continent’s pre-
colonial inheritance and its early-modern encounter with the West (Vaughan
2006). This suggests once again that it is the conflict and accommodation
between indigenous and colonial institutions, rather than colonial institutions per
se, which have determined Africa’s development in the longer term, for better or
for worse.
First, the slave trade and the implications of the expansion of slavery for
internal African society stunted its growth, even if it did not actively ‘under-
develop’ Africa. This is perfectly compatible with AJR’s data. Indeed, it is built into
the idea of an extractive colonial inheritance. But it is important to note that,
from the later nineteenth century, much of West Africa, the key sector of the
Atlantic slave trade, was relatively better placed in terms of commercial linkages,
GDP per head and institutional stability than East Africa or even Southeast Asia. It
remained so throughout much of the twentieth century. This may of course have
fostered a type of economy in which powerful magnate ‘gate-keepers’ battened
on external connections rather than exploit and develop internal resources, as
Frederick Cooper argues (Cooper 2004). But it did at least stimulate new forms
of entrepreneurship.
Second, much of Africa lacked, or rather Africans felt no need to build,
powerful, well-defined states to the extent that Europeans, Asians or North
African Muslim societies did. There were some kingdoms with highly developed
state-like features, such as Asante or Benin in the West or Buganda in the East.
History, historians and development policy56
Bayly 02_Tonra 01  21/06/2011  10:17  Page 56
There were also large multi-ethnic empires. But these were usually built over, and
did not generally replace ‘tribal’ segments either in the centre or at the periphery
and do not seem generally to have established powerful ideologies which would
have legitimated centralized control. Most importantly, complex, cash-based
revenue systems had not developed to the same extent as they had in Eurasia and
the Muslim North. Indians and subjects of the Ottoman Empire had long been
used to rendering ‘unto Caesar what belongs to Caesar’ and this provided a more
substantial base for colonial and post-colonial statehood. States in Sub-Sahara
Africa tended to decompose from within relatively rapidly. 
Third, these impediments, combined with the often-difficult environmental
conditions for agriculture, led to extensive rather than intensive forms of culti-
vation. As observed above, African farmers had, and retain today, what has been
called an ‘exit option’(Cooper 2004, Austin 2005). This made elite control of
labour and its allocation to wealth creation more difficult. This should not be
interpreted as evidence that Africa failed to take some necessary evolutionary
trajectory. Indeed, it probably made African societies more equitable and less
exploitative than their Eurasian contemporaries until the later nineteenth century.
Africans prized honourable leadership; they maintained complex social patterns
based on age-sets, but in many areas they avoided constructing a well-developed,
stable and exclusionary class structure. Partly as a result of this, the city as a social
formation was not a marked feature of much of East and Central Africa, outside
the Arab-influenced Swahili Coast. Again, unlike the great kingdoms of South,
East and West Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa did not generally have an ancient system
of land-revenue payments based on the exploitation of peasant labour. This
limited the emergence of indigenous commercial classes and partly explains
Asia’s differential advantage in twentieth-century development. There were, of
course, some important exceptions to this rule. In Yorubaland, for instance, a
system of tribute payment to warlords from farmers had developed during the
Yoruba wars. Political relationships were increasingly negotiated through cash.
During the nineteenth century, the West African cocoa economy developed
within, and in turn stimulated this cash economy (Berry 1993). This reminds us
that there was much variation within both West and East African economies and
that transcontinental comparisons should not be driven too far. Yet, by and large,
cash revenue systems were more deeply rooted in North Africa and in South Asia
than in any part of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Finally, literacy was a latecomer in much of Africa, even during the colonial
period. Asia and the Middle East had literate bureaucracies and commercial
communities along with a high degree of popular ‘literacy awareness’. This also
facilitated the emergence of strong states. Paradoxically, then, it was the fact that
a pre-colonial extractive state did not exist over much of Africa that made its
colonial experience even more traumatic than that of Asia, as Young (1997) and
Herbst (2000), among others, have demonstrated. The leaders of post-colonial
states in turn attempted to create ‘integral’, ‘patrimonial’ states following colonial
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models and these continued to clash with many local structures and sensibilities
(Young 1997: 290).
How does this relative weakness or absence of states, classes, literacy and
cities in pre-colonial and early colonial Africa fit with the idea of the hybrid
origins of comparative economic development? Europeans created the most
extractive forms of all colonial relationships with West Africans in the form of the
slave system. High settler mortality – or at least the perception of it – inhibited
European settlement, in conformity with AJR. However, once the slave trade had
been suppressed, or had moved southward to Portuguese territories after 1840,
what was to become Ghana and Nigeria and other colonial territories in the
north-west were in a strong position to develop rapidly on the basis of what were
called legitimate trades: palm oil, cocoa, timber etc. (Hopkins 1973). Wealth
created on the coast had a backward linkage effect, producing wealthy tribal 
elites and local kingdoms and enriching migrant cocoa farmers and bazaar
traders (Hill 1956). 
In terms of the AJR formulation, colonialism in West Africa after the 1830s
had two contradictory faces and this challenges their model. First, it created
external economic linkages through trade, the activities of Christian missions and
educational facilities, an entrepreneurial ‘creole’ elite and large coastal cities. All
these provided the context for the growth of African capacities. The Gold Coast
and Ghana had some of the earliest African newspapers and in the Gold Coast
African National Union, one of its earliest anti-colonial political parties. Arguably,
West African institutions have been more stable than those in East and Central
Africa, despite periodic wars, relapses into authoritarian rule and the misuse of
oil revenues. The fact that West Africa has supported a huge population boom is
good evidence of relatively successful comparative economic development. Yet, it
is important to note that it was precisely the lack of a large white settler class –
precisely because of its reputation as a ‘white man’s grave’ – that indigenous
entrepreneurship was able to flourish and a critical public emerge. For instance,
Andrew Cohen in the British Colonial Office in the 1950s was able to argue that
West Africa was two generations or more ahead of East Africa. In addition, the
paradoxical benefits of having colonial institutions without a colonial settler class
was enhanced by the inheritance of indigenous institutions already mentioned:
cities and bazaars, some state-like formations, religious and cultural forms which
appropriated and used incoming Christian education and mores.
The contrast here with East and Central Africa is clear. Colonialism came to
the East quite late (after the 1870s) not so much because of European fears of
mortality as because of geographical remoteness. After 1870 a colonial and
Indian settler class monopolized economic and political power, especially in what
became Kenya, Tanzania and Rhodesia. Historians argue that this frustrated the
development of African capacity for much of the colonial period (Low and Smith
1976, Lonsdale and Berman 1992). Consequently, East and Central Africans had
much more difficulty using the mechanisms of the post-colonial state and
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economic institutions because of lack of experience and colonial policies of
divide-and-rule applied to different ‘tribal’ groups. This has lead to misgovern-
ment, genocide, economic stagnation and even, in the case of Malawi and the
Horn of Africa, the recent resurgence of famine. 
In this case again, ‘western-style’ institutions and property rights forms of
consensual government were known and potentially available to East and Central
Africans. But their capacity for enhancing living standards has even now hardly
been realized, mainly because the actual form of colonial rule – a dominant
white farming sector, with Indian subordinates, proved impermeable to most
Africans. Additionally, pre-existing forms of social organization in many of these
territories – the relative absence of market-based entrepreneurship of market
organization – made it more difficult yet for these colonial institutions to bond
with African ones and create flourishing hybrids. As Derek Peterson has shown,
literate instruments, newspapers, spread fast in Kenya, but they did so very late,
in the 1940s and ’50s (Peterson 2004). By comparison, the Gold Coast and other
West African settlements had newspapers as early as the 1870s, while India, as
observed earlier, had its first daily newspaper in 1819 and its first Bengali
language newspaper shortly afterwards. Similarly, town councils and juries with
indigenous members also existed much earlier in Asia and West Africa than in
East Africa. The reason for this concerned both colonial economic or political
interests and also the inheritance of indigenous literacy and literacy awareness.
By contrast, the medium-term historical analysis suggests that the relatively
denser white settlement in East Africa impeded rather than advanced comparative
economic development. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson have created a
powerful tool of long-term historical analysis that has the great advantage of
being empirically testable. My concern has been to suggest ways in which to
make their model compatible with, or bring it into dialogue with, the very
different type of methodology employed by social and political historians or
historical anthropologists. Historians build up larger structures of argument from
carefully contextualized special cases, or local and regional studies. I think these
can be used as useful checks on the broader arguments advanced by long-term
analysts, such as AJR, North (1990) and Landes (1998), or for that matter,
Gunder Frank (1998). 
In addition, social historians draw attention to less easily measurable factors
in development which were endogenous to different world societies: for
instance, rates of literacy in pre-colonial or colonial times, the circulation of
information through news sheets or later newspapers, the existence of local
deliberative bodies, or the participation of indigenous people in such bodies
under colonialism, the degree of protection historically afforded to tenants, and
Indigenous and colonial origins of comparative economic development: the case of colonial India and Africa 59
Bayly 02_Tonra 01  21/06/2011  10:17  Page 59
so on. Adopting what I have called a hybrid approach to the history of economic
development to show how colonial institutions have been functional to the
growth of incomes and well-being at different times and not at others, should
help analysts to fine tune the broader models. First, it would help to further
refine critiques of the use of current GDP per head as a benchmark for long-term
development. We also need to be more alert to medium-term historical change.
Something would be lost by not noting that in 1950, West Africa and Burma, for
instance, were as wealthy and economically sound as Singapore, Thailand and
Malaysia.
Second, it would help to refine the notion of ‘colonial institutions’, breaking
down this broad category into several different elements at different times and
places. The British dominions, for instance, cannot really be placed in the same
category as India or Nigeria. Third, detailed historical contextualization would
allow us to bring into the argument pre-colonial, non-colonial or indigenous
institutions. This would give us a better idea of how clearly benign institutions –
equality before the law, ‘one man one vote’, the right to criticize government –
traveled and were transformed in different colonial environments, many of
which were hostile. Fourth, turning to the arguments of Sen, Appadurai and
others, the wider use of historical data in development debates would give histor-
ical depth to the notion of capacities and capabilities. The history of newspapers
in India, which was considered here, has been largely positive in its political,
social and economic impact. It took root partly because a culture of criticism was
allowed to develop by authorities in the UK, even when it was irritating to the
Indian government – a ‘colonial origin’. But it also flourished because it bonded
with existing styles of information gathering and criticism – an indigenous
capacity that was thereby enhanced.
What is the use of all of this to policy makers? First, historians can introduce
a much-needed uncertainty into their minds. The possibility of ‘chaos’ – in the
technical sense – emerging from policy initiatives is very great. Unintended
consequences follow from improperly analysed assumptions. The British in Iraq,
in 1914–20, swept away the Ottoman government, its municipal councils and 
its revenue system on the grounds that they were ‘despotic’. The result was a
series of ethnic insurgencies that continued throughout the 1920s and consumed
40 percent of the Colonial Office’s budget that might have been spent on African
development. The consequences of Sir Arnold Wilson’s administration might also
have served as a warning to our recent politicians. General ideological principles
need to be applied with care and ‘western’ democratic institutions are not the
only benign institutions known to mankind.
Second, historical examples counsel administrative patience. India, once seen
as passing through its ‘most dangerous decades’ or hobbled by a ‘Hindu’ rate of
growth, is now seen as a thriving knowledge economy. Africa, six years ago, was
designated the ‘hopeless continent’. But enhancing capacities and instilling the
sense of aspiration takes time. It involves a long domestication process in which
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existing sensibilities can be adjusted to best practice from abroad. Peer educators
are critical and so is transparent politics. Religious organizations, though a
double-edged sword, cannot be ignored because they may affront western
rationalism. This chapter has taken a decidedly non-linear approach to the growth
of material and moral welfare in the long term and here it contrasts with AJR’s
broader reading. These two approaches are not necessarily incompatible; nor does
one represent ‘historical truth’ and the other not. From the point of view of
policy-making, however, the more diffuse and specific methodology of the social
historians’ approach may help to nuance policy initiatives by emphasizing the
complexity of historical causation. In the case centrally discussed above, the
‘institutions’ most likely to generate welfare will not necessarily bear much
resemblance to the common forms of western democracy and governance. They
may for instance, be indigenous councils, conclaves of elders, religious institu-
tions or cultural performances.
Third, entrepreneurial classes may become corrupt when they operate as
monopolists, but indigenous entrepreneurial traditions, whether on the model of
the Indian bania communities or the Chinese family firm, have proved critical in
rapid economic development. These businessmen have a sense of the local market
and can assess local patterns of consumption. Finally, the stability and proper
working of local deliberative and civil society institutions is as important as
‘democracy’ at a national level. Centralisation is often misguided. But any such
democratic institutions must be legitimated by indigenous ideologies and
practices if they are to be fully accepted.
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COMMENTARY
History, time and temporality 
in development discourse
Uma Kothari
Trained as a geographer, time, as well as space, has been central to my under-
standings and interpretations of social processes and social change. The
comments here, therefore, focus on two areas in which I think history can make
a contribution, conceptually and methodologically, to understanding construc-
tions of time and the past in development policy. First, I explore the problematic
way in which the discourse writes and conceals its history, and address how we
can usefully engage an historical perspective to move beyond a bounded history
that simply charts a linear chronology of events and sequential theoretical
positions. Second, and perhaps more importantly, I argue that how we under-
stand, invoke and imagine time and temporality in development – particularly in
relation to other people in different places – reproduces and embeds global
hierarchies and distinctions. Indeed, particular understandings of the past and
constructions of the future not only dominate development discourse and
practice but reinforce inequalities. Thus, an historical analyses that can challenge
how, for example, development problematically creates and uses temporal
distinctions between past, present and future as well as how it discursively
imagines other places as existing in the past, is central to unpacking development
policies and its institutions as well as complex processes of planned social change
more broadly. Finally, I suggest that a postcolonial historical analysis can offer
ways of writing different histories and of moving beyond this problematic
framing of time.
Mainstream development discourse is silent about its history, legacy and
genealogy. It rarely acknowledges its full historical antecedents and in particular
its roots in a colonial past, despite ample evidence that the post-war international
development industry was built on colonial foundations and reworks relation-
ships, perceptions and attitudes of empire. Instead, much research and teaching
in Development Studies continues to reify 1945 as the key year in which devel-
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opment was initiated with the establishment of the World Bank and other Bretton
Woods institutions. With a few notable exceptions (Crush 1995, Slater 1995,
Power 2003), the history of development, often rehearsed, has tended towards a
compartmentalization of clearly bounded, successive periods characterized by
specific theoretical hegemonies (see Hettne 1995, Preston 1996 for examples of
this). Thus, they begin with economic growth and modernization theories, move
on to discuss ‘underdevelopment’ theories, neo-liberalism and the (post)
Washington consensus and culminate in current thinking around globalization
and security. This bounded classification not only obscures the colonial genealogy
of development but also undermines attempts to demonstrate historical continu-
ities and divergences in the theory, practice and policies of development. 
This delimited and linear history constructed and continuously represented
emerges, in part, out of a perceived necessity to distance development, which is
understood as inherently ‘good’, humanitarian and progressive, from the
contemporary negativity surrounding Britain’s imperial history and a colonial
encounter that was ‘bad’, exploitative and oppressive. So there is a political
imperative to avoid tarnishing what is presented as a humanitarian project far
removed from the supposed exploitation of the colonial era. Invoking this reified
narrative of development’s history, individuals and institutions involved in devel-
opment today have effectively distanced their work on poverty alleviation from
the past, thus absolving them of the responsibility of considering how their
activities might in some ways reflect colonial practices and perceptions. One
former colonial administrator and subsequent development professional
indicates this social distancing from colonialism when he said, ‘It was necessary
to present oneself as a ‘new’ kind of Brit, not like those gin guzzling, idle, red
faced colonial chaps’. In this way, development has successfully been recast as a
universally ‘good thing’ even though it may be ridden with paradoxes. 
Understanding the form and extent of colonial traces, however, is necessary
if we are to explore how development mediates, extends, entrenches or counters
colonial legacies. These historical relationships need to be analysed, not only to
examine why international development has evolved in the ways in which it has,
but to evaluate the potential for future development strategies specifically and the
form of North/South relations generally. Since development institutions and
policies continue to articulate at different levels and in different ways a relation-
ship between the ‘west and the rest’, it is clearly important that we understand
the history of that relationship, the form that it takes in the present and the likeli-
hood of its transformation.
Continuities and divergences over time have recently been identified through
institutional histories, analyses of the origins of the ‘doctrines’ of development
and the colonial genealogy of ideas and practices of development (Cowen 
and Shenton 1996, Havinden and Meredith 1993, Munck and O’Hearn 1999) as
well as through life histories of individuals (Kothari 2005). And, there is
increasing recognition that the current economic, social and political situation 
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in developing countries and the continuing interest of the West in the Third
World cannot be properly understood without an adequate understanding of
their historical background. However, despite these critiques of the distorted
history of the discourse, identifying and understanding the implications of a
historical trajectory that links colonialism to development is not a mainstream
preoccupation within the field of development. Furthermore, because develop-
ment is embedded in notions of modernity and progress, the idea that particular
linear changes take place in linear time is reproduced. Moreover, this limited
historical analysis also reveals the largely unreflexive nature of the discipline,
partly engendered through the necessity to achieve development goals and
targets such as project outputs and, at a larger scale, the Millennium Development
Goals. 
The problematic way in which the field writes its history and the kinds of
relations this conceals is compounded by how we understand and imagine ‘time’;
a notion that is central to development based as it is on ideas of progress and
change. Development policies, practices and interventions devised to bring about
these transformations are severely time bound, as evident, for example, in the
very short period allocated to a development project cycle and the speed at which
change is supposed to occur with the setting of endless projections and targets,
best exemplified by the Millennium Development Goals devised in 2000 with an
end date of 2015. Historians who take a much longer view of history and study
how economies, polities and societies change over hundreds of years must surely
question whether these massive transformative goals of development are achiev-
able in such a truncated time period. Perhaps historians can, therefore, identify
more realistically what is and what is not achievable. 
Perceptions of modernity and progress, foundational to a development
concerned with transformation, transition and change, are deeply embedded in
notions of time. However, how the past and the future are understood and
imagined in development policy is largely ignored, under analysed and poorly
theorized. Thus, a history of development is not simply about what events took
place in the past, the charting of a trajectory of dominant ideas and approaches
over time, but also how the past is imagined and mapped onto other places in
the present. The issue here is how the boundaries that delimit where develop-
ment takes place, to and by whom, are marked out and how this subsequently
frames the spatial and temporal limits of development as a field of study and
intervention. 
At the outset, development policy depends upon the identification of a
subject, the poor and marginalized recipients of aid and policy interventions, as
distinct from those who are developed and can legitimately bestow ideas about
progress, morality and civility. Indeed, development has always been premised on
a complex and contested set of boundaries, opposites and dualisms. These spatial
(first and third worlds) and ideological (modern and traditional) binaries that
demarcate the geographical location and the characteristics of different societies,
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and that essentialize much development thinking, are further imbued with
notions of temporality (past and future; old and new). 
In development discourse people in distant places became what Appadurai
(1988) calls ‘incarcerated’, confined, in particular locations ‘over there’. This
distancing and incarceration is informed by ideas about modernity that underpin
development discourse and is further perpetuated by the language of, for
example, the ‘local’, ‘indigenous’ and ‘grassroots’ that embeds recipients of devel-
opment interventions in certain places and abstracts, excludes and separates them
from the global. While this produces geographical separations of ‘over there’, it
also creates temporal ones, as these places and the people who inhabit them are
also imagined as existing ‘back then’. Through a discourse of tradition,
backwardness and underdevelopment, they become confined and consigned to
the past. These social imaginings of the past that are mapped onto contemporary
spatialities show how the past is not simply another time but also another place.
Different temporalities then are ascribed to different spaces and peoples and in
this way, a distinction is produced between the ‘here and now’ of the west that is
positioned in relation to, and against, the ‘there and then’ of the Third World.
Development interventions are subsequently framed to help the so-called Third
World move into the future – not necessarily a future of their own imagining,
however, but a future as exemplified by the west. With the past imagined as a
place in the present, it is literally another country where they do things differ-
ently, allowing the west not only to live in the present but to represent the
(global) future.
The past is a contested historiography, therefore, but so is the future problem-
atically framed. Development is a term used to both describe processes of change
and to offer a normative framework to guide change. However, projections of
where we are, where we should be going, and how we move from one set of
circumstances to another are predetermined in ways that foreclose the future. The
practice of development depends on notions of progress that assume universal
trajectories of development in which certain people and places are left behind
and have to be brought into modernity through development interventions
(Ferguson 2006). Such assumptions are founded on western epistemologies in
philosophy and social theory that establish the categorical split between past,
present and future as distinct kinds of time. The future then, is predictable,
ordered and regulated; pre-empted and foreclosed through formal planning
procedures exemplified through the targets and future scenarios of major devel-
opment agencies that can be achieved through the adoption of a particular set of
policy prescriptions and planning instruments that impose a predicted future
within a short timeframe and with known outcomes. The World Bank’s influen-
tial Voices of the Poor study (Narayan et al. 2000), reinforces this when it concludes
that the poor need to change in order to fit in with a future which is already
known and aspired to for them. Such perspectives, and the policies that stem
from them, ignore the steps and strategies that people use to imagine and realize
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their own futures or as Appadurai puts it, their capacity to aspire (Appadurai
2004). The implications of this way of thinking are profound, namely that
universal history, and inclusion within it, is about progression towards the
modern in the context of capitalist development. 
I have argued that spatial and temporal distinctions ‘incarcerate’ the poor in
specific times and places and (re)produce hierarchies. History scholarship can, I
think, contribute methodologically, empirically and conceptually to uncovering
and understanding these perceptions of time and move development policy
beyond the temporal boundaries that continue to inform the industry. Taking a
historical perspective can illuminate how history-making so often conceals
legacies of the past evident in the contemporary period and more significantly
challenge representations of the Third World as a place inhabited by peoples with
no history until they become part of the story of the west. Indeed, as Slater
(1993) reminds us, Third World histories have been envisaged as only beginning
with their encounter with the west when he writes, ‘the rise of the west, as an
idea rather than a geographical frame, is indeed a global story’. 
Change over time then is embedded in a series of dualisms whereby devel-
opment articulates a progression which is cultural (from traditional to modern),
moral (from bad to good), spatial (Third to First worlds), political (autocratic to
democratic) and temporal (from past to future). There have been attempts to
unsettle and disrupt these and the categories they construct. For example,
postcolonial analyses provide critical responses to the historical effects of
colonialism and the persistence of colonial forms of power and knowledge into
the present. In exposing colonial discourses and practices, postcolonialists reveal
how contemporary global inequalities between rich and poor countries have
been, and continue to be, shaped by historical power relations in multiple ways.
Through problematizing, deconstructing and decentring the supposed univer-
sality of western knowledge, postcolonial perspectives critically engage with, and
resist the variety of ways in which the west produces knowledge about other
people in other places and interrogates hegemonic histories that often obscure
the continuing effects of colonialism (see Kothari 2004). However, the implica-
tions of how time is invoked, particularly in its imaginings of past and future,
have yet to be fully understood (Slater and Bell 2002). The challenge, therefore,
is to explore how time is used to construct the other so that, as Fabian (1983)
argues, we can begin to see the Third World as contemporaries of the west. A
critical historiography, one that draws on a range of different sources, can help
us do this by providing different histories of development, identifying continu-
ities and divergences with the past, exploring the discursive distinctions between
past, present and future and their spatial mapping and challenge the compressed
time-scale of much contemporary development policy.
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3
Social security as a developmental institution?
The relative efficacy of poor relief provisions
under the English Old Poor Law
Richard M. Smith
In the 1960s and 1970s, it was widely believed that ‘development’ in the West
was both a fundamentally economically driven process and one which had
exploded into life with the world’s first industrial revolution, which occurred in
Britain between 1780 and 1850. This was reflected in the statistical narrative of
growth researched by Deane and Cole and in the influential interpretation of
W.W. Rostow’s Stages of Economic Growth, with its celebrated metaphor of the British
economy ‘taking-off’ into self-sustaining flight during the early nineteenth
century (Deane and Cole 1969, Rostow 1960). In many respects this general
narrative continues to be influential in development policy circles today. 
However, development scholars and practitioners alike need to take on board
the full implications of the profound transformation that has come about during
the 1980s and 1990s in historians’ understanding of the nature of industrializa-
tion and associated urbanization in Britain. The new orthodoxy is a much more
evolutionary model of centuries-long build-up from 1600 through to 1800. As
Table 3.1 demonstrates, during these two centuries England’s economy achieved
a sustained trajectory of upward economic growth, quite abnormal for all the rest
of western Europe. This can be proxied by the extent of growth of the urban
population in England and England’s contribution to overall European urban
growth from 1600 to 1800. By 1700 England had surpassed her great rival
Holland as a crucible of European commercialization and growth of the
secondary sector. Thus, historians of the world’s first episode of ‘development’ are
now, following the lead of the Nobel laureate Douglass North (1981), focusing
on examining the full range of economic and social institutions which could
account for that exceptional performance across two centuries before steam
power was first used to spin yarn in Lancashire. 
One of these institutions attracting great interest is the role of the precocious
‘Old Poor Law’, a national social security system deemed by act of parliament to
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operate throughout England in 1601. Though it was an institution comprised of
many parts, and one that evolved over time, it is helpful to think of it as being
comprised of two general elements: an ‘indoor’ component, which sought to
provide basic assistance in the form of housing and hospitalized health care to
the poor (and especially to orphans and unmarried mothers); and an ‘outdoor’
component, which provided cash payments and food rations to the destitute
(and was available to broader sections of the population during economic
downturns and episodes of harvest failures resulting in food price inflation).
Both forms of assistance were ‘portable’, in that eligibility was not conditional
upon permanent residence as a basis for membership in a particular geograph-
ical community, though assistance itself was monitored and distributed through
local parishes. Recent scholarship, which this chapter surveys and extends,
suggests that the Old Poor Law was instrumental in encouraging labour mobility
and in providing an elementary but innovative and relatively comprehensive
social safety net, which facilitated broad-based entrepreneurship and innovation
by ensuring that failure in such ventures did not lead inexorably to destitution.
Over a decade has passed since Peter Solar, in a stimulating revisionist analysis
of the English Old Poor Law, made a forceful case for the role it played in facili-
tating the distinctive character of pre-industrial economic success, achieved by
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Table 3.1 The English share of European urban growth 1600–1800 
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what Wrigley has termed England’s primarily ‘organic economy’ (Solar 1995,
Wrigley 2006). Solar made a claim that, when comparisons are made between
English poor relief and other systems of poverty alleviation to be found in most
other areas of pre-industrial Europe, levels of English poor relief exceeded those
provided elsewhere. His principal interest was in the ways that this provisioning
led to certain economic efficiencies, particularly when compared with England’s
near neighbour France. In particular, he stressed the role played by the poor law
in facilitating labour mobility, contrary to Adam Smith’s view of the system and
its assistance in enabling a particular type of capitalist agriculture to arise. The
latter argument has subsequently been endorsed by Wrigley in his more recent
attempts to chart both the causes and consequences of English agrarian success
in underwriting both rapid urban growth and the shift of employment into the
secondary sector well before 1750. While Solar’s paper has received some
comment of a critical nature,1 the argument has become tacitly accepted in many
quarters. 
This present chapter attempts to develop some of Solar’s arguments still
further and in so doing to confront some of the criticisms made against Solar’s
case. More is made in this current assessment of the distinctive role played by
parishes as units of revenue raising and welfare distribution, particularly with
regard to issues of equity and welfare citizenship. A more wide-ranging attempt
is also made to extend Solar’s observations about the centrality of the agrarian
underpinnings of revenue generation for welfare provisioning, not just in rural
but in urban industrial regions as well. Finally, certain demographic conse-
quences that may have flowed from the operation of the system that help to
account for the benign nature of the Malthusian ‘positive check’ when applied to
English mortality in a wider European context are considered.
1  The settlement laws, parochial residence and welfare citizenship 
under the Old Poor Law
While this chapter is primarily concerned with the issue of welfare entitlements
and discriminations in relation to parochial residence and particular notions of
citizenship that flow from this membership or association, and is largely set
within a pre-industrial English context, it is also concerned with a key issue in
the comparative treatment of these matters over time within England and
between England and her continental European neighbours between 1600 and
1800. Some of these matters will have to be drawn with broad brush strokes,
given the scope of the chapter. The issue underpinning the bulk of the chapter,
and one that has long preoccupied historical demographers of pre-industrial
societies, concerns the susceptibility of their populations to demographic crises
associated with short-term economic difficulties, primarily due to dearth and
harvest deficiencies. 
It was over twenty years ago that the Cambridge Group for the History of
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Population, in a demographic reconstruction of England from 1541–1871, was 
able to establish how much of the variation in mortality was explicable in terms 
of variation in the price of wheat in the same year and the four subsequent years. 
For England from the mid-sixteenth to early nineteenth century, it was discov-
ered that price variation accounted for only 16 percent of the variation in 
mortality and that most of this was the result of nine years of extreme upward 
fluctuations in prices. It was also revealed that the net effect of price fluctuations 
was essentially zero and that runs of years of high prices had no effect on 
mortality (Wrigley and Schofield 1981: 371–82). The contrast with other parts 
of Europe is striking. In France, for instance, 46 percent of the fluctuations in the 
non-infant death rate in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were associated 
with grain price fluctuations and runs of high prices had an extra effect on 
mortality (Galloway 1981). Clearly we would need to consider a host of factors 
to do with the nature of agrarian institutions (particularly legal and tenurial 
issues), marketing and productivity in a comprehensive comparison of these 
situations. In this present discussion, a set of issues to do with welfare provi-
sioning – and particularly to do with revenue raising through taxation at the 
level of the politically constituted parish, as well as the criteria by which eligi-
bility for the receipt of relief were determined – are singled out for comparative 
consideration.
One theme that looms large in the research of early modernists who have 
focused their attention on poor relief in early modern England has been, from 
the mid-sixteenth century, the increasing government interference with, central-
ization and emerging uniformity of, poor-relief provision. For the most part this 
research turns a blind eye to the medieval situation. If attention is given to the 
earlier period it is usually granted within the framework of discussions of 
voluntary charitable activities performed by ecclesiastical and monastic institu-
tions, and the welfare provided by gilds and fraternities and individual benefac-
tions as reflected in the acts of testators in their wills (McIntosh 1988, Bennett 
1992, Harvey 1993). 
To these concerns may be added the traditional medieval peasant ‘poor law’; 
as it was first termed seventy years ago by Frances Page. Such a poor law was 
conventionally seen as having been based upon family arrangements by which, 
within the manorial courts, new tenants promised to the ‘retired’ or impover-
ished elderly peasant shelter in housing, food, clothing and fuel (Page 1930). 
Some historians have noted how great was the public dimension in these contracts, 
particularly in the late medieval demographic conditions when arrangements 
were made between persons who were frequently unrelated (Clark 1982, Smith 
1991). This public involvement in welfare provision went beyond the curial 
monitoring of intra-familial and inter-personal maintenance agreements, since 
what was to become a fundamental element in early modern poor law, the 
common parish box, is known to have existed and is frequently mentioned in the 
wills of testators of the fifteenth century who left money or requested through
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‘death bed land transfers’ that land be sold specifically to raise funds for the poor,
or for the payment of the king’s taxes on behalf of fellow disadvantaged parish-
ioners (Dyer 1994). 
Given what appears to be a veritable ‘mixed economy’ of welfare prevailing
before the events of the 1530s, when the early Tudor regime effectively ‘nation-
alised’ the church and its institutions that rendered charity, it is not surprising
that what emerges as a result of a succession of legislative moves from 1536
onwards, culminating in the Elizabethan statutes of 1598 and 1601, should be
regarded as so fundamentally different from prevailing practices in the later
middle ages. Noteworthy in this respect are moves to fund welfare through a
compulsory property tax, the ‘centralization’ (at the local parish level) of its
administration being carried out through parish vestries and their unpaid
officials working in conjunction with Justices of the Peace (JPs), as well as steps
to punish vagrants and to put the able-bodied poor to work. The emerging focus
upon the parish as the unit of welfare funding and administration is now so
frequently singled out as not only differentiating early modern England from her
European neighbours, but as also marking a very real break with earlier medieval
practices in which the parish had a very minor role to play in the totality of
welfare provisions (Slack 1988, Innes 1999). 
We are fairly certain that parliamentary legislation was consistently using
local models of welfare-provisioning that had been locally tested before the
introduction of the 1598 and 1601 Acts. Indeed, it might be claimed that we have
here a form of ‘institutional path dependency’ in the sense that parish-based
revenue raising became ‘locked in’ as a mechanism for funding local welfare
needs, although it could not have been so securely embedded without a strong
central government or a state with responsive and reliable representatives or law
officers resident in the localities, in the persons of the JPs. For instance, although
statutorily separate, Tudor and Stuart dearth or famine policies (principally the
‘Books of Orders’, on which see Section 3, below) did much to remedy deficien-
cies in the social distribution of scarce grain in grain-producing areas (Slack
1980). It is also probable that the abandonment, particularly after 1630, of these
interventions in favour of new practices aimed at increasing the cash in the hands
of those whose vulnerability was exposed to high grain prices in bad years may
have had beneficial commercial and economic consequences, effectively boosting
the purchasing power of the poor (Slack 1992).
There has been much stimulating work on the parish, indeed the politics of
the early modern parish has been promoted to a research theme of justifiable
significance by Keith Wrightson and many of his pupils in recent years, and has
rightly assumed a position as important as that of the politics of the county and
the nation.2 This work has reminded us, in the elegant phrasing of Steve Hindle,
that ‘the early modern English parish, like all communities, had both margins and
boundaries, and that becoming a member of, and belonging to, the parish
community were transactions which entailed the negotiation of relativities of
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status and of space’. Indeed, as is frequently noted, the very existence of community
also implies exclusion from membership (Hindle 2000: 97). Such a notion
seems incontrovertible, yet it remains unclear how far developments from the
late sixteenth century constituted a major redrafting of the criteria for
community membership resulting from the central role assumed by the parish as
a provider of relief to the poor. 
There seems good reason to suppose that with the concentration of authority
in the hands of parish officers that discretionary parochial relief provision was a
noteworthy feature of day-to-day practice in the determination of welfare
payments. There may have been a harder edge to the categorization of eligibility,
as well as a growing desire by elites to associate poverty’s causes with human
failings in conjunction with a clearer identification of a tripartite classification of
the poor into the impotent, the thriftless and the labouring poor. There is, too, a
sense in the writings of early modernists that the English parish begins to acquire
a stronger spatial sense of itself, of its boundaries and of its inhabitants who have
entitlements – with entitlements to relief being a major concern. This is reflected
supposedly in a growing fear of strangers and the ‘unsettled’ – a fear that culmi-
nates in the Settlement Laws of the late seventeenth century which codify this
notion of attachment to place and its associated entitlements. There is much to be
said for this approach, which interrogates the community by focusing as much
on who was excluded as on who was an acknowledged member or insider. 
However, to characterise such features of the local social structure as ‘the
unwelcoming, not to say the unwelcome, face of community’ is to focus on only
one side of the coin (Hindle 2000: 101). A system of welfare funding that was
so heavily dependent upon revenue-raising from a local property tax would be
obliged, particularly in a society in which geographical movement was so
common an experience, to set rules regarding those individuals for whom local
ratepayers assumed a responsibility for support. Welfare systems have never been
universal in their reach. Entitlements have almost invariably been restricted by
ruling that ‘strangers’ are not eligible for support. Indeed, according to Michael
Walzer, welfare systems, as expressions of distributive justice, necessarily require
hard lines to be drawn between insiders and strangers. As he puts it, ‘the idea of
distributive justice presupposes a bounded world of “citizenship” within which
distribution takes place: within a group of people committed to dividing,
exchanging and sharing social goals, first of all among themselves’ (Walzer
1983: 31). 
It might be helpful to introduce into this debate notions from collective
action theory and from the perspective of the donor – the welfare funder as well
as the welfare beneficiary. If not, we may be in danger of losing sight of how
revenue for welfare purposes might be generated locally in adequate quantities
to meet needs. Collective action theory would suggest that willingness to provide
welfare funds would be forthcoming and persist only if one could trust one’s
peers, not just in one’s parish of residence but in all other parishes to be equally
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forthcoming in their revenue raising. If welfare is provided in one parish and 
not in another the danger is that those in search of support will move to that
parish in inordinate numbers allowing potential rate or taxpayers in other
parishes to free-ride. Collective action theory takes it for granted that it is rational
for a group member (i.e., in this case, a rate-payer) to want to enjoy the benefits
of welfare provisioning for the poor without paying the costs, thereby creating
the paradoxical situation that a good does not come into existence or functions
only sub-optimally although its proper functioning is beneficial to all members
of the group. 
Mancur Olson provides the widely exploited theoretical framework for the
importance of the free-rider problem in the resourcing of collective goods, since
the non-excludability of the good implies that a member of a group profits, even
if he or she makes no contribution to it (Olson 1965). Such a position takes it
for granted that it is rational for a group member to want to enjoy the benefits
of an arrangement without paying the costs. Abram de Swaan, in his In the Care of
the State, has considered in rather generalised terms early modern European
charity and welfare provisionings in these terms and sees the English Elizabethan
poor law as one means by which the free-rider problem is effectively tackled. For
de Swaan, the Poor Law of 1601, by requiring the parish to levy an adequate
poor rate from its property owners, enabled the replacement of an unstable pre-
Reformation local equilibrium of voluntary collective charity by a system of
obligatory taxation (de Swaan 1988: 21–36). Thereby the task of collection, co-
ordination and disbursement is shifted from voluntary church agencies to
appointed or elected overseers of the poor and, more importantly, the care of
persons without means of subsistence was assigned to their community of legal
‘settlement’. By conceptualising the problem in these terms it becomes easier to
see how the increasing formalisation of the subsequent Settlement Laws, which
accompanied and buttressed the Poor Laws and the sustained growth in the sums
raised and dispensed (even though real incomes were rising in the century after
1650), were intimately interconnected and mutually reinforcing developments
(Slack 1990: 45–58, Smith 1996). 
The law of settlement and removal introduced in 1662 definitively removed
any idea that paupers had a secure claim to relief simply on the basis of residence
in a parish (although it is doubtful whether such a right ever existed). However,
England was in possession of a particularly mobile population, as anyone who
has ever attempted to undertake nominative linkage of individuals appearing in
a parish register will testify. Rarely do 50 percent of those born in an early
modern English parish go on to marry and or die in that same parish. This feature
of the social structure further highlights the need for a welfare system based
upon more than 10,000 separate funding units to have rules relating to place-
based entitlements to relief. 
The law that dealt with these matters was not a single piece of legislation, but
a complex collection of statutes and legal precedents. Two provisions constituted
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the root of the 1662 legislation. First, anyone able to rent a tenement for £10 per
annum was exempt from its provisions and all those who were unable to meet
those conditions had to reside in a parish for forty days or more to acquire a
‘settlement’ (right to poor relief) there. This was not easy, since to gain a settle-
ment a migrant had to give notice in writing of his or her arrival and this in turn
had to be read in church and entered into the Poor Law account book of the
parish. 
Such a procedure made it easy for objections to be raised. By the beginning
of the eighteenth century there were various routes through which migrants
were able to establish a new entitlement to relief that over-rode the forty-day
rule. A settlement could be obtained by someone being hired for and fulfilling
one year’s service, and upon marriage a wife acquired her husband’s settlement.
Apprenticeship, service and marriage were contracts to which the Poor Law
remained subservient. Likewise, anyone living on their own freehold acquired a
settlement and those performing a parochial office automatically gained a settle-
ment. Those who had not acquired a settlement in this way were at risk of
removal if they were suspected of needing relief prior to 1795. But even in this
respect the force of the law was mitigated somewhat by various measures. For
instance, departing migrants could obtain certificates from the parochial officials
in the parish where they were legally settled, recognising that parish’s obligation
to provide relief if they were to become chargeable elsewhere. A significant
amount of non-resident relief was moved across space from parish to parish, and
was a means by which urban parishes maintained relatively low expenditure,
notwithstanding the presence in them of recent migrants lacking a local settle-
ment (this is discussed in greater depth in section 2 below).3
At the heart of many of the difficulties arising from this system was the small
size of the parish unit as a source of and dispenser of welfare funds.4 Welfare
theory provides a powerful argument that small demographic units of welfare
provisioning based upon local revenue raising may be particularly susceptible to
problems that stem from risk covariance. The theory is that ‘insurance’ is
generally most efficiently supplied if the income of the person being insured is
not positively correlated with the income of those providing the insurance. Thus
if a community falls on bad times it should look for support from outside the
community. Obviously, had early modern English poor relief been provided in
geographical units larger than the parish an incentive problem associated with
risk covariance may have been reduced and attitudes towards in-comers and the
‘unsettled’ may have been less fraught (Newbery 1989, Platteau 1991). However,
as the units of risk-pooling increase in size problems associated with the elicita-
tion of accurate information about the needs of potential beneficiaries become
greater, and the willingness to contribute to the welfare fund on the part of the
property holders may diminish. The small size of most parochial communities
may have helped in the elicitation of information about individual needs,
reducing but not eradicating the adverse selection effects that bedevil social
History, historians and development policy82
Bayly 03_Tonra 01  21/06/2011  10:19  Page 82
security systems, although leaving beneficiaries susceptible to the discriminatory
actions on the part of parish officers.5
2  The agrarian roots of English poor relief in comparative context
A note worthy feature of historians’ work on early modern English poor relief in
the period during which Parliament strove to establish the laws embodied in the
later Tudor statutes of 1598 and 1601 is that they possessed a decided urban
emphasis or preoccupation. In fact, the notion that poverty and the procedures
for tackling it were heavily focused on towns gave to the literature on early
modern England an attribute which it certainly shared with the early modern
European historiography of poverty and welfare (Slack 1988, Warde 2007).
However, where the English historiographical tradition diverged from that of
much of Europe was that by the eighteenth century and especially its latter half,
the emphasis was much more heavily directed to poverty as a rural problem and
deeply rooted in the functioning of the agrarian economy.6 In contrast, consid-
erations of poverty in much of eighteenth-century Europe retained an urban-
centric emphasis that suggested a continuity of concepts and sources with the
European situation two centuries earlier.
A particularly suggestive indication of this distinctively rural ‘tradition’ of
thinking and emphasis can be identified as early as 1792 in the Annals of Agriculture
(Howlett 1792). In that year, Arthur Young had brought the reports of the French
Committee of Mendicity that had appeared over 1790–91 to the attention of
John Howlett, that astute contemporary observer of eighteenth-century English
poor relief practices, enclosure and population (to name but a few of his
interests). Those involved in France in the drafting of these committee reports
were of course much interested in procedures relating to poor relief as practised
in England, and it had been noted with incredulity by contemporary French
commentators that Howlett himself had reported that ‘the number of our poor
occasionally relieved are frequently a third part of the total of paupers assisted’.
Furthermore, they had observed that it was reported that ‘in a certain parish fifty
or sixty miles from London are annually no less than a third of its total popula-
tion [relieved] and that, extraordinary cases excepted, the proportional number
of poor is greater in country parishes than in manufacturing towns’. French
expectations were clearly that rural areas would have few relief recipients and that
towns, particularly those with industry, would expend more resources in relief
and higher proportions of their populations would be recipients there than in
rural areas.
It is commonplace to stress that in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
France, unlike England, revenue for poor relief was in general not raised by
compulsory rating or taxation. Many villages and towns had so-called bureaux de
charité which were a pool of alms primarily from voluntary (albeit very diffuse)
sources, which did provide outdoor relief, often in case or kind. But this
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provision was supplemented and often surpassed in absolute amounts in the
largest towns by the more ambitious and certainly more ostentatious hôpital general
as an institution for the employment of the idle, relief of the sick and orphaned
and the punishment of the rogue or vagrant. To these providers of welfare we
should add the Hôtel-Dieu, an older institution theoretically serving the sick poor
and primarily, indeed almost exclusively, urban-located. It embodied certain
attributes of the English workhouse or house of correction but did much more
besides and usually contained in excess of 100, and in the larger provincial
centres could house over 1,000 inmates.7 In France, the most striking embodi-
ment of formal relief was the large urban-located institution; in England, it was
the parish-based rate that was collected in both town and countryside with equal
efficacy and, as Table 3.2 shows, in the late eighteenth century, Howlett provided
evidence to show that it was siphoned off with a higher intensity in rural than
in urban settings, with a pound raised per 2.6 inhabitiants in 320 county
parishes, as against one pound per 6 inhabitants in nine large towns.8
It cannot be stressed too greatly that in France the resources in theory
available for outdoor relief through bureaux de charité seem in practice to have been
somewhat limited. In fact, these funds, when available, tended inexorably to
gravitate to towns. Ecclesiastical tithe, for instance, usually hovering around one-
twentieth of gross agricultural product, was frequently carried off to swell the
store-houses of church dignitaries in the diocesan capitals, and so served as an
urban levy on the countryside. The tendency for the nobility and haute bourgeoisie
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Table 3.2 Howlet’s evidence on the urban-rural differential in the Poor Law’s financial
incidence (ratio of each £ raised per head of population)
No. of Poor’s rate Proportion of £
inhabitants to inhabitants
Nine towns, chiefly 193,158 49,296 about 1 to 6*
manufacturing of the greatest 
magnitude in this kingdom,
that is Norwich, Manchester,
Birmingham, Bristol, Sheffield,
Exeter, Worcester, Leeds and
Nottingham
67 towns of inferior, none of 130,000 36,844 1 to 31/4 (3.25)
them containing 10,000
320 county parishes 139,000 53,413 1 to 26/10 (2.6)
* In the cities of London and Westminster and borough of Southwark, the proportion is nearly the
same
Source: Howlett (1792)
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to be urban domiciled exacerbated the urban-focused character assumed by
charitable funds.
The Committee of Mendicity surveyed each French département’s total
resources supposedly available for the provision of outdoor relief. Assuming, as
did Olwen Hufton (1974) when she pioneered consideration of this source, that
around 25 percent of the population was in need of welfare support, then the
real extent of resources available to meet that need, and revealed by the Comm-
ittee’s work, was evidently not very great. If allowance is made for the possibility
that approximately 30–40 livres might meet the bread grain requirements for
one individual over the course of the year, then some simple calculations can be
made relating to the relief potential provided by these welfare funds across
regions. In the wealthiest départments (Seine-Inférieure, Flandre, Meuse, Cote-d’Or,
Bouche-du-Rhone and Loiret.), so distinguished on the basis of their available
charitable funds, 1–4 livres per capita for the poor, or the equivalent of 10–40
days of bread, could be provided annually. Worse than this, in the geog-raphically
extensive belt running from the Basses-Pyrénénees through Gascony, the Landes,
Gironde, Lot-et-Garenne, and Lot through the Dordogne, Charenter and the
Corèze to the Creuse and Puy-de-Dôme, the total resources divided by the 25
percent assumed to have been in need would have been sufficient in any one year
to buy a single pound of bread for each hungry person. These figures, even if
exaggerated regarding the inadequacy of the support available, are striking in
what they reveal when set against the rate-based relief in England, which in the
mid-1780s was capable of supporting, primarily in the form of outdoor relief,
10 percent of the total population in bread for the whole of any calendar year.9
The extent to which the later seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Poor Law
in England offered aid in the form of outdoor relief might at first glance seem
surprising, given that the Elizabethan statutes which provided the legal founda-
tions on which the system of parochial relief rested stressed four main functions,
of which only one involved substantial expenditure on people in their own
homes. These were (i) to relieve in almshouses those unable to work – old, sick
and disabled persons, (ii) to provide work for those unable to find work but who
were able-bodied, (iii) to apprentice children by redistributing them into house-
holds so situated that they could put them to work profitably, and (iv) to assist
those who found themselves in ‘family circumstances’ that made them incapable
of being self-supporting. By some considerable margin, the emphasis on the
Elizabethan legislation as it had progressed from the 1550s was on the first and
second functions – indoor relief and work provision. These were very familiar
themes in pan-European welfare aims and practices at the time and in no sense
distinguished England from her continental neighbours. Furthermore, the signif-
icant physical size of indoor institutions combined with punitive measures to
deal with vagrants and the quasi-disciplinary attempts to give the unemployed
work were particularly prominent features of the markedly urban-oriented
settings of welfare provisioning in the sixteenth century. This is not surprising in
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so far in an English context it was the towns that had lost most in terms of insti-
tutional support for the poor as a result of the changes brought about in the
1530s.10
To focus on outdoor relief without reference to the Tudor and early Stuart
dearth or famine policies would be to tell only part of a far more complex story.
There is not space to delve deeply into this matter, but it might be worth stressing
the significance of the shift in dearth policy or practice after 1630 that Slack
(1988) was perhaps the first to signify. The interventionist stances that had been
crystallised in part through the Books of Orders moved more directly to one in
which, rather than intervening in the market to requisition grain and to limit its
free movement in periods of shortage, greater reliance was placed upon putting
cash in the pockets of the poor to enable them to buy grain or bread. This was
most definitely enabled by and possibly a contributor to the spread of rate-raising
and the use of rate-based revenues for the provisioning of outdoor relief. It was
in such processes that the spread of rate-based revenue to rural settings acquired
momentum and that in part helps to explain how the situation we observe so
much more clearly in the eighteenth century had come into being.11
In introducing this discussion, use has been made of John Howlett’s
comments on urban-rural contrasts. It is worth stressing how London and
Middlesex stand out as a welfare ‘desert’ when funds derived from the rates are
concerned, a feature that would add greatly to the disbelief of those French
commentators from the early 1790s. There may be a mixture of explanations for
this feature of poor relief geography. Low per capita expenditure might well
reflect the large quantities of alternative charitable resources in London
(although crowding-out effects in the relationship between rate-based and
voluntary charitable expenditure are generally not a feature of welfare funding in
early modern England); London’s more diverse economy would have provided a
multitude of opportunities to generate incomes; London would, unlike the
nation in general, have had a population with a far higher proportion of its
population between fifteen and thirty-five – the age groups least likely to be
deemed eligible recipients of relief.12
Many long-stay migrants would also have lacked a settlement in the city but
would have been eligible for support from rural areas from which they had
migrated. In fact, the evidence assembled by Sokoll (2001) relating to the early
nineteenth-century pauper letters written by those who were resident extra-
parochially suggest a strong propensity for those settled in rural and market-
town Essex to have relief sent from those rustic settings to support them in their
London residences.13 Non-resident relief is a subject that is greatly in need of
more thorough-going quantitative research, since it may be another factor at a
broader inter-regional level that might account for lower expenditure in the
northern urban and industrial regions in the eighteenth century. It is also another
indicator of how far welfare revenue raising was so heavily grounded in the rural
economy and the agrarian sector, and perhaps another reason for reflecting
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further on the large charge placed upon this sector in underpinning social and
economic change over the two centuries prior to 1850. This was a charge that
the French rural economy could not meet and perhaps would not have been
required to carry, given the dominance of the peasant farmer as opposed to
journalier households in the majority of French regions.
3  Parochial relief practices and epidemiological consequences in England 
c.1650–c.1800: some further comparisons
In this section of the chapter the focus is primarily on certain features of English
and French mortality and epidemiological history in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries that may be set against the background of welfare practices
in those two historical settings. In what follows, the preoccupation is principally
with possible demographic patterns that flow from the differences in the relative
shares of relief that are provided in ‘indoor’ and ‘outdoor’ forms in different
contexts and the quantities of welfare funding available per capita in town and
country. In particular, the focus is placed upon the role of the small parish unit
as the administrative context within which funds were raised and disbursed in
England and the absence of such frameworks and practices in France.
In specifying ‘indoor’ and ‘outdoor’ relief, a distinction is being made in
fairly generalised (some might claim crude) terms between relief given as
income substitutes or supplements to persons who did not live within the
confines of larger institutions such as hospitals, workhouses or houses of correc-
tions, and that given in the form of care, cash allowances and medical services to
persons lodged within such institutions. Consequently, indoor relief is regarded
as that which is obtained by persons on, or as a consequence of, entering such
institutions. It must be acknowledged at the outset that one cannot be too
categorical in the use of these terms in so far as they were far from being ‘non-
communicating’ sectors of welfare provisioning. Certainly, continental European
hospitals did give outdoor relief, although it proved to be an area of their overall
activity that is difficult to quantify; where it has been studied, the focus has
almost invariably been upon fairly substantial urban centres in which a minority
of the total populations resided (Jutte 1994, Henderson 2006). However, the
principal purpose here is to attempt to relate these welfare systems to the
demographic and more specifically, the epidemiological regimes in which they
were embedded. I would argue that it is the relative share of welfare in the
respective sectors that is the key issue in so far as that distribution has consider-
able bearing upon both the way welfare was managed and the extent to which it
reached those in need of assistance.
It is noteworthy how quickly use of indoor relief and its associated institu-
tions – almshouses, hospitals, bridewells, houses of correction – became
restricted elements in relief provision after c.1630 relative to the provision of
outdoor relief in the form of cash payments to persons in their own homes.
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Another integral part of early modern English welfare provisioning, although
statutorily separate, was the Tudor and early Stuart dearth or famine policy which
was embodied in the Books of Orders, specifying a set of actions to be imple-
mented in the event of harvest difficulties, food shortages and high prices (Slack
1980). The key practices concerned government measures to ensure that, in times
of dearth, corn supplies were to be kept in the country, carefully husbanded and
distributed to those in need. These measures involved prohibition of grain
exports when prices were high, public purchases of corn from abroad, and
searches and surveys of corn supplies undertaken by public authorities with a
view to a regular and ordered provision of the open market. In practice, the
policy of searches and market provision did more to remedy deficiencies in the
social distribution of scarce grain in grain-producing areas than deficiencies in
its geographical distribution, reflected in the continued vulnerability of the
northern and north-western regions of England to famine well into the third or
fourth decades of the seventeenth century when most of the remainder of the
country was not so affected (Appleby 1978). 
Nonetheless, it was certainly a dearth policy that encouraged a sense of social
responsibility among JPs, who were increasingly expected to act by the general
populace in the public interest. These same local men who were also agents of
central government were simultaneously charged with monitoring the
machinery for the implementation of a parish rate-funded relief (Walter and
Wrightson 1976). As previously noted, it was after 1630 that the ‘dearth policy’
was altered as with a growth in relief practices financed from parish rates,
strenuous efforts were made to expand the quantity of cash in the hands of those
whose vulnerability was exposed to high prices in dearth years. On any scale of
rating of public action and early responsiveness in the face of famine threats,
English Tudor and especially early Stuart governments, both centrally and locally,
would score highly. Central governments were well informed in large measure
because of the effective integration of parishes into the national administrative
centre through the speedy reactions of the JPs – those outwardly orientated,
although provincially, indeed parochially domiciled, unpaid ‘workhorses’. They,
more than any other agency, came to determine a pattern of poor relief which
was largely rendered in the form of cash placed in people’s pockets. The move
towards widespread raising of parish rates to fund these cash payments was by
no means instantaneous.
Of course, the cash relief provided from the rate-based welfare funds rather
than food aid per se may have been decidedly problematic. As Drèze and Sen
remind us, cash aid can almost always help an individual to acquire food and
avoid starvation (Drèze and Sen 1991). It is less clear, however, whether such
practices are always good for collective security, in so far as one person’s capacity
to obtain food through cash can adversely affect the entitlements of others by
placing an upward pressure on prices. Nonetheless, in the early modern English
case, this potential outcome seems largely to have been avoided, since the
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enhanced purchasing power so provided appears to have stimulated interregional
trade, effective grain storage and overall agricultural productivity. Wrigley has
reminded us that even Malthus, who is generally perceived to be no friend of
‘transfer incomes’, had seen – in his neglected essay entitled An investigation of the
cause of the present high price of provisions, published in 1800 – the beneficial impact of
income subsidies in dearth years in very similar terms in his diagnosis of
different outcomes following from severe dearth conditions in England and
Sweden in the late 1790s. T.R. Malthus judged the English case far more
favourably both in economic and demographic terms, notwithstanding the fact
that less severe physical shortfalls of grain had provoked much higher price rises,
in part because of the impact of wage subsidies which he saw as sustaining
demand. In England there was no mortality surge but in Sweden death rates rose
sharply (Wrigley 1999).
What emerges as the striking feature of the Old Poor Law in England is that
monetary relief was given in substantial quantities both to the impotent,
especially elderly poor, and to those indubitably able-bodied, most commonly
young widows or women deserted by their husbands and left with young
children. This relief was allocated to parishioners primarily in their own homes.
In addition, in the last half of the eighteenth century (although with consider-
able variation from place to place), able-bodied male heads of household increas-
ingly received monetary relief in growing quantities (Slack 1992). This was
provided when a combination of difficult economic conditions such as arose
through bad weather, high prices or slack seasonal labour demand, and the
claims of more dependants than such male (frequently the sole income-providers
in rural economies) could cater for, drove them to desperation. Such a set of
welfare-provisioning characteristics came about, notwithstanding the 1722
Workhouse Act which had sought to check applications for relief from the able-
bodied by making entry into the workhouse a condition of receiving relief. While
workhouses were built (which in the terms of this present discussion, may be
categorized as indoor relief) they were to be found in only 15 or 16 percent of
the English parishes by 1773 and few of those parishes apparently applied the
workhouse test (Slack 1990: 31–3).
In 1802–03, the first date for which we can undertake such a calculation,
about 75 percent of the Poor Law Bill of c.£4,000,000 was spent on outdoor
relief. Of the marginally more than 1,000,000 persons (approximately 11
percent of the population) receiving relief that year, 93 percent were relieved
outdoors. While this almost certainly represents the pauperization of a larger
proportion of the able-bodied population than applied a century earlier, it would
seem that no fundamental change of practice had occurred. Evidence from the
Board of Trade returns for 1696 suggests that relief, largely of the outdoor kind,
was available at the level of about £75 per annum for every 1,000 of the popula-
tion or alternatively would at the prices then current have supplied about 5
percent of the population with basic food requirements for the whole of a year.
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In 1696 the value of parish charities, which also largely took the form of outdoor
relief, was considerable and therefore would have to be added to the revenue
raised by the parish rate. In what are justifiably considered to be controversial
assessments (Slack 1990: Table 1, 22), Jordan (1959) estimated that in 1660 the
total income from charities was c.£100,000, roughly the same, perhaps, as the
income from poor rates at that date.14 The number of charitable trusts probably
doubled in the next century and a parliamentary enquiry estimated their income
in 1788 at £258,700 (the returns are known to be incomplete). Paul Slack has
recently gone so far as to suggest that in the 1780s (before the huge rise in rate-
based poor-relief expenditure took place) income from charities was
contributing as much as the rates and in the towns with hospitals and subscrip-
tions, charity may have been the dominant partner alongside rate-based income,
although it too made considerable contributions to outdoor relief (Slack 1990:
41–4).15
In section 2 we have already drawn some comparisons with the situation in
France and commented on the patterns evident in the data collected by the post-
revolutionary Committee of Mendicity. Additional evidence is also revealing. In a
detailed, highly relevant case study, Colin Jones has considered this same body of
evidence and finds in 332 communities in the Montpellier region – containing
250,000 to 275,000 persons – that 150 (or 46 percent) had no forms of relief
whatsoever. Jones is also able to estimate, albeit in a highly approximate fashion,
the amounts of home relief available; 162 communities had nothing to dispense
and 73 had less than 49 livres to distribute. Indeed, 72 percent of the 332
communities had either no relief or at best could support just one person for one
year (Jones 1982). Such evidence is entirely consistent with the expectations of
those French commentators who found Howlett’s observations so 
hard to believe regarding the relative relief expenditure levels in town and
country in England.
In what follows, attention is directed to certain demographic implications of
this uneven and thin spread of charitable resources in France, in particular, their
tendency to concentrate in the towns. Take, first of all, the substantial sums
expended on eighteenth-century English single-parent, female-headed house-
holds in general. Such transfers from collectivity to households or individuals
were far less likely in France at a comparable point in time. One obvious
concomitant of this was the tendency of both unmarried mothers and fatherless
households to drift into towns or to jettison their marginal, insupportable, and
in some cases, unwanted offspring in urban centres. While this matter could be
assessed in far greater detail, for the purposes of this present discussion it is
necessary only to sketch certain demographic patterns concerning illegitimacy
that are highly characteristic of eighteenth-century French society.
In the second half of the eighteenth century it was not at all uncommon to
find French urban and rural illegitimacy ratios that differed by a factor of ten to
twenty. For example, Jean-Pierre Bardet’s study of Rouen shows the illegitimacy
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ratio in the city (Bardet 1983: 337) to have been around 20 percent while in the
surrounding Normandy countryside it was less than 2 percent. Bardet’s estimates,
partially based on the déclarations de grosesse illégitimes, suggest that over 70 percent of
those births in Rouen concerned girls who had come into the city or were recent
immigrants. The link between this form of behaviour and the exposure of the
newborn is, of course, well known and in this matter, Rouen is no exception; in
1710, foundlings left with Rouen’s Hôpital Général displayed a death rate of 580 per
1000, rising over the subsequent seventy years to the sickening heights of 916
per 1000 in 1780. Rates of foundling mortality varying from 600 to 900 per
1000 are the norm in French urban communities throughout the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries.
The concentration of very large numbers of domestically insupportable
infants and children within these overcrowded hospital premises had obvious
repercussions for their well-being. Jones’ study of the Hôpitaux Généraux in
Montpellier and Nîmes shows how infants spent their early months with wet
nurses, but wet nurses who were for the most part some seventy kilometres
distant from the towns and resident within the impoverished welfare ‘deserts’
that were the villages of the Cévennes, the uplands forming the south-eastern
fringe of the Massif Central. In part, this great distance was caused by the fact that
wet nurses in the immediate surroundings of these two southern French towns
were hired by the town’s elite and were in receipt of wages that were three to
four times greater than those accepted by their Cévenol equivalents. In 1779 an
inquiry revealed that out of 610 children sent into the Cévennes in the period
from 1767–77, 71 percent had died prior to the date of their scheduled return
(Jones 1982: 106–7). These figures would be swollen considerably if accurate
data were available on the deaths occurring in the hospital prior to the journey
to the mountain villages. While it would be simplistic in the extreme to see such
patterns as solely to do with the relative supplies of outdoor and indoor relief in
country and town, the contrasts with England are revealing.16
Outdoor relief in England seems to have been much more consistently and
overtly employed to uphold the independence of the household in situ whereas
the French urban-based institutions provided more restricted domestic support
or in the case of the foundling and its mother, offered a highly dangerous alter-
native to the family or household environment.17 Welfare, in the form of cash
payments, fuel allowances and rent subsidies given in England to people in their
homes may have proved to be a more effective way of maintaining relatively low
levels of infant and child mortality than was achieved in the majority of French
regions. In France we can observe the practice of irregular, unpredictable and
certainly inadequate shows of gift-giving to rather small numbers of people or
the transfer of infants from the less hazardous rural to the more hazardous urban
environments in which the hospitals were located. From such institutions the
foundlings were sent into the problematic care of their impoverished wet nurses
serving further to reduce their survivorship chances. Such features of welfare
The relative efficacy of poor relief provisions under the English Old Poor Law 91
Bayly 03_Tonra 01  21/06/2011  10:19  Page 91
provision were characteristic practices in sizeable regions of eighteenth-century
France. 
By contrast, a more predictable and relatively generous level of outdoor relief
to mother and infant offspring may indirectly have increased the fertility-
reducing effects of breastfeeding that was surprisingly ubiquitous in English
villages and small towns, by improving infant survival prospects and by length-
ening the post-partum non-susceptible period that is noteworthy at twelve to
fourteen months for being comparatively much longer in England than in many,
although not all parts of France (Wilson 1986). While the regional differences in
breastfeeding in both France and other parts of continental Europe are in need of
explanations that have to do with complex cultural histories, it is far too simple-
minded to equate areas of low infant mortality with areas that show such feeding
practices to be ubiquitous, for there were many rural areas in which breast-
feeding was the norm but in which infant mortality rates far exceeded 200 or
250 per 1000.18
The child mortality rates are commensurately higher in the French parish
data sets and the contrast between the two ‘national’ experiences emerges strik-
ingly when survivors to exact age ten are considered in the two populations; for
every 1000 individuals born in early eighteenth-century England, 700–725
survived to age ten whereas in France only 500 of the original cohort of 1000
would live. Even in the most favourable French region, the south-west, the
survival rate to age ten was 580. Mortality rates from the rural parishes of Devon
which are among the most favoured communities with regard to their life
expectancy so far analysed would suggest that they experienced levels of survival
rates to age ten in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in excess of 800.19
The welfare practices of the English Old Poor Law and its associated institu-
tions, narrowed down the obligations that individuals owed to their wider kin,
enabling the parental generation within the simple family household to enlarge
pari passu its capacity to help, care and offer guidance to the infant and young
child. One obvious area of restricted kin support consequent upon communal
care provision is that provided by the lineal family to the elderly (Smith 1984,
Laslett 1988, Smith 1998). While not denying a significant amount of intra-
familial care, the parish in rural England played a key role, consequently dimin-
ishing the obligation heaped upon married children who might at that very
phase when assistance to elderly parents was needed, have dependent children
and infants of their own. The long birth interval-breastfeeding-low infant
mortality areas (with infant mortality rates 100–150 per 1000) may be in certain
circumstances reflecting the consequences of injections of income subsidies into
household economies that ensured the survival of both mother and child. The
limited family provision for the elderly, the departure from their natal hearth of
older children as parochially funded servants-in-husbandry or as pauper appren-
tices contracted to work or placed by Poor Law officers in the households of non-
kin may have been other additional influences reducing pressures on English
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household economies with tangible benefits accruing to the youngest depen-
dants (Wrigley 1987a: Table 7.7).
It would seem that a good deal of the outdoor relief provided through the
English Old Poor Law was concerned with remedying income losses brought on
by contingencies such as sickness, death, decrepitude, indeed ameliorating a fall
in living standards at times of relative scarcity. The identification of likely benefici-
aries of such a system does not have to be in the form of strict means-testing or
income-testing. Regular life-cycle contingencies, such as maternity, sickness,
disability, unemployment and old age, can be used as fairly straightforward tests
of the probability of being in need. The effectiveness of this type of system
depends, as Tony Atkinson and John Hills note, on the extent to which those
covered by these contingencies are the poor in a society (Atkinson and Hills
1991). It also depends on the administrative costs of identifying entitlement to
what might be regarded as ‘categorical’ benefits. The administrative problem that
such a system is obliged to solve are not to be underestimated and above all
concern the elicitation of the correct information concerning who has fallen into
the relevant categories. It might be proposed that the English Old Poor Law,
especially in the agricultural regions of southern Britain, was reasonably
successful in eliciting appropriate information and rendering the effective
reactions. Both cash subsidies and the provision of grain through systems of
communally administered and funded welfare – along with an administrative
machinery that intervened in grain markets to minimize the dislocational effects
of variable harvest quality – all helped to minimize short-term rises in mortality
in periods of inflated food prices. 
In section 1 we noted that Galloway found that 46 percent of the fluctuations
of deaths over age five in France in the period 1677–1734 were associated with
fluctuations in grain prices.20 In England from 1675–1755 the comparable figure
was only 24 percent; in France the response in the year of high prices and that
following were 30 and 29 percent respectively, whereas in England the compa-
rable percentages were only 11 and 19. Furthermore, Galloway discovered that in
France and not in England runs of years of high prices had an extra effect in
raising mortality (Galloway 1981). Somehow it does seem that the propertied
classes in early modern England solved the problem of collective action with
regard to their dealings with the poor by their administration of a system of
regular rate-based relief and irregular but very necessary voluntary redistribu-
tions that depended on the vast majority of benefactors trusting that their peers
would do likewise. 
One suspects in this respect that English systems, unlike those in France, were
only minimally bedevilled by the free-rider problem where the generation of
reasonably adequate welfare funds was concerned. Such success did, however,
depend on a particular kind of face-to-face relationship between benefactor and
beneficiary. In some senses the system most likely limited the frantic town-ward
migration of impoverished families in periods of dearth, if not of adolescents and
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young adults who were not yet `settled’ or who were not deemed to a deserving
age category. It may have indirectly limited the extent to which disease was
spread during periods of crisis. Such an interpretation is sustainable, notwith-
standing some suggestive findings from John Landers and Patrick Galloway that
London may have attracted during years of dearth in the late seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries increased numbers of persons in the age groups 15–24,
who may in terms of the ‘welfare-beneficiary’ model to which we referred
earlier, not have been deemed socially acceptable beneficiaries of poor relief in
rural communities but perished as urban immigrants who were exposed to
diseases to which they had no acquired immunity – smallpox is the most obvious
cause of death impacting upon this group (Galloway 1985, Landers 1993:
115–40).21
A comparable effect has also been identified by Patrick Galloway working on
eighteenth-century Rouen where high food prices were associated with
mortality surges in the town but not in rural areas. What is more, the mortality
surges in Rouen were equally characteristic of all social classes, suggesting that
hunger per se was not the proximate cause of death. The preferred interpretation
of this pattern is that social mechanisms designed to reduce hunger among urban
populations, such as price controls and the distribution of grain to the poor
which did not operate in rural districts could induce mortality surges if starving
people of all ages flooded into the urban centres from the countryside bearing
disease with them rather than becoming exposed for the first time to those
diseases endemic within the towns on their arrival (Galloway 1986). 
4  Conclusion
Can we go so far as Ron Lesthaeghe and claim that the extent of risk-sharing
across both social class boundaries, economic sectors and across regions are a
good measure of a society’s social and political integration and that a high degree
of such integration corresponds with a greater preponderance of ‘preventive
checks’ over ‘positive checks’ in the demographic system (Lesthaeghe 1980)? In
so far as the system of welfare such as that produced by the English Old Poor Law
was one that ensured that the effects of the demographic actions of individuals
would be spread over politically constituted parish units, Lesthaeghe is correct in
his judgement. This issue is of broader significance since in making sense of the
character of the early modern English demographic regime it is vital to be
cognisant of the fact that the purchase which fertility had on the demographic
growth rate depended heavily on the underlying high rates of survivorship that
held throughout the whole of the early modern period, not withstanding the
tendency of life expectancy to go through a long cycle of deterioration and
improvement.22
Similarly, did the face-to-face nature of the relationships between the
ratepayer, the welfare administrator or overseer who might himself or his family
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one day be a recipient of welfare and the welfare beneficiary, create the cohesive-
ness to which Lesthaeghe refers? If it was achieved, was it only effectively secured
in highly specific regional contexts and was it anchored by means that infringed
personal liberties with adverse equity implications? Some might respond that the
parochial framework which in the vast majority of cases involved relatively small
populations facilitated a close face-to-face relationship between overseer of the
poor and beneficiary thereby helping to minimize, if not to eradicate, the adverse
selection effect that bedevils social security systems. Furthermore, the small-
group context created by the parish within which the bulk of relief was provided
may have served to reduce many of the transaction costs associated with admin-
istration and information that are frequently assumed to create incentive
problems that worked against the successful implementation of welfare schemes
in pre-industrial settings. In modest-sized parochial units the costs of informa-
tion collection, contract enforcement and entitlement awareness may have been
reduced to manageable levels. 
Abram de Swaan viewed the English Old Poor Law as having secured a
favourable resolution of the problems of risk-covariance and free-riding through
imposing a strong dose of central control (de Swaan 1988: 37–41). Undoubtedly
a powerful state would seem to be a necessary condition, but so is an equally
vibrant and functionally effective local community in the form of the parish
along with a relatively muted role for the wider kin group as a welfare provider.
This chapter, given the constraints of space, has devoted insufficient attention to
the roles played by a host of voluntary and formally corporate institutions that
complemented the Old Poor Law in the provision of welfare and which
unambiguously linked early modern England with many of her European neigh-
bours. However, as Paul Slack reminds us in the conclusion of his Ford Lectures,
in the case of early modern England we have an intriguing paradox since
‘England seems to have been able more easily than other countries to enjoy the
benefits of both a flourishing corporate and voluntary sector and a powerful
central authority and legal system, without the second smothering the first’
(Slack 1998: 161). In fact, Slack regards the Old Poor Law as ‘the most striking
example of the state and the community interacting creatively without one
crowding out the other’. The crowding in that this enabled, it might be suggested,
had significant advantages for early modern England in generating more resource
redistribution across classes and between agrarian and industrial sectors as 
well as enhancing demographic survivorship probabilities which were an
important pre-requisite in enabling the variable operation of the preventive
check to have had so much of a purchase on English population growth rates,
especially after 1650.
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Notes 
1 Some critics, for example, are unwilling to view the Old Poor Law as possessed of
systemic qualities because of what is thought to be far too great a variation in the
levels of relief from parish to parish and from region to region. Steve King (2000,
1997) has argued that that the numbers of persons in receipt of relief in the late
eighteenth century – and what he terms the generosity of support offered to them –
were much reduced in the north and west of England compared with the south and
east (but see Solar 1997). Steve Hindle (2004: 283) has wondered, however, whether
this argument about regional differences is ‘significantly overdrawn (not to say
exaggerated)’ and prefers to see it, based on his work in the seventeenth- and early
eighteenth-century welfare provisioning and rate-raising to support it, as reflecting
‘mosaics of local variation rather than a major regional schism’. 
2 See Wrightson (1996), and many other essays in Griffiths et al. (1996). 
3 Of course, it did lead to litigation between conflicting parishes regarding their
obligations to provide relief to individuals. Also, as the Poor Law was English it did
not extend to Scotland and Ireland; paupers from these areas could be removed from
the country since they had no legal settlement if recently arrived and if they had not
acquired it through the various routes outlined previously (Feldman 2003). This was
especially difficult for temporary harvest workers for instance and became a major
issue under the New Poor Law in the nineteenth century, especially in the industrial
north and around and after the Irish Famine.
4 For an especially balanced, insightful but generally positive assessment of the efficacy
of the Settlement Laws under the Old Poor Law, see Snell (2006).
5 It is a moot question how far what emerged in the seventeenth century constituted
a manageable and effective trade-off between incentive and co-variance problems in
the delivery of welfare. These are issues that are sometimes not fully confronted by
students of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century poor relief, but must loom large in
any serious attempt to review the equity issues at the core of an emerging parochially
focused form of welfare provisioning from the late fourteenth century onwards.
While the risk pool in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries may have been
broader and very loosely structured, by dint of its greater diversity in the matter of
forms of charitable provision, it is not at all clear that it was more inclusive in its
capacity to deliver assistance to those in need and particularly in its ability to deal
with severe dislocation associated with harvest failure. In a thought-provoking essay
in which he pursues the fundamental question posed in the title, ‘Did the peasants
really starve in medieval England?’ Chris Dyer (1998) is inclined to say that for the
most part after 1375 the answer must be a very definite no. This may well prove to
be a more meaningful chronological break-point and one from which an increas-
ingly parochially circumscribed system of revenue-raising and revenue redistribution
brings significant equity advances over large tracts of southern Britain.
6 For example, Schwartz (1988) and Adams (1990).
7 A good overview is to be found in Woolf (1986).
8 For an exemplary study of a predominantly rural setting that demonstrates very
clearly the central features of rural government and social policy in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries see Eastwood (1994).
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9 This discussion of the evidence collected by the Committee of Mendicity is based on
Hufton (1974: chapter 5).
10 Neil Rushton’s reworkings of the evidence created by the Valor Ecclesiasticus of 1535
shows that religious houses, broadly defined, may have been expending up to
£13,000 on charitable activities. In so far as the wealthiest and most significant
contributors to this sum were operating in the larger urban provincial setting the loss
of this source of charitable assistance removed a substantial element in welfare
resources from urban populations. It should not be forgotten that the bulk of this
income had been received from what might be regarded as an urban levy on the
countryside in the form of rents and payments in kind for rural manors or farms (see
Rushton 2001).
11 It might be wise not to overplay the speed with which these practices became so
extensive over rural settings. Paul Slack was inclined when writing in the 1980s on
this subject to suggest that as late as 1660 only a third of English parishes were
raising rates (see Slack 1988: 179), although by 1700 a large majority were doing
so. Steve Hindle (2004: chapter 4) argues that Slack’s diagnosis may have been too
pessimistic regarding the speed with which rural overseers in association with JPs
were able to establish a nationwide system of rate-based revenue raising.
12 These observations are based on the findings from work in progress on the spatial
patterning of relief expenditure revealed in the Board of Trade enquiry of 1696 and
parliamentary enquiries of 1748–50, 1776, 1783–85 and 1802–03.
13 For a useful analysis of letters written by and settlement examinations of London-
based persons seeking relief from rural and non-metropolitan parishes, see Taylor
(1989). Arguments are taken further in Taylor (1991).
14 But see Hadwin (1978).
15 See also Innes (1996).
16 We may stress this contrast, cognisant of Adrian Wilson’s attempt to estimate illegit-
imacy ratios in mid-eighteenth century London through concentration upon the
foundlings taken into the newly established London Foundling Hospital during the
period of the so-called General Reception between 1756 and 1760 (Wilson 1989).
Wilson estimated that the majority of those received were illegitimate and that they
constituted a ratio of 10–12 percent of London births (50 percent by women who
had come to the capital specifically to give birth). Alysa Levene (2003) has very
recently shown that Wilson’s work has produced a significant overestimation of
metropolitan illegitimacy and suggests that illegitimate foundlings may have
accounted for 50 rather than 80–90 percent of the London Foundling Hospital
intake, as argued by Wilson. Her findings suggest a significant downgrading of the
incidence of metropolitan illegitimacy. Even if we were to allow Wilson’s initial
estimate to stand, the drawing power of that massive metropolitan centre with 10–12
percent of the nation’s population seems muted compared with proportionally far
larger flows of mothers and offspring to the much smaller French urban centres. If,
as Wilson suggests, a true ratio of illegitimacy in London in the mid-eighteenth
century was closer to 5 percent, compared with 3–4 percent in the provinces, it
could still be argued that London was not an environment that specifically encour-
aged illegitimacy or the immigration of unmarried mothers to it. The proportion of
London’s unmarried female population at risk to give birth to bastards was much
higher than in the provinces, so an illegitimacy ratio in excess of those in the
countryside by a margin of a couple of percent most likely implies an illegitimacy
rate (per 1000 unmarried females) that was actually lower than in rural areas, as in
fact applies when we have access to the first returns from the Registrar General in the
nineteenth century.
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17 Rates of mortality among foundlings could range from 700–900 per 1000; see Jones
(1982: 45–94) and Bardet (1983: 337).
18 As is well known, the study of infant mortality in seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century France is not straightforward because of the difficulties associated with 
the under-registration of infant and child deaths. French historical demographers
have developed methods to correct these shortcomings which now offer us 
reasonably robust data sets that may be regarded with considerable confidence. 
The most comprehensive sample is that reported by Jacques Houdaille who notes 
an overall improvement in infant mortality rates from 1690 to 1780, but not-
withstanding the decline, the rates revealed make for fairly depressing reading 
when set alongside the equivalent English evidence (see Houdaille 1984). Even 
in the French region with the lowest infant mortality, the south-west, where 
breastfeeding is thought to have been almost ubiquitous, infant mortality rates in 
the 1690s were close to 200 per 1000. Rates of 275 to 350 per 1000 are encoun-
tered in eastern and north-eastern France where breastfeeding was less common 
or of a shorter duration. In fact, Houdaille’s national estimates range from 350 
per 1000 in 1690–1719 to 320 in 1720–49 and fall to 263 in the period 1750–79.
Parish family reconstitutions prepared by the Cambridge Group for the History of
Population and Social Structure from a reasonably large sample of English registers
suggest that infant mortality rates in the 1690s and early 1700s may have reached
c.195 per 1000, but thereafter fell so that in the period 1720–49 rates were approx-
imately 180 per 1000 and by the third quarter of the century had fallen to 150 
when those in France were still in excess of 260 per 1000 (see Wrigley et al. 1997:
214–48). 
19 It is worth noting that historians, when confronted with differences of the order 
of magnitude displayed by these data sets, have reacted in various ways. French
historical demographers have tended to doubt the accuracy of English registers 
and regard the low rates as an ‘under-registration’ effect; others resort to arguments
that seek an explanation squarely within the differences in basic productivity of 
the French and English agrarian systems. Of course, such an explanation is deserving
of serious consideration and the evidence relating to substantial superiority of
English over French levels of agricultural productivity is indeed compelling.
Nonetheless, it is not at all clear that nutritional factors should be regarded as decisive
in determining these differences. It is doubtful whether patterns of breast-feeding 
in the first six months of life varied as much as they did after the first six months of
life, but nonetheless we find contrasts between France and England that stand out 
in the early as well as the latter parts of the first year and the subsequent years 
1–4 and 5–9, pointing, it would seem, to the importance of factors to do with 
the quality of the domestic environment and other features and procedures
connected with child care and household income (compare infant and child
mortality rates reported in Houdaille (1984) with those reported in Wrigley et al.
(1997: 214–48).
20 For the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries the French mortality series are
plagued by the under-recording of infant and young child deaths so the comparison
between France and England has to be based on deaths relating to the population
above age five.
21 This is a subject evidently needing further comparative assessment involving work 
on English and French urban centres of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
It would be valuable to know whether the ‘urban effect’ during periods of high 
food prices was more marked in France than in England, therefore reflecting the
greater spatial unevenness of welfare provision, social and political intervention in
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the latter than the former society. It would also be interesting to know whether the
mortality enhancements were as socially undifferentiated in one urban system as in
the other.
22 The technical basis of this claim is to be found in Wrigley and Schofield (1981:
236–40).
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4
Historical lessons about 
contemporary social welfare: 
Chinese puzzles and global challenges
R. Bin Wong
Explaining China’s past to find approaches to our common future
We look out at the world around us and see problems and possibilities created by
our social practices. We have some basic ideas about where conditions are better
and where they are worse, on the basis of which our thinking about development
seeks to create the traits found in good conditions elsewhere. The history that
typically matters to Development Studies is of two kinds. There is the implicit
distillation from certain European experiences, a set of related political, social
and economic changes that collectively define modern conditions, a heady brew
to be sure but I will suggest in this chapter it remains inadequately nourishing
for our appetites to construct better futures. Alternatively, history’s other lessons
involve failures elsewhere, oft explained by either the limitations of the natives
or the less worthy intentions of external actors conceived variously as benefac-
tors and oppressors. We completely miss another kind of potential historical
lesson, one that explains a non-western case through its continued reworking of
earlier practices and priorities. When these efforts address large issues we deem
of more general importance, understanding the historical lesson can matter not
merely for a particular case but for our understanding of global issues more
generally.
This chapter considers issues of social welfare and political accountability. It
argues, contrary to the general implications of research and scholarly observa-
tions, levels of social welfare need not always vary positively with levels of
democratic practice. I suggest instead that technologies of rule that enable
concerns for social welfare can exist quite independently of European-derived
ideas and institutions of political representation and government administration.
Could these non-European practices suggest ways to approach social welfare
challenges beyond the specific case of China, which is the main subject of this
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chapter? If so, our textbook understanding about social welfare challenges in the
contemporary world may want to include some new historical lessons.
China’s durability as a territorial unit is frequently noted by both specialists
and in more general discussions, but it is more often assumed and taken as a
natural fact than it is taken as a condition to be explained. Since no other imperial
state in world history has bequeathed to its successors in the twenty-first century
a government that continues to rule most all the territory and a far vaster popula-
tion than was once ruled by an empire, China’s reproduction of agrarian empire
has to be considered a major subject in world history. This chapter takes on only
a small part of this subject that connects quite directly to the capacities and
commitments of the contemporary Chinese state toward its subjects. In partic-
ular, this chapter suggests how political accountability in both the eighteenth
century and in contemporary China is achieved through balancing central-local
relationships in ways that facilitate spatial integration through attention to equity
issues. This is not to say that Chinese governments have consistently satisfied
social welfare concerns; far from it. But the state’s successes have been intimately
tied to such satisfactions. These successes have had relatively little to do with
democratic practices, at least as conventionally conceived, and for this reason
offer a different perspective on thinking about how social welfare issues might
be addressed in what continues to be a quite undemocratic world.
Social spending and democracy: contexts for variation
The proposition that democracies will spend more on social welfare than
despotic regimes makes intuitive sense. If democracies make policies according
to the will of the people, they will certainly favour public needs more than a
despotic regime will since the latter seeks to maximize the despot’s interests and
welfare over those of his subjects. The economist Peter Lindert, for example,
documents a relationship between democracy and social spending in his two-
volume study Growing Public (Lindert 2004), which begins in the late nineteenth
century among countries that have varying amounts of political representation.
In an example perhaps more familiar to those engaged in development studies,
Amartya Sen has famously contrasted Chinese and Indian efforts at famine relief
to support the proposition that famines are less likely to take place the more
democratic the regime. In brief, he observes ‘that no major famine has ever taken
place in any country with a multiparty democracy with regular elections and
with a reasonably free press’ (Sen 2002: 287). The finding holds across rich and
poor democracies and is further supported by contrasts between China and India.
China ‘managed to have perhaps the largest famine in recorded history, during
1959–1962, in which 23–30 million people died, while the mistaken public
policies were not revised for three years through the famine. In India, on the
other hand, despite its bungling ways, large famines stopped abruptly with
independence in 1947 and the installing of a multiparty democracy (the last such
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famine, “the great Bengal famine,” had occurred in 1943)’ (Sen 2002: 287). The 
basic proposition appears to be a causal one – democracies do not have famines 
– and the logic is a political one. Rulers who need to be re-elected and who are 
subject to a free press cannot hide disasters and cannot afford to address them 
because people will not vote to continue them in power should they fail to 
address famine issues. The logic is a reasonable and general application of 
interest-based actions by government and citizens faced with a major social crisis 
like famine that people believe the government can intervene to prevent.
Innocent of Chinese history, the China-India contrast makes persuasive sense. 
If, however, we consider the existence in eighteenth-century China of complex 
large-scale famine relief campaigns and the storage of tons upon tons of grain for 
relief of seasonal food supply shortfalls, it becomes less clear that the degree of 
democratic accountability can explain government interventions to meet social 
welfare needs. The contrast of eighteenth-century conditions in China with those 
in the late 1950s demands some explanation that doesn’t depend on levels of 
democratic accountability since such concepts seem ill-conceived to apply to 
China’s past. To deal with these challenges we need to consider a bit of Chinese 
history.
A brief lesson in Chinese history
In the eighteenth-century Qing Empire, we find a well-ordered society in which 
the state spends considerable sums on water control, on food supply storage, and 
major famine relief campaigns. The state also stressed education; from time to 
time officials in different provinces made special efforts to establish schools to 
educate poorer boys who could not afford private school or tutors to prepare 
them for the studies needed to take the civil service examinations. Officials in 
some parts of the Empire also worked with local elites to establish orphanages 
and arrange for support of indigent widows. Social spending in eighteenth-
century China was often substantial. Just water control works alone likely 
averaged some 3.5 million taels annually in the mid-eighteenth century; in these 
same years bureaucratic salaries totaled some 6 million taels annually and the 
routine costs for the military about 18 million taels annually (Zhou 2002: 
24–9).1 Water control expenditures thus ran to nearly 20 percent of the amounts 
spent on military maintenance and over half the amount budgeted for official 
salaries. 
Chinese officials understood that the maritime regions of the Empire posed 
different opportunities and challenges than the landlocked interior. The 
eighteenth-century state had little need for revenues from maritime trade and 
was far more interested in controlling the European merchant presence on 
Chinese soil; interior regions presented varied social and natural environments 
that officials sought to stabilize culturally and develop economically (Wong 
2004). The state, moreover, showed special awareness of the needs of more
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peripheral and poorer regions to which it sent resources in efforts to make the
agrarian economy more viable for populations that were in some places growing
quickly because of migration (Wong 1997: 105–39, Wong 1999: 210–45). Ideas
about promoting food supply security and the importance of a materially secure
population to the political fortunes of rulers go back to pre-imperial Chinese
political thought and took various institutional forms over the two thousand
years in which imperial rule was the norm more often than not. Ideas about
promoting market-based economic growth and the state playing a considerable
role in peripheral regions inspired a variety of polices in the last millennium of
imperial rule, including the eleventh-century policies of Wang Anshi to develop
state monopolies to management of merchant-led growth in the eighteenth
century (Smith 1991, Millward 1998). Finally, a stress on the welfare of rural
residents took on growing visibility after the fourteenth century as the propor-
tion of people living in urban settlements appears to have declined; social
stability reached far beyond the city walls within which most European notions
of public order were conceived.
It would be convenient to attribute Chinese policy-making simply to a cultur-
ally specific political ideology that developed over many centuries. But political
rhetoric alone seems inadequate to explain the differences between China and
Europe regarding social spending before the advent of democracies. Henry IV in
sixteenth-century France is reputed to have promised a chicken for every pot and
eighteenth-century Frederick the Great in Prussia professed a concern for human
welfare at the same time as he spent most of his time and energy, as well as his
subjects’ resources, on war-making. Our awareness of limited efficacy of welfare
rhetoric in European cases prepared, at least indirectly, an earlier generation of
scholars studying Chinese history to be skeptical of the practical relevance of
political claims to paternal benevolence.
With the opening of Qing dynasty archives in the 1980s, scholars have
gained a more empirically grounded understanding of state activities, including
those related to social welfare (Will and Wong 1991). What we continue to
struggle with is an explanation of the choices the Qing state made to embark
upon such major programs. Some have suggested that as a conquering people
from beyond the Great Wall, the Manchus, felt a particular need to legitimate
themselves politically in terms of a long-standing rhetorical vision of good
governance. This factor may explain some of the motivation, though it also seems
that late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century emperors were tutored in texts and
internalized a set of Confucian political beliefs that made their efforts more than
the anxious instrumental acts of leaders who saw themselves as foreign and thus
in special need of acceptance by those they ruled. Part of the explanation no
doubt lies in the greater importance of warfare and military spending to early
modern European rulers than late imperial Chinese emperors. 
In the two centuries before Lindert’s late eighteenth-century baseline for
observing a rise in social spending first in England and then on the nineteenth-
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century European continent, social spending was more likely to be shouldered by 
local governments, if by governments at all. Charity by religious institutions 
formed a highly visible part of welfare efforts. For their parts, centralizing 
governments were busier with state-building which meant raising monies to 
build bureaucracies and armies (Tilly 1975, 1992). European state-makers 
competed with each other for territory and taxable populations, seeking to 
improve their geopolitical strength at the expense of other states. In contrast, the 
Chinese Empire was not part of a set of similar competing states. While the 
agrarian empire faced various semi-nomadic groups who could cause difficulties 
along shifting frontiers, the general pattern in earlier centuries had been for 
northern tribes to depend on a unified Chinese Empire to be a richer and more 
dependable source of goods than a weak and fragmented empire could possibly 
be. Nomads had, in other words, an interest in negotiating favorable terms for 
exchange and gift-giving with a strong rather than a weak agrarian empire. 
The Chinese state was only overthrown once between the late fourteenth and 
early twentieth centuries and in that case the conqueror not only established 
control over all of the previous dynasty’s territories, but also extended the 
Empire’s northern and western territories. Under these general conditions, the 
need for military expenditures did not, indeed could not, fuel the growth of the 
Chinese state in the manner taking place in Europe. To the contrary, the Chinese 
state already had a civil service bureaucracy with a broad strategy of rule, which 
included social spending. The political logic of maintaining a stable agrarian 
empire called for ensuring the material security of the peasant population. The 
eighteenth-century Chinese state translated this general commitment into 
policies for opening new arable land, maintaining water ways and irrigation 
works, and spreading agricultural and handicraft technologies from economic 
cores to peripheries. One of the more expensive operations they mounted 
required massive efforts to build and maintain a system of civilian grain reserves 
and in times of extreme deprivation they made extraordinary efforts at famine 
relief (Will 1990, Will and Wong 1991). 
Famine relief issues were enmeshed in broader concerns about state inter-
vention to stabilize social conditions across an agrarian empire. The eighteenth-
century state provided what we would call today collective goods – peace, 
security, and economic infrastructure. Major projects required special efforts to 
mobilize monies and manpower; these campaigns made it possible to make 
major repairs and even improvements in water control management. The govern-
ment’s development of a granary system to store hundreds of thousands of tons 
of grain for sale and loan to needy people also depended on major campaigns. 
Since these campaigns were intermittent, people felt little need or desire to create 
clear principles for negotiating with officials over how much they owed in 
money or labour service. They tried whenever possible to evade or deflect the 
state’s demands, a practice far easier than attempting to develop formal and 
explicit rules to govern negotiations. The routine presence of the late imperial
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state was limited – not surprising since its bureaucracy ruled a vast agrarian
empire – and in the eighteenth century its extraordinary interventions could be
positive, like famine relief, as well as negative, like financing a military campaign.
It should be clear that the demands of sustaining an agrarian empire are
different from those of facing competing state-makers in Europe. Since the sizes
of the physical spaces and populations are roughly comparable, we could imagine
that the lessons to be drawn from these separate historical experiences might also
be broadly comparable. The European lessons inform much of our basic under-
standing of modern state formation and economic development. The Chinese
experiences to date have not been interpreted in a manner encouraging any
lessons to be drawn. Knowing that this is not the place to offer a well-developed
explication of the arguments and evidence for the Chinese state strategies and the
general implications of their successes, it may still be a time when the possibility
of Chinese lessons can at least be posed.
Given the very real limitations of administrative capacities in a pre-industrial
political context, a state’s abilities to rule bureaucratically over a large territory
and population depended on encouraging positive relations between centre and
locale. No political centre could command the coercive resources to impose
constantly its will on its subjects. To be successful, a state had instead to offer
some persuasive vision of good rule and implement policies that at least some of
the time came close to achieving stated intentions. Local welfare needs figured
prominently in the agenda for local social order expressed in Confucian political
ideology and implemented through institutions designed to promote such a
social order. The political success of agrarian empire depended on meeting the
social welfare expectations of vast numbers of local communities. Social welfare
and political viability were intimately connected, both in the rhetoric of the
actors themselves and in the social practices we can observe and analyze. Since
these practices emerge with neither the ideas nor institutions of democratic
political regimes, we have identified a context separate from the conventionally
expected ones for social welfare concerns proving fundamental to the successes
of a political system achieving social order across large spaces and populations.
The eighteenth-century Chinese case suggests the hypothesis of effective rule
being more likely to emerge across a large area when central governments more
effectively meet local concerns for social welfare and economic prosperity. The
plausibility of this possibility has been easy to ignore since we know that the
principles were not in fact observed in some subsequent periods of Chinese
history. Before considering further the possible general implications of Chinese
historical practices for contemporary challenges more generally, some presenta-
tion of later Chinese situations in which the eighteenth-century logic of political
success is absent is needed.
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Nineteenth-century sorrows and twentieth-century tragedies
In nineteenth-century China, taxation begins to increase dramatically at mid-
century and bureaucratic effort is shifted from social spending to military and
defense matters. The relative amounts of Chinese government expenditures
devoted to social spending go down as military-related expenditures increase
from the eighteenth through the nineteenth centuries, while the opposite trend
occurs in Europe. The initial military threats and subsequent diplomatic resolu-
tions with European powers begun in the late 1830s were followed by massive
mid-century rebellions, and subsequent continuing institutional innovations in
response to western challenges. The previous priority placed on social welfare
expenditures was no longer possible, the central government’s influence over
local conditions increasingly limited. The central government was in fact
successful in mobilizing ever larger revenues; it learned how to use western
principles and practices of bank borrowing and public debt. But these kinds of
successes were not accompanied by a continued capacity to fulfill the agenda for
rule articulated and implemented in the previous century. While these limitations
were not themselves directly responsible for the collapse of the dynasty – foreign
pressures and the stresses created by them were far more important – formu-
lating principles of rule after 1911 would include concern for local social order,
even when no central government ruling the territory of the Qing dynasty was
able to establish itself until 1949. 
In the era of warlords that followed the dynasty’s fall, as well as the decade of
Nationalist rule and subsequent years of Japanese invasion and civil war with the
Communists, there was no central government seeking to sustain social order
through the maintenance of local welfare standards. Political instability and
military turmoil reduced the country to a far more chaotic condition than could
have even been imagined in the eighteenth century. China couldn’t use the
principles and practices of social welfare provision to create political order until
a military security had been once again achieved. Such an outcome was by no
means a foregone conclusion. There could have been a mix of successor states
more similar to those that followed other cases of agrarian empire across Eurasia.
That China in 1949 was once again a unified country, the government of which
claimed sovereignty over most all of what had been the eighteenth-century Qing
Empire’s greatest extent, did however mean that the challenges of ruling local
societies from a distant center once again entered onto the government’s political
agenda.
The Communist state reintroduced a form of centralized rule many of whose
features would have been familiar to a mid-eighteenth-century ruler or his
officials. The central state asserted its sole authority over issues of taxation,
removing from lower levels of government any statutory opportunities to raise
revenues. The central government claimed to control authority over personnel
decisions throughout the country and implemented a set of principles for
selecting and placing its officials, different in substance to be sure from late
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imperial principles, but similar in its assumptions about how the centre chose its
officials according to a mix of political and bureaucratic criteria. Most relevant to
the particular theme of this chapter, the central government embraced its respon-
sibility for securing and hopefully improving the economic conditions of
peasants and workers across the country. The first several years of Communist rule
can be seen as the successful restoration of economic stability and social order in
a country wracked by hyperinflation and starvation. Basic to these successes was
arming local areas with the means to create social order with some minimal
subsistence security. These achievements were not however secure because the
new ideology demanded social change and aspired to economic development in
ways unimaginable two hundred years earlier and most importantly, the state
created tools of persuasion and coercion far exceeding those available in earlier
eras. 
From the government’s zealous pursuit of what Mao Zedong called ‘contin-
uous revolution’, the countryside was collectivized and increased output was
expected from popular responses to government exhortations for ever greater
efforts. Looking into these conditions helps us address what otherwise appears as
historically implausible – a Chinese state of the late 1950s far less able to
intervene in famine conditions than its mid-eighteenth-century predecessor was.
Innocent of the particulars, it is difficult to imagine that a mid-twentieth-century
authoritarian state with a far larger bureaucracy committed to major interven-
tions in local social and economic life could prove less able than a mid-
eighteenth-century state limited by pre-industrial technologies to ameliorate
famine conditions.
Two contrasts in particular help us to begin to resolve the surprise. First, the
mid-eighteenth-century Chinese central government received monthly grain
price reports and harvest results or projections from every province of the
empire. While harvest data were no doubt most always impressionistic and of
uncertain quality, price data were usually quite reliable in this period. Provincial
officials forwarded to the centre monthly summaries based on the high and low
prices of each grain on local markets in each county, averaging some forty-odd
per province, delivered to them every ten days. With such information, central
government officials were in a surprisingly good position compared with others
in the eighteenth-century world to anticipate harvest shortfalls and rising prices
across a space as large as Europe for a population larger than many European
countries put together. In comparison, officials in the late 1950s were expected
to report ever-growing output from the formation of communes which concen-
trated many production and consumption decisions across many natural villages.
False information about grain harvests obstructed the abilities of leaders to learn
just how bad conditions became in many areas. Second, mid-eighteenth-century
China had a well-developed commercial system in which long-distance
movements of grain were a major activity. When poor harvests struck one area,
grain movements adjusted according to market conditions. When market-based
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movements proved inadequate, officials could themselves travel to large grain
markets and arrange purchases and transport of grain to their jurisdictions with
great need. They would not do so, however, without first making use of the grain
they stored in official granaries intended to ameliorate seasonal fluctuations in
grain prices with spring sales and autumn purchases after new harvests brought
down prices. In contrast China in the late 1950s had suffered a major disman-
tling of the earlier commercial networks so that there was no economic system
through which price signals could influence flows of grain or to which officials
could appeal for help in relieving supply shortages from areas with better
harvests. 
Changes in economic organization and administrative capacities matter more
to explaining this Chinese contrast than do differences in democratic ideology
and institutions. Similarly, the dramatically open response top Chinese officials
have made to the spring 2008 earthquakes in Sichuan results from a desire to
mobilize both domestic and foreign support in relief efforts and a desire to be
seen as responsive to popular suffering. The US of course remains far more a
democracy than China despite its hurricane relief efforts falling far short of what
the Chinese have mounted for its earthquakes. Thus, it would seem the relation-
ship between degree of democracy and responsiveness of government to social
disaster is conditioned by other factors quite independent of democratic
impulses.
Theories about public choice predicated on democratic forms of decision-
making cannot help us explain the eighteenth-century Qing’s levels of social
spending. Nor can a narrow focus on political ideologies get us very far in
explaining why Qing state social spending was higher in absolute and propor-
tional terms than in European states of the same era since European rulers also
made strong statements about the importance of their subjects’ welfare. Finally,
such theories cannot help explain the contrasts between Chinese conditions in
the mid-eighteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. Economic institutions and
administrative capacities seem useful for the temporal contrast within China, but
how might we contrast the general approach to social spending to China today
with other parts of the world? Does history matter, and if so how? 
The social sciences approach issues of public finance and social spending in
a variety of ways. Economists seek ways to make voter choice about government-
provided goods and services approach in logic their consumer choices for private
goods on the market, but the intrinsic differences between voting and market
purchases make possible various alternative mechanisms for deciding upon how
social spending normatively should take place. Political scientists and sociologists
are more likely to address some combination of organizational and network
features of decision-making on social spending to make clear how political
connections matter and how organized interest groups make their voices heard.
Much of what we learn is about institutional settings in advanced industrial
societies and we do so through a set of principles embodying both normative
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values and analytical understandings. When Chinese study these foreign cases
they focus on what they can consider the technical or scientific features of public
finance and social spending so that the possibilities of borrowing from these
advanced experiences and fitting them within a Chinese context becomes more
plausible. 
But how can they or we understand the formation and relevance of these
Chinese contexts? The argument for how history matters centres on the role of
earlier state practices for constructing and sustaining such a large territory under
a centralized bureaucratic regime and the proposition that the strategies and
preferences that animated those earlier practices can still matter today, even
amidst conditions that both we and the Chinese perceive in fundamentally
different terms discursively. For example, observers of China’s reform-era
changes have sometimes marveled at the open willingness of the government to
tolerate diverse experimentation as it changes its institutional rules. Some China
specialists have offered functionalist explanations of why such flexibility has
been demanded by the circumstances for the reforms to succeed, but this begs
the question of why the Chinese succeeded at being flexible when so many
others do not approach institutional change with such an open and flexible
manner. One set of reasons for this flexibility, I suggest, has to do with the
naturalized quality of experimentation that comes out of earlier recognition of
variation in the manner in which local order was sustained and extended. For
instance, certain local institutions, including granaries and schools, were
intended to be created and maintained by local elites who shared the Confucian
political and social ideology of officials; the actual roles of elites and officials
varied across China with officials playing a larger role where elites were less
common, less wealthy and less willing. These variations were very much accepted
in the eighteenth century. In the 1920s and 1930s, innovations and successes at
promoting social order at the local level, most notably the conservative Confucian
reformer Liang Shuming’s efforts in Shandong province, could become models
that central government officials wished to spread more widely, in ways not so
dissimilar from how the Communist party state in the 1960s attempted to
promote ‘learning from Dazhai’ as a model of self-reliance in a poor agricultural
region. In a similar vein, the late imperial state had for centuries promoted a very
general agenda of orthodox cultural practices regarding weddings and funerals
and ancestor worship, while allowing tremendous variety of local deities to be
worshipped as people desired, typically intervening only in rare instances when
officials feared that some sect might threaten political stability. There is, in other
words, a basis in history for permitting great variation in local social and political
practices that form the unstated context for the ways in which economic reform
experimentation has taken place.
Where a long history of fiscal administration exists, as is the case in China,
the ways in which taxation policies change is enmeshed in the transformation of
existing practices with innovations and changes working only in so far as they
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solve their targeted challenges without exacerbating difficulties in meeting some
other set of concerns. A good example of this is the chronic underfunding of
local government, a phenomenon made more severe since the mid-1990s, even
in those areas where local government social spending had increased in the
previous decade. During the 1980s and into the 1990s, those locales where
township and village enterprises (TVE) blossomed, which included many of the
areas with previously vibrant commercial economies before 1949, indeed
typically for centuries, relied on revenues from these TVE as a source to fund local
education, health and housing. As the central government initiated a series of tax
reforms to reverse its slipping grasp over taxes as a percentage of gross domestic
product (GDP) and as a share of total tax revenue (lower levels of government
were increasing their relative shares), local governments previously able to
engage in considerable social spending faced growing constraints. There 
were also local governments where TVE had not become a significant economic
driver of growth and they continued to lack the ability to make many social
expenditures. 
In counties lacking much TVE, local officials levied additional taxes and fees
upon agricultural households who could ill afford to bear these burdens. Readily
available systematic data is scarce but Bernstein and Lü present figures from a
Chinese study published in 1998 suggesting that peasant tax burdens were
inversely related to income, suggesting what was in effect a regressive taxation
regime (Bernstein and Lü 2008: 99). The problems with local levies in rural areas
after the mid-1990s led to a phased reduction in agricultural taxes as well as
turning miscellaneous fees into explicit taxes. Together the processes culminated
in the end to agricultural taxation in 2006. This change is most significant
symbolically because it marks the end of reliance on agriculture as a source of
fiscal support, which agriculture had been for much of the two thousand years
of imperial era history as well as for many political authorities in the twentieth
century, including the People’s Republic in its first several years of rule. In
material terms, the end to agricultural taxation reflects the economic changes
taking place in Chinese society – an urbanizing and industrializing society has a
new fiscal base. The ways in which different levels of the state tap new sources of
wealth began with local governments with TVE having the capacity for increased
social spending followed by central government efforts to capture a greater
portion of new sources of revenue. Relations among levels of government
regarding the levying and sharing of fiscal revenues will no doubt prove dynamic
and changing. Crucial among the challenges of the reform era for those areas that
are neither urbanizing nor industrializing is how to develop a viable fiscal base
for social spending. 
The problem is obviously economic at its base – greater absolute poverty
compared with places that are urbanizing and industrializing. But it can also be
considered as part of a larger political issue, as do Bernstein and Lü, who stress
the importance of local people having a say in the taxes that are levied upon them
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(Bernstein and Lü 2003, 2008). The essay appears in a volume, Taxation and State-
Building in Developing Countries: Capacity and Consent (Brautigam et al. 2008), which
develops the theme of consent of the governed to taxes as a key way to build
democratic governance. Amidst poverty, however, some resource transfers have to
be attempted if poverty is to be alleviated and social goods and services provided.
The problems within China that result from such a situation provide a partial
parallel to those that emerge for smaller countries that are poor and rural where
foreign aid is a critical source of potential help that often gets used ineffectively
and inappropriately. It is possible that officials in poor regions of China are prone
to rent-seeking as there are fewer ways to amass wealth than there are in more
dynamic economic areas. 
The difference between the international and Chinese cases is that the latter,
I argue at least in part for reasons with a long historical background, is
committed to these transfers and as they are ‘national’ in scope, the forms of
social identity and perceived interests and concerns will be far different than
those between donor countries and the developing world. But what makes these
transfers possible has little to do with democracy or even with consent in any
explicit, consciously formulated manner. Historically, Chinese were drawn to
make decisions favouring public expenditures because these helped to maintain
peace and prosperity across their empire. Their situation contrasted sharply with
early modern European rulers whose public expenditures went to war-making.
Chinese governments began to take social expenditures seriously at an earlier
date than they did and thus they present from a European perspective something
of a puzzle, which we can solve once we move outside a frame of reference in
which European experiences supply the norms. For their part, European states no
longer compete militarily with each other, and we can even see some resource
flows related to economic welfare issues across those states that belong to the
European Union; while these will never resemble closely what takes place in
China because the ideological and institutional bases of governance in China and
Europe will long remain different, it changes our view of how social spending
generally and transfers specifically develop when we introduce historical
perspectives beyond those supplied by Europe.
Conclusion
Whatever the prospects and problems of fiscal transfers to fund social spending
generally, what we see in China is a persistent concern by the central government
to promote economic development and social services across both regional
divides and urban-rural divides, each of which is a preference and concern we
can see in earlier centuries. The differences in today’s conditions, however,
transform the nature of the challenges. Regarding regional disparities, it was a 
far easier task to imagine diffusing best technologies before the original
Industrial Revolution and the subsequent changes that have transformed
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economic possibilities several times in the past two centuries. For urban–rural
divides, eighteenth-century Chinese government officials managed to mitigate
those gaps by promoting social spending across both rural and urban areas;
much of their public goods investment went to water control, grain storage,
roads and communications that benefited both urban and rural residents. Today
the challenge is to extend the higher rates of social spending in cities to rural
areas near them. This effort seeks to lessen part of the legacy of the institutional-
ized divide between urban and rural China for the first three decades of the
People’s Republic, a divide that helped China escape the massive problems of
overpopulation and underemployment in many Third World cities before the past
three decades of economic growth makes it easier to ponder how urban advan-
tages, many of them associated with higher levels of social spending, can be
extended to the countryside. The Chinese state takes a far more activist role in
addressing what it considers the challenges of regional disparities and urban-
rural gaps than we would anticipate in other parts of the world. One could argue
that they must do so because their rapid growth rates make the challenges more
salient than they would be were the economic transformation taking place at a
slower rate. Yet, it does seem that urban–rural gaps remain pronounced in many
parts of the developing world without the level of effort devoted to them that we
see in China. If these impressions can be substantiated more fully, a case for a
variety of ways in which history matters to explaining patterns of social spending
as a feature of a larger set of issues about political accountability within and
beyond democracies seems well worth making across the world generally. 
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COMMENTARY
Why might history matter 
for development policy?
Ravi Kanbur1
When economists analyze development policy, the first requirement is a descrip-
tion of the economy – of individuals, households, firms, farms and any other
relevant entities, how they behave and how they interact. Typically, the interaction
is modelled as being through markets, mostly competitive, although every now
and then non-competitive interactions, and non-market interactions are also
incorporated. Having set up the ‘non-policy’ outcome (that is to say, without the
policy of specific interest) the policy is introduced and the consequences are
worked out given the model of the economy specified earlier. Those in the new
political economy school might also try to endogenize the policy choice itself,
by in turn modelling the policy and political process, the incentives of the
different players (interest groups). In this setting, the consequences of intro-
ducing a policy might be very different, since over and above how individuals,
households, etc., react to the policy is how the policy gets implemented, and
perhaps how other policies in turn get changed, or get influenced to be changed,
by interest groups whose behaviour we hope to have modelled sufficiently
accurately.
Of course, encapsulated in the above are the divisions that dog economic
analysis of development policy, even when all sides agree on the objective of
development policy (for example, reducing infant mortality rates, rather than
building a sense of and a pride in nationhood). Depending on assumptions of
how markets behave, or how the political economy behaves, very different
conclusions can be reached, for example, about the policy of reducing tariffs. If
markets are competitive, and the political economy is impotent, then reducing
tariffs turns out to improve the general welfare, suitably defined, despite some
distributional consequences. But political economy is not of course impotent,
otherwise the repeal of the Corn Laws in nineteenth-century Britain would not
have been such a prolonged affair, and the Economistmagazine would not have had
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to be founded to argue the case for it, and Trollope would not have had such great
material for his novels. And markets are not necessarily perfectly competitive, or
else Adam Smith would not have had to observe in The Wealth of Nations that ‘People
of the same trade seldom meet together even for merriment and diversion, but
the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public or some contrivance to
raise prices’.
Economists know all this, of course. They are sometimes criticized unfairly by
the other social sciences for ignoring distribution and politics. They certainly
don’t ignore these issues at the research frontier, but they are often ignored in the
policy context. Paradoxically, therefore, where it matters most they tend to ignore
politics in the policy prescription, although these days economics research papers
are replete with models of rational choice politics.
There are two other features of the models and the world view, which
underpin economic policy analysis, that are worth highlighting. ‘Initial condi-
tions’ of natural resources, technology, etc. are taken as given for the policy
analysis. And the behavioural responses of the different entities are taken not only
as given but also to follow particular precepts and patterns. Rational choice –
utility maximizing for individuals, profit maximizing for firms – is what drives
agents in most policy oriented economic models. Again economists are aware of
this. They know that initial physical conditions matter – that is why economies
rich in natural resources perform differently to those rich in unskilled labor
(perhaps ‘poor in’ might be a better description). In some sense the market
structure – which markets are competitive, which are not – is also part of the
initial conditions.
So the outcome of a policy intervention depends on a lot of things. But how
does it depend on history? In a very straightforward sense today’s physical initial
conditions are the result of history. Natural resource deposits are of course the
product of prehistory. But this is perhaps not an interesting sense in which
history matters. They are also the product of extraction in the past, which did
depend on human behavior and thus begins to be an interesting sense in which
history matters for development policy – human history altered the then initial
conditions to give us the initial conditions of now, and since these initial condi-
tions matter for the outcome of development policy, history matters for develop-
ment policy. But does the simple timeline of natural resource deposits, leading
up to their current level, matter above and beyond what the current level is? Only
if that time trend revealed something about the structure of the economy, how
its entities would have had to have interacted to have led to that pattern and if
that interaction were to continue, then history would be illuminating. But again,
this is nothing new to economists. Analyzing historical time series data to reveal
an underlying structure (within an assumed overall frame, the ‘maintained
hypothesis’) is what econometricians do all the time. So what exactly is it that
history gets us afresh?
I would like to suggest that what it gets us is a handle on how the agents in
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the economy – individuals, households, firms, interest groups, etc. – will
respond to the policy intervention in question, taking as given the physical initial
conditions (natural resources, technology, market structure, etc.). But in order to
allow the seed of this suggestion to take root it cannot be allowed to fall on the
stony ground of conventional rational choice theory. Some people give up their
lives for a cause. Others will suffer great hardship, undergo starvation, rather than
eat food that is not acceptable to them culturally. Generally, human beings seem
to be more than willing to cut off their noses to spite their faces or, to put it more
generously, inflict great losses upon themselves and upon others to right what
they consider to be an unjust outcome. They will leave money on the table if they
perceive that picking it up would be unfair. Recent lab experiments with human
subjects have begun to convince economists that there may be something in these
deviations from rational choice theory after all.
Once economists accept this departure from rational choice theory, then the
actual preferences and behavioural tendencies of individuals and groups within
society become part of the initial conditions of the model, the model through
which the proposed policy intervention is going to be assessed. But how these
initial conditions came to be is more interesting, or at least less mechanical, than
physical initial conditions such as natural resource availability, or even market
structure. The same policy intervention, for example means testing of social
benefits, elicits very different individual and social responses in different
societies, for example Europe and America – and even within Europe there are
variations. There is a visceral reaction to inflation in Germany which is very
different from that elsewhere in Europe. And progressive taxation, and redistrib-
utive policies more generally, gets very different responses in different countries.
These examples hint strongly that it is the history of the different societies
that explains the difference. But is this just correlation? What is the causal
mechanism? Scratching beneath the surface reveals that simple arguments will
not suffice. Take the case of German inflation. For the immediate post-war gener-
ation in Germany, hyperinflation was a living memory. It is understandable that
they would be willing to incur significant costs in other dimensions to control
inflation. For the generation that followed, the hyperinflation was their parents’
inflation, they had not themselves experienced it. But their concern is perhaps
explainable by inculcation through parents. But what about the current genera-
tion, whose defining event was not the putting up of the Berlin Wall, but its fall?
Anti-inflation sentiment in Germany remains high, eighty years, four genera-
tions, after Weimar; sixty years after the Second World War; forty years after the
Berlin wall went up; and now almost twenty years after it came down. The policy
failures of four generations ago continue to animate attitudes to policy today, and
underpin the stance of the Bundesbank and through it the stance of the European
Central Bank. 
Clearly, history matters, and it matters in important and interesting ways 
for policy today. But it is not just actual events in the past. It is how they are
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recorded, interpreted and the interpretation transmitted, that matters. This is
what determines the mental makeup, the preferences in economists’ termi-
nology, of agents in the economy. That is the causal mechanism. It is the
embedding of the past in the present’s perception of policy that is the transmis-
sion mechanism linking history to today’s development policy. That it is percep-
tion, and not reality (whatever that is or was), does not matter. For purposes of
the analysis of development policy, how agents in the economy will react to it,
perception is reality. If means testing is detested because in the past means-test
officers terrorized poor communities and heaped indignities upon them, and
indeed this in turn was the outcome of a long history of a fear that poor relief
would make poverty too easy,2 and this has now become folk memory through
a seamless combination of word of mouth, literature and, more recently, televi-
sion, then that is the reality that policy will have to deal with. The balance may
have to be shifted towards more universalist approaches to benefit provision,
with consequent loss in efficiency of resource use. But that is how it has to be –
history matters.
History matters also to how a ruling elite perceives its objectives and its
constraints. The strong concern about inequality, especially spatial inequality, in
China goes back to well before the communist era. It is rooted in the history of
an empire with fissiparous tendencies, requiring force and suasion in equal
measure to keep provinces from breaking away. It is that concern which is
reflected in generations of Chinese rulers, right up to the present ruling elite of
the Communist party. But, again, what is the transmission mechanism from the
sensibilities acquired by the rules of the Qing Empire in the eighteenth century
to the rulers of the Communist party today? It is not just, of course, the raw facts
of what happened in the eighteenth century, the investment in flood control,
famine relief, orphanages and so on, but how these have been woven together
through successive interpretations into a coherent narrative that has symbolic
meaning to today’s rulers.3 And it is no less real for being symbolic. It affects
today’s policy stance. 
It should be clear, then, that the way in which history matters is more than
as a series of facts and events in the past related to the policy in question, say.
Rather, what is equally if not more important is how and in what form these
events of the past came to be embedded in the consciousness of the present
generation. Indeed, as noted above, what is in the present consciousness may be
quite far removed from the reality of the past, but it is the reality of the present,
and thus influences the response to policy of individuals and groups of individ-
uals.
None of this is to suggest that history is destiny. Policy-makers do not have
to be the prisoners of the past, at least the past as it is embedded in the percep-
tions of the present generation. But they cannot ignore it either. At the very least
they have to know what these perceptions are – this is just prudent description
of the reality onto which the policy intervention will be implemented. But they
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must go further. If they are to overcome the weight of the past, they have to
understand why the population and the polity have these perceptions about this
or that policy. What was the process that led to their embedding – what events in
the past, what sort of interpretation, what transmission mechanism. It is only
with this knowledge, knowledge that only the disciplined study of history in its
various facets (political, social, intellectual, cultural) can provide, that they can
address the constraints, or the opportunities, that history presents to them for the
policy question at hand. This is finally, in my view, the most important sense in
which history matters for development policy. 
Notes
1 This note is inspired by the chapters by Smith and Wong, and the other papers and
discussion at the conference at which the contributions to this volume were
presented.
2 The attitudes and debates in Tudor England are discussed in Smith (Chapter 3, this
volume).
3 I interpret this to be one of the main points of Bin Wong (Chapter 4, this volume).
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5
Health in India since independence1
Sunil S. Amrith
We recognise health as an inalienable human right that every individual can justly
claim. So long as wide health inequalities exist in our country and access to essential
health care is not universally assured, we would fall short in both economic planning
and in our moral obligation to all citizens.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, October 20052
This chapter suggests that a historical perspective on health policy in
independent India can help to explain a number of deeply rooted features of
public health in India, which continue to characterise the situation confronting
policy-makers in the field of health today. These features include:
1 The paradox that a heavily interventionist state that has never, since
independence, made health a priority in public policy or in the allocation of
public resources. The Indian state’s conception of development has allowed
little space for the importance of health and wellbeing. Conversely, the
political economy of health care in India has been characterized by
widespread privatization, and the large, perhaps dominant role of the private
and informal sector in providing health care, even to the very poor.
2 Marked regional variations in health outcomes, and in the degree and the
extent to which healthcare is publicly available. It is well known that
between, say, Kerala and Bihar lies a huge gulf in capacity and historical
experience in the field of health (as also in many other aspects of human
development). These variations do not always correlate closely with differ-
ences in income. 
3 The complex and uneven relationship between Indian democracy and public
health. The language of rights, so prevalent in post-colonial India, has only
at certain times and in certain conditions broadened to encompass the right
to health. Health has only intermittently been the subject of political
mobilization. 
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India has unquestionably experienced a significant and continuous lowering of
mortality and a steady increase in life expectancy since independence. Life expec-
tation at birth was estimated at 36.7 years in 1951; by 1981 the figure stood at
54 years, and by 2000, 64.6. The infant mortality rate fell from 146 per 1,000 in
1951, to 70 per 1,000 half a century later, although the decline in infant
mortality slowed or stagnated during the 1990s (Visaria 2004). 
Yet it is clear that these gains have seen a highly unequal distribution across
regions, and along lines of caste and social status. The trend of declining mortality
in modern India coexists with persistently high levels of ill-health and disability.
The most recent National Family Health Survey shows that 45.9 percent of
children under three are underweight, and that only 43.5 percent of children are
fully immunized (The Hindu 2007b). India has the highest number of tuberculosis
cases, and probably the largest number of people suffering from HIV/AIDS, in
the world (Visaria 2004). At the same time, ‘first world’ illnesses – hypertension,
cardio-vascular disease, cancers – are increasing rapidly (Visaria 2004, The Hindu
2007b). 
The Indian government acknowledged the challenges in its most recent
comprehensive National Health Policy document (Government of India 2002):
Given a situation in which national averages in respect of most indices are themselves
at unacceptably low levels, the wide inter-state disparity implies that, for vulnerable
sections of society in several states, access to public health services is nominal and
health standards are grossly inadequate. 
Detailed analyses and anecdotal evidence alike suggest that the state of India’s
public health services is dire. Even official sources lament that,
the presence of medical and paramedical personnel is often much less than that
required by prescribed norms; the availability of consumables is frequently negli-
gible; the equipment in many public hospitals is often obsolescent and unusable;
and, the buildings are in a dilapidated state… the availability of essential drugs is
minimal; the capacity of the facilities is grossly inadequate. 
‘Grossly inadequate’ is a phrase that appears all too often in the report. 
There is little doubt that health has not been one of the Indian state’s priori-
ties since independence. Only in the last few years has public expenditure on
health in India risen above the level of 0.8 or 0.9 percent of GDP, which is India’s
historical average, lower than almost any other country in the world (Drèze and
Sen 2002: 202). The share of public expenditure to total health expenditure in
India is around 15 percent: the average for Sub-Saharan Africa is 40 percent, and
for high-income European countries, over 75 percent (Drèze and Sen 2002:
204).
This picture of failure and underinvestment contrasts rather sharply with the
confidence, the ambition and the sense of historic opportunity that pervaded
public discourse about health around the time of India’s independence. Buoyed
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by their acquisition of sovereignty and state power, the representatives of the
Indian people set out to ‘wipe a tear from every eye’, as Gandhi put it. Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh’s commitment to the ‘right to health’ has clear and
distinct roots in the 1940s, but so too does the Indian State’s manifest failure to
live up to its promises.
This chapter suggests that history is essential to an understanding of the
challenges facing health policy in India today. Institutional trajectories matter,
and the chapter tries to show that a history of underinvestment and poor health
infrastructure in the colonial period continued to shape the conditions of possi-
bility for health policy in India after independence. This will be familiar to devel-
opment policy-makers and institutional economists interested in ‘path
dependency’. However, the focus of the chapter is less on institutions than on the
insights intellectual history may bring to our understanding. 
I argue that attention to the ethical and intellectual origins of the Indian
state’s founding commitment to improve public health are worthy of attention,
and indeed that these moral and political arguments continue to shape a sense of
the possible in public health to this day. By situating particular policies in the
context of the political questions to which they emerged as a response, a histor-
ical approach can show that particular solutions adopted were chosen from a
range of possibilities, greater or smaller in different circumstances; thus revisiting
‘paths not taken’ is one evident way in which history can inform contemporary
development policy. Thus the chapter shows that a top-down, statist approach to
public health was not the only option available to India in the 1940s, and that
there was a powerful legacy of civic involvement and voluntary activity in the
field of public health. Some of these traditions may continue to shape the recent
move back towards giving civil society a greater role in public health. Equally,
however, taking seriously the reasons why a state-directed and technocratic
approach seemed so clearly the best path for policy-makers in the 1940s might
direct our attention to some of the weaknesses or shortcomings of voluntary
initiatives in health, often forgotten in contemporary enthusiasm for civil
society’s capabilities. 
Furthermore, the chapter aims to suggest that ideas and arguments can take
on a life of their own. Ethical and constitutional commitments, for instance to
the ‘right to health’ or more generally to social justice, are open to appropriation
and redeployment in any number of contexts. Health activists in India today
invoke, repeatedly, the language of the 1940s and the Indian Constitution, in
their criticisms of the state’s failures; by redeploying earlier languages of legiti-
macy, political actors today reinforce the power of those ideas to shape expecta-
tions and motivate change. Examining where those ideas come from, and some
of the contradictions that underpin them, can help us to understand better the
multiple and sometimes unexpected ways in which they live on to shape political
debates about health, and may also point to their double-edged nature. 
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A historical perspective on the political culture of public health in India
suggests that one of the most striking contrasts between the late-colonial period
and the period after independence lies in the extent to which the Indian political
elite concerned itself with questions of public health. The instrumental
argument, that it has not been in the ‘interests’ of India’s elite to prioritize public
health – given their easy access to high-quality, urban curative health services –
is indisputable; but interests can come into being and unravel through political
discourse and as a result of political mobilization. In the first half of the twentieth
century, the Indian political elite was deeply concerned with questions of 
public health, engaging in more or less paternalistic attempts to educate, and
uplift the health of, the Indian population; after independence, as responsibility
for health resided more and more with the developmental state, the culture of
public discussion and voluntary activity in the field of health witnessed a rapid
decline. 
What was the ‘colonial legacy’?
It was as a response to crisis and emergency that the colonial state in India began
to develop what we might recognise as a concerted public health policy. Probably
the first document of ‘public health policy’ in British India was the 1863 report
of the Royal Commission on the sanitary state of the British army in India
(Harrison 1994). Concern about threats to the health of the Indian army, partic-
ularly after the rebellion of 1857, motivated a wide-ranging inquiry into health
conditions in the country. 
Only gradually did this interest in the health of the troops lead to a more
general interest in the health of the population, and then too only as a response
to immediate crises. If India did not experience the massive decimation of
indigenous populations through disease and warfare that the ‘New World’
witnessed, there were nevertheless many episodes of sharp rises in mortality,
associated with the violence and social disruption of conquest and conflict, most
notably the Bengal Famine of 1770. A century later, the great famines of the
1870s and 1890s caused both mass mortality and mass migration; it was fear of
unrest and social disruption that caused the colonial state, belatedly, to take some
interest in famine relief and public health (Dreze 1988, Hodges 2004).
It was for a long time a commonplace that one of the ‘benefits’ of colonial
rule in Asia and Africa was the advent of modern medicine. Institutions of public
health – hospitals, health centres, medical research laboratories, pharmaceutical
production facilities – were amongst the new colonial institutions that appeared
in South Asia, along with the railways, the telegraph and new forms of land
tenure and law. If some historians have subsequently allowed the pendulum to
swing far in the other direction, seeing medicine as only a tool of colonial power
and domination over Indian lives and bodies, this chapter tends to concur with
Bayly (this volume), namely that what we need to understand is the ways in
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which Indians engaged with, appropriated, criticised and adopted colonial health
institutions. 
The broad set of policy shifts that began in the later nineteenth century,
around the time of the late-Victorian famines, had lasting and important conse-
quences for the future of public health policy in India.3 Two, perhaps contradic-
tory, legacies of this period stand out for their significance in shaping the
conditions of possibility for public health policy in India: the first is institutional,
the second, ideological. 
As an ‘extractive’ colonial state, public health and social welfare were never
near the top of the Raj’s priorities. What is most striking about the medical infra-
structure that the Raj bequeathed to independent India is its weakness and its
limited reach. In the heyday of Victorian liberalism, one of the cardinal principles
of British rule in India was that Indian revenues would pay for Indian expendi-
tures, and in the late nineteenth century, the tax base of the colonial state grew
progressively weaker. 
Colonial public health policy was inherently limited and self-limiting; it
focused on keeping epidemics at bay, responding to crises and not much more.
A crucial institutional innovation came in the 1880s (Jeffery 1988), when much
of the responsibility for local health and sanitation was devolved to partly elected
local government bodies, a responsibility shared by the 1920s with provincial
governments. This is a division of responsibility that lasts into the present day, and
puts significant limits on the capacity to enact public health policies: then, as
now, the ability of local and even provincial governments to raise resources is
very limited.
Nonetheless it was at the level of local sanitation that the most tangible
improvements in public health were found in early twentieth-century India.
Cholera, the great scourge of India in the nineteenth century, saw a significant
decline as a result of the provision of clean drinking water at major sites of
pilgrimage (Arnold 1993). The establishment of panchayats with responsibility for
sanitation and conservancy led to marginal, but nevertheless real, improvements
in local sanitation in certain locales – inevitably those where the local elite used
their new powers to enact change (Tinker 1954). 
However, Hugh Tinker’s meticulous work shows how limited even these
improvements could be. He showed the inadequacy of personnel, infrastructure
and resources in the public health system of British India: just fifty-six health
officers, for example, in all of the municipalities of Madras Presidency; only four
serving all of rural Burma. As a result of the weakness of infrastructure, ‘local
authorities at best could only select the most pressing cases for relief; at worst the
slender local funds were dissipated in tiny sporadic ventures from which no
permanent benefit was derived’ (Tinker 1954: 287).
At many points, the colonial state justified the paucity of its expenditure on
public health with reference to notions of India’s ‘naturally’ high death rate, and
by raising the spectre of Malthusian catastrophe if too much was done to reduce
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mortality (Arnold 1993, Davis 2001). Yet in the light of the terrible famines of
the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the colonial state did make a number
of commitments, which transformed the conditions of political possibility. At no
point did the state commit itself to providing a certain minimum of public
health. It did, however, declare in 1880 that in a ‘calamity such as famine, excep-
tional in its nature and arising from causes wholly beyond human control’ it
‘becomes a paramount duty of the State to give all practicable assistance to the
people in time of famine, and to devote all its available resources to this end’
(Government of India 1880: 31–2). The state committed itself, at least nominally,
to preventing death from starvation. This commitment was open, thereafter, to
expansion and interpretation. Thus if the institutional legacy of colonialism was
to constrain the public health apparatus of India, the ideological legacy was the
rise, perhaps unintended, of the notion that the state would and could intervene
to prevent certain kinds of suffering.4
The ambivalent nature of the colonial state’s engagement with questions of
public health had two particularly notable consequences. The first is that Indian
elites began to take up the ideas of the colonial state in order to hold it to
account. Health, that is to say, was politicized. The early works of Indian political
economy, by Dadabhai Naoroji, Romesh Dutt and others, highlighted the short-
comings in the colonial state’s response to famine and epidemics, and pointed to
the responsibility of high levels of taxation for the immiseration of the Indian
countryside. Speaking in the colonial legislative council, Gopal Krishna Gokhale
raised, time and again, the poor state of health and sanitation in India, comparing
it with conditions prevailing in Britain and elsewhere. Gokhale and others
mounted their critique of the state’s neglect of public health by invoking the
state’s own promises and principles in that regard; this is a pattern that continued
in India after independence.
By the 1920s, this had evolved into the argument that only a representative
national government could truly care for the health of the Indian people. In the
view of Dr Nil Ratan Sircar, a prominent nationalist and member of the Indian
Medical Association, ‘medical backwardness’ was a consequence of imperialism:
An alien trusteeship of a people’s life and fortune is almost a contradiction in terms.
For among the governing factors in all sanitary reforms and movements are the social
and economic conditions of life, the environment, material as well as moral, and
above all the psychology of the people – and an alien administration, out of touch
with these living realities, will either run counter to them and be brought up against
a dead wall of irremovable and irremediable social facts or … grow timid and fight
shy of all social legislation, even in the best interests of the people’s lives and health.
(Ray 1929: 5)
The suggestion here was that the colonial administration did not possess the will,
the knowledge or the confidence to intervene deeply enough in Indian society to
ameliorate health conditions. 
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As India’s modernizing nationalists set their sights on power, in the 1930s,
they committed themselves to precisely this kind of ‘deep’ intervention by the
state in society. The health of the population became part of a much broader
agenda of transformation from above. A healthy, productive and useful popula-
tion would be put in service of an industrializing state that promised to provide
welfare for the citizens of the new nation. In this way, Indian nationalists could
argue not only that the colonial state had failed in its duty to care for the welfare
of the population, but that they, as genuine representatives of ‘the people’, could
and would do so, using the latest technologies of government (National Planning
Committee [NPC] 1948). It will perhaps be surprising and even uncomfortable
to us now to note that amongst the charges Indian nationalists levelled at the
colonial state was that it was not interested enough in questions of eugenics, not
bold enough to ‘sterilize the unfit’ (NPC 1948).
The second important consequence of the colonial state’s unwillingness to
spend much money on public health was that in late-colonial India, there was
much scope for ‘civil society’ or voluntary initiatives in health. Devolving respon-
sibility to charities and voluntary bodies suited the colonial state, which was
imbued with the ideals of Victorian liberalism, and its belief in the power of civil
society to solve social problems; relying on philanthropy was cheaper, too. Many
of the early health initiatives were undertaken on the initiative of Christian
missionaries (Lal 2003). However, new ideas about the importance of health and
sanitation were taken up by middle-class Indians, creating a strong aspiration for
change in the fields of marriage practices, childrearing, and public sanitation.
Social reform organizations, often religiously inspired, made healthy living
central to their practices and interventions (Watt 2005). New norms of healthy
behaviour circulated through print, in the limited but significant public sphere
which developed across India in the later nineteenth century (Bayly, this
volume).
To cite just one example of the new breed of periodicals dedicated to
questions of personal and social hygiene, there was Health, a journal ‘devoted to
healthful living’, founded by V. Rama Rao in 1923. The somewhat hybrid
commitments of the journal are clear from its credo, advocating ‘vegetarianism,
temperance, purity, simplicity and moderation in all phases of life’. The magazine
invited contributions from far and wide, on ‘Vital Health Care Topics – diet,
nutrition, prevention of disease, care & feeding of infants … Healthful beauty,
vital statistic, etc.’, in the form of ‘line drawings and dramas’ as much as drier
articles and opinion pieces. And few people were as enthusiastic as Mahatma
Gandhi in his profusion of writing about issues of health, which reached a very
wide audience indeed through his periodicals and newspapers, Young India and
Navajivan (Amrith 2006). 
A number of Indian social reformers established, on a local and experimental
basis, health projects of their own: model health centres, demonstration projects
and educational initiatives. To extend Bayly’s (this volume) comments about the
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law, this suggests that ‘peer educators’ were equally important in instilling new
expectations of health, and new kinds of behaviour, limited though their reach
may have been. 
One of the most crucial areas in which voluntary activity flourished in the
1920s and 1930s was in the field of local sanitation; Bengal in particular
witnessed the emergence of numerous local-level initiatives to improve sanitary
conditions in rural areas. To take one example, the Central Co-operative Anti-
Malaria Society of Bengal was established by Dr G.C. Chatterjee in 1912, and by
the 1930s it had 2,000 similar bodies affiliated to it: local-level initiatives carried
out by elite reformers. Through the missionary fervour of the societies, one
admiring British official declared, ‘the illiterate, suspicious and apathetic peasant
could be moved to action’ (Blunt 1939: 382). Yet the income of this valiant
society, ‘from the endowments collected and invested by Dr Chatterjee’, was
‘small in comparison with the task before it’.5
For its part, Rabindranath Tagore’s Sriniketan rural reconstruction project
adopted models and techniques from far and wide: the technique of the rural
survey, new ways of collating statistics, new sanitary technologies, and modes of
education. The blueprint for Sriniketan’s organization reveals the traces of diverse
influences, but the dominant strain is the method of rural reconstruction
pioneered in Yugoslavia (Tagore 1938):
Organization:
1  A detailed study of the village or villages comprising the health society, of the
inhabitants, of the social and economic conditions connected with public health
problems, and of the incidence of diseases.
2  Preliminary propaganda to develop people’s consciousness of the need of better
health and the means by which it could be obtained
3  Constant education in the ideas of health, sanitation and hygiene, through
lectures, demonstrations, exhibitions, etc. 
4  Organization of a medical establishment, with a qualified medical officer,
compounder and dispensary, run on co-operative basis, each member paying an
annual subscription, in cash or labour of equivalent value.
5  Arrangements for the medical examination and the keeping of the health records
of all members.
6  Sanitation and preventive work carried out with the help of organised squads of
young men of the village: filling up of the stagnant pools, making of roads and
drains, preventing the breeding of mosquitoes, cleaning jungles and utilizing
waste lands for the growing of fruit and vegetable gardens, etc.
The plans envisaged the large-scale mobilization of voluntary labour, and nothing
short of a change in attitudes and aspirations on the part of the villagers – the
rise of expectations of healthy life.
The comparative frame of mind, the widened awareness of other ways and
other places, was evident: ‘in China it has been demonstrated that even a few
weeks’ training, provided it is intensive, can be sufficient to produce efficient
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workers for rural health work’, the workers of Sriniketan concluded. Taking their
lead from practices elsewhere, but also from their knowledge of the local medical
marketplace, leaders of the Sriniketan project developed a list, for each local
project, of ‘an absolute minimum’ of drugs that any village dispensary ought to
have (Tagore 1938). 
Indeed, one of the most notable features of the expansion and dissemination
of ideas about public health in the 1930s, particularly in the context of present-
day development policy, is the importance of international standards, informa-
tion and models. The Rockefeller Foundation, for instance, had extensive
involvement in establishing small-scale health projects in India, China and
beyond. The discussions of the League of Nations Health Committee were widely
reported in India, and the League’s expert committees on minimal standards of
nutrition, for instance, provided new ammunition for nationalist critiques of the
colonial state (Amrith 2006). Indeed, in the 1930s the government of India was
held to account, to some extent, by having to report to the League of Nations on
the progress of health and welfare in India.
The value of health: shaping political discourse
Development experts working in ‘transitional’ societies in the world today will be
familiar with the openness to new ideas (often ideas from other countries, or
from international organizations) that such transitions bring, for better or for
worse. A historical perspective on India’s political transition to independence –
in particular the period between 1945 and the early 1950s – suggests that the
languages of politics forged at these moments of transformation can have lasting
effects. Promises made during moments of great political enthusiasm can take on
a life of their own.
At the moment of India’s independence, the value of public health was deeply
contested. Within the thinking of the Congress Planning Committee, health was,
at once, a basic human right, a tool for the improvement of the ‘Indian race’,
making it more efficient and more governable, and health was an instrument for
economic development. The need for public health stemmed from an egalitarian
commitment to welfare, and from a far-from-egalitarian fear of the rising
numbers of the lower classes.
Furthermore, there remained a wide gulf between aspirations for the
improvement of public health, and the absence of the ability to bring this about.
The serious crises of the 1940s, with the massive influx of refugees during and
after Partition, revealed the fragility and weakness of India’s health infrastructure.
This was, essentially, the crux of the colonial legacy: the nationalist engagement
with questions of health and welfare, in dialogue with and in opposition to the
colonial state, had created a great sense of expectation; the long legacy of under-
investment in health institutions, however, made those promises and expectations
unrealistic, and almost impossible to fulfil. 
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As Uday Mehta has written, the ‘immediate ambit’ of political power in post-
colonial India was ‘dictated by the intensity of “mere life”’. Mass poverty and
destitution put most Indians ‘under the pressing dictates of their bodies’; ‘and
this ambit’, Mehta observes, ‘can have no limiting bounds. This simple logic
transforms power from a traditional concern with freedom to a concern with life
and its necessities’ (Mehta 2006: 26–7). Only the rationality of the state, that is
to say, could reconcile the enormity of ambition with the lack of resources. 
The dominant view in India was that the problems of ‘life and its necessities’
were so pressing that there was little time, or need, for dialogue and discussion.
In the late-colonial period, as I have argued, ideas about health and healthiness
circulated widely through civil society – in pamphlets and magazines, through
baby and child associations, within particular neighbourhoods. The institution of
planning, with wise experts allocating scarce resources, appeared increasingly as
a substitute for that sort of social engagement with questions of health and
welfare (Chatterjee 1997). Indeed, the new leaders of India condemned as
outmoded the principles of charity and sympathy that had underpinned earlier
elite interventions in the field of health. ‘When planned society comes fully into
being, occasions for individual unorganized or sporadic charity will have no
place’, they declared, even if this charity was motivated by an ethic of ‘service’
(seva) or self-sacrifice. The planners envisaged a transition ‘from dependence on
spontaneous charity and goodwill to scientific social work’, and a process
whereby the state would ‘institutionalise the methods of social service’ (NPC
1948). Little wonder, then, that in recent years, health activists in India have
bemoaned the absence of any deep social awareness that health is a right and an
entitlement of citizenship; the Indian state felt little need, after 1947, to commu-
nicate this to its citizens. 
Arguably, it was a failure to justify health as an intrinsic value that paved the
way for the relative weakness of public health in the broader competition for
support and resources within the Indian state after independence. When, by the
1960s, external resources for population control proliferated, and the old
argument reasserted itself that population control may be a more ‘cost-effective’
way of achieving the same ends as public health, the level of resources devoted
to public health dropped significantly (Rao 2005), and there was surprisingly
little discussion or dissent. This instrumental approach towards the various
components of development policy is also responsible for some of the worst
excesses of the post-colonial Indian state in the field of population policy, which
reached their sordid climax in the forced sterilizations of the Emergency period
(Rao 2005). More prosaically but – as all who work in development know –
crucially, ideas matter in the quest to justify expenditure and budget allocations,
in mobilizing the resources necessary to make policy interventions meaningful
and self-sustaining. Champions of public health in post-colonial India did not
make the argument strongly enough that health was intrinsically valuable. For
instance, much of the legitimacy of the malaria control and eradication program
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of the 1950s came from the argument that malaria control would result in
demonstrable economic benefits; when those benefits proved difficult to demon-
strate or quantify, support for the malaria control program dropped off sharply.
Health in India after 1947
Malaria control: a case study
The development of malaria control policy in the 1950s encapsulates, in many
ways, the political culture of public health that evolved after independence. This
is, not least, because at its height, between 1959 and 1963, the National Malaria
Eradication program took up nearly 70 percent of India’s budget for communi-
cable disease control; communicable disease control itself accounting for nearly
30 percent of the overall health budget under the Second Plan (Jeffery 1988).
India quickly became the world’s largest market for DDT. The malaria eradication
program was heavily dependent on outside funding: between 1952 and 1958,
the US contributed more than 50 percent of the cost of the program, and nearly
40 percent of the cost of the eradication program between 1959 and 1961
(Jeffery 1988: 200). 
The National Malaria Control Programme – which subsequently set its sights
on malaria eradication – epitomises the political culture of public health in the
‘high-Nehruvian’ era, and it points to the contradictions and the weaknesses
inherent in the Indian state’s approach to public health. 
The success of the malaria control and eradication policies must not be
underestimated. The success was quite staggering. Malaria, perhaps the leading
cause of mortality and morbidity at independence, had virtually disappeared by
the late 1950s.6 The Indian anti-malaria campaign was undoubtedly the world’s
most extensive. By 1958, a total of 8,704 malaria squads were in operation – a
dramatic indication of the expansion of malaria control from a few pilot projects
– and the spraying of a total of 438 million houses was complete. The statistics,
however problematic, tell an astonishing story. The number of recorded cases of
malaria fell from 75 million in 1951 to just 50,000 in 1961. The malaria eradi-
cation program employed 150,000 people by 1961. By that year, malaria cases
accounted for less than one percent of all hospital admissions, an astonishing
diminution in the burden of malaria. It is important to bear in mind that though
the eradication program failed, with a significant resurgence of malaria in the
1960s, the incidence of the disease has never since reached the levels where it
stood in the 1940s. 
Yet the malaria eradication campaign did begin to falter, in the 1960s,
because of the absence of health infrastructure and, on some views, because of
resistance to DDT and to anti-malarial drugs. Reliance on technology (DDT) was
a consequence of the weakness of India’s health infrastructure at the moment of
independence; DDT promised a ‘magic bullet’, a cheap solution to a mass
problem that did not require much in the way of local health infrastructure. Yet
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the success of DDT, in the end, depended upon a level of medical surveillance that
was noticeably absent in India. An active program of ‘case-finding’ constituted a
crucial final stage in malaria eradication; Indian conditions made this very
difficult. After the initial campaign of intensive spraying, to eliminate the anopheles
vector, malaria control teams needed to find all infected persons in an area and
treat them with anti-malarial drugs to eliminate the human reservoir of
plasmodia before the mosquitoes could return. Such was the state of rural health
services that ‘by the time a reasonably prompt report came that a particular
individual was infected, he might have left his village or because of a false or
ambiguous identification at the local clinic have become untraceable’ (Harrison
1978: 252).
In 1961, there were fewer than 100,000 cases of malaria in India. Between
1961 and 1965, the number of cases jumped to 150,000, and then doubled
again within a few years. The Indian government itself concluded, in an investi-
gation into the resurgence of malaria in the country, that:
We can see that in those States where the rural health services are well developed,
such as Mysore and Kerala, reversions have not occurred, and the maintenance is kept
under good control even in areas previously hyperendemic. In other words, the map
of reverted areas can be super-imposed on those with delays or imperfections in the
development of the rural health sector. (Sharma and Mehrotra 1986)
Mysore and Kerala are, in a sense, the exceptions that bring into sharp relief the
prevalent political culture of health in most of India: a culture in which public
health fared poorly in the competition for political attention and funding, and in
which there is a history of infrastructural underdeveloped stymied ambitious
policies. 
For the most part, the dominance of the ‘vertical’ malaria control apparatus
throughout the 1950s led to a consequent neglect of general health services,
while establishing a pattern that continues to this day. The government of India’s
most recent National Health Policy reflects, honestly, on this legacy:
the Government has relied upon a ‘vertical’ implementational structure for the major
disease control programs. Through this, the system has been able to make a substan-
tial dent on reducing the burden of specific diseases. However, such an organizational
structure, which requires independent manpower for each disease program, is
extremely expensive and difficult to sustain.
The report proceeds to suggest that such programs may ‘only be affordable for
those diseases which offer a reasonable possibility of elimination or eradication
in a foreseeable time-span’ (Government of India 2002: § 2.3.2.1), viz. smallpox,
the one eradicationist success. The ultimate cost of this approach was the patient,
unglamorous task of building up local health services.
As early as the 1960s, the pioneering research conducted by the National
Tuberculosis Institute in Bangalore underscored the costs of neglecting local
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health services, showing the weakness of health services in the face of the serious 
problem of tuberculosis. Criticizing the tendency by the Indian state and by the 
World Health Organization (WHO) to blame the failure of public health 
programs on the ‘non-compliance’ of patients, a sociologist at the Bangalore 
institute wrote: ‘the Indian villager does not need to be told in words about the 
tuberculosis problem, but needs a service to deal with a problem which … is 
only far too well known to him’ (WHO 1963). The problem did not lie in the 
‘ignorance’ of the poor, and the solution did not lie in a simplistic form of ‘health 
education’. The problem was deeper, and lay in the lack of confidence that many 
Indians’ prior experiences with the public health services had engendered in 
them. ‘People who now feel ill’, Andersen continued, needed the confidence that 
that ‘they will be taken care of as well as medical technology can currently 
manage’, and ‘people who fear that they or their dear ones might become ill’ 
ought to have the sense that ‘should catastrophe strike’, that it could, and would, 
be cured (WHO 1963).
It is in the gap between expectations of health and the availability of health 
facilities that we can look for an explanation of why, despite the centrality of the 
state to public health policy in India since independence, India has developed one 
of the most extensive, and least regulated, private markets in health in the world. 
The medical technologies that circulated as a result of the public health 
campaigns of the 1950s ‘were not supposed to become common commodities’, 
but the effort to control them was ‘doomed to failure’ (Whyte et al. 2002). The 
very weakness of local health infrastructures meant that pharmaceutical 
technologies have circulated in an unregulated way (Dreze and Sen 2002). 
‘Malaria doctors’ dispensed not only anti-malarials, but also all manner of other 
drugs (Phadke 1998). Powerful anti-tuberculosis agents became available from 
private providers, from grocery shops and ‘medical stores’ to private clinics and 
ayurvedic practitioners. Rarely if ever were patients able to afford to complete 
their courses of treatment, leading, inevitably, to the spread of drug-resistant 
pathogens.
A further and serious consequence of the ways in which the Indian state has 
engaged with public health in the period since independence – emphasizing 
single diseases, and technocentric interventions on a large scale – has been the 
neglect of quotidian, but essential questions of local sanitation. As Vijayendra Rao, 
Radu Ban and Monica Das Gupta have shown in recent research, environmental 
health outcomes in India are very poor (Ban et al. 2010). Over several decades, 
this has been due to low levels of political commitment and advocacy, and a lack 
of public awareness of sanitation and threats to public health. As Mavalankar and 
Shankar (2004) put it: ‘the availability of cheap antibiotics coupled with lack of 
visions among the public health and political leadership has meant that authori-
ties have become complacent to poor sanitation and water supply’; they aptly 
label this an ‘insanitation-antibiotic syndrome’. 
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India’s state of chronic insanitation has often found representation in litera-
ture and on screen over many decades: in Phanishwar Nath Renu’s description of 
the poverty and insanitation of rural north India in the Hindi masterpiece Maila 
Anchal; in R.K. Narayan’s gentle satire of the crumbling infrastructure of his 
fictional village of Malgudi after Indian independence; in Satyajit Ray’s 
memorable rendition of Ibsen’s An Enemy of the People. 
To the extent that a lack of political awareness and commitment lies behind 
India’s problem of insanitation (Ban et al. 2010), a historical perspective would 
seem essential to explaining the roots of this policy failure; particularly when, as 
the earlier part of this essay suggested, sanitation was at the core of many earlier 
elite attempts at public health reform in the early twentieth century. 
Regional variation and political culture
This broad account of the shortcomings in national disease control policies needs 
some qualification at this point, because – as indicated above – there were signif-
icant regional variations in the ways in which the national (and international) 
disease control campaigns affected local health services. The point here is that 
regional political cultures exercised a significant impact on the extent to which 
public health became a political priority after independence, and the extent to 
which the ‘right to health’ had any prospect of enforcement.
As is well documented, Kerala presents a history quite different to that of 
much of India; one in which the ‘universal’ campaigns of disease control and 
eradication were matched by a sustained, and deeply politicised, effort to build 
up local institutions. Health in mid-twentieth-century Kerala was championed as 
a ‘people’s right’, in a way almost without parallel in the region. The declaration 
that health was a ‘fundamental right’, institutionalised with the foundation of the 
WHO after the Second World War, took on ethical force and political meaning in 
Kerala, where a political culture of social reform had taken root in the nineteenth 
century, particularly in the princely states of Travancore and Cochin (Jeffrey 
1993).
The mobilization of a well-organized communist movement, first within and 
later outside the Congress party, led to a level of political competition unusual in 
post-colonial India. Of equal significance was the emergence of a broad-based 
People’s Science Movement in the 1950s, which has remained potent and which 
currently has over 50,000 members: the People’s Science Movement has 
conducted health camps, campaigned on unsafe drugs, and spread public 
awareness of health through its publications, Sastragathy and Sastra Keralam (Isaac et 
al. 1997). 
The broad politicization of questions of public health led to a heightened 
awareness among the poor that ‘health services were their right and not a boon 
conferred upon them’. In the words of one observer, ‘In Kerala, if a Primary 
Health Centre were unmanned for a few days, there would be a massive demon-
stration at the nearest collectorate led by local leftists, who would demand to be
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given what they knew they were entitled to’ (Mencher 1980: 1781–2).
Moreover, notions of health and wellbeing in Kerala continued to circulate
widely, after independence, through a vigorous popular press – newspapers,
women’s magazines – in a highly literate and informationally dense society, and
one in which female labour-force participation was high (Devika 2002). Thus the
specific configuration of political society in mid-twentieth-century Kerala served
to turn national and international promises of health and welfare into claims of
entitlement. 
In the more recent past, the neighbouring state of Tamil Nadu has chalked up
significant achievements in the field of health. Since the 1970s, Tamil Nadu has
seen the largest proportionate fall in child mortality (after Kerala), as well as a
significant decline in fertility (Visaria 2000). A particularly noteworthy interven-
tion in this case was the institution in 1982 of the Mid-Day Meals Scheme, which
has guaranteed one meal a day to children in government-aided schools. Twenty
years later, the scheme feeds 7.8 million children a day, and is credited both with
a significant reduction in malnutrition and undernutrition, as well as an increase
in school attendance (Drèze and Sen 2002, Parikh and Yasmeen 2004). Given
India’s generally appalling record in addressing the problem of malnutrition, this
is a noteworthy exception. More generally, and again in contrast to the pattern
across large parts of north India, local health services in Tamil Nadu are broadly
of good quality, and widely accessible. Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen (2002), in
making their case for Tamil Nadu’s achievements, point out that 89 percent of
children in the state are fully immunized, and 84 percent of births attended by a
health professional. 
Amongst the explanations for Tamil Nadu’s relative commitment to public
health (its ‘political will’ in the language of policy) are its long tradition of social
reform, manifested in the rise of the radical anti-caste Self Respect movement in
the 1920s, and the translation of this movement into a powerful regional political
force after independence. Tamil Nadu’s unusually competitive political system –
the Congress has not ruled in the state since 1967 – allowed for the politiciza-
tion of issues of public health. Described by some commentators as a form of
‘populism’ (Subramanian 1999, Harriss 2001), the competition between rival
factions of the Dravidian movement in Tamil Nadu have made public health a
subject of political competition in a way that it has not been elsewhere in India
(Visaria 2000). The history of anti-Brahmin activism in Tamil Nadu translated
into a widely implemented program of affirmative action (‘reservations’) in the
health sector, with the result that the ‘social distance’ between medical workers
and patients is perhaps smaller in Tamil Nadu than elsewhere (Visaria 2000).
The pioneering Mid-Day Meals Scheme, for instance, which has subsequently
been implemented widely in other states – was a direct initiative of the charis-
matic film-star-turned-Chief-Minister, M.G. Ramachandran (‘MGR’). Launching
the scheme in 1982, MGR declared:
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This scheme is an outcome of my experience of extreme starvation at an age when I
knew only to cry when I was hungry. But for the munificence of a woman next door
who extended a bowl of rice gruel to us and saved us from the cruel hand of death,
we would have departed this world long ago. Such merciful women folk, having great
faith in me, elected me as Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu. To wipe the tears of these
women I have taken up this project … To picture lakhs and lakhs of poor children
who gather to partake of nutritious meals in the thousands of hamlets and villages
all over Tamil Nadu … will be a glorious event. (Harriss 1991:10)
This is not the usual language of development policy; MGR’s objectives, as
Barbara Harriss pointed out, ‘were political, not at all technocratic’ (Harriss
1991: 10). The hyperbole and emotionalism here may make many development
policy-makers very uncomfortable, yet the importance of MGR’s intervention lies
in his ability to translate a very specific and ambitious health intervention into
the language of everyday politics. As Sudipta Kaviraj (1991) has argued, it was the
failure of the post-colonial state to achieve this in most fields of its endeavour that
underlie a number of its failures and frustrated expectations.
Civic activism in health, too, remains strong. The Tamil Nadu Science Forum,
founded in 1980, has played a role akin to the People’s Science Movement in
Kerala, focusing initially on literacy, but by the 1990s turning to public health.
The Tamil Nadu Science Forum’s health movement, the Arogya Iyakkam, has been
active in 500 villages, spreading awareness and education about public health.
The ‘lessons’ of Tamil Nadu and Kerala, such as they are, are that political
mobilization matters, and can act as a counterweight against the tendency
towards technocracy. Both examples, however briefly presented, suggest that an
important factor in explaining the relative success of these states in securing
improvements in health lies in the re-activation, after independence, of deep
traditions of local activism, public discussion and cooperative endeavour in the
field of health. 
To put it another way, it seems to be the case that in those parts of India
where the ‘right to health’ had the deepest roots and saw constant reinforcement
after independence, the resultant health outcomes were more impressive. This
might offer interesting insights to development policy-makers contemplating the
most effective strategies for communicating particular development policies to
diverse publics. Yet this also, in some ways, returns us to what economists call
‘path dependency’. For it is arguably only those parts of India which already
possess deep traditions of civic activism in health which are in a position to
deploy the full range of political and constitutional discourses available to them
to hold the state to account. For regions much less endowed with strong civil
society, the lack of a binding, legal commitment on the part of the state to provide
for public health means, by and large, that it fails to do so.
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Conclusions
Charles Rosenberg, a leading historian of medicine, has written recently that
Policy is always history. Events in the past define the possible and the desirable, set
tasks, and define rewards, viable choices, and thus the range of possible outcomes.
As we move through time those choices reconfigure themselves, trends may establish
themselves – but at any point in time the ‘actionable’ options are highly structured.
… Most important, what history can and should contribute to the world of policy
and politics is its fundamental sense of context and complexity, of the determined
and the negotiated. (Rosenberg 2005: 28)
This chapter has attempted to show that, in the field of health, notions of ‘the
desirable’ in India were shaped by Indian interpretations, appropriations or criti-
cisms of colonial ideas about health, nourished by an increasingly international
field of debate and the international flow of information in the 1930s. By the
mid-twentieth century, these included the notion that health was a right. Yet the
institutional legacies of the colonial state, in terms of the medical infrastructure
and fiscal structure of the new state, acted to constrain the extent to which the
‘desirable’ (a vast reduction in disease and human suffering) could be realised. 
In the context of the mid-twentieth century, it is difficult to imagine that any
approach could have prevailed but the highly statist, centralizing and technocratic
one that governed public health in India for a generation or more after 1947. The
enormity of the ambition, the extent of the promises made to India’s new
citizens, and the flow of policy models and technologies from abroad, all pointed
in that direction. But historians would do well to highlight the element of
complexity and contingency that remained: there were many other ‘capacities
and capabilities’ that Indian society developed in the late colonial period,
including a deep civic engagement with questions of health in the public sphere.
It is perhaps some of these traditions, which the post-colonial state ignored or
suppressed, that will be of particular value at a time when development policy
appears to be looking for non-statist approaches to what is now called ‘global’
(no longer national) health. I conclude with three possible areas in which India’s
past may provide resources, models or inspiration for development policy in the
present and future.
The first lies in the stock of political ideas that originate from the debates of
the 1930s and 1940s, and which remain open to reinvigoration and reinterpre-
tation. The commitments that the Indian state made to its citizens at independ-
ence were hard-won. They were the result of political debate and political
struggle, within the nationalist movement, and between the nationalist
movement and the colonial state. If the subsequent history of public health policy
in India after 1947 exhibited many signs of depoliticization, the example of
Kerala shows that this was not universally true. Recent years have witnessed
moves by a range of groups to make health, once again, a subject of public
debate. Such groups seek to turn the promise of the right to health care into a
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properly political demand for its provision. This is most notably the case of the
Jan Swasthiya Abhiyan (People’s Health Movement), which declares that:
We reaffirm our inalienable right to and demand for comprehensive health care that
includes food security; sustainable livelihood options including secure employment
opportunities; access to housing, drinking water and sanitation; and appropriate
medical care for all; in sum – the right to Health For All, Now! 
This demand is the more powerful for drawing on precisely the language of
rights and promises which the post-colonial state made to the people on the eve
of its foundation. The ideas of 1947 still matter; they still provide legitimacy and
force to political demands in the present. The sheer range of political commit-
ments made in 1947 – in the Constitution, and in the international agreements
that the Indian state signed – may have led to frustrated expectations, but as long
as they remain unmet, they provide a yardstick by which activists and civil
society groups can judge the state’s failures (Feher 2007).
The second resource that India’s past may provide lies in the historical impor-
tance of the engagement between India and international/transnational institu-
tions in the field of health. In asking how India is responding, and should
respond, to the globalization of public health, it is worth recalling that the history
of public health in India has always been a transnational and an international
history (Amrith 2006). International influence on India’s health policy has not
always been positive (Rao 2005, Amrith 2006), but India is nevertheless in a
good position to determine what and how much to adopt, adapt or reject from
the models and advice that come flooding in. 
Writing of what ‘global democracy’ might look like in the field of adminis-
tration and policy-making, Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel (2006: 781) point to
the possibility of policy-making by ‘deliberative polyarchy’, in which ‘the aim is
not to achieve uniformity, but to pool information, identify best practices and
compare solutions across locations’. Thus forms of global connection and
comparison in the field of public health would uncover ‘unexplored possibilities
and unintended consequences’. This is, in fact, a rather good (if surprising)
characterization of how international connections fed into thinking about public
health in India in the 1930s. A rather unlikely instance of this kind of ‘delibera-
tive polyarchy’ at the interface of local, national, and transnational institutions
was found in the League of Nations’ conference on Intensive Rural Hygiene in
the Far East, held in Bandung in 1937. This was an occasion for colonial and
national governments, independent scientists and even some early ‘NGOs’ to
share ideas, information, and approaches, without trying to impose uniform
policies in the way that the WHO tried to do after 1945 (Amrith 2006).
Something of this approach seems to underpin the establishment of the
Public Health Foundation of India (The Hindu 2006). The Foundation’s aim is to
‘address the limited institutional capacity in India’ by ‘strengthening training,
research and policy development in the area of public health’ (The Hindu 2007a).
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The Foundation has heavy state involvement, but is relatively autonomous, with
academics, private foundations and civil society groups involved in its adminis-
tration.8 The Foundation is based on ‘the best of Indian and international
courses’; ‘the inputs might be international’, director Srinath Reddy insists, ‘but
the context is predominantly Indian’ (The Hindu 2007a).
The history of public health in India since independence illustrates, above all,
the complex relationship between health and democracy. Rediscovering or
reinforcing some of India’s traditions of democratic deliberation about health
and wellbeing might help to correct some of the failings of an excessively statist,
centralizing approach, whilst maintaining or even reinforcing the central role
that the Indian state continues to play in giving the most disadvantaged people
some access to the conditions of health and wellbeing. In the context of India’s
vibrant democracy, its own historical commitments and promises mean that the
Indian state cannot fully abdicate its responsibility for health and welfare, even if
at times it may wish to do so. 
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Notes
1 An earlier version of some of these arguments appeared in Amrith (2007). My thanks
to participants at the authors’ workshop for this volume for helpful comments. 
2 As cited in Sharma (2005). 
3 Since I am chiefly concerned here with tracing the history of institutions and the
ideas underpinning them, I will take as read the argument that changes in mortality
and morbidity may have owed as much to non-policy factors, including secular
trends in the virulence of particular pathogens, and patterns of natural resistance
within populations (Klein 1990).
4 Of course, notions of the responsibility of the ruler to alleviate suffering, particularly
in times of dearth or famine, long pre-dated the British, and the Mughal state had
highly developed doctrines on these subjects. However, by universalizing these
expectations – beyond the person of a just king or ruler – the colonial commitment
nevertheless marked a shift.
5 Central Co-operative Anti-Malaria Society, Annual Reports (Calcutta, 1927 – 43) held at
the Wellcome Contemporary Medical Archive Centre, Wellcome Library, London.
6 In 1951, there were an estimated 75 million cases of malaria in India. After the resur-
gence of the 1970s, the number of cases was approximately 2.7 million in 1981, and
has since stabilized at a level of around 2.2 million – however, recent years have
witnessed a 50 percent increase in the incidence of the most lethal, P. Falciparum strain
(see Government of India 2002). 
7 I owe this point to David Hall-Matthews’ commentary on an earlier draft of this
chapter.
8 Note, however, that the Foundation is criticized by K.S. Jacob for its attempt to
provide ‘American-style education’ and its ‘side-stepping of existing public health
resources within medical colleges and governmental institutions and their
completely separate operations’ (The Hindu 2007c).
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6
Healthcare policy for American 
Indians since the early twentieth century
Stephen J. Kunitz
In the English-speaking liberal democracies of North America and Oceania,
European contact with indigenous peoples caused catastrophic population losses
initially, and recovery only relatively recently. In addition, policies with respect to
the treatment of the original indigenous inhabitants have been broadly similar,
moving from subjugation to assimilation to self-determination (Kunitz 1994). In
all four of the settler societies in which such contact took place – Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, and the United States – policies for the past generation or
so have favoured greater autonomy and self-determination for the indigenous
people.
The reasons for this convergence have to do with both diffusion of influences
among them, and broadly similar socioeconomic changes within each country.
Each has become increasingly urban, and as the bulk of each population has
become less involved in farming and extractive industries, they have become
increasingly removed from contact and conflict with indigenous people, and
increasingly sympathetic to the claims for the restitution of land rights and
protection of the environment (Kunitz 2000). Members of the settler societies,
whose interests still conflict with those of indigenous people, tend to be far less
sympathetic to their claims to land, fishing rights and natural resources.
Within these very broad similarities, however, there are great differences
among countries that are shaped by their histories of contact and by the differ-
ences among and within both the settler and the indigenous societies. For ease
of exposition, I shall deal only with policy changes in the United States since the
late nineteenth century.
American Indians and African Americans 
Because much has been written about the consequences of slavery and contin-
uing discrimination for the health of African Americans, this chapter deals with
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a smaller minority group in the United States, namely American Indians and
Alaska Natives. There are, however, some illuminating similarities and differences
between them that are worth mentioning briefly. An important similarity has to
do with the importance of federalism. 
In the United States there has historically been tension between those who
would centralize power in the federal government and those who would decen-
tralize it to the states. This was built into the structure of the government at the
founding of the republic and continues to be a live issue into the present.
Typically, liberals are said to support centralization and ‘big government’ and
conservatives decentralization and small government, but the dividing line is not
as clear as the conventional wisdom suggests. It was conservatives who advocated
passage of the 18th amendment to the Constitution, which made the sale of
alcoholic beverages a federal offence instead of a local option. And it was under
a liberal administration that community control of services in poor neighbour-
hoods was supported during the 1960s.
Nonetheless, with regard to the rights of minorities, it has generally been the
federal government that has been cast in the role of protector, often only with
great reluctance, whereas states have generally been less willing protectors. In the
case of both African Americans and American Indians, local and state interests
have supported the interests of whites and have resisted the intrusion of the
federal government on behalf of minority populations, especially with regard to
the civil rights of African Americans and the protection of Indian land rights and
natural resources. Because state interests are well represented in the federal
government, particularly in Congress, such resistance has often been effective.
For instance, in the 1930s southern congressmen were able to exclude many
African Americans from the benefits of New Deal legislation, and as we shall see,
similar differences between state and federal agencies have been important in
American Indian health policy throughout the twentieth century.
On the other hand, an important difference between the situations of African
Americans and American Indians has to do with the fact that African Americans
were enslaved to provide labour whereas it was land and natural resources that
were taken from Indians, in return for which they were set aside on reservations.
Thus, though the slaves who were brought from Africa were members of many
different tribes, those differences were vaporized in the crucible of slavery. In
contrast, because many Indian tribes, especially west of the Mississippi, have been
able to retain land (even if much diminished) since the time of early contact with
Europeans, tribal diversity and cultural differences have remained important, as
have differences in access to political influence, economic opportunities and
services, including health services. One result has been significant regional and
tribal differences in health, a vast topic to which I return briefly below (Kunitz
et al. 2010).
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Health policy for American Indians 
Policy with respect to health services for American Indians has been embedded
within, and responsive to, Indian policy more broadly. And Indian policy has in
its turn been responsive to political, economic and cultural forces that have their
sources well beyond Indian country. As in the other Anglophone countries
mentioned above, policy has swung between the poles of assimilation and
tribalism or nationalism. Assimilation refers to the incorporation of Indians into
the larger population, based upon the assumption by Indians of the individu-
alism and acquisitiveness that have been important characteristics of American
society. Claims to land and natural resources as the property of tribal entities were
to be foregone as Indians assumed the rights and obligations of citizenship. On
the other hand, tribalism or nationalism, now called self-determination, refers to
the maintenance of distinct tribal entities, considered domestic dependent
nations with treaty rights to land, natural resources, and services, maintaining
their own cultures, and controlling services and economic development on their
own territory. 
Until the 1870s, tribes were dealt with as collectivities and treaties were
agreed upon, or more often forced upon them after military defeat. In 1871,
however, Congress deprived Indians of the right to enter into treaties but did not
at the same time grant them citizenship (Jorgensen 1978: 10f). Moreover, rights
to land and resources were eroded by subsequent legislation, perhaps the best
known of which was the General Allotment Act of 1887, better known as the
Dawes Severalty Act. This Act, and others like it, allotted reservation land to
individual Indians. The land that remained was then thrown open to acquisition
by non-Indians. This was clearly a way of dispossessing Indians and making their
resources available to others. The rationale was that once Indians owned land as
individuals, they would be on their way to assuming the values of the larger
society.
Assimilation
Justifying this policy was the social evolutionism that pervaded much western
thought, including ethnology, in the late nineteenth century (Hinsley 1981). The
development from savagism through barbarism to civilization was believed to be
a universal process. John Wesley Powell and his colleagues at the Bureau of
American Ethnology (BAE) did not think that savages and barbarians were physi-
cally or mentally different from civilized people, but that culturally and techno-
logically they were far less advanced. Thus, while they liked and respected many
of their Indian informants, an attitude that distinguished them from many other
Anglo-Americans, they shared the widely held belief that Indians must ultimately
give way to a higher civilization (Worster 2001: 112–13, 262, 266). It was
therefore one of the tasks of ethnology to salvage whatever could be learned of
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the languages and cultures of the indigenous peoples of the United States
(Gruber 1970), both to help with policy-making and administration, and to
justify and explain the higher claim of Europeans to Indian lands. Ethnologists
believed that one world community would evolve, with separate races disap-
pearing, but with the descendants of the most advanced dominating. William
Henry Holmes, a colleague of Powell’s, wrote:
In the inevitable course of human history the individual races will probably fade out
and disappear, and the world will be filled to overflowing with a generalized race in
which the dominating blood will be that of the race that today has the strongest
claim, physically and intellectually, to take possession of all the resources of the land
and sea. The resultant race will not have of the native American blood even this one
three-hundredth part, because they are decadent as a result of conditions imposed by
civilization.2
Powell himself believed that government policy had been for the most part
benign and administered by honourable men. Writing not long after passage of
the Dawes Allotment Act in 1887, he claimed that at the time of Columbus,
Indians in what became the United States numbered between 500,000 and one
million. By the 1890s they numbered about 250,000. The decline had been
caused by warfare with whites, as well as between tribes, and by ‘the presence of
civilization itself’, for ‘the diseases of the lower classes of the white race were
introduced among the Indians’. However, Powell continued, an army of mission-
aries and teachers had accomplished much, though impediments to progress
remained. The most important of these were: Indian religion and the resistance
of the ‘shamans’ found in every tribe who were ‘believed to be endowed with
wonderful powers of sorcery’; Indian reluctance to engage in the civilized arts;
‘tribal organization’, which, being based upon kinship, discouraged individual
ownership and inheritance of land; and the great number of different languages
spoken by Indians. All of this would change, he wrote. Land was being purchased
from Indians at fair prices; warfare had almost entirely ceased, largely replaced
by farming and industry; and ‘in a generation or two the pristine tongues will all
be gone’. Indeed, with wise and humane administration, ‘for two generations
more, the problems will be solved; the remnant of the Indians will be saved and
absorbed in modern enlightenment’ (Powell 1893; see also Worster 2001:
542–3). 
Washington Matthews, a military physician who wrote the first ethnographic
studies of Navajo Indians, who was a colleague of Powell’s at the BAE, and who
wrote about the impact of consumption (tuberculosis) on the Native American
population, observed: 
Nowhere in this or other papers do I speak of the actual possession of civilization 
as injurious to the Indian … but I refer instead to the evils that result from ‘contact
with civilization’, from ‘the influences of civilization’ etc. The policy hitherto
pursued by our people toward the Indians has resulted in maintaining a certain large
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and representative portion of them and their mixed descendants as isolated commu-
nities of barbarous aliens in the midst of a civilized population, too busy with 
other matters to try to understand them, and generally too selfish to consider 
their weakness. The means of leading a successful healthy savage life has been taken
away from them, never again by any possibility to be restored, while the means of
leading a successful civilized life has not been furnished them instead. (Matthews
1888: 154) 
Matthews believed that more specialized schools for Indians, like Carlisle and
Santee, were required, schools that educated young people who never thereafter
returned home but blended into the larger society. This was, he recognized, a
policy of extermination. ‘Any policy which tends to assimilate the Indian to the
white population is, in one sense, but not a cruel sense, a policy of extermina-
tion’ (Matthews 1888: 155). Nonetheless, given the realities of the situation as
he saw it in the 1880s, it seemed the most humane solution. Indeed, it was the
same solution – called ‘Americanization’ – espoused by many reformers of the
time as they considered the situation of immigrants to rapidly growing urban
slums (Elliott 1998, Prucha 1973). So widespread, indeed, was the assumption
of the disappearance of American Indians that even Franz Boas, a critic of Powell’s
social evolutionism, believed that ethnology at the BAE would cease to exist as its
subjects became extinct in twenty years’ time (Hinsley 1981: 277).3
This was not an unreasonable assumption. While there is no agreement about
the size of the indigenous population of the western hemisphere at the time of
first European contact (Henige 1998), there is unanimous agreement that the
native population experienced a dramatic decline subsequently. As noted above,
the same sort of decline was observed in Australia and Polynesia, but not on the
Eurasian landmass or in Africa (McNeill 1988). The differences in economic
development between the regions where the indigenous populations collapsed
and where they did not, have been commented upon by others.4 There is little
doubt that where ‘good’ institutions and economic development occurred, the
environment was relatively safe for Europeans. It is just as clear, however, that
Europeans were detrimental to the health of the indigenous peoples of those
regions, for the populations that declined had no history of exposure to many of
the diseases imported by Europeans and subsequently by African slaves, and
hence they were especially susceptible. In addition to disease, warfare and dispos-
session had equally profound consequences, so much so that by the late
nineteenth century, when the indigenous population of the United States reached
its nadir, many observers – whether they believed in social evolution or not –
could assume that Indians would disappear entirely. Indeed, economic develop-
ment and ‘good’ institutions took root where the indigenous peoples had been
exterminated, or nearly so. 
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Communitarianism from the 1920s to the 1940s
And yet Indians did not disappear. While mortality was high in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Shoemaker 1999, Hacker and Haines
2006) and has continued to be higher than in the rest of the US population, 
and though census data are very far from perfect, there is convincing evidence
that throughout the twentieth century the Indian population increased, though
at different rates and for different combinations of reasons in different tribes.
From 248,000 in 1890, the population increased to 524,000 in 1960, an
increase of 1.1 percent per year, the result of very high mortality and fertility. 
By 1990 the population had increased to 1,959,000, implying an impossibly
high average annual growth rate of 4.3 percent since 1960, the result of reduced
mortality, continuing high fertility, and rapidly changing self-identification 
on the part of respondents to the Census (Passel 1996). Despite changing 
self-identification, a dramatic increase did occur and is substantiated when
particular tribal populations are considered more closely (Shoemaker 1999,
Trafzer 1997). Without doubt the most dramatic growth has been in the past
forty to fifty years.
The reasons for the slow rate of increase in the pre-World War II period were
poverty and substandard living conditions, virtually non-existent economic
growth, the continuing expropriation of Indian resources, and abysmal health
services (Meriam et al. 1928).5 In 1921 the Snyder Act (PL 67-87) was passed,
providing ‘such monies as Congress may from time to time appropriate, for the
benefit, care, and assistance of the Indians throughout the United States,’
including ‘for relief of distress and conservation of health’ (The Synder Act
1921),6 and in the 1930s a significant change in Indian policy did take place.
Despite these changes, it is very difficult to believe that they led to changed
practices resulting in dramatic improvements in the health status of the popula-
tion. Descriptions of services available to Indians on various reservations in the
1930s invariably describe overcrowded facilities, insufficient and inadequately
trained staff, and low morale.7
The policy supported by President Roosevelt’s New Deal Administration in
the 1930s emphasized the importance for native peoples of having viable tribal
communities. It was, according to one historian of the period, an ‘assault on
assimilation’ (Kelly 1983).8 Despite dilution by Congress of the original bill
(Select Committee on Indian Affairs 1989: 51–2), the Indian Reorganization Act
of 1934 allowed for the purchase and consolidation of Indian lands, the creation
of tribal governments, and the establishment of schools on reservations. The
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), under its commissioner, John Collier, also hired
anthropologists to do studies among various tribes in order to improve the
understanding by bureaucrats of the people they were supposed to be serving
(Kunitz 1972, Kelly 1980), a policy that was derided by many career BIA
employees as ‘the anthropological approach’. Despite anthropological research,
and despite the fact that democratic decision-making on the part of tribes was
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the goal, the administration of the BIA tended to be heavy handed and top down.
Moreover, resources for significant tribal enterprises such as cattle ranching were
not made available, although the federal government did provide such support to
non-Indian agricultural enterprises (Jorgensen 1978: 17–22). 
Nonetheless, compared with the previous period, the Collier years repre-
sented a distinct improvement for Indians. Indeed, federal policy was understood
by many non-Indian westerners and their congressional delegations to be a threat
to the acquisition of Indian land and natural resources, and when the
Republicans regained the White House with the election of Dwight Eisenhower,
Indian policy once again emphasized the dismantling of Indian reservations and
the assimilation of Indians into the larger US population.
Termination in the 1950s9
When Harry Truman became president upon the death of Franklin Roosevelt, one
of his major concerns was to reorganize the government. He believed that his
predecessor had not been a good manager and that the executive branch required
rationalization. At the same time, the Republican-dominated Congress, which
was elected in 1946, wanted to trim the Executive Branch for the purposes of
‘economy and efficiency’ and, many Democrats feared, to undo the reforms of
the New Deal (Moe 1982).
The result was legislation that empanelled a bipartisan Commission on
Reorganization of the Executive Branch of the government under the chairman-
ship of former president Herbert Hoover. ‘There is no doubt’, one observer
wrote, ‘that the Commission’s ultimate plan was to have been keyed to a
Republican Administration which everyone, except Truman and some
23,000,000 Americans who voted for him, anticipated in November, 1948. The
Commission’s findings and recommendations for changes in executive organiza-
tional structure were to have been the grand overture of a new Republican era’
(Moe 1982: 24). Despite the fact that the Republicans did not win the presiden-
tial election of 1948, the commission’s recommendations were of enormous
significance, for they had not been forgotten when the Republicans under
Eisenhower did win four years later.
The Hoover Commission’s Task Force on Indian Policy advocated the integra-
tion of Indians into the larger US population, a policy completely antithetical to
the one pursued by the Bureau of Indian Affairs under John Collier in the 1930s
and early 1940s. The members recommended that, ‘[P]ending achievement of
the goal of complete integration, the administration of social programs for the
Indians should be progressively transferred to State governments’.10 This was to
include, of course, all health services, and it became federal Indian policy during
the Eisenhower years. It involved terminating the federal recognition of Indian
tribes; encouraging the relocation of Indians from reservations to cities; transfer-
ring responsibility for Indian affairs and services from the Bureau of Indian
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Affairs to states and counties, or to other federal agencies; and weakening, with
the hope of ultimately dismantling, the Bureau entirely.
It was recognized, however, that termination of federal oversight of many
tribes could not occur overnight. The economic, educational and health status of
many Indians was so inadequate compared with that of the rest of the US popula-
tion that in many instances services would have to be improved before the
government could withdraw entirely.11 Moreover, state and county governments
were simply unwilling to shoulder the responsibilities recommended for them
by the task force. Thus, instead of becoming a state responsibility, the onus of
responsibility for Indian health was transferred from the BIA to the US Public
Health Service (another federal agency) in 1954 as authorized by PL 83-568. The
purpose was to both weaken the BIA organizationally and to improve health
services and thus the health status of Indians. The assumption was that the
commitment was finite, for once health had been improved sufficiently, the
federal government could withdraw and Indians would assume their place in the
mainstream of American life. 
Testimony in the hearing before the bill was passed indicated several
important differences of opinion about its desirability. Indian tribes were
themselves divided on the issue. Some expressed fear that the result would be
hospital closures, decreasing access to healthcare, and discrimination in non-
Indian facilities; others believed that the level and quality of healthcare provided
by the BIA were simply inadequate and that a professional corps of commis-
sioned officers would be more numerous and better trained, would have access
to more resources, and would provide better care. Professional opinion was
decidedly in favour of the transfer for the same reasons. 
The Department of the Interior under a Republican administration now
favoured the transfer of responsibility, although Oveta Culp Hobby, Secretary of
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, had what were perceived to be
primarily administrative objections and resisted transfer to her department. Her
concerns were dismissed. Nonetheless, the Indian Health Service has always
occupied a somewhat marginal place in the Department of Health Education and
Welfare, now the Department of Health and Human Services.12
Senator Edward Thye of Minnesota, who introduced the bill into the Senate,
had said that the purpose was several-fold: 
1  To improve health services to our Indian people; 
2  To coordinate our public health program; and 
3  To further our long-range objective integration of our Indian people in our
common life.13
The authors of the legislative history of the bill were equally clear as to its
purpose: 
The proposed legislation is in line with the policy of the Congress and Department
of the Interior to terminate duplicating and overlapping functions provided by the
Healthcare policy for American Indians since the early twentieth century 153
Bayly 06_Tonra 01  21/06/2011  10:23  Page 153
Indian Bureau for Indians by transferring responsibility for such functions to other
governmental agencies wherever feasible, and [to enact] legislation having as its
purpose to repeal laws which set Indians apart from other citizens.14
The Indian Health Service 
The system of care that was developed by the Public Health Service may be
characterized as ‘hierarchical regionalism’, a term one writer has used to describe
the attempts by reformers to reorganize the entire American healthcare system.15
The Indian Health Service (or Division of Indian Health, as it was then known)
was highly integrated, in terms of both services and administration, with field
stations linked to general hospitals and referral centres. Service units (catchment
areas) reported to area offices, which in turn reported to headquarters in
Washington. A Public Health Service document published shortly after transfer
stated, ‘Indian health services on the reservation should be tied in more closely
to a regional pattern so that services of larger medical facilities would be available
for diagnostic, consultative and treatment services for complicated cases’ (US
Public Health Service 1957: 118–19).
The healthcare system that was created had both strengths and weaknesses.
Indeed, one implied the other. The strengths derived from its high level of organ-
ization and integration, efficiencies of scale, much improved access to services,
and an emphasis on public health programs, such as tuberculosis control and
increased availability of clean water sources both in homes and at protected well
sites. The result was a distinct improvement in mortality rates (Rubenstein et al.
1969). It is no accident that, as noted above, it was in the 1960s that the great
increase in the Indian population began, due largely to a rapid decline in
mortality from infectious diseases.
The very organizational characteristics that made the Indian Health Service
effective, however, also worked to weaken it. On the one hand, in the early years
innovative experiments in healthcare delivery and medical interpreting had been
encouraged, and yet there was great bureaucratic resistance to institutionalizing
the innovations (Adair and Deuschle 1970). As healthcare was recognized to be
increasingly effective, utilization grew and crowding and long waiting times
became a serious problem. Insensitivity and ignorance on the part of insuffi-
ciently trained healthcare providers often led to misunderstandings. Paperwork
and planning often consumed excessive time. And, like many large service organ-
izations, the Indian Health Service was often unresponsive to the demands of
local communities despite its stated goals (Kane and Kane 1972). All these very
real problems became grounds for criticism in the 1960s and 1970s.
Self-determination since the 1960s
The demand for community control, which originated in the civil rights
movement of the 1960s, enshrined ‘maximum feasible participation’ of the poor
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in the Economic Opportunity Act. The result was the increased hiring of Indian
paraprofessionals, the creation of community health boards, and the beginning
decentralization of what had begun as a highly centralized system. The
Community Action Programs of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO)
were meant to fund community organizations directly, bypassing other govern-
ment agencies, both local and federal. They had a profound impact in Indian
reservation communities, where tribal organizations received funds free of the
control of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (Castile 1998: Chapter 2). 
These first meaningful efforts to support self-determination were begun
under a Democratic administration, during Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on Poverty,
but decentralization and community control accelerated throughout the 1970s
after President Nixon specifically rejected the policy of ‘forced termination’,
which had been instituted when he was Vice President during the Eisenhower
administration. In a message to Congress he wrote, ‘The policy of forced termi-
nation is wrong, in my judgment, for a number of reasons. First, the premises on
which it rests are wrong.’ He said that federal responsibility was not simply an
act of generosity towards a ‘disadvantaged people’ that could therefore be discon-
tinued ‘on a unilateral basis whenever [the federal government] sees fit’. 
The relationship rests on ‘solemn obligations’ – that is to say, on ‘written treaties
and through formal and informal agreements’. Second, ‘the practical results 
[of forced termination] have been clearly harmful in the few instances in which
[it] has actually been tried’. And third, forced termination has made Indians
suspicious:
the very threat that this relationship may someday be ended has created a great deal
of apprehension among Indian groups and this apprehension, in turn, has had a
blighting effect on tribal progress … In short, the fear of one extreme policy, forced
termination, has often worked to produce the opposite extreme: excessive depend-
ence on the Federal government. (Nixon 1979)
The policy his administration was to pursue was to steer a middle course.
I believe that both of these policy extremes are wrong. Federal termination errs in
one direction. Federal paternalism errs in the other. Only by clearly rejecting both of
these extremes can we achieve a policy which truly serves the best interests of the
Indian people. Self-determination among the Indian people can and must be encour-
aged without the threat of eventual termination. In my view, in fact, that is the only
way the self-determination can effectively be fostered.
This, then, must be the goal of any new national policy toward the Indian people:
to strengthen the Indian’s sense of autonomy without threatening his sense of
community. We must assure the Indian that he can assume control of his own life
without being separated involuntarily from the tribal group. And we must make it
clear that Indians can become independent of Federal control without being cut off
from Federal concern and Federal support. (Nixon 1979: 3)
The Nixon administration’s Indian policy was embodied in two central pieces of
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legislation passed during the very brief Ford administration: the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act (PL 93-638), passed in 1975, and
the Indian Health Care Improvement Act (PL 94-437), passed a year later. Title I
of PL 93-638 created mechanisms whereby tribes could, if they wished, contract
with the Secretaries of Interior and of Health, Education and Welfare to develop
new services or assume control over services previously provided by the federal
government (Kunitz 1983: 47–8, Urban Associates, Inc. 1974). 
President Nixon’s assistant, John Erlichman, said the president was interested
in Indians for several reasons: ‘First, he was a ‘strict constructionist’, who believed
that treaties were meant to be observed. Second, he believed that because they
were relatively few in number, Indians were a ‘manageable minority’ and that
their problems could be addressed by the government. Finally, he was favourably
disposed towards Indians because of his high regard for his football coach at
Whittier, ‘Chief’ Newman.16 He failed to mention the confrontations at Wounded
Knee and Alcatraz, the Trail of Broken Treaties, and other events that also had a
substantial impact on the Administration. Indeed, historians of the period have
argued that self-determination was a cynical ploy to co-opt and destroy grass
roots and activist Indian movements and to create and install as leaders tribal
chairmen who would acquiesce in the federal government’s plans to dispose of
Indian water rights, land, natural gas and oil for the benefit of large corporations
(Forbes 1981). 
Whatever the intentions of the Administration and the Congress, the new
Indian policy was welcomed by people at all points on the political spectrum.
Among many American Indians, as well as among non-Indians on the political
left, people who were critical of professional and administrative dominance
welcomed greater community control of health and social services, as well as of
resources and economic development. On the political right, which included
some Indians (Swimmer 1989–90),17 were those who believed that big govern-
ment was the problem, not the solution, and that a ‘new federalism’ was
required, of which Indian nations, like states, counties and private enterprises,
would be the beneficiaries. In this atmosphere, assertions of incompetence and
corruption on the part of government officials charged with responsibility for
Indian affairs were not uncommon (McCain 1994).18
These converging views from left and right on the inadequacy of federal
programs are very similar to the converging views about the ineffectiveness of
healthcare and the medical profession that also surfaced more broadly in the
1970s (Kunitz 1987, 1991, 2007). In each instance, a libertarian and anti-
authoritarian ideology animated the attack on dominant professional or govern-
ment institutions. Despite the similarity, however, the underlying premises of
right and left were fundamentally different. For the left, individuals and commu-
nities were victims of an oppressive social system and medical establishment. For
the right, individuals and communities were responsible for their situations. The
political left assumed that government support – for instance, in the form of
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national health insurance – should be available, but that access to care should not
be controlled by the medical profession. The political right assumed that govern-
ment support is intrinsically bad, creating dependency and sapping initiative, and
that privatization is the appropriate response. The result of this convergence
during the Nixon years was that national health insurance failed and what was
put in place was privatized corporate healthcare.
The same ideological differences seem to me to underpin much of the
advocacy of self-determination for American Indians. Many Indians, and the non-
Indian left, assumed that the federal government has a continuing obligation to
provide an adequate, and increasing, level of support for services that will be
managed by tribal entities free of excessive government control. The political
right has accepted for the moment the idea that Indian tribes should be able to
exercise self-determination, but this means only a minimal level of government
commitment and survival in the marketplace (Castile 2006: 74–6). As with the
provision of healthcare more generally, which version of self-determination is
ascendant will have profound consequences for the future of Indian sovereignty
and the accessibility and quality of health services for American Indians.
Self-determination and/or self-termination
There is widespread agreement that, as President Nixon wrote, the federal
government has a legal obligation to protect American Indian tribal sovereignty
and to provide support for social and health services. But, as Timothy
Westmoreland has observed in a personal communication,
The more important question is ‘Is there an enforceable obligation?’ No. There’s a
legal maxim that ‘There’s no right without a remedy,’ meaning that you don’t really
have the right if you can’t enforce it. That is, I think, the AI/AN [American
Indian/Alaska Native] dilemma. Those promises sure look like some moral obliga-
tions to me. But can they be enforced? No.
He goes on to say:
As far as I know, all Indian health laws are limited by the general phrase (paraphrased
here): ‘Subject to the availability of appropriations’, which means that the high-
sounding opening language and authorized services are limited by however much
the Congress decides to spend on them. No money, no service. The magic phrase for
true mandatory spending is something like: ‘This constitutes budget authority in
advance of appropriations.’ That’s not in any of the AI/AN [American Indian/Alaska
Native] laws I’ve looked at.19
This is important. It means that government spending on Indian programs,
including health programs, is not an entitlement for Indians in the way that
Social Security and Medicare are for the beneficiaries of these programs. It is 
not part of the government’s mandatory spending, and it does not increase
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automatically each year, but is part of the discretionary budget, voted on annually
(Westmoreland and Watson 2006). It is this that jeopardizes health programs,
whether managed by the Indian Health Service or tribal entities. In either case,
every study agrees,20 the money allocated for health services, even when the
amount recoverable from Medicare, Medicaid and private insurers is added, has
been far less than is available to non-Indian citizens.21 This means that resources
for healthcare, whoever controls and provides it, are inadequate unless additional
funds can be obtained. Some Indian tribes have been able to obtain additional
funds, often from successful tribal enterprises, the most dramatically visible of
which are gambling casinos (Taylor and Kalt 2005). Others are unlikely to be
successful.
There has been debate about the desirability of treating the Indian Health
Service budget as an entitlement. Some believe that if healthcare were an entitle-
ment, there would be a cap on the amount of money that would be available, 
and that public health services (e.g. sanitation) might be excluded. Others argue
that effectively there is a cap now, that it is set too low, and that only if 
healthcare is considered an entitlement will adequate and stable levels of support
be achieved.22 This is an important debate, for on its outcome hinges the level 
and stability of funding of clinical and community services, possibly for years 
to come.
The recent legislative history of the Indian Health Care Improvement Act
illustrates the problem. Recall that it was originally passed in 1976 to provide an
infusion of money for health services. It has been renewed and expanded
regularly since then, until 1998.23 Since 1998 it had proven impossible for the
Congress and the Administration to agree on the support of new services and as
recently as 22 January 2008, the Bush Administration was threatening a veto of
the bill (S. 1200), which among other things would provide additional funds for
urban health and would not require renewal for ten years.24 Funding for services
had been appropriated year to year under the Snyder Act (PL 67-87) of 1921.
Passage in March 2010 of the Obama Administration’s health reform legislation
included renewal of the Indian Health Care Improvement Act as well as signifi-
cant increases in funding for a variety of programs. However, funding is still not
an entitlement.25
Given the issues surrounding the adequacy of funding, it is no surprise that
tribes have responded differently to the opportunities for managing their own
services. Between 1980 and 1995, the tribes that assumed control of services
were those that had had to deal with regional Indian Health Service offices that
had proven unresponsive to their needs. They also tended to have had lower levels
of poverty than tribes that did not take over services (Adams 2000).
These differences in tribal decisions mirror differences of opinion among
Indian healthcare professionals on the desirability of tribal management of health
programs. A study by the National Indian Health Board concluded that tribal
management of programs was working successfully, but that it could work even
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better in the future. And while the Indian Health Service would likely play a less
integrative role in the future, Indian health boards would increasingly assume
that role (Dixon et al. 1998).26 This would include everything from health policy
to disease surveillance, to bulk purchasing of pharmaceutical and medical
supplies.
On the other hand, Everett Rhoades, a former director of the Indian Health
Service, believed that:
erosion of the federal role is bound to continue. A great redistribution or rearrange-
ment is happening, with a shift of resources to the …wealthier tribes. They will
continue to do better, and the poorer tribes will continue to do worse.27
There are examples to support each view. On the optimistic side, there are
regional Indian health boards that do serve an integrative function, for instance
with regard to disease surveillance, epidemiology and health service planning
and management. On the pessimistic side, there is the example of the closure of
an urban Indian Health Service hospital, as a result of a demand for funds by
nearby tribes that wanted them to manage their own health service on their
reservations (Dinsdale and Frosch 2006). A large number of urban Indians thus
were left without accessible care. In this case, competing claims to an already
limited amount of money have had negative consequences for some and positive
consequences for others. 
This example also illustrates the problems faced by American Indian migrants
to metropolitan areas (Pfefferbaum et al. 1997, Urban Indian Health Commission
2007). Because Indian healthcare benefits are not portable, they do not attach to
individuals and are not usable wherever they happen to be. With more than half
of self-identified American Indians now living in metropolitan areas, many of
them poor and without health insurance, this is clearly a major problem that has
been only partially dealt with by the Indian Health Service, which has allocated
only a very small proportion of its budget to urban programs, in part because
Indian reservation leaders fear the money will be diverted from their programs.
The second Bush Administration attempted to remove even this small amount
from the budget, and it is one of the reasons the president threatened to veto the
Indian Health Care Improvement Act. Indeed, it was the Administration’s view
that the Indian Health Service was meant to serve only Indians living on and near
reservations. Once they migrate to cities, as 50 percent or more now have, they
should obtain care as other citizens do. This is an accurate reading of the purpose
of the original legislation creating the Indian Health Service, which was to
terminate the special status of American Indians, but it is a policy that was
repudiated twenty years later.
Health consequences of recent policy changes
As observed previously, acceleration in the growth of Indian population after
World War II coincided with, and in part resulted from, the great improvement
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in health services that followed transfer of responsibility from the BIA to the US
Public Health Service (Watson 2006). The death rate declined from the time of
transfer in the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s, and it was the so-called avoidable
conditions – those amenable to intervention by the healthcare system – that
declined most rapidly (Hisnanick and Coddington 1995). Then the decline
stagnated and reversed slightly. Over the same period, mortality rates for the non-
Indian population continued to decline (Indian Health Service 2004: 156; Kunitz
2008). 
This seems to have been the result of several factors. The decline was largely
the result of the decline of infectious diseases, including gastroenteritis, tubercu-
losis and childhood pneumonia and diarrhoea. As their incidence decreased,
however, non-infectious conditions began to increase in both relative and
absolute importance. Among the most important were diabetes, heart disease and
smoking related conditions such as lung cancer. Diabetes accounted for about 50
percent of the increase from the mid-1980s to the late 1990s; smoking-related
conditions for about 10 to 20 percent of the increase. 
There are large regional differences in mortality, however, that are obscured
by the overall trends. In the 1950s the differences in age adjusted mortality rates
among tribes on the Northern Plains, in the south-west, and in Oklahoma were
non-significant (US Public Health Service 1957: 216–18). Fifty years later,
although rates had generally declined, they were far higher on the Northern
Plains than elsewhere, the result of, among other things, greater poverty, less
adequate health care, and more severe misuse of alcohol and tobacco (Kunitz et
al. 2010).
One can debate how much of the increase in deaths due to non-infectious
diseases and chronic conditions was avoidable had there been timely preventive
and treatment interventions by the healthcare system, but it is generally agreed
that healthcare systems do have something to offer with respect to both preven-
tion and treatment. That there has been an increase in death rates suggests, then,
that the healthcare system has not been as effective as it should have been. There
are no adequate data available to determine whether programs managed by tribal
entities performed better or worse than those managed by the Indian Health
Service, and of course there may well be non-health-related reasons for favouring
tribal management of health systems, such as capacity building, but what limited
information is available suggests that there was no great difference between them
that is not better explained by median household income (Kunitz 2004). It
appears, rather, that the low level of spending, perhaps 50–60 percent per capita
of what is spent for non-Indians; the stagnant budget for more than ten years;
and difficulties recruiting healthcare professionals to many remote locations,
have all affected health programs managed both by the Indian Health Service and
by tribal entities.
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Conclusion
Termination has been called a ‘failed detour’ on the way to self-determination
(Shelton 2001: 22). This is not entirely accurate. It was neither a detour nor was
it a complete failure. That it was an abrogation of treaty obligations and
catastrophic for some tribes and many individuals is certain, but at the same time
it did lead to improved health services and to improved health. In that limited but
important sense, it was not a failure. Nor was it a detour because, despite the
oscillations in policy described at the outset, the overall trajectory of Indian
policy has been to loosen the government’s commitment to tribal governments
and to individuals.
Thus, in the 1930s the legislation drafted by John Collier’s administration
had been much weakened by the time it passed through Congress, and by the
early 1940s Collier’s position had been weakened by western congressmen, who
opposed the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ attempt to protect Indian rights. Shortly
after, the entire policy of self-determination was reversed and termination
became policy. 
Termination as a policy was officially abandoned in the mid-1970s, but
because the budget for Indian health is not treated by Congress as an entitlement,
it has suffered compared to programs that are treated as entitlements. As a result,
even without a stated policy of termination, and even if no-one truly wanted
termination, the effect has been to weaken health programs, especially for
immigrants to cities and for tribes that do not have alternative sources of revenue.
In fact, the Bush Administration’s policy had implied de facto if not de jure termina-
tion, at least of health services, for Indians who move to cities. As I have already
observed, this is consistent with the intent of the original legislation that created
the Indian Health Service in the first place. It was not an entitlement but a finite
commitment, meant to last only as long as Indians were not fully integrated into
the larger American society, and this is the policy the Bush Administration
pursued. It is not yet clear how policy and practice will evolve under the Obama
Administration.
But what of those people who remain on or near their reservations? The level
of support they receive continues to be inadequate and thus must be supple-
mented by other sources, including various forms of third party and government
support, and tribal revenues. The result is that tribes may receive very different
levels of services because there are differences in the success of their business
ventures. Indeed, according to the Senate Republican Policy Committee, an
amendment to the Indian Health Care Improvement Act was under consideration
in 2008 which would have required means testing for Indian beneficiaries of the
Indian Health Service, so that tribes with large revenues from gambling casinos
would have to pay for services currently provided by the Indian Health Service,
thus making more money available for tribes without resources.28 If imple-
mented, this would have meant a further erosion of the government’s commit-
ment to Indians.
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Different degrees of success and failure of tribal enterprises are explained
partly by location, partly by the larger economies in which tribes are embedded,
and partly by internal organizational features over which tribes do have control
(Cornell and Kalt 2003a, 2003b). For example, there are nineteen Pueblo Indian
tribes in New Mexico, with populations ranging in size from 500–600 to
8,000–9,000. Eleven of them have gambling casinos, the gross revenues of which
during the first six months of 2007 ranged from about $6 million to over $80
million.29 The variation in revenues is inversely correlated with the distance from
the major metropolitan area, thus illustrating the importance of location, which
is one very important source of differences among Indian populations, even in
the same state. 
The question is whether access to adequate health services should be held
hostage to the success or failure of tribal enterprises, and whether a means test
should be imposed for services that are understood to be a treaty right. Should
the federal government acknowledge and meet its obligation to provide adequate
services, no matter what the success or failure of tribal enterprises? In light of the
experience of the past 100 years, it is unlikely that all or part of the budget for
Indian health and other programs will be made mandatory. For conservatives
who support self-determination are likely to believe that such a guarantee would
promote dependency and discourage privatization and integration of Indian
communities into the larger economy, and they may well prevail.
The issue is not whether self-determination is inherently a good or bad
policy as far as health is concerned. As usual, the devil is in the details. For the
policy of termination led to the creation of a program that had very beneficial
results, and the policy of self-determination has, so far at least, had at best
equivocal results. The issue is how programs are funded and supported. With
adequate support, it is likely that self-determination can be very successful,
resulting in health programs that are responsive to the particular needs of
individuals and communities. Without such support, however, it seems likely that
the growing inequality that has characterized the United States generally will also
increasingly characterize Indian country. 
More broadly, this case study suggests two points. First, politically attractive
and unattractive labels can be misleading. The content of programs – how they
are funded, and how effectively, equitably, and efficiently they serve the people
they are meant to benefit – is what is important. 
Second, it is an unspoken assumption that it was necessary for the building
of the ‘good’ institutions that have made economic development so successful in
the United States and the other Anglophone liberal democracies (Acemoglu et al.
2001) that the virtual extermination of the indigenous people of each country
should occur. Whether necessary or not, it happened, and the legacy has been the
continued marginalization and relative poverty and ill health of those who have
survived. One manifestation of marginalization is the relative lack of influence of
American Indians on health and development policies that affect them, at least
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until recently. And what influence they have even now is limited, for despite the
existence of treaties and the support of many non-Indians, the right to self-deter-
mination exists at the sufferance of the federal government and can be taken away
or rendered meaningless unilaterally. Indians and other indigenous peoples may
lobby, demonstrate, seek redress in the courts, complain to the United Nations,
and engage in what has been called the politics of embarrassment (Kunitz 2000),
but in the end they are considered by many people both within and outside
government to be just one more interest group,30 unique in some ways but not
entitled to any special consideration. In 1832 Chief Justice Marshall described
Indian tribes as dependent domestic nations, a concept that Indian legal scholars
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COMMENTARY
Can historians assist 
development policy-making, 
or just highlight its faults?1
David Hall-Matthews
Historians tend not to stick their necks out. They spend their days striving to root
out empirical evidence from the past; then when it comes to interpreting it, they
celebrate uncertainty. Each effect had multiple causes; every event could have
been different had it not been for its contingent concatenation of contexts.
History is drawn upon every day to justify policy, but most historians would
sooner deconstruct the origins of binding myths than help to construct more
useful ones. If this generalization is true, historians and development policy-
makers are uneasy bedfellows. Despite having to plan for the unknowable future,
development strategists must make concrete recommendations. Usually they are
aware of the limitations of drawing conclusions from linear models. Much less
often, as in this volume, they ask historians for advice. But how can historians
rise to the challenge, when confident predictions about the future are antithet-
ical to their raison d’être? 
For a start, it can only help policy-makers if specialists in analysing long-term
trends are enlisted to point out the risks or errors in their assumptions, modify
the tendency to isolate single causes (or effects) and emphasise the importance
of political, social and cultural contexts. By embracing complexity, historians may
be able to foresee possible ranges of outcomes or, with a little more certainty,
warn of likely adverse reactions to policies that have chimed negatively with local
populations in the past. That is useful, but not constructive. And social scientists
can make similar claims too. Indeed many university departments of
Development Studies see their role as precisely to critique the approaches of
donor nations and institutions, using nuanced local case studies to demonstrate
failures of sensitivity. Moreover, they are more willing to draw comparisons. All
development students are encouraged to consider the transferability of their
findings, specifying, as far as possible, which are locally significant and which
might be applied elsewhere. Historians of particular regions are frequently
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reluctant to do this. Nonetheless, there are several ways in which planners could
and should seek out positive, practically useful lessons from good historical
research. History can highlight previously successful strategies; aid reflection on
the policy-making process itself; and expose the origins of current ideas.
Development policy-making, in the broadest sense, is as old as society. At the
simplest level, historians can reveal which brilliant new programs have actually
been tried before, then buried – as well as what has worked in the past. The
reasons will sometimes be specific and context remains important, but previous
unintended consequences ought never to be unanticipated in the future.
Historians, uniquely, can examine circumstances before, during and long after
particular interventions, and thus assess their multiple impacts over a far greater
time period and in a more nuanced way than is possible for contemporary
programs. Development is necessarily a slow process and history can sometimes
show where and in what forms long-term persistence may be needed. If, for
example, the Indian anti-malaria campaign faltered in the 1960s because it was
not followed through, as Sunil Amrith shows, it is straightforward to predict that
recent successes in East Africa will also be reversed if local health services and
political will are not bolstered in the long-term.
Development policy-makers, however, are ill-disposed to learn from the
mistakes and successes of the past, for several reasons. Many, by instinct, are
forward-looking modernizers and prone to believe the teleological fallacy that
things can only get better. At its worst, there is a tendency to invert E.H. Carr and
see developing countries as representing the past, from which, ergo, there is
nothing to learn (Carr 1961). Agenda-setters rarely, in any context, trumpet their
own past failings, but those in the development field also have particularly short
institutional memories on which to draw. Development is widely perceived to
have been invented in the 1940s, with Bretton Woods and President Truman’s
much-misquoted inauguration speech (in which he coined the term under-
development) (Rist 2002: 69–79), as are Development Studies – as if Adam
Smith, Thomas Malthus and Karl Marx had written about something else entirely.
Given the direct similarities between the goals, methods, assumptions and even
language of development agents today (including many NGOs) and those of
colonial administrations, this is wilful – and harmful.
There is an enormous amount to be gleaned from colonial records. Not 
only are they open to scrutiny – unlike those of UN organizations, for example
– they are exceptionally full. Though they rarely took place in the public domain
at the time, it is possible to trace every last scribble in the margin of colonial
debates. Thus history enables us not only to see what policies have been tried
before, but what happened during often long-drawn-out policy-making
processes. We can examine what alternatives were considered, who proposed
them and why they were passed over. What made people angry, and what 
was generally assumed. What was prioritised and by what criteria success was
measured. How unpopular measures were presented – and thus how some still
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extant development paradigms came to be. Here’s one example. Sir Richard
Temple, Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal in 1874, ran a famine relief campaign so
exemplary that nobody died, only to be lambasted for his excessive expenditure.
Three years later, having been transferred to Bombay, he was asked to explain
why he had spent so little in another famine in which many perished. He
declared that his aim had been to prevent people from becoming dependent on
relief, admitting only privately that they had not been in his earlier campaign
(Hall-Matthews 1996). The fear of aid dependence is still routinely used to justify
limiting interventions that would more likely foster independence.
Analysing different types and aspects of policy-making processes can only
benefit those involved in them today. When does strong individual leadership
help and when does it stifle creativity? What are the pros and cons of extensive
consultation? What affects the relationship between written guarantees and
material outcomes? Again, such questions can by no means only be answered by
historians, though they inevitably have a wider stock of divergent cases on which
to draw – and perhaps a broader-minded sense of how strengths and weaknesses
may be judged. Policy-making involves engagement with multiple individual,
institutional and civil society stakeholders – but more importantly with a range
of ideas. Some are embedded in particular communities, some are imported.
Some are tested scientifically, some contested politically. Whether economic,
cultural, ideological, legal or moral, all ideas have specific origins and reflect
people’s sense of their own history. All policy-making – even that proposing
radical departures from the past – depends on hindsight.
That is why doing history properly is so important. Poorly informed or
applied historical analogy has too often been used to support poor policy – and
sometimes even been the origin of it (Komprobst 2007). The 2003 invasion of
Iraq was publicly contrasted with the appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s, but
never compared with the ruinously bloody and expensive British mandate of
Mesopotamia in the 1920s. Applying lessons from one country too readily to
others is particularly dangerous. Environmental concerns generated by the
American dustbowl in the 1930s resulted in decades of draconian policies to
prevent soil degradation in Africa for which there was little evidence (Anderson
1984). Knowing where ideas and concerns come from – and how they have
changed over time – is therefore essential to sound policy and likely to throw up
new insights. 
History can be used, then, to reflect on current approaches, by revealing their
origins and by carefully comparing them with similar strategies in the past. It can
help us to see clearly how contemporary perceptions converge or diverge from
those of previous development policy-makers. Why do we make the assumptions
we do? When and why did our predecessors come up with them? Do we need to
reconsider them, or are we standing on the shoulders of giants? Where issues that
concern us have already been debated for decades or centuries without resolu-
tion, at the very least we can cut to the chase by getting to know those debates.
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Then it can be judged whether to build from where they left off or discard them
as futile – or worse. A paradigm shift comes not with a new answer to an age-old
question, but with a new question. The long, ongoing debate discussed by
Stephen Kunitz, for example – between those favoring assimilation and self-
determination for American Indians – has served to distract attention from how
best to meet their welfare needs. Indeed the relationship between the ideological
battle and the level of resources allocated might best be seen as a downward
spiral. It is worth remembering the reason why things can not only get better:
some people have an interest in others’ arrested development. Good development
policy needs to take account of such interests and countermand their impacts –
but they are fiendishly difficult to discern without deep knowledge of their
origins and trajectories.
It is possible, then, for history to assist, positively, in the development of
better policy, precisely by showing, negatively, where the obstacles have been to
desirable outcomes – whether within policy-making processes themselves or in
reactions to them. Public health policy is particularly useful to consider in this
respect, because its goals are uncontroversial. It is also relatively easy to measure
not only its impact but its scale. To a large extent, in a development context, good
public health policy simply means sufficient resource allocation to the health
sector to ensure that it has the capacity to function effectively and can be accessed
by the entire population. This has rarely been achieved, for two main reasons.
First, the development of grassroots healthcare – as distinct from intervening in
response to spectacular outbreaks of famine or epidemic disease – is dull, slow
to show results and difficult to politicise. Second, governments everywhere are
prone to social discrimination. But can they be incentivized to recognize their
responsibility?
History may not be able to provide many examples of prior success in this
area, but historical research gives clear pointers nonetheless. The cases in this
volume from India and America show that it is not enough to have large, 
well-funded, federal states – or even written commitments. Development aid
earmarked for healthcare can be undermined by fungibility and, besides, no
conditionality is permanent. Rather, the respectable health outcomes in 
Tamil Nadu and Kerala are argued by Sunil Amrith to reflect a long-standing
political culture that manifests itself in the ability of poor populations to demand
effective service delivery. That is consistent with the relatively worse health
provision in less politicized Indian states, or African countries – or among
geographically dispersed American Indians – though it still leaves an enormous
problem to solve. It is not easy to stimulate a political culture from scratch.
Stephen Kunitz shows that identity-based assertion is not enough to ensure 
the fulfilment of material rights – and for some minorities, it is a dangerous
course. It could take decades to reach a point where people feel able to hold
governments to account in specific policy areas, instead of acting as a malleable
vote bank. Even Amartya Sen’s assertion that functioning democracies prevent
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famines can only be taken as a policy prescription in the extremely long term
(Sen 1999: 160–88). 
This further suggests the need for caution in trying to cut development’s
Gordian knots. Frustrated by weak and reluctant governments – and perhaps also
with passive populations – former Millennium Development Program chief Jeff
Sachs recommends bypassing state healthcare agencies and delivering basic needs
like mosquito bed nets directly to populations via NGOs (Sachs 2005) – a view
echoed in much of the HIV/AIDS prevention work supported by the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation, and in general by recent USAID policy. This has had
some spectacular results in reducing the incidence of critical diseases – such as
malaria in Zanzibar – but has done little to increase states’ capacity to deliver
public healthcare, or people’s say over its delivery. Health services provided in the
context of global philanthropy – whether by nineteenth-century missionaries in
Kerala or Bill Gates today – can embed top-down paternalistic approaches and
reduce states’ sense of responsibility for provision, as much as they can induce a
culture in which people feel able to demand it. Where international efforts are
directed through accountable states, their benefits are unmistakeable; where they
sidestep ‘bad’ governments, they can further undermine poor people’s capacity
to demand health provision (Helleiner 2000).
In such contexts, lively historical debates over what has generated political
assertiveness in some places but not others – and why – are useful, and can
contribute directly to development discourses around the relative merits of
participatory approaches, empowerment, promotion of civil society and good
governance. Historians routinely disagree with each other over the main causes
and components of political culture, and over whether it is beneficial or even
important. When trying to address messy, intractable development problems,
however, a bit of messy uncertainty is a good thing. Trying to understand the
complex processes of policy-making is hard enough at the institutional level, let
alone trying to analyze the motivations, preferences and fears that go into the
everyday decisions of entire populations. Development policy-makers can learn a
great deal from historians, but perhaps the most important is the willingness to
admit that they don’t have all the answers. 
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7
The end of literacy: the growth and
measurement of British public education
since the early nineteenth century
David Vincent
In his annual report for June 1839, Thomas Lister, Registrar-General of England
and Wales, published the first attempt of a modern state to estimate the cultural
capital of an entire nation. Alongside the tables of births, deaths and marriages he
included a new measure of the country’s health: 
Almost every marriage is duly registered, and every register of marriage is signed 
by the parties married; those who are able writing their names, and those who 
are unable, or who write very imperfectly, making their marks. Therefore, an 
enumeration of the instances in which the mark has been made will show the
proportion among those married who either cannot write at all, or who write very
imperfectly.1 
The French had begun to enumerate the literacy of conscripts in 1827, but the
sample was limited by age and class. The marriage registers offered a broader
perspective: ‘It may be said in favour of this criterion,’ wrote Lister, ‘that it is free
from the disadvantage of selection, including alike every class and condition, and
every age, except children and very old persons’ (Porter 1843: 277). Although
Lister was by profession a novelist, and had been appointed the first Registrar-
General in 1836 on the strength of his involvement in an enquiry into education
in Ireland, he had enough statistical common sense to be initially cautious about
the stability of the data. It seemed intrinsically unlikely that the sum of contin-
gent personal decisions should generate stable measures of education. However
the returns of the first three years were consistent enough to suggest that the
registers might indeed constitute a reliable index. At this point they began to
enter the public arena. In his The Progress of the Nation in its Various Social and Economical
Relations of 1843, G.R. Porter published an analysis of the returns by county
(Porter 1843: 279). From 1846 the annual reports of the Registrar General (no
longer Lister, who had himself become part of the death statistics, succumbing
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to tuberculosis at the age of forty-two2), listed them by each of the 324
Registration Districts of England and Wales (PP 1846: xxviii-xxx, 35–41). It thus
became possible to draw in close detail the map of writing abilities across
England and Wales (and by a separate process Scotland) and to measure its
change year by year. 
In this chapter I want to explore the significance of counting communication
skills in one of the earliest societies to achieve mass literacy.3 Much of the debate
around the achievement of the Millennium Development and World Education
Forum Goals in education, as in other areas, revolves around the issue of quanti-
tative analysis – what the annual trends mean, what constitutes data and how they
are compiled and understood, what the relationship is over time between invest-
ment and output. The first reaction of an historian of nineteenth-century Europe
coming upon these attempts to chart a path for developing countries in the
twenty-first century is the sheer familiarity of the categories that are being
deployed. The process may be seeking to equip populations for the digital age but
they depend on structures of practice and thinking rooted in the last years of the
stagecoach and the beginning of the railway era. The notion of a goal itself, the
measurable output of official endeavour, belongs to the founding of the modern
state. There is something to be learned from how learning was constituted as one
of the world’s first performance indicators of public expenditure. It is a matter of
the judgments and exclusions which the tables embodied, and of their interac-
tion with the delivery and experience of education. 
The deliberate construction of consistent data-sets describing the condition
of a society was a consequence in the first instance of the creation of a
functioning state infrastructure. There are isolated instances of systematic record-
keeping at least of reading abilities which stretch back into the early modern
period, particularly where protestant churches imposed obligations on their
clergy to inspect the condition of their congregations. The most notable case was
Sweden’s Church Law of 1686 which required tests of the capacity of families to
read the Bible. However, it required the intervention of later twentieth-century
historians to translate this information into accounts of the literacy of the
country as a whole (Johansson 1988). In France, a retired schoolmaster Louis
Maggiolo was commissioned in 1877 to collect all available parish records to
construct a back history for the information which was being collected through
marriage registers from 1854 and the census from 1866. His work in turn was
not properly exploited until it was reanalyzed by François Furet and Jacques
Ozouf a century later (Furet and Ozouf 1982). 
The systematic production of statistics which had meaning for their own era
required the reform of government. The tables for England and Wales were a
byproduct of the Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages Act of 1836, which
replaced a decentralized system of parish registers with a standardized and effec-
tively policed national apparatus. The Act was designed to provide a secure basis
for the attempts to understand the dynamics of mortality and population growth
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which had occupied pioneering statisticians for more than a century and for
resolving the increasing volume of disputes over the ownership of private
property (Cullen 1975, Higgs 2004: 1–21; 51–6). The legislation was part of the
fall-out of the Great Reform Act of 1832, which created a new legitimacy for
government and led immediately to a series of modernizing reforms in welfare,
education, policing and public administration. There were and have remained
intense debates about what the tables of marks and signatures signify, but neither
at the time nor since has there been any questioning of the figures themselves.
Whether or not brides had feigned illiteracy to avoid embarrassing illiterate
grooms, the count of marks in the registers in every corner of the country was
held to be fully accurate. The office of the Registrar-General, whose duties
expanded to include the decennial census in 1841, set a new standard for public
statistics. Its formation was accompanied by the creation of the Statistical
Department of the Board of Trade in 1833, headed by G.R. Porter, which
commenced the collection of data on the rapidly growing economy, and by the
efforts of the Home Office to compile crime figures on a systematic basis. The
Reform Act state knew itself and proved itself through its capacity to count the
condition its citizens. 
The Reform Act emerged out of the most dangerous constitutional crisis
Britain had faced since the Glorious Revolution of 1688. It was almost immedi-
ately challenged by the losers in the settlement, who were further outraged by its
early legislation, particularly the New Poor Law of 1834. The initial set of
marriage register returns coincided with the emergence of what is generally
regarded as the world’s prototype mass class-conscious protest, the Chartist
Movement, whose first and second petitions were presented to Parliament in
1839 and 1842. The invention of modern social statistics constituted a deliberate
intervention in the political drama. It reflected a conviction that repressing infor-
mation and its communication was no longer a tenable response for govern-
ments facing challenge from below. The attempts made during the Reform Act
crisis to discipline the radical press had backfired, with journalists and printers
using persecution to mobilize support for their cause. The post-reform Whig
governments embarked on a strategy of liberalizing controls and promoting what
they understood as knowledge. The newspaper stamp, which had been designed
to price political journalism out of the pockets of the lower orders, was reduced
to a penny in 1836 and the tax on paper was halved a year later. Hansard, the
official record of Parliament, hitherto available only to MPs and peers, was put on
public sale in 1838. In 1840, written communication across the nation was
promoted by the costly introduction of the Penny Post.4
The statistical analysis of society both reflected and directed the new strategy.
In Porter’s The Progress of the Nation, the first attempt to grasp the totality of the new
industrial order through numbers, the pioneering review of the marriage register
signatures appeared in a chapter on education which was located in a section of
the book entitled ‘Moral progress’. Related chapters covered crime, ‘manners’
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(mostly the incidence of drunkenness) and postage. Porter summarized the
challenge presented by his findings: 
It must be owned that our multiplying abodes of want, of wretchedness and of
crime, our town populations huddled together in ill-ventilated and undrained courts
and cellars – our numerous workhouses filled to overflowing with the children of
want – and our prisons (scarcely less numerous) filled to overflowing with the
votaries of want, do indeed but too sadly and too strongly attest that all is not as it
should be with us as regards this most important branch of human progress. (Porter
1843: 172)
The overall problem pointed to a principal cause: 
It is seen, and is beginning to be practically acknowledged, that the greater part of
the moral evil under which societies are now suffering is the offspring of ignorance,
and without insisting on any very high degree of perfectibility in human nature, we
may reasonably hope that the removal of that ignorance will do much towards
restoring moral health to communities and thus fit them for the rational enjoyment
of blessings so increasingly offered for their acceptance. (Porter 1843: 173)
In the discussion of the marriage register tables, the term ‘ignorance’ stood as
both a consequence and a description of the inability to read and write. Porter
eagerly accepted the new opportunity to trace the variations in performance
across the registrations districts.5 As he moved west, he reached the scene of the
Newport rising, where a recent attempt by Chartists to storm the town had been
repelled by the army: 
The proportion of ignorance in exhibited by Monmouthshire and Wales, where 48
in 100 males, and 69 in 100 females, were unable to write their names, offers a
striking commentary upon the scenes of violence that were committed in that
quarter in November 1839. (Porter 1843: 281)
He and other contemporary commentators were particularly interested in the
opportunity presented by the concurrent developments in counting signatures,
which could be used as proxies for education and crime, measured by prison
inmates. The conclusions were stark. As an MP observed in a debate on the intro-
duction of the school inspectorate in 1839: 
In short, two thirds of the children of the humbler classes were entirely without
education. The consequence of this neglect was, that the criminal calendar was yearly
increasing, and it appeared that out of 22,000 committals in the present year 20,000
were of persons wholly destitute of education.6
The construction of the opposition between ignorance and knowledge was
fundamental to the meanings embedded in the literacy tables. If it embodied a
liberal faith in the capacity of communication to promote rational behaviour it
also constituted a sweeping dismissal of the entire structure of learning in the
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communities of the labouring poor. Patrick Colquhoun, one of the earliest
advocates of public education, explained the need for intervention: ‘In Great
Britain and Ireland at least 1,750,000 of the population of the country, at an age
to be instructed, grow up to an adult state without any instruction at all, in the
grossest ignorance’ (Bell 1807: 10). The first subsidized schools were not merely
inscribing learning on the tabula rasa of young minds; they were actively
combating the instruction received in the home. An early school inspector
explained what was at stake as the children were taught their letters by the new
generation of trained teachers: ‘It is indeed a sad and evil necessity, if the first
lesson which they learn at school is to beware of their own parents and to look
with disgust, if not horror at the filthiness and abominations of their own homes’
(Vincent 1989: 73).
The literacy tables were used not only to condemn but also to disaggregate
the social structures of the labouring poor. In his report for 1857 the Registrar
General drew attention to a fact that was being routinely ignored in commen-
taries on his tables. ‘Each marriage constitutes a family; and to the family the fact
that one of its members can read and write, is of more importance than the fact
that both can read and write’ (PP 1857: v). As he went on to point out, this meant
that the binary tables of individual marks and signatures misrepresented the
distribution of communication skills in society. Combining the performance of
brides and grooms significantly reshapes the profile of change over the period.
The average level of illiteracy between 1839 and 1914 was 25 percent, but taking
the partners together, literacy was to be found in 85 percent of marriages and
illiteracy in 36 percent. In the ceremonies two witnesses, usually close relatives
of the principals, also faced the task of signing their names. If the extended family
structure is considered, only one ceremony in fifteen across the period was
devoid of the skill of signing a name. On this basis, there is a case for arguing
that England and Wales was a literate society by the time Queen Victoria came to
the throne. Conversely, there was someone still signing with a mark in as many
as 44 percent of the marriages (Vincent 1989: 22–3). These networks contained
the old and the young. As reading and writing was largely, though not exclusively,
learned in childhood, a period of rapid growth separated the performance of age
cohorts. In nineteenth-century England, one generation was on average twenty
points more literate than its predecessor. In practice this meant that in the neigh-
bourhoods of the labouring poor, the elderly illiterates lived amongst the
youthful schooled population, not disappearing from the returns until the post-
1945 welfare state.7 It is necessary to go back to the registers themselves to
reconstitute these communication networks, a painstaking task requiring the
modern paraphernalia of research grants, sampling techniques and machine-
assisted analysis. Left to themselves, the published tables construct a society
comprized of an aggregation of discrete individuals, displaying a personal level
of skill or behaviour. The returns are at once statistically accurate and radically
misleading in respect of both the pace and the meaning of change.
The growth and measurement of British public education since the early nineteenth century 181
Bayly 07_Tonra 01  21/06/2011  10:30  Page 181
The opposition between ignorance and knowledge embraced not just the
capacity to read and write but the means by which it was acquired. Although the
early commentators chose to dwell on the scale of unmet need, the first marriage
registers revealed just how much had been achieved without any kind of govern-
ment intervention. The tables of signatures and marks reflected on average the
attainments of children some fifteen years earlier. They indicated that centuries of
domestic, commercial and philanthropic instruction had achieved literacy levels
of 60 percent for men, and nearly 50 percent for women. More detailed analysis
of a national sample of the nineteenth-century registers, which contain informa-
tion on the occupations of those in the ceremony, suggests the presence of
writing skills throughout society (Vincent 1989: 97). Skilled artisans were almost
universally literate and had been for generations, and even amongst unskilled
labourers around a fifth could sign the register. The advocates of reform, who
achieved the first public subsidy for elementary education in 1833, were well
aware of a thriving sector of what were termed ‘private adventure schools’,
sustained by the pence of working-class families. They were convinced, however,
that the instruction in reading and writing received at the hands of these
untrained teachers was worse than useless. Porter observed that, 
The reports of the Statistical Societies of Manchester and London have shown how
unworthy of the name of education is the result of what is attempted in the majority
of schools frequented by the children of the working classes, and which are
frequently kept by persons ‘whose only qualification for this employment seems to
be their unfitness for any other’. (Porter 1843: 274)
At the time he was writing, the official guess was that the two large church
societies for teaching the poor their letters were reaching less than half the
market for elementary education. As late as 1870, when the state finally accepted
the responsibility for financing and controlling a national system, there may have
been as many as half a million parents still choosing to pay untrained, unofficial
instructors to teach their children (Gardner 1984: ch.2). In presenting his
Education Act, W.E. Forster described this sector as ‘generally speaking, the worst
schools, and those least fitted to give a good education to the children of the
working classes’.8
That parents persisted in making their own arrangements was a reflection of
the ease with which a free market in schooling could flourish. Small groups of
children were accommodated in the living space of widows or of workmen
seeking an alternative to ill-paid and unreliable manual labour. School primers
began to appear not long after the invention of the printing press, and by the
early nineteenth century it was possible to purchase every kind of printed
teaching aid, new or second-hand (Michael 1993: 2).9 Above all, the untrained
teachers supplied a cost-effective service to their customers. They were cheap;
they delivered only basic instruction in reading and writing and did not attempt
to impose a superstructure of moral education. Their hours of attendance were
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readily adjusted to the rhythms of the local economy and they negotiated with
their customers as equals, not as figures of authority. The fragmentary evidence
of working-class autobiographies of the period suggest that even in small
communities, parents faced choice and exercized it, moving children in and out
of schools as their finances and domestic priorities dictated (Vincent 1989:
66–72).
The only student of this sector calls these enterprises the ‘Lost Elementary
Schools of Victorian England’ (Gardner 1984), but they were not so much
mislaid as deliberately excluded from the public archive. To the official mind they
stood doubly condemned. Not only were they run by the untrained and answer-
able to the uneducated but they professed no system and kept no records. The
ability to count, to translate learning into numbers, was itself a key means of
distinguishing the transmission of knowledge from the inheritance of ignorance.
The consequence for our understanding of the period has been profound.
Historians, bent on the teleological task of establishing the origins of the present-
day schooled society, have too readily accepted the judgment of contemporary
politicians, commentators and administrators that such forms of instruction were
without value and without a future.10 They have allowed their enquiries to be
policed by the boundaries of the tables in the official returns. To do otherwise
requires venturing into difficult, fragmentary and essentially unquantifiable
evidence. Even so, the statistics tell us something. Not until 1880 were all parents
legally required to send their children to an inspected classroom.11 Advocates of
compulsion had been resisted for half a century, partly because of doubts about
the propriety of interfering in the domestic arena and partly because of uncer-
tainty about the capacity of the local infrastructure effectively to police such a
regulation. Up to this moment the decision to send a child to school, whether in
the private or inspected sector, was ultimately at the discretion of the pupil’s
family. By that time the marriage register returns indicate that only 5 percent of
the task of achieving a literate society remained. Any explanation of change needs
to be founded in the aspirations and strategies of the users as much as the
suppliers. 
Amongst those who established the system of public subsidy of the church
schools, a basic critique of informal education was its instrumental approach to
literacy. Parents who employed instructors from their own community bought
only the technical capacity to read and write. They were not interested in the
superstructure of moral instruction, and still less in paying for instruction in the
immense range of cultural, domestic and occupational learning which took place
in the homes, neighbourhoods and workplaces of the labouring poor. In the
debate over the creation of a system of inspecting the use of public funds in
1839, Lord Stanley emphasized that ‘education was not a thing apart from and
separate from religion; but that religion should be interwoven with all systems
of education, controlling and regulating the whole minds and habits, and princi-
ples of the persons receiving instruction.12 The primers used in the early
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inspected classrooms concluded with lists of the hardest words in the Bible
(Matthews 1966: 19–74). However, as the level of public investment steadily rose
from an initial £20,000 to over half a million a year a quarter of a century later,
making it the third largest category of non-military spending,13 doubts began to
arise about whether this broad conception of learning was sustainable. Following
the report of a Royal Commission in 1861, Robert Lowe, Secretary of the
Committee of Council of Education,14 set about modernizing the system of
inspected schooling with a steely realism. 
It had to be understood, he argued, what the state was paying for. ‘Our
business is to promote instruction. However desirable more religious instruction
may be, that is not the specific thing for which the grant is given.’15 His essen-
tially secular conception of literacy was founded on a commitment to what Lant
Pritchett has termed a ‘performance orientation’ of schooling (Pritchett 2004: 4,
Filmer et al. 2006: 9). Ensuring that the masters subscribed to the tenets of one
of the two competing denominations and that the school was run on Christian
principles did not guarantee that the pupils learned their letters. To the contrary,
the Newcastle Commission had established that ‘even in the best schools only
one-fourth of the boys attain the highest class, and are considered by the inspec-
tors to be successfully educated’.16 Public funding was for the benefit of the
pupils rather than, as he put it, ‘a grant to maintain the so-called vested interests
of those engaged in education’.17 And it should be for all the children, not just
the most able or most fortunate. The teachers whose salaries were now subsidized
by the public purse needed to recognize their task: ‘We want to make them
educate, not children in the first class, for that is done already, but those who now
leave schools without proper education.’18
At the heart of his reform was the question of how performance was to be
calculated. After 1839, highly paid and well-educated inspectors had made
annual visits to each subsidized school, assessing whether the general quality of
the establishment and its buildings was sufficient to justify the continuation of
its grant. For Lowe they were measuring the wrong thing by the wrong means:
‘I do not deny that quality is a very important thing, but when I come to a final
system I cannot but think that quantity is, perhaps, more important … I have
come to the conclusion that inspection as opposed to examination is not, and
never can be a test of the efficiency of a system of national education.’19 Lowe was
proposing to add to the marriage register returns a direct, quantitative score of
literacy at the point of acquisition. The examination was to be of each pupil,
tested one by one in front of the inspector in the three skills of reading, writing
and arithmetic. Part of the school’s grant was to be calculated on the basis of the
number of pupils, to reflect the volume of it labour, part on whether the teacher
was certificated, as a measure of its professionalism, and the bulk on the
performance of the pupils before the inspector, to indicate its effectiveness. No
other part of the curriculum, whether spiritual instruction or lessons in subjects
such as history or literature, was to be tested or paid for. He summarized his
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reform in a passage that was endlessly repeated in the wave of condemnation that
his ‘Revised Code’ provoked in the educational establishment:
I cannot promise the House that this system will be an economical one, and I cannot
promise that it will be an efficient one, but I can promise that it shall be either one
or the other. If it is not cheap it shall be efficient; if it is not efficient it shall be cheap.
The present is neither one nor the other. If the schools do not give instruction the
public money will not be demanded, but if instruction is given the public money
will be demanded – I cannot say to what amount, but the public will get value for
its money.20
The point was the final phrase. Literacy, together with numeracy, had become the
key performance indicator of the most rapidly growing category of public expen-
diture. It had been placed at the centre of the contract between the taxpayer and
the state.
Lowe’s ‘Revised Code’ was swiftly imposed across the inspected school sector
in 1862, a measure of his personal determination and also of the strength of the
administrative machine that had been constructed over the previous two decades.
At its heart was a particular axis between a conception of public education and a
means of measurement. It was a brutal but provisional victory. Every succeeding
generation refought the battles between the interests of the professionals and the
needs of the children, between stretching the most able and leaving none behind,
between focussing on key skills and engaging with the breadth of the
curriculum. Yet the impassioned debates of the 1860s and thereafter concealed
underlying convictions which were slow to change.
Chief amongst these was the attitude to the parents of the illiterate and to the
schools they patronized. Lowe had flirted with the idea of extending the state
subsidy to the unofficial sector but concluded that this would be a ‘reckless
expenditure of public money’.21 ‘Those schools’ he argued, ‘are mere commer-
cial speculations.’22 His reform embodied the beginning of a dialogue with
parents, in that, as the preceding Newcastle Commission had established, it was
clear that left to their own devices, basic instruction in the literacy and numeracy
was what they wanted (PP 1861: 159). But otherwise neither he nor any of his
critics had any intention of ceding authority to the users of elementary
education. The matter was put bluntly in a pamphlet denouncing the Revised
Code by one of Lowe’s most vocal opponents, James Kay-Shuttleworth, for a
quarter of a century the leading administrator in the construction of the modern
system of mass schooling:
In like manner, the ignorant do not know their want. There is no power in those who
are apathetic about learning to create or support schools. Among an illiterate people,
there is no demand for education, and there can be no supply which depends on
such demand. The instruction of a people hitherto trained only to manual toil cannot
originate with itself. (Kay-Shuttleworth 1873: 148)
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A fundamental driver in the sequence of reforms culminating in the enforcement
of compulsory attendance in 1880 was not the construction of a new system but
the destruction of the uncountable and unaccountable sector which the ignorant
persisted in using. Compulsion meant that parents could be prosecuted not only
for withholding their children from the inspected classroom but also for sending
them instead to private schools, and only at this moment, with universal nominal
literacy in sight, were the unofficial teachers driven from the market. 
The tables supplied by the marriage registers from 1839 and enriched by the
school inspectors from 1862 reflected the model of government action which
stretched across the educational establishment. Historians have to treat them with
a mixture of dependency and rejection. On the one hand they constituted consis-
tent measures over time, generated on transparent principles and compiled with
administrative competence. Unlike census and household data in other
nineteenth-century and contemporary measurements which rely on self-declara-
tion,23 there was an element of objective performance. A wealth of debate over
the marriage register signatures has established that they did generate a long-run
indicator of capacities to read, which they understated, and to write, which they
overstated, although given the limited need most working people had to use a
pen in the period, not by as much as was sometimes feared (Reay 1991: 113,
Stephens 1998: 26–7). Better still were the still relatively neglected statistics
produced by the Universal Postal Union from 1875, which systematically
measured not the possession of the skills of literacy but their application.24 By
1914 it was generating statistics of per-capita postal flows across the developed
and developing world, together with a wealth of collateral detail which would
enable the curious, for instance, to compare the number of post boxes in Sierra
Leone (18) with Somaliland (5) and with British India (76,506) (Union Postale
Universelle 1915: 3). By contrast, counting change in the later twentieth century
was hampered by the continual revision of the category of literacy once the
marriage register signatures had outlived their usefulness. The most significant
official UK review of the state of post-war literacy, the Bullock Report of 1975,
found itself unable to make any quantitative statement about achievement over
time because shifting standards prevented the creation of a ‘firm statistical basis
for comparison’ (Bullock 1975: 6, 16, 24).25 And in the twenty-first century the
internet produces endless statistics at the point of use but no consensus about
their value for understanding the distribution of communication practices across
societies so divergent in their technological infrastructure.
At the same time, historians are faced with a continued challenge to reach the
cultures of the ‘ignorant’ and to estimate the scale and the consequences of their
demand for education. Lowe’s school examinations reinforced the conception of
literacy as a personal possession. Reworking the statistics on a domestic basis,
examining the practices of appropriating the skills and artefacts of literacy, taking
stock of the depth of exposure to texts and the complex interactions between
printed, oral and visual communication, it is possible to make a case that what
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Chris Bayly terms ‘literacy awareness’ was a universal condition in England before
the state spent a farthing on teaching the poor their letters (Bayly, this volume, 
p. 52). The problem then, as it still is, lies in integrating the national and transna-
tional measurements of change with the local and deeply contextualized
meanings and effects embedded in the uses of literacy. Contemporary analysts of
education programs have at their disposal an enviable range of techniques for
generating evidence, but there remains a question, to which historians do not
have a privileged answer, as to whether education in its fullest sense is a goal
which can ever be consistently measured over time and across space.26
This chapter has made an ahistorical use of the term literacy. In the middle
quarters of the nineteenth century the word itself had not been coined. Those
who laid the foundations of mass education and the means for measuring its
output deployed the old terminology of reading and writing. Although ‘illiteracy’
had been in use since 1660, ‘literacy’ did not enter the English language until as
late as 1883 in the United States and 1893 in the United Kingdom. In France the
equivalent term for illiteracy, analphabétism, was not coined until 1920.27 The word
came into being to describe a specific instantiation of the practice of written
communication. It referred to a condition that united decoding and inscribing
letters. It was a personal, not a social, condition and essentially binary and
quantifiable in its incidence. It was taught in specific institutional locations by a
defined pedagogy, and it was dissociated from other forms of communication
and all forms of learning gained outside the schoolroom. In the course of the
twentieth century the term as an adjective was applied more broadly to mutually
exclusive cultures, in which entire structures of cognition and behaviour were
determined by the presence or absence of a command of reading and writing.28
Although it came to be recognized that the condition could be varied by appli-
cation to specific tasks, with the phrase ‘functional literacy’ gaining acceptance in
the 1970s, it remained associated with the mass of the population rather than
with high culture. Richard Hoggart’s seminal The Uses of Literacy was about the
readers of the popular press, not the writers of poetry and novels (Hoggart
1957). 
In this sense, the history of literacy has both a beginning and an ending. Its
reign has lasted little more than a century. Over the last twenty years the word
has begun to slip its moorings. It is now being attached to an ever-widening
range of practices. A cursory search produces arts, computer, critical, cultural,
design, diaspora, ecological, emotional, financial, health, information, media,
mental health, multimedia, physical, racial and scientific literacies. In some cases
the original meaning of literacy as the capacity to decode written communica-
tion is being extended to engage with the products of the electronic revolution.
‘Media Literacy’, explains the UK government’s OfCom, ‘is the ability to access,
understand and create communication in a variety of contexts’ (Office of
Communication 2004: 4). The further it strays from specific technologies the
vaguer it becomes. ‘Information literacy’ is officially defined as the capacity ‘to
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recognize when information is needed and have the ability to locate, evaluate and
use effectively the needed information’ (American Library Association 1989: 1).
Beyond the new media lie still more diffuse concepts. The notion of ‘emotional
literacy’ has lately emerged as a key to conducting successful personal relation-
ships or to becoming an effective manager of organizations (Bocchino 1999,
Orbach 1999). In this case, as in others, the antonym describes a more recog-
nizable condition. ‘I was raised’, writes Claude Steiner, ‘in a state of utter
emotional illiteracy, as was expected of white middle class boys destined to
become the professional men of my generation’ (Steiner 2003: 15). In the
classroom where the term was originally located, new applications are discov-
ered. The schoolchild must now learn physical literacy, to become a ‘person’ who
‘moves with poise, economy and confidence in a wide variety of physically
challenging situations’ (Whitehead 2001).29 Robert Lowe would be less than
amused to hear his twenty-first-century successor, the Labour MP Jacqui Smith,
assuring Parliament that in schools ‘the Physical Education Programmes of study
sets out - for all Key Stages – the knowledge, skills and understanding pupils need
in order to be physically literate’.30
Elsewhere I have protested this slippage of meaning (Vincent 2004). In
Chambers 21st Century Dictionary the word now is given as a synonym for skill:
‘Competent and experienced in something specified e.g. computer-literate.’ The
displacement of a term derived from the ability to make objects by a one derived
from the ability to communicate may reflect a fundamental shift in our culture.
It does not, however, assist in the long-run understanding of a specific capacity.
I have sympathy with the view, if not the syntax, of the anthropologist Brian
Street:
if we want to indicate that language, for instance, or literacy, as a particular instanti-
ation of language, is always accompanied by/associated with/interwoven with other
semiotic practices, such as visual and oral, then it is better to name each of these
channels, and to find ways of describing the relation between them, than to name
them all as literacies. If they are all ‘literacies’, then we will struggle to differentiate
‘literacy’; as the reading/writing dimension of a semiotic practice from, say, the oral
or the symbolic dimension. (Street 2001: 16)
But on reflection I think the game is up. The shiny new library in my own univer-
sity has equipped itself with a suite to teach ‘information literacy’, which means
computers not the codex. I register a mild objection with the librarian and she
politely ignores me. The word cannot be put back into its semantic box.
Even where the term is being retained in accounts of development, the effort
to free it of the constraints of its late nineteenth-century meanings is generating
further confusion. The Education for All program monitors the growth in literacy
in developing countries in terms that Victorian educationalists would compre-
hend, publishing statistics based on UNESCO’s binary measurement of individual
ability or inability ‘to read and write with understanding, a simple statement of
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their everyday life’ (UNESCO 2007: 62), but then also recognizes that ‘literacy as
practised at home and in communities typically differs from that valued by
schools or the workplace’ and that literacy is ‘a socially organised practice’
(UNESCO 2007: 66). ‘A key feature’ of the OECD’s Program for International
Student Assessment (PISA), the most sophisticated attempt to measure educa-
tional change in developing societies, is ‘the innovative “literacy” concept that is
concerned with the capacity of students to apply knowledge and skills in key
subject areas and to analyse, reason and communicate effectively as they pose,
solve and interpret problems in a variety of situations’ (OECD 2004: 20). The
innovation represents a conscious rejection of the past: 
The concept of literacy used in PISA is much broader than the historical notion of
the ability to read and write. It is measured on a continuum, not as something that
an individual either does or does not have … A literate person has a range of compe-
tencies and there is no precise dividing line between a person who is fully literate
and one who is not. (OECD 2004: 23) 
The skill PISA is seeking to isolate and measure may be central to performance in
the occupational and domestic arena and the emphasis on the relativism of ability
has much to be said for it. But whether terming it ‘literacy’ aids the under-
standing of contemporary development programs is open to doubt. There is gain
as well as loss in retaining the meaning of a concept over time, especially one that
has been subject to long-run measurement. Disconnecting the term from history
disables the capacity fully to understand the dynamics of change.
There may be only two alternatives left to the student of written mass
communication, whether in the old world or in developing countries. The first is
to accept the dispersal of the original meaning and redescribe this field of
learning and practice as ‘literacy literacy’. The second is to revert to the language
of those who constructed the modern apparatus of instruction and measurement.
Reading and writing, lire et écrire, leggere e scrivere, have such long histories that
attention is always directed to the context of their application. The terms imply
two different communication skills, with a variable relation between them. They
emphasise practice, foregrounding the connection between the actor and the
text. And they make no assumption about how the skills were acquired, by whom
or from whom. Literacy, when it can be deployed in its original form, can be
understood as just another way of counting.
References
Official publications
Hansard, XLVIII, 14 June 1839, col. 238
Hansard, XLVIII, 14 June 1839, col. 298
Hansard, CLXIV, 11 July 1861, col. 728
Hansard, CLXV, 13 February 1862, col. 199
The growth and measurement of British public education since the early nineteenth century 189
Bayly 07_Tonra 01  21/06/2011  10:30  Page 189
Hansard, CLXV, 13 February 1862, col. 202
Hansard, CLXV, 13 February 1862, col. 203
Hansard, CLXV, 13 February 1862, col. 211
Hansard, CLXV, 13 February 1862, col. 216
Hansard, CLXV, 13 February 1862, cols 229–30
Hansard, CXCIX, 17 February 1870, col. 441
PP 1846, XIX
PP 1857, p. v
PP 1861, XXI, pt. 1, Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the State of Popular Education
in England
Secondary sources
American Library Association (1989) Presidential Committee on Information Literacy: Final Report,
Chicago, IL: American Library Association
Bell, Andrew (1807). Extract from a Sermon on the Education of the Poor, 2nd edition, London
Bocchino, Rob (1999). Emotional Literacy: To be a Different Kind of Smart, London: Sage
Bullock, Alan (1975). Language for Life, London: HMSO
Cipolla, Carlo (1969). Literacy and Development in the West, Harmondsworth: Penguin
Codding, George (1964). The Universal Postal Union, New York: New York University Press
Cullen, Michael (1975). The Statistical Movement in Early Victorian Britain, Hassocks: Harvester
Press
Dyche, Thomas (1710). Guide to the English Tongue, 2nd edition, London
Filmer, Deon, Amer Hasan and Lant Pritchett (2006). ‘A Millennium Learning Goal:
Measurable real progress in education’, Working Paper No. 97, Washington, DC:
Center for Global Development
Furet, François and Jacques Ozouf (1982), Reading and Writing: Literacy in France from Calvin to
Jules Ferry, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Gardner, Phillip (1984). The Lost Elementary Schools of Victorian England, London: Croom Helm
Graff, Harvey (1987). The Legacies of Literacy, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Higgs, Edward (2004). Life, Death and Statistics: Civil Registration, Censuses and the Work of the General
Register Office, 1836–1952, Hatfield: Local Population Studies
Hoggart, Richard (1957).The Uses of Literacy, London: Chatto and Windus
Johansson, Egil (1988). ‘Literacy campaigns in Sweden’, Interchange 19(3/4): 135–62 
Kay-Shuttleworth, James (1873). ‘A sketch of the history and results of popular education
in England; with some considerations as to the Revised Code (1866)’, in James Kay-
Shuttleworth (ed.) Thoughts and Suggestions on Certain Social Problems, London: Longmans,
Green and Co, pp. 140–66 
Markham, William (1738). An Introduction to Spelling and Reading English, 5th edition, London
Matthews, Mitford McLeod (1966). Teaching to Read, Historically Considered, Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press
Maude, Patricia (2001). Physical Children, Active Teaching: Investigating Physical Literacy,
Buckingham: Open University Press
Menon, Manikath (1965). The Universal Postal Union, New York: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace
Michael, Ian (1993). Early Textbooks of English, Reading: Colloquium on Textbooks, Schools
and Society 
Mitchell, B.R. and Phyllis Deane (1971). Abstract of British Historical Statistics, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
Office of Communication (2004). OfCom’s Strategy for the Promotion of Media Literacy – A Statement,
London: OfCom
History, historians and development policy190
Bayly 07_Tonra 01  21/06/2011  10:30  Page 190
OECD (2004). Programme for International Student Assessment, Learning for Tomorrow’s World. First Results
from PISA 2003, Paris: OECD
Ong, Walter (1982). Orality and Literacy, London: Methuen
Orbach, Susie (1999). Towards Emotional Literacy, London: Virago
Porter, George (1843). The Progress of the Nation in its Various Social and Economical Relations, from the
Beginning of the Nineteenth Century to the Present Time, London: Charles Knight & Co.
Pritchett, Lant (2004). ‘Towards a new consensus for addressing the global challenge of
the lack of education’, Working Paper 43, Washington, DC: Center for Global
Development
Rawson, Rawson W. (1841). ‘An enquiry into the condition of criminal offenders in
England and Wales, with respect to education’, Journal of the Statistical Society of London
3(4): 331–52
Reay, Barry (1991). ‘The content and meaning of popular literacy: some new evidence
from nineteenth-century rural England’, Past and Present 131(1): 89–129 
Smelser, Neil (1991). Social Paralysis and Social Change: British Working-Class Education in the Nineteenth
Century, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press
Start, K.B. and B.K. Wells (1972). The Trend of Reading Standards, Windsor: National Foundation
for Educational Research
Steiner, Claude (2003). Emotional Literacy: Intelligence with a Heart, Fawnskin, CA: Personhood
Press
Stephens, W.B. (1998). Education in Britain, 1750–1914, London: St Martins Press
Street, Brian (2001). ‘Contexts for literacy work: the “new orders” and the “new literacy
studies”’, in Jim Crowther, Mary Hamilton and Lyn Tett (eds) Powerful Literacies,
Leicester: NIACE, pp. 13–22
UNESCO (2007). Education for All by 2015. Will we Make it?, EFA Global Monitoring Report 2008,
Paris: UNESCO
Union Postale Universelle (1915). Statistique Générale du Service Postal, Année 1913, Berne: Union
Postale Universelle
Vincent, David (1989). Literacy and Popular Culture: England 1750–1914, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press
Vincent, David (1998). The Culture of Secrecy: Britain 1832–1998, Oxford: Oxford University
Press
Vincent, David (2000). The Rise of Mass Literacy, Cambridge: Polity
Vincent, David (2003). ‘The progress of literacy’, Victorian Studies 45(3): 405–31
Vincent, David (2004). ‘Literacy literacy’, Interchange 34(2-3): 341–57
Whitehead, Margaret (2001). ‘The concept of physical literacy’, British Journal of Teaching
Physical Education 6(2): 127–38
Notes
1 Cited in Porter (1843: 277).
2 He was replaced by Major George Graham, youngest brother of the serving Home
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3–4).
5 The 1836 Act used as its basic unit of registration the Poor Law Unions created in
1834.
6 Hansard, XLVIII, 14 June 1839, col. 298. See also Rawson (1841). 
7 Their presence is described in Richard Hoggart’s (1957) classic account of inter-war
Leeds. 
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9 For examples of primers in print across the period before the public subsidy of
elementary education, see Dyche (1710) and Markham (1738).
10 The summit of this tradition is represented by Smelser (1991).
11 Local school boards were permitted to set attendance by-laws in 1870, and required
to do so in 1880. Workhouse children and some groups of factory children were
subject to regulation from the 1830s onwards. When it finally arrived, compulsion
was gently policed, particularly in respect of girls.
12 Hansard, XLVIII, 14 June 1839, col. 238.
13 Total public expenditure on education grew twenty five times between 1833 and
1860. Other than the salaries of civil servants, it was ranked behind law and justice,
and the post office (see Mitchell and Deane 1971: 396–7).
14 Effectively the Departmental Minister.
15 Hansard, CLXV, 13 February 1862, col. 216.
16 Hansard, CLXV, 13 February 1862, col. 202.
17 Hansard, CLXV, 13 February 1862, col. 211.
18 Hansard, CLXV, 13 February 1862, col. 216.
19 Hansard, CLXV, 13 February 1862, col. 203.
20 Hansard, CLXV, 13 February 1862, cols 229–30.
21 Hansard, CLXV, 13 February 1862, col. 199.
22 Hansard, CLXIV, 11 July 1861, col. 728.
23 The data measured by the Education For All programme is derived from ‘conven-
tional cross-country data drawn from censuses or household surveys that rely on self-
assessments, third-party reporting or educational proxies’ (UNESCO 2007: 62).
24 For accounts of the organization see Codding (1964) and Menon (1965). The value
of its data for an understanding of the dynamics of mass communication is explored
in Vincent (2003).
25 On the post-war literacy surveys see Start and Wells (1972).
26 See for instance Lant Pritchett’s definition: ‘Basic schooling is a means to acquiring
the skills and competencies that contribute to a fuller, more humane, and productive
human existence’ (Pritchett 2004: 5).
27 My thanks to my colleague Jim Coleman for this reference.
28 See, for instance, Ong (1982).
29 See also Maude (2001).
30 Jacqui Smith, Hansard, 20 March 2006, Written Answers, col. 104.
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8
The tools of transition: 
education and development in 
modern Southeast Asian history
Tim Harper
In 1935, one of Java’s greatest educators, Ki Hajar Dewantara (1889–1959),
reflected on modern education and its accomplishments:
It is not an easy task to go through a period of transition, and it becomes even harder
when extraneous factors intervene in the renovation process, greatly hindering a
normal adjustment.
How often we have been misled by presumed needs which we considered natural
but which we later realized were proper to alien forms of civilization. We discover
too late that such demands can be satisfied only with difficulty or not at all from our
own resources. Dissatisfaction has thus befallen us, and worse: slowly but surely we
have become alienated from our own people and our own environment. This alien-
ation would have been bearable had it not been that in our case the abandonment of
our own culture did not at the same time bring access to another civilization. Thus
we have sacrificed what was ours but have not gained in its place anything that might
be considered its equivalent; we have lost our world, but we have not entered
another.
Who is to blame? Our answer is that it is our own fault, though only indirectly so.
We had to choose, and we made our choice … We have added much new cultural
material, the value of which cannot be discounted; however, it often fits so ill with
our own style or is so far removed from it that we can use it at best as a decoration
and not as material to build with. It is quite understandable why we have been so
mistaken in our choice. In the first place, much has to be chosen, and there has been
so little to choose from. (Ki Hajar Dewantara 1967: 151)
Ki Hajar Dewantara was the driving force behind one of the most remarkable
indigenous educational movements anywhere in the colonial world: the Taman
Siswa, or ‘garden of students’, which by 1932 had established over 166 schools in
Java and Madura, outside the control of Dutch imperial authorities. It was part of
a longer tradition of activism by Indonesian elites, stung by what the Filipino
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nationalist José Rizal called ‘the spectre of comparisons’ with Europe, to
modernize their societies from within (Anderson 1998). But, in a break with
earlier ventures, and many later initiatives, the Taman Siswa leaders were deeply
ambivalent about the wholesale adoption of western methods. They drew from
Javanese cultural practices, built on the growing use of the Indonesian language
and espoused the principle of kerakjatan, or ‘people-mindedness’, which they saw
was an essential force of Indonesian culture. In 1936, Ki Hajar Dewantara urged
his followers to abandon the language of social hierarchy and call themselves
‘brothers in learning’. Yet, at the same time, the Taman Siswa was a creative
amalgam of the ideas from Europe, of Montessori and Fröbel and the Dalton
school system in the United States. Its leaders also absorbed Rabindranath Tagore's
critique of western education, and maintained contacts with his Santiniketan
school (McVey 1967). For two decades, Taman Siswa fought a running battle with
the colonial government over the recognition of its schools and curricula.
However, spite of these difficulties, the Taman Siswa schools in many ways
exceeded the provision of the colonial schools of the day, and became the inspi-
ration for the more radical ‘wild schools’ established by Indonesian nationalists
and communists in the 1940s and 1950s. Ki Hajar Dewantara’s experience
examplifies a broad grassroots education tradition across Southeast Asia – of
village scholars, ‘people’s schools’ and ‘guerrilla model’ literacy campaigns – but
it also signals some of the tensions in the relationship between education and
development over the longer term. 
The first is that, for all the importance attached to education in national
development in Southeast Asia, its role in some ways has been ambivalent. This
can be clearly seen in the colonial period. Education was a central way in which
societies mobilized to challenge and resist European rulers. But on the other hand
it has also been the central vehicle through which both colonial and post-colonial
states have sought to impose their own visions and discipline their subjects.
Education remains the locus of a range of state policy obsessions. But despite its
grip on the formal sector, the state has never succeeded in dominating the
informal sector, which is often distinguished by more open networks and more
experimental forms of schooling. Education is both central to the discourses of
state-formation, but also of resistance to them. An over-riding question, as Ruth
McVey put it for Indonesia after its independence in the 1950s, was ‘whether
instruction was to be in familiar surroundings and with a minimum of formality,
or whether it should be in a place kept apart, which embodied the new order to
which the pupil was to be acculturated and which aroused awe and obedience.
Governments and established faiths have preferred the latter; new beliefs have
often opted for the former, both because it emphasized accessibility and because
it required fewer resources’ (McVey 1990: 8). This question, I think, remains
relevant today.
A second tension lies in the ‘spectre of comparisons’ itself. Southeast Asia’s
history, as its scholars have frequently observed, has been marked by a cultural
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willingness to compare, borrow and adapt ideas, practices and institutions from
outside. Yet, as Ki Hajar Dewantara suggested in 1935, this also been a source of
great anxiety and conflict. If anything, historians have sometimes minimized the
trauma that such openness to change brings. In Southeast Asia, education has also
frequently been portrayed as an expression of the authority of ‘indigenous’
culture. As will be plain, where the ‘indigenous’ begins and the extraneous ends,
in this limitlessly plural and cosmopolitan region, has always been a matter of
contention. The ‘indigenous’ is often a product of an immediate post-colonial
history rather than the expression of a longer cultural experience. But the idea of
the ‘indigenous’, or autochthony, if you will, has been a strong feature of devel-
opmental thought in Southeast Asia before and after independence. The quest for
‘an autonomous history’ of Southeast Asia has also been a governing scholarly
paradigm, and until quite recently this has overshadowed the study of outside
connections. The cosmopolitanism of the region is an aspect of its history that
modern regimes, and scholars, have often found it difficult to come to terms
with. 
Finally, people like Ki Hajar Dewantara and their ideas are all but forgotten
today. If they are remembered, they are remembered solely within a larger
narrative of ‘national awakening’, bled of all contradiction and complexity. This
is a narrative of modernity, focussed on major state institutions and their
antecedents. Southeast Asian studies has, as a field, been development-obsessed.
The place of education is assumed in this narrative, but has rarely been explored
systematically and critically. This is in spite of, or perhaps because of, the faith
Southeast Asian elites have placed on education as a tool of national consolida-
tion, ethnic integration and as a bridge to a new social and economic future.
Education’s role in ‘nation-building’ was self-evident; ‘culture’ a given. The quest
for rapid economic growth often encouraged quick-fix solutions and a focus on
immediate policy issues. In the 1960s, educationalists complained, from their
perspective, that education was often taken for granted, subject to a ‘general
laissez-fairism’ (Fischer 1965). Most were concerned with the immediate needs
of advocacy for development, rather than looking at broader historical frame-
works. In the 1960s, World Bank interventions favoured larger institutional
projects rather than broader-based literacy projects, and, over a longer period, the
formal sector over the informal. Culture was off-limits (‘we’ll be funding
temples next’) (Jones 1997). Little research on education in the post-colonial
world has been truly comparative, a fact attested to by the editors of the journal
Comparative Education in a review of twenty years of their own work (Little 2000).
Historians of Southeast Asia, since the publication of seminal studies in the first
years of independence, have been largely disinterested in education policy. In this
area, as in others, post-colonial thought from the 1980s onwards was critical of
the progressivist assumptions of earlier scholarship, but unwilling to revisit the
terrain with the same depth of research. In many countries, contemporary
education policy is a fiercely politicized, sensitive area, for which good sources
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are often hard to come by. But there are signs that the scholarly ground is shifting
and that, through an accumulation of work on Chinese and Islamic education,
the importance of the non-formal sector in particular seems to be coming back
into focus. 
With this in mind, the potential contribution of historians, it seems to me, is
modest and straightforward: to try to provide a useful narrative of regional
thinking about education and development in Southeast Asia, particularly during
its key ‘periods of transition’. This, I think, is something we have not done well.
But we can also strive to set educational developments within in a wider context,
highlighting some themes which, over the years, we have treated rather better. In
what follows, several suggest themselves: (a) the sheer diversity of models of
development that have marked the region’s thought; (b) the importance of
considering them in a transnational context; (c) recurrent patterns in the ways
new ideas from outside have been contested within a Southeast Asian ecumene;
(d) the long-term historical role of the non-formal sector. This chapter attempts
to map some of the region’s capacities and capabilities, and to examine how
adequately they have been exploited by the formal educational sector. This has
been achieved very unevenly.
The longer duration
Over the longer duration, what are the educational resources available to the
region? ‘Southeast Asia’ is a slippery concept. Whilst from the 1950s a first gener-
ation of western specialist historians of the region talked confidently of
‘Southeast Asia’ as a distinct entity, and of the ‘autonomy’ of its history, they have
struggled to define its commonalities from such a diversity of historical and
cultural experience. Attempts to do so – chiefly through the ‘Indianization’ of the
region’s early history, or the shared experience of an ‘age of commerce’ in the
early modern period, or in common forms of local state-formation over the
longer term – have all run into difficulties when confronted with the diversity of
the region’s experience and the porousness of its boundaries. Its inhabitants
rarely use the term ‘Southeast Asian’ of themselves. The term first secured inter-
national recognition with the creation of ‘South East Asia Command’ in 1943,
and was entrenched by the Cold War, and the politics of the ‘Area Studies’
framework within the western academy. There is more than a grain of truth in
Benedict Anderson’s observation that Southeast Asians first came to see
themselves as such in the graduate schools of North America. This complicates
any attempt to define ‘indigenous’ capacities and capabilities over the longer
duration. Scholars now tend to see the region as a flexible, contingent category,
a world drawn together not by shared culture, but by the histories of what the
late Denys Lombard termed its ‘networks and syncronisms’ (Anderson 1990,
Reynolds 1995, Kratoska et al. 2005, and especially Lombard 1995 and
Sutherland 2005). 
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Knowledge was at the heart of these networks and syncronisms. This is an
important theme of some of the most important recent attempts to identify
commonalities in the region’s experience over long periods of time. Tony Day
and Craig Reynolds, for example, whilst rejecting any idea of teleology in
Southeast Asia’s development, have nevertheless pointed to recurring shapes in
the relationship between knowledge and power over different times and places
within the region. ‘This feature is characteristic of all subsequent state formations
in the region, namely, the tendency for knowledge to be viewed as inherently
“cosmological” and “universalistic”, a tendency which shaped the relationship
between knowledge and power in a particular way. This relationship involved a
synthesis of the “latest” technology and of religious belief in the service of state
domination’ (Day and Reynolds 2000: 4–5). This analysis picked up on an aspect
of the early history of the region that was highlighted in the seminal writings of
O.W. Wolters: the eagerness, anxiousness of rulers and elites to absorb influences
and ideas from outside: ‘knowledge was understood to be a fund of timely, and,
above all, effective “expedients”, another feature of historical experience in the
region.’ Neither Wolters, nor Day and Reynolds, have discussed education at
length – few general accounts of Southeast Asian history do so for any period.
But Wolters nevertheless argued that pedagogical theory and practice were vital
to unlocking the ‘full-bodied story of Southeast Asia’ (Wolters 1999: 223). 
One way to take this forward is to emphasize that such a history can only be
understood in global terms. The traces of teaching and learning that survive from
the early period of Southeast Asian history lie in Hindu and Buddhist manuals of
instruction, the development of monastic cultures across Asia, and trails left by
the circulation of scholars. Through this, successive world religions, and their
traditions of high learning, lodged themselves in the region’s cosmologies. In the
I Ching we can read of schools of Chinese scholars in Sumatra; from the beginning
of the second millennium of the Common Era, the trading imperium of Srivijaya
established outposts of learning in Southern India and in Canton (de Casperis
and Mabbett 1990: 320). From the outset, the role of specific migrant groups in
education was pivotal, particularly in maritime regions. In Islamic Southeast Asia,
where the faith was propagated by sufis and traders (who were often one and
same), certain key communities were important to the spread of schooling and
the establishment of new standards and curricula over several hundred years. In
recent years, the Hadrami Arabs have been a focus of historians’ interest as
exemplars of the role of transnational networks in the region’s development; in
the pre-colonial period, for example, they appear as traders and advisers to rulers,
but also as mystics and religious rebels. In the colonial period, they emerge as a
distinctive kind of educational entrepreneur: drawing on phenomenal interna-
tional networks and financial resources to found reformist Islamic schools and
printing presses. Before the 1920s, the wealth at the disposal of the community
in Singapore for these kinds of projects eclipsed that of the British colonial elite
itself (Freitag and Clarence-Smith 1997, Ho 2006). But equally in this kind of
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history, the role of South Indian Muslims, Tamil social reformers, Buddhist
revivalists, jobbing Theosophists, and Paris- and Leiden- trained scientific social-
ists was equally significant. Added to this were more regional patterns of
migration. The Minangkabau of West Sumatra, largely due to their matrilineal
traditions, had a tradition of out-migration, merantau, which had with it the idea
of eventual return by individuals equipped with new wealth or knowledge. Many
chose the path of teacher (Wang 1985). Pilgrimage created centres of education
at stages along the route, whether it be in colonial entrepôts, such as Singapore,
or through the large Jawi, or Southeast Asian communities in Mecca and Medina
themselves (Laffan 2004). What we might term an educational cosmopolitanism
lay at the heart of the region’s experience.
Secondly, these systems of learning permeated down to a local level. The
village level Confucian scholar was an old tradition of Vietnamese life which the
communists exploited in their mid-twentieth century revolution. When the
French traveller, Jean de Lanessan, wrote in 1895 that ‘even the nhaques’ (the
peasants) could read and write, there was perhaps an element of Orientalist
romanticism at play. But equally, Ho Chi Minh’s assertion in 1945 that the
communists could teach nine out of ten illiterates to read and write adequately
in three months was based on some foundation, given their achievements in this
regard (Woodside 1983: 404). The shifting geographies of political power were
important to the creation of local educational networks. Whilst the richer monas-
teries, and the most ambitious scholars, were to be found near the principal
courtly centres of the region, these polities were relatively mobile; scholars
moved with them, but sometimes they might often be left behind as political
authority flowed elsewhere. In the Malay world some of the most vibrant centres
of learning were the local sultanates. These remained such, even when colonial
conquest had rendered them political backwaters. For example, when, in the late
nineteenth century, the Dutch authorities sought to establish a standardized
‘Malay’ as a second-tier language for native education, they turned to the quite
enclave of Riau, where a network of schools and a distinctive literary tradition
continued to thrive. The local variant of ‘Malay’ was, in turn, taken up by
Indonesian nationalists, and this form of ‘Indonesian’ has become one of the
world’s most spoken languages and an instrument for some of the most impres-
sive achievements in literacy work in Southeast Asia (Hoffman 1979, Maier
1993).
Distinctive pedagogical traditions developed which have persisted into the
present era. Two of the most durable and adaptable are those of the pondok of the
Malay peninsula, and the pesantren in Java. This village-based schooling embraced
a wide range of institutions, some very small, teaching little more than rote-
learning of the Quran in Arabic. But others, by the later nineteenth century, began
to embrace more subjects, and in and around the Straits Settlements and the
trading towns of coastal Java, began to benefit from the influence of foreign
Muslims. Through sheer numbers (one estimate of the numbers of pesantren for
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Java and Madura in 1885 was 15,000 schools with 230,000 students) they had
a wide influence (Ricklefs 2007: 49–57). Belts of schools emerged in specific
locales that supplied teachers for neighbouring regions: the pondoks and madrasahs
of Patani, in southern Thailand, for example, fed teachers into the northern Malay
states, and on to the Middle East, and have maintained circulating linkages to
South and Central Asia from at least the later nineteenth century. In the colonial
era, the independent Islamic character of Patani earned it the sobriquet ‘the cradle
of Islam in Southeast Asia (Madmarn 1999: 12). Yet it benefited at the same time
from the modern communications of British Penang. As we shall see, these old
circuits have once again become visible. Village-level institutions, away from
major sites of political power, often have a longer history and deeper interna-
tional linkages than more formal institutions closer to them. 
Networks – of temples, schools, travelling scholars, circulating libraries and
print culture – created diverse ecumenes of knowledge in Southeast Asia. In re-
evoking this world, there is a slight danger that we might be left with too
seamless a picture of migrant webs and fluid connections. It is important to
remember that cosmopolitan knowledge was always a challenge to established
regimes: whilst they exploited it, and attempted to reconcile it to overarching
local cosmologies, this process was often fraught with danger. Periods of transi-
tion in knowledge were therefore often marked by attempts by states to
command its flow and strengthen orthodoxy. Anthony Reid, in his account of
Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, argues that the age of decisive loss of autonomy
of the states of the region in the later seventeenth century was one such period,
an ‘age of absolutism’ of a mounting concern with normative Islamic orthodoxy
over syncretic local practice; of attempts by Buddhist monarchs on the mainland,
for example, to strengthen their control over the sangha (Reid 1993). A second
period of European conquest in Java and the Straits of Melaka in the early
nineteenth century can be seen in a similar light. Here, along with expressions
of receptivity to western ideas, there was also a revival of Javanese knowledge in
response to the intellectual aggression of the European Enlightenment. In their
study of one of the most remarkable and compendious documents of Southeast
Asian scholarship in the nineteenth century, the Serat Centhini of the Javanese court
of 1814 – often seen as the work of a Javanese Encyclopaedist – Day and Reynolds
see ‘a self-reflexive “framing” of cultural practices and values in a period of rapid
and violent change’ (Day and Reynolds 2000: 37). By 1900, during a third
aggressive wave of European conquest, when a new kind of colonial state was
making its presence felt, similar processes were at work. On the one hand, the
imperial globalization of the fin de siècle fostered a cosmopolitan consciousness –
an ‘Imperial Enlightenment’ – that created, not least, a new level of local invest-
ment in schools (Frost, forthcoming). But it was also the beginning of the
cultural resistance of Ki Hajar Dewantara’s age of ‘transition’ and ‘comparison’. In
each of these periods, challenging new ideas from outside were matched with
local reconceptualizations and pedagogical innovation. 
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A colonial inheritance?
In this context it is hard to isolate the ‘colonial origins’ of development in
Southeast Asia. They are intertwined with, dialogical to, its local dynamics. Both
in general terms, and in the field of education, the experience of European rule
was focally intense, but unevenly felt. Before the turn of the twentieth century,
colonial provision for schools was very marginal: it was limited to support for
Christian enterprise and a few showpiece colleges, mainly in the port cities. They
produced a small local elite proficient in European languages. In the British case,
it was smaller domiciled migrant groups – the ‘Straits Chinese’ in Singapore,
Malacca and Penang, for example – who were best placed to seize the opportu-
nity presented by mission school English to claim a privileged intermediary
position for themselves. But at the same time, these same groups took a growing
local interest in vernacular schooling and literacy. 
The Europeans themselves were slower to provide for this than Asian educa-
tionalists were. The key innovations arose in the 1900s: the regional standard was
the ‘Ethical Policy’ in the Dutch East Indies, which, for the first time, equated
economic progress with expanded provision for ‘native’ welfare. In the words of
one of its chief apologists, the orientalist Snouck Hurgronje, the aim was of
‘lifting the natives up to a higher level of civilization in line with their innate
capacities’. However, early twentieth-century imperialists, steeped in the hierar-
chies of racial thought of the day, had a limited view of these capacities and
therefore of the scope of colonial provision. For example, it was axiomatic to
governing doctrines of ‘trusteeship’ in the British empire that education should
not create new aspirations that could not be met. Therefore, it was the stated
object of British policy in Malaya to make the Malays better fishermen and
farmers. In practice, this meant the provision of basic vernacular schools, but at
the same time it limited access to higher, secondary, English-language schools to
the Malay aristocratic elite, who were cultivated as minor civil servants under
indirect rule. The local Eton, the Malay College Kuala Kangsar – the Bab-ud-Darajat,
or ‘gateway to high position’ as the Malays called it – existed principally to
educate a native petty aristocracy in gamesmanship and table manners, although
over time it did admit a modern curriculum and a limited degree of meritocracy
(Stevenson 1975). 
At one level, the aggregate indices of change were impressive: by the early
1930s in the Dutch East Indies, 9,600 desascholen, or village schools, existed, where
1.66 million received, and themselves paid for, the limited vernacular education
intended for them. But this was only 8 percent of the population between
walking age and adulthood. The numbers of Indonesians in European schools
amounted to only 0.14 for the total population: there were 178 Indonesians in
university and 392 in vocational agricultural or forestry schools, where, under
the logic of colonial education policy, investment was supposed to be directed
(Ricklefs 2001: 202–3).
The principles of colonial education had a long afterlife. As Syed Hussein
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Alatas argued in his 1977 book, The Myth of the Lazy Native (Alatas 1977), 
anticipating arguments made the following year by Edward Said, the rhetoric of
later Malay social reformers, including the future prime minister, and ‘father of
modernization’, Dr Mahathir Mohamad – their calls in the 1960s and 1970s to
energize and discipline the Malays through a ‘Revolusi Mental’ – recycled colonial
stereotypes of Malay inertia and resistance to innovation. European educational-
ists held a mirror up to local tradition so it could find itself wanting. Another
enduring feature of regional ‘ethical’ policies was a system of ethnical preference,
in which local elites often connived. This helped entrench a ‘racial division of
labour’ within the colonial economy. In British Malaya, the rationale of vernac-
ular schooling for the Malays was the need to maintain a stable ‘yeoman
peasantry’ and confine them to agriculture. The middle rungs of the commercial
economy thus were abandoned to the Chettyars and Chinese (Kratoska 1975).
There was no provision for commercial education. It was the Islamic religious
schools that by the 1930s first began to offer Malays courses on accountancy, the
madrasahs of Sumatra that, by the 1940s, produced some of the most dynamic
women leaders and teachers. 
Above all, for all the thrusting modernity of the late colonial period, technical
accomplishment was acquired by Asians mostly though their own initiative. This
was one reason why it became such a rallying cry for young nationalists. In his
fascinating study of technology and nationalism in Indonesia, Rudolf Mrázek
quotes a patriotic publication from 1939 imaging a future world of mechanized
power: ‘Let us come together, for instance, in a radio course, let us become radio
mechanics. In a course like that, high-school graduates can sit in the same
classroom with the pupils of elementary schools… As they become good enough
to connect a wire, check a voltmeter and ammeter, and as they learn how to prompt
a spark out of terminals and condensers… they, without a moment of hesitation, will
come out into the world’ (Mrázek 2002: 190).
Much of this is well known. But what has been less studied is the complex,
many-layered role that Southeast Asians played within colonial institutions in
their ‘period of transition’. The memoir (in English, and the first such) of the
leading Malay educator Haji Abdul Majid bin Zainuddin, The Wandering Thoughts of a
Dying Man, is a fascinating oblique commentary on imperial trusteeship (see Roff
1978). Abdul Majid was a teacher at the Malay College Kuala Kangsar, and
outwardly one of the most vocal empire loyalists of his time: he was an advocate
for Malay recruitment into colonial armies, and served as the British govern-
ment’s representative in Mecca, partly in an intelligence role. But he describes his
views on education in very different terms. ‘I was convinced that, coming as I did
from a life of having associations with people of the “Old World” straight into
the life under the changed conditions of the “New World”, I would be the best
person to advise the educational authorities how or in what form that education
should be to give the best results to the Malays in their condition of being trans-
formed from their ideals of the old into those of the new world.’ He did this by
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exploiting the logic of colonial policy in very specific ways: so that his support
for military recruitment can be seen as an attempt to recover the martial spirit of
the Malays. As a teacher at the Malay College, he observed that the British policy
of religious instruction for the boys, on a Sunday, followed the model of Bible
Classes in English public schools, and that this offered new possibilities to expand
the realm of religious instruction of the Malay elite, which had hitherto been
confined to Quranic recitation. Abdul Majid used the opportunity to launch
modernist kitab classes and recruit a new generation of reformist religious
teachers (Roff 1978). 
If we move beyond a generalized picture of the retrogressive colonial impact
on local initiative, there were areas in which it contributed to the building of
indigenous capacity. Under the mantle of colonial indirect rule, the kinds of
improvizations made by Abdul Majid were widespread, and often led to
enhanced scope for investment in the non-formal sectors of education. Abdul
Majid was a prolific translator and producer of primers, for Malays and non-
Malays, and reminds us that the cottage industries of language training and trans-
lation in Southeast Asia were a vital field for national initiative, often spearheaded
by graduates of second division colonial institutions such as the vernacular
teacher training colleges. In Frederick Cooper’s words: ‘colonial history reminds
us that in the most oppressive of political systems, people found not just niches
in which to hide and fend for themselves, but handles by which the system itself
could be moved’ (Cooper 2005: 242).
The late imperial meridian of the 1920s and 1930s was the highpoint of
Southeast Asian educational entrepreneurship. New groups began to take the
lead. Before the twentieth century, the Chinese worlds in Southeast Asia were an
imperfect reflection of society at home; pioneering communities of traders and
labourers, with few literati or divines. By the turn of the century, new community
initiatives were launched and education was their focus. In the inter-war years,
new-style Chinese tycoons, presiding over transnational operations, invested
heavily in national type schools. Even the organizers of the Taman Siswa looked to
Chinese merchants for support. Technical training was offered by Chinese private
schools. Existing rural traditions were re-energized: in Indonesia, the left took
over the ‘wild school’ model; in Vietnam, the beginnings of the ‘guerrilla model’
of education can be discerned. It was a time of great innovation, of cross-cutting
experiments, of a local sociology of comparison. Above all, the connection
between education and democracy seen in the work of Ki Hajar Dewantara
became general. But all this signalled a final phase of the colonial impact in
education: a revived hostility to outside influences and connections, and a
paranoia at the pan-Islamic protest, international anarchism and Bolshevism that
many of these educational initiatives seemed to represent. The heirs of old
scholastic pilgrims were shadowed or imprisoned. Access to education overseas
became more circumscribed. 
By the later 1930s, the growing insularity of colonial society was marked by
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a general clampdown on nationalist activity. This did not extinguish educational
initiative: it was because open politics became so difficult that nationalist energies
were diverted into the cultural sphere. But it also meant that education became
deeply politicized, and there was a price to pay for this. The failures of colonial
policy were nowhere more poignantly displayed than by the fact that some of the
most distinctive local educational initiatives that occurred in these years took
place among the concentrations of graduates and educators in the colonial
Bastilles of Indochina, and the Dutch isolation colony of Boven Digul in remote
West Guinea (Zinoman 2001, Mrázek 2002). 
Finally, the colonial inheritance was complicated by the presence of Japan as
a model and as a colonial power. The Meiji experience was widely admired and
emulated across the region by people from Malay theocrats to radical national-
ists. Many key Asian educators and nationalist thinkers sojourned and studied in
Japan. Japanese rule in much of the region after 1942 gave, in its early stages at
least, a high priority to the re-education of its subjects away from a slavish
colonial mentality and to the inculcation of the Nippon sheisin, the élan of imperial
Japan. Despite the disintegration of Japan’s constructive colonialism into war
imperialism and repression, several aspects of this experience endured. The first
is that the numbers of Southeast Asians sent to Japan dramatically increased in
number. The evidence shows that many played a role in post-colonial education
and that their worldview was significantly shaped by their time overseas (Akashi
1978). Second, the methods of Japanese schools in Southeast Asia themselves
influenced many more local educators: especially their military discipline, the use
of songs, the vigour and élan. Third, the Japanese placed great weight on
language as medium to forge a new consciousness. This excited the imagination
of a generation already committed to new vernacular tongues; the idea that
language was ‘the soul of the nation’ would have a great influence on educational
policy after the war. Above all, the Japanese emphasis on the role of the state
deepened the conviction of the emerging new national leaderships that the state
was the crucial vehicle for economic and social transformation. This was tanta-
mount to a new civil religion. Recent work on the Japanese in Asia over the
course of the twentieth century has pointed out the swiftness with which
Japanese influence in the region reasserted itself after the war, not least in the
field of education and the possibilities for cultural diplomacy it provided (Ahmad
2003, Koh 2007).
Education and national development
The colonial origins of development can only be understood within a Southeast
Asian narrative of the development of capacities and capabilities over a longer
period of time, shaped by outside interventions that were not directly of the 
West (Bayly, this volume). What is less clear at this point, to historians, is
precisely how these interactions were carried forward into post-colonial policies.
Histories of development in Southeast Asia that straddle the colonial/post-
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colonial watersheds have been few and far between (Amrith 2006). Southeast
Asian archives for this period of transition, for the most part, remain closed.
There was, however, a plethora of research in the 1960s on the mentalité of the
post-colonial elite; it has been all but forgotten, but it is worth revisiting (e.g.,
Tilman 1964, Scott 1968). What is clear from it is that many of the methods of
late colonial development were carried forward into the new era. Political transi-
tions, of course, varied dramatically in Southeast Asia. In Indochina, the ‘guerrilla
model’ of education prevailed until the later 1960s. In Indonesia, the colonial and
post-colonial co-existed in uneasy ways. In Malaysia and Singapore, there was a
remarkable continuity in personnel and practice. Driven by the concerns of
counter-insurgency, and uniquely well-financed, the late colonial state was
particularly influential in shaping the contours of policy. It crushed the existing
politicization of education, but allowed new kinds of political patronage to
emerge. For example, adult education was encouraged by the British as a means
for conservative political allies to gain support. The committees of management
of rural and small-town Chinese schools, as much as the jungle, were perhaps the
key site of the Malayan Emergency campaign (Harper 1999). Despite the differ-
ences, by the end of the first decades of independence broader patterns became
discernable, patterns in which many of the Southeast Asia capacities before the
war became less visible. 
First, as the drive for modernization and economic development dominated
state policy, there was a decisive move to more formal models of education. This
model was not, as some had suggested, a convergence of existing education
types. Rather it saw a sudden set of interventions to bring education into line
with national priorities. The post-war years were an era of dramatic expansion in
provision. In Indonesia, the independent regime had promoted education to the
extent that between 1953 and 1960 the number of entrants to primary schools
rose from 1.7 to 2.5 million, and adult literacy of those over ten years of age rose
to 46.7 percent (as against 7.4 percent adult literacy in the 1930s). In the 1950s
they were 280 schools in Jakarta, but only 180 possessed buildings in which
classes could be held. By 1984, it was reported that 97 percent of seven to twelve
year olds attended schooling. This was, as Adrian Vickers remarks, in one sense ‘a
miraculous achievement’, but in another sense the development of schooling was
dogged by inefficiency, low-pay, problems of moonlighting teachers and high
drop-out rates, rather than steadily rising skills (Ricklefs 2001: 290, Vickers
2005: 132–89). At the same time, independent states remained very suspicious
of informal grassroots initiatives. This was, not least, because some of the most
impressive mass education  programs from the 1950s through to the 1960s were
organized by the left. A case in point is the ‘wild school’ system itself. By the
1950s, the Communist Party of Indonesia had reformed itself and the graduates
of the old ‘wild schools’ led new, ambitious mass literacy campaigns. The doctri-
naire Marxism they espoused; their emphasis on science and organization, the
establishment of a people’s university (modeled on the volksuniversiteit in the
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Netherlands), all amounted to a major challenge to the state. The campaigns
ended with the general extermination of the Communists in 1965–66 and, for
those who survived it, in the prison camps of the New Order (McVey 1990).
A second theme is that, whilst regimes still voiced commitment to the ideal,
in the Cold War era of ideological polarization and uncertainty, the connection
between education and democratization was in many ways broken. The watch-
words were ‘education for national unity’, which was not the same thing as
participation and representation. As government control over the finance and
curricula of schools and universities increased, their influence on national policy
declined, as did that of the many informal educational networks. Education
continued to be politicized. For example, in Malaysia, and elsewhere, the colonial
tendency towards ethnic preference was seen now as a prerequisite for national
unity, and was intensified at the expense of social equity. After ethnic riots in
1969, and another period of Emergency rule, a sequence of laws sought to
reverse the comparative disadvantage of the Malays in education and the
commercial economy through positive discrimination. This was one of the most
ambitious and sustained attempts at social engineering anywhere in the post-
colonial world. But it also went hand-in-hand with a new Universities and
Colleges Act of 1971 which significantly reduced civil liberties on Malaysia’s new
university campuses (Selvaratnam 1985).
This signals a third theme: the role of state ideology. In Indonesia, the
pancasila; in Malaysia, the rukunegara – both roughly translating as ‘principles of
state’ – and in Vietnam, ‘Ho Chin Minh Thought’, all became enshrined in syllabi
at every level. From the 1980s, as authoritarian regimes became more belea-
guered, the role of these orthodoxies was, if anything, accentuated. State ideology
was driven in no small part by the desire to discipline minorities. In Vietnam,
state education policy was part of the wider drive to incorporate indigenous
minorities. In Thailand, it was an arm of a long-term project of national standard-
ization and disciplining begun by reforming monarchs in the late nineteenth
century. In the 1950s and 1960s, funded by US development aid, primary
education in Thailand expanded; textbooks enjoined children ‘to buy Thai goods;
love Thailand and love to be a Thai; live a Thai life, speak Thai and esteem Thai
culture’ (Baker and Phongpaichit 2005: 172). The overseas Chinese and Indians
found that the space for vernacular education had shrunk dramatically. The use of
the national language was a primary yardstick of integration right across
Southeast Asia. In Malaysia, and elsewhere, this amounted to ’a second wave of
decolonization’: one corollary of the ethnic precedence given to the Malays was
an assault on Anglophone culture (Watson 1996: 305). Not least amongst its
ironies was that it was often led by those who had most benefited from late
colonial schooling. As in Indonesia, the national language was effective, to a
degree, as a tool for reducing illiteracy. But it did not necessary dramatically
enhance rural people’s access to new urban opportunities, nor Malaysia’s access
to the English-speaking world of global commerce (Puteh 2006).
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The result of these changes was a growing disjuncture between old and new
educational capacities. The development decades after independence were
founded on the primacy of the nation-state (Berger 2004). Old cosmopolitan
networks were disrupted by new national imperatives. At the height of the Cold
War, whilst many non-Communist states in Southeast Asia voiced commitment
to internationalism, they were as paranoid about the destabilizing effects of
transnational linkages as had been the colonial regimes before them. As Lee Kuan
Yew, Chief Minister of Singapore, put it in 1962 – explaining to the United
Nations Committee on Colonialism the detention without trial of many left-wing
activists, many of them educators – their cosmopolitan creed now made them
‘anti-national’ (Harper 2001: 43). As part of his campaign against them, Lee also
closed down the great achievement of Chinese educational initiative in Southeast
Asia, the Nanyang University, which had been funded by subscriptions from the
entire community; taxi-drivers as much as tycoons. In extremis, in Burma for
example, this kind of outlook led to an extraordinary degree of state insularity in
a globalizing world. New international networks, of course, emerged. Susan
Bayly’s important study, Asian Voices in a Post-Colonial Age, traces these across several
continents and generations, such as in the renewed circulation of Vietnamese
intellectuals to new sites of sojourn, the Soviet Union and beyond (Bayly 2007).
By the early 1980s over 7,000 Thais were in US universities: since the time of
King Chulalongkorn (1868–1910) education abroad was an avenue for the old
elite to maintain social standing in a more egalitarian age (Baker and
Phongpaichit 2005: 151–65). But there was often a discontinuity between old
and new sites of education. Within the region, many educational centres –
Rangoon, Penang, Saigon, Bandung – entered a period of decline. It remains to
be seen if some of these cosmopolitan cities may revive.
By the 1980s and early 1990s, these tensions came to a head. In Vietnam,
where state education policies were some of the most successful anywhere in the
region, a mood of self-criticism set in. It was unclear to Vietnamese leaders how
much modern specialist education had actually achieved. In 1980, the percentage
of eligible children who were receiving some form of education at the age of six
in northern Vietnam was 90 per cent. Yet the percentage of students staying on in
school was much lower (a mere 52.1 percent of all pupils in fourth grade were
of the appropriate age). This was a striking sign of how the system had declined
in efficiency. In the early years – as the ‘guerrilla model’ gave way to a more
bureaucratized one – revolutionary enthusiasm had made up for a deficit in
finance. However, the resources were not there to sustain the initiative. There
were not enough opportunities for those who stayed in school – itself the
product of a drive to get people out of agriculture rather than to improve it. This
signalled deeper cultural problems: the inability of the government to educate for
a more developed workforce; the mentality of influential village leaders who still
saw schools as part of an elitist literary culture (Woodside 1983). 
Similar problems could be discerned across the region: particularly those of
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university students graduating into a world of diminishing economic opportu-
nities. In Indonesia, in 1973, only 0.25 per cent of the population were enrolled
in tertiary education, yet still graduate unemployment existed. Across the region
there remained a bias towards the arts and humanities, rather than technical
training. In Thailand, numbers in the tertiary sector grew thirty times in three
decades to 3.4 million; until 1997 an expanding private sector provided to a
degree for many of them. But there were limits to the economy’s ability to absorb
graduates. In the Philippines by the late 1990s, perhaps 38 per cent of young
people were in tertiary education, mostly in a plethora of provincial and private
‘diploma-factories’. But this little served domestic development; instead, it
created a globalized worker: in international shipping, hospitality, domestic
service and healthcare. There was a great deal of substance to the oft-heard charge
at the time of the 1997 economic crisis that the educational and skills founda-
tions of development in Southeast Asia were thin, and that ‘rich foreigners and
poor natives did much of the real work of export-developmental growth’
(Anderson 1998: 305–6).
* * *
In the past two decades or so, education in Southeast Asia remains the focus of
the state’s most cherished visions of the future. Governments continually push for
new national standards. There remains in the region an unshaken faith in nation-
building; in education for national unity; an unwavering belief in the ‘essential
“goodness” of nations’ (Hau 2005: 60). State projects have been increasingly
large-scale, particularly in the field of higher education, and the pursuit of a
technology-driven millennium. The aggregate achievements, on paper at least,
remain impressive. Southeast Asia enjoys high literacy levels, and state provision
for higher education is, for the most part, increasing. But distortions remain and
may even be amplified in the future. Historians may have useful things to say
about them, not least because there are signs that some longer-term themes of
education in Southeast Asian history may be reasserting themselves. Here I focus
on the case of Malaysia.
First, the private entrepreneurship that so shaped local provision is now once
again more clearly in the ascendancy, particularly in higher education. In
Malaysia, besides the nine major public higher education institutions, there are
more than 300 private institutions, centres, or colleges which are involved in the
provision of some form of tertiary education; twenty-three of them are engaged
in ‘twinning  programs’ with western universities; the Universities of
Nottingham and Monash have been two of the pioneers in setting up large
branch campuses in Malaysia. Local private universities have been established by
big business: the communications company, Telekom; the power monopolist,
Tenaga Nasional, and the car manufacturer, Petronas. They are bidding to draw in
students from regional, Islamic and global markets. New kinds of knowledge
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entrepreneurs have emerged, many from ethnic minorities. For example, the rise
of Lim Kok Wing’s Limkokwing University of Creative Technology has been
phenomenal: the Malaysian campus now claims to host 8,000 students from 100
countries, and it runs other campuses in Indonesia, Botswana, China and the
United Kingdom. To quote from the mission statement: ‘Tan Sri Lim had the
vision to see a need where none existed before. He had the passion to do
something that had never been done before. And he had the tenacity to keep
pushing forward to translate that idea into reality … He married creativity to
technology, uplifting public perceptions of professions that were thought to be
low-paying and lacking in status’ (Limkokwing website). This kind of initiative
can be seen at other levels, such as in the financing of secondary and religious
education.
As in the past, this growth was in part due to the failings of state provision.
To some extent it has staunched a brain drain from Malaysia: the latest figures
show that the number of Malaysians studying in the United States has begun to
decline. The Malaysian government responded – in the form of a major 1996
consolidating Education Act – by liberalizing the regime for these initiatives and
corporatizing the public sector. It has expanded state provision for affordable
part-time learning (on the Open University model); it has allowed, within
certain conditions, more use of English as a medium of instruction. Many of
these initiatives have been welcomed, but they are not without their tensions.
There is the question of how far western partners can accommodate to the illib-
erality of the state’s regulation of higher education. And there is the uncomfort-
able fact that most of these initiatives privilege English-medium education; the
position of the national language, Malay, remains a sensitive issue, and politically
dangerous, not least because some of the staunchest defenders of the national
language policy are embedded in the academy and represent politically powerful
groups such as schoolteachers (Harper 1996). Nor is it clear that the policy has
reassured ethnic minorities of the long-term survival of their vernacular
education. In many ways, the compromise 1996 Act still gave powers to the
government to forcibly entrench the primacy of the Malay medium (Segawa
2007). All these issues relate directly to the historical dilemma of how the new,
the necessary perhaps, can be accommodated to dominant local cosmologies.
Older transnational connections are also reasserting themselves, most visibly
in the sphere of religious education, with the revivification of long-distance
networks of madrasah-based schooling. Throughout the 1980s, the Malaysian
government became increasing concerned about this. At the same time, and
partly in response to it, the government of Dr Mahathir Mohamad attempted to
blaze a trail as an Islamic tiger economy. This meant investment in its own major
educational initiatives such as the International Islamic University, which is based
near Kuala Lumpur. This partial Islamization of the government machinery also
meant more investment – ideological and material – in domestic religious
teaching. After 1985, a series of confrontations with heterodox movements such
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as the al-Arqam sect, led to the ‘re-education’ of many ‘deviant’ members; it was
significant that many of them came from the very technocratic groups the
government was trying to create (Fauzi 2005). A pressing concern was the over-
production of ulama: at the beginning of the twenty-first century, some 125,000
children in Malaysia received an Islamic education in religious institutions. But as
the sense of security threat deepened after 2001, the sheer scope of these
networks generated something of a panic. The government found it had scant
information on them; its estimates of the numbers of students in particular
madrasahs in Pakistan proved to be only 10 percent of the total; there were 6,000
Malaysians at Al-Azhar in Cairo alone (Abuza 2002: 12). In late 2005, the
government finally announced plans to issue ‘non-objection certificates’ to the
10,000 Malaysians leaving each year to study abroad, as well as registration with
the overseas mission: previously this had not been mandatory (THES, 20
September 2005). This panic also reflected the West’s ‘rediscovery’ of Islamic
education after 2001.
Yet set against these security fears, which, as we have seen, have a long
history, there is another perspective: one that saw these links as less threatening;
the forms of education involved as more diverse and less anti-modern than they
were sometimes depicted. In particular, it could be argued that rather that an
outside intervention in Southeast Asian education, these kinds of religious insti-
tution had been at the heart of it for many decades. Many of the patterns of
schooling that had suddenly come into the light were based on old linkages, such
as long-standing familial connections. These were by no means solely of a conser-
vative or militant kind. By 2005, a revived internationalist outlook led the leader-
ship of the Islamic Party in Malaysia to pass into the hands of ‘Young Turks’ who
sought a closer working alliance locally with other more secular and even non-
Muslim opposition groups. This is a wider pattern. As early as the 1960s, the first
modern field studies of the pesantrens of Java indicated their versatility and adapt-
ability (Castles 1966, Dawan 1985). Over the past few years – alongside other
groups with a more jihadi message – a ‘new’ pesantren has come to the fore:
negotiating and defining its own kind of Islamic modernity (Lukens-Bull 2005).
This is not the place to discuss adequately where Islam’s role in civil society
might lead. But it is useful to note that there has emerged from this a new interest
in the lineage of religious schools, and a more nuanced and anthropological
understanding of the kind of informal education they provide, and how it might
be harnessed to wider national needs. It reminds us that the human networks and
syncronisms that underplay state initiatives are still imperfectly understood. 
Which brings us back to the dilemma of Ki Hajar Dewantara. As Merle
Ricklefs has pointed out, Ki Hajar Dewantara was not offering Islam as a solution
to the failings of the education of the Javanese (Ricklefs 2007: 225). In his
discussion of language, Arabic was not mentioned. The dilemma was to some
extent between western and a Javanese identity. ‘Because of the great inferiority
complex which we derived from our particular governmental experience, we
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were easily satisfied with anything that made us look a bit Dutch.’ But the
educators of the Taman Siswa also searched for commonalities in established tradi-
tions from outside: the very term ‘garden of learning’ was a conscious
borrowing, for Java, of the German Kindergarten movement. What the Taman Siswa
movement propounded was a multi-layered approach to education for national
unity: local vernaculars as a general language of instruction, a national language
for the higher grades of primary school, and English for the secondary school. It
was deeply rooted in a Javanese context, yet led by individuals deeply aware of
the challenges of a global modernity into which they had been thrust irrevocably
by colonial rule.
So much of the history-writing in Southeast Asia, a region where nationalist
master-narratives have held so much sway in shaping perceptions of the past, lies
in recovering its rich intellectual resources, of which Ki Hajar Dewantara is just
one embodiment. Education in Southeast Asia remains imbricated in deep histor-
ical patterns. Yet policy debate largely takes place, often on a hair trigger, without
reference to this past. History brings, above all a sensibility of what the
Indonesian historian, Taufik Abdullah (Abdullah 2008), has called ‘the formation
of networks of local collective memory’. There is a pressing need to understand
better these layers of experience – and how they intersected with other, cosmo-
politan flows of ideas – because they still inform, in crucial ways, what many
educators are working for.
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COMMENTARY
Remembering the forgetting in schooling
Lant Pritchett
Before discussing the two chapters on history and education and how that relates
to contemporary policy discussions in developing countries, I would like to start
with three different strands of intellectual history; this is a bit idiosyncratic, but
it brings to bear some literatures that I believe are relevant for our purposes. 
First, there is a large ‘business management’ literature, the stuff about
business you can buy in airports and read on airplanes – Tom Peters’ In Search of
Excellence, Jim Collins and Jerry Porras’ Built to Last, Stephen Covey’s Seven Habits series
(plus a moderate amount of the more theoretical works, like Milgrom and
Roberts 1992). While this literature is easy to disdain, any economist who
believes in the market test can hardly ignore it. One of the commonplace
arguments of this literature is that successful organizations need to have a clear
and coherent ‘vision and mission’. An organization needs to have a sufficiently
concise and directed statement of purpose that any agent of the organization can
answer the question: ‘Is what I am doing consistent with the organization’s
goals?’ Organizations thrive on a mythic level, preferably with a foundational
creation myth of the origins of the organization and its noble purpose. 
Second, the approach of economics is pithily expressed in the fact that the
branch of game theory that deals with the possibility of allowing people to
communicate during negotiations is called ‘cheap talk’. This is the view that, no
matter what people say, when push comes to shove people will act in their own
best interest, regardless of what they may have said or promised to do earlier.
(That is, there might be some future reputation penalty for not keeping
promises, but one only keeps promises that are to one’s own [current and future]
advantage to keep).
Some might view this take of economics as cynical, but it seems the
consensus of twentieth-century social science outside of economics is that it was
not cynical enough. Having read Foucault, I take Foucault as having said that all
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important human reality is socially constructed through discourse and that
discourse is structured by power relationships, such that ultimately power creates
the relevant social and hence human reality. So human communication is worse
than self-interested ‘cheap talk’ – language itself systematically (deliberately?)
distorted by power. 
The third element is a bit less intellectual history but a bit more pragmatic.
Most negotiations over the end of conflicts have some ‘hold harmless’-like
agreement to them. That is, there is some kind of amnesty for actions committed
during the period of conflict. Forgetting about the conflict after the conclusion
of the deal was deliberated and essential to a successful conclusion to the conflict.
The upshot of these three is that I believe that:
• Organizations (and by extension, social movements of which successful
organizations are a subset) thrive on a clear vision and mission
• The vision and mission of organizations and movements is structured by
power, which structures discourse and social reality around its interests, and
• The creation of foundational myths of organizations, institutions, and
movements is often a deliberate process of forgetting, precisely to ‘hold
harmless’ and cover up the actual conflicts they were created to mediate.
Perhaps nowhere are these three points better illustrated than in the government
ownership and control of schooling. Government-produced schooling is
arguably the most wildly successful movement of the twentieth century. Not only
has it succeeded ‘on the ground’ in expanding publicly produced schooling so as
to reach universal schooling in nearly every country of the world, but has also
succeeded ideologically. The one thing everyone, from the most activist progres-
sive to the most heartless corporate raiders, agrees upon is the importance of
schooling, with government responsibility for, and hence control of, schooling
taken as the obvious, if not only, solution. 
This is, in part, because government schooling has a really fantastic founda-
tional myth and a compelling ‘vision and mission’. The foundational myth is that
before government schooling there was nothing but a blight of ignorance, or
worse, education only for ‘the elite’ and that then, because of its benign concern
for the welfare of its people the government stepped in and provided universal
education to lift the masses up out of illiteracy, ignorance and superstition. This
foundational myth is consistent with the current ‘vision and mission’ which is to
expand the public production of education to reach everyone to provide equal
opportunity to all children to have the education that prepares them to take their
place in the world. 
What is most striking is that the economics profession – and in particular
development economics and in particular the branch that gives ‘policy advice’ –
which can normally be relied upon to at least nominally question the role of the
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state versus ‘the market’, has bought lock, stock and barrel into the foundational
myths of government schooling. The main roles of the ‘economics of education’
have been either to concoct positively silly positive models that rationalize why
the government production of schooling is ‘optimal’ or to provide support to
more (quasi-advocacy) and better (e.g. ‘educational production functions’)
government-produced schooling.
All of this brings me to the two chapters by Vincent and by Harper, and to
the question of history and policy-making. The study of history is, at its best, the
process of remembering. Any remembering will be inconsistent with the perpet-
uation of foundational myths, which are premised on forgetting. Every element
of the foundational myth of government schooling is, depending on one’s prefer-
ence for paradigm and hence jargon, demonstrably false (for people who still
believe in attributes like ‘true’ and ‘false’) or easily deconstructed (for the post-
modernist).
The chapter by Tim Harper on Southeast Asia documents that the founda-
tional myth view that ‘before there was government-provided schooling there
was nothing’ is not viable in this case. In fact, the key issue in the expansion of
government schooling has nearly always been the displacement of the already
existing forms of schooling. One index of just how powerful a hold the founda-
tional myths of government schooling have on the current imagination is that the
people commonly refer to the ‘vision and mission’ of schooling as a drive for
‘universal primary education’. The amazing thing is that almost everyone accepts
the implicit premise of equating ‘education’ with ‘modern formal (government-
controlled) schooling’. The obvious point is that ‘education’ is taken as the prepa-
ration of a child to adequately fulfill his or her roles as an adult – economically,
socially and politically. In this sense, there has everywhere and always been
universal primary education. 
The shift towards government schooling is not that societies previously did
not educate their young and now they do, but rather a contestation about what
constitutes an education. Modern schooling is fundamentally a contest of world
views. In ‘the West’, the historical battle of world views between religion and
religious belief as a primary organizing principle and the modern secular state
has been won so decisively by the forces of the modern it is difficult, if not
impossible, to even recreate a non-secular world view. Charles Taylor’s recent
book A Secular Age (Taylor 2007) emphasizes that it is impossible even for a
religious believer to reconstruct the intellectual and social milieu1 in which
religion was the default mode of thought. As he puts it:
The change I want to define and trace is one that takes you from a society in which
it was virtually impossible not to believe in God, to one in which faith, even for the
staunchest believer, is one human possibility among others. (Taylor 2007: 3)
Hence, in the modern West an education into a world view that is an alternative
to the dominant mode of thought is treated as no education at all – merely the
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perpetuation of superstitions. The forgetting of the actual historical origins of
modern schooling is therefore nearing perfection. 
This triumph of the foundational myth of modern schooling is part and
parcel of the success of ‘modernization’ in the west. We have collectively sold our
religious souls for a mess of pottage – but what a mess of pottage it has been. The
levels of prosperity of every type (not just consumer goods, but health, personal
security, social equality) that have come about in the West simply stagger the
historical imagination. There simply is no historical analogue for the improve-
ments in material well-being from the late nineteenth century to today.
What Harper’s brief account of the history of education in Southeast Asia
brings to the surface is that the transition to modernism has not in fact been
nearly as complete nor nearly as successful in ‘the rest’ as in ‘the West’. Having
myself lived in Indonesia, the passage he quotes from the Indonesian educator
Dewantara is particularly poignant: ‘Thus we have sacrificed what was ours 
but have not gained in its place anything that might be considered its equivalent;
we have lost our world, but we have not entered another’ (Harper, this volume,
p. 213).
This historical view is particularly informative for development as one of the
phenomena of our age is that the four-fold broadly synchronous ‘modernization’
of the West’s historical experience has not been reproduced successfully in many
parts of the world. The enormous success in spreading modern forms of
schooling – which are fundamentally about the transformation of world-views –
has not been matched by a similar success in other areas of economic, political,
administrative and social modernization. The ‘failed states’ of the world –
countries like Afghanistan, Nepal, Cambodia, Sudan, Somalia, Yemen – have also
sold their soul, but for a very paltry mess of pottage. 
This contrasting success and forgetting in the West with failure creates an
awkward situation. ‘The West’ and its institutions (in particular the array of donor
institutions) live in a mental world with only one possibility – the modern –
having forgotten that anything else ever was. In poor countries, governments
maintain the fiction of the modern, but other possibilities exist and are the
reality. This means that the reaction of ‘development’ policy – which is more or
less adequately defined by the attempt to replicate the historical transition experi-
ence of the West – to failure is always a doubling down of the bets, an intensifi-
cation of ‘more of the same’ as it literally cannot see (Scott 1998) any other
possibility.
The chapter by David Vincent is similarly revealing about the extent to which
forgetting is essential to the maintenance of the status quo of education. The
triumph of the government school was a two-fold process of defining schools as
either ‘modern’ or not (hence ruling out community and religious schools as
legitimate contenders) and then tainting private schools as either bastions of the
elite (and hence socially suspect) or of insufficiently low ‘quality’ or ‘profession-
alism’ such that schooling became not just ‘modern’ in content but also the
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quintessential representative of what Michael Woolcock and I elsewhere have
called ‘the Solution’ (Pritchett and Woolcock 2004). That is, the view became that
the appropriate mode for the provision of schooling had to be a modern
Weberian bureaucracy. This ruled out private schooling or arms-length
contracting as even potentially legitimate modes of accomplishing the public
purposes of a modern school. Thus, even in countries with a long tradition of
belief in free markets, such as the USA and the UK, the private share of primary
school enrollments is about 5 and 10 percent respectively, and proponents of
‘vouchers’ seem slightly out of touch. 
Development policy is trapped. Having forgotten the history of viable alter-
natives to the modern school, the policy dialogue is completely constricted by
the powers of the present. Governments want to, and have the power to, maintain
the myths that maintain modern forms of schooling because they so perfectly fit
their interests. A move to more community control of schooling or relaxing the
constraints on private modes of schooling are portrayed as steps ‘backward’
because the modern school is ‘forward’ looking. But precisely the main benefit of
history for development policy is to expand the range of current possibilities by
undoing the successful, deliberate forgetting that has both created successes, but
also closed off the range of alternatives considered in response to failure. 
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9
Energy and natural resource 
dependency in Europe, 1600–1900
Paul Warde
To an earlier generation of economic historians, it was self-evident that modern
growth was predicated on favourable resource endowments and the technology
to exploit them. The precocious English use of coal and development of associ-
ated technology, such as the steam engine, represented the exemplary case
(Pollard 1981, Wrigley 1988). Yet more recent developments have shaken that
belief. It has been a striking characteristic of recent economic development and
the international division of labour that economies heavily dependent on natural
resource exploitation and export suffered from sluggish economic growth. One
can speak now of a ‘resource curse’ (Barbier 2005). The importance of natural
resource availability for economic success is now treated as a special case, as in
the expansion of American economies in the period 1870–1914 (Findlay and
Lundhal 2004), or as having rested on unequal exchange, facilitated by the use
of military might to obtain colonial resources at low cost (Pomeranz 2000). In
the case of England, reassessment of historic growth rates has played down or
eliminated the special character of the Industrial Revolution (c.1770–1830),
making the very process of development appear to be more incremental in
character and less closely related to the employment of particular technologies or
energy sources (Crafts 1985, Crafts and Harley 1992, Crafts 2003).
Hence relative natural resource abundance may now be viewed as detrimental
to development (the so-called ‘Dutch disease’ as path dependency), while relative
scarcity may actually prompt benefits through ‘induced innovation’ and substitu-
tion to less resource-dependent activities. A belief in the fundamental substi-
tutability of factors of production in the long term has shifted attention away
from resources as a major developmental issue for many economic historians. If
factors are relatively easily substitutable, then relative backwardness must be
explained by variant institutions or preferences (e.g. North and Thomas 1973,
Clark 2007, Mokyr 2009). While the study of the material world is increasingly
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dominated by ecological and evolutionary approaches that argue that substi-
tutability is frequently not possible, and that the keystone nature of certain
species and processes (sometimes known as ‘control parameters’, variation in
which prompts non-linear behaviour) are what defines particular ecologies (and
perhaps economies), a failure in which can prompt mass extinction, neo-classical
economics has by and large been happy to abstract humanity out of these
constraints. 
Recent economic studies have also given more prominence to the importance
of the services and commercial sectors in promoting growth, an approach that
can be associated with a belief in the ‘dematerialization’ of the economy: that is,
the idea that above a certain level of income, each unit earned requires progres-
sively less material or energetic input. Evidence for this belief is that the primary
producing sectors are small in most developed economies, and that only a small
amount of national expenditure is devoted to the energy and raw materials
sectors. This is a far cry from the pre-industrial norm, where a very high propor-
tion of all economic activity was devoted to obtaining food, fodder and fuel. It
may be hoped that later developers can circumvent the pattern of early stages of
development being resource-intensive (associated with the ‘environmental
Kuznets curve’), and benefit from growth based on knowledge and cutting-edge
technology (Romer 1990, Kander 2007). Certainly the ‘energy intensity’ (energy
consumption/GDP) of economies has tended to be stable or to fall in the very
long run, although everywhere aggregate energy consumption has continued to
expand with growth (Gales et al. 2007, Kander 2007). The rise of resource inputs
tends, however, to be seen as a consequence, rather than a cause, of growth.
This chapter revisits the nature of early economic growth, with two case studies
of natural resource use from the early modern era. The first case is the
Netherlands, which some would argue to have been ‘the first modern economy’
(de Vries and van der Woude 1997). The Netherlands, especially its highly
urbanized and industrialized western province of Holland, was clearly not a
region well endowed with any natural resources, aside from peat supplies. Yet for
200 years, from the late sixteenth century, the Dutch economy earned the highest
per capita incomes in Europe and was the undisputed centre of the European
carrying trade, industrial and technological progress, and a major processing
centre for colonial goods (van Zanden 2000, 2004, Allen 2001, Ormrod 2003).
Dutch growth promoted early forms of economic integration around the North
Sea and the Baltic in a system of core-peripheral relations that pre-empts in many
regards contemporary globalization (Wallerstein 1974, van Bochove 2008).
Despite the relatively low level of technological progress and consumption by
later standards, which necessarily limited the scope for large income differentials
(Malanima 2002), the Dutch long maintained an economic lead over neigh-
bours, despite heavy dependence on the input of raw materials: foodstuffs,
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timber, wood byproducts, metals, and fibres. Why were the Dutch able to
maintain a lead for so long? Was Dutch success in fact an early example of
‘dematerialization’? And did putative Dutch modernity also lead to the structural
retardation of regions supplying natural resources? 
By the early nineteenth century, Dutch economic leadership was being
supplanted by British: not only in terms of Europe, but the world. British indus-
trialization was long characterized by the export of raw material or low-value
products, but during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it underwent a
transformatory process of improving labour productivity in agriculture, import
substitution, achieving technical leadership in low-quality consumer goods, and
a vigorous re-export trade in colonial goods (Matthias 1984, Crafts and Harley
2003, Ormrod 2003, Wrigley 2004). It became heavily dependent on coal, in
both the household and industrial sectors, and some would argue also on ‘ghost
acreages’ obtained via colonial expansion and the slave trade (Pomeranz 2000).
Yet much of its raw material and especially energy needs were met domestically.
England became a technological leader in some industrial sectors, although by no
means all, notably with the epochal transformation of thermal energy into kinetic
energy achieved by the steam engine (Allen 2009, Mokyr 2009). This growth
was clearly energy intensive – increasingly so, up until the 1880s (Warde 2007).
Is England thus an exceptional case of natural resource-based growth and
economic leadership, rather than the exemplary case for industrialization as
understood by earlier generations of economic historians (Rostow 1953)? 
Unlike today, but rather like most of the world until well into the twentieth
century, early modern Europe was largely an ‘organic economy’. That is, nearly
all of its energy came from the process of photosynthesis in plants transforming
insolation into forms useable by people: food, fodder for animals and firewood.
Energy supply was thus spatially diffuse, and growth required territory (Wrigley
1988, Sieferle 2001). The advent of fossil fuels abolished the ‘photosynthetic
constraint’: as well as providing vastly greater reserves of energy that could be
rapidly consumed. Sources of fossil fuel were located in more concentrated
reserves and could be exploited without competition for other land uses, encour-
aging concentration with the benefits of economic density and spillovers (known
as ‘punctiform growth’). This also promoted a subsequent march towards the use
of fuels of ever greater ‘quality’, with high energy content by mass, and especially
those that can be used in liquid form in transportation. In turn both these
quantity and quality aspects promoted the concentration of power, and much
larger and rapidly working machines that provided not just a substitute for older
forms of power (horses and water-mills, for example), but the capacity to achieve
new tasks. We may ask how important such resource-based concentration could
be for early modern success, an interesting historical note. But we may also point
to the re-emergence of an areal energy economy, in the shape of biofuels and to
some degree other renewable sources such as wind farms which reintroduce
‘older’ dynamics into the spatial organization of the economy (MacKay 2009).
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Electrification may be considered a highly efficient form of energy transport
(despite losses in both generation and transmission), and hence modern areal
economies may operate under much lower constraints than historic organic ones.
Nevertheless, can we learn lessons from the areal, and more particularly the
organic, economies of the past?
The Dutch ‘Golden Age’ and natural resources
During the seventeenth century, the Dutch merchant marine economy amounted
to some two-fifths of that of the entire continent of Europe. The Dutch popula-
tion amounted to around 2 percent (van Zanden 2000). The United Provinces
were a commercial superpower that dominated the carrying trade, but the bulk
of that shipping was still employed quite locally in the near European trades to
north-west Europe, and especially in the timber trade and grain trade of
Scandinavia and the Baltic. The grain trade was considered the ‘mother trade’ and
by the early seventeenth century supplied 14 percent of all Dutch foodstuffs,
allowing local agricultural specialization in high-value dairying and fattening of
animals for meat. Grain was primarily drawn from Poland, while the centre of
the timber trade gradually shifted from the eastern Baltic to Norway, and the late
seventeenth century saw the rise of a large German traffic, predominantly along
the Rhine, but also the Elbe and Weser. Increasingly, large amounts of coal and
grain were also shipped from England, supplementing the long-standing trade in
wool and coarse woollen cloth. Small in volume but high in aggregate value was
the trade in wood byproducts, carried via ports in the eastern Baltic, such as
Danzig, Königsberg and Riga. This consumed vast quantities of wood by the
standards of the age: the Dutch annually imported twice as much wood, in the
form of ash which was used as an alkali in industry, as grew in the entirety of
Britain. At its peak ash consumed around seventeen times as much wood as the
Republic’s timber imports. Finland was the main supplier of tar and pitch,
essential components of the shipping industry, a trade again that outstripped the
demand for actual timber (Warde forthcoming). Nearly all these trades were
conducted with regions where the wage levels were significantly below those in
the western Netherlands and with low population densities, with the exception
of its near neighbour, England (Allen 2001, van Bochove 2008).
The Dutch had few resources of their own, although they had excellent access
to the sea for both transport and fisheries (de Vries and van der Woude 2007).
But they drew heavily on their northern European neighbours. The bulk trades
that underpinned Dutch industry and shipping can be explained with recourse
to the classic Heckscher-Ohlin thesis that areas trade goods according to their
relative resource endowments. The land-poor but densely populated Netherlands
specialized in manufacturing and services. Indeed, its one natural resource 
that was widely exported was fish, a specialization that gets around the land
constraint. In contrast, the grain fields of southern Poland or the great forests of
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Scandinavia, upland Germany, and the Baltic littoral and interior provided wood
products; copper and iron came from Scandinavia, and lead from England.
Indeed, much of these natural resource reserves, such as timber, were simply
unused before Dutch demand drew them into international trading networks.
This trade should be seen as a ‘vent for surplus’ from relatively remote regions
that had little trading presence before the seventeenth century, opening them up
to development. 
The trades were of course limited by transport and transactions costs; indeed
one reason for the relatively slow entry of some regions into the international
market was the lack of information and communication with north-west
European demand. In the case of riverine transport, serious impediments, in the
form of weirs, bridges and millworks, were only slowly removed by government
interventions, creating an infrastructure for the timber trade. Everywhere,
however, water was central to affordable transport: whether across the sea,
Finnish lakes, or where grain and timber was borne down rivers from the hinter-
lands of Scandinavia, the Gulf of Finland, southern Baltic and Elbe, Weser and
Rhine. Water transport was massively cheaper than that over land; in the case of
bulk products, such as timber, well over 90 percent of their final cost was
composed of transportation charges. Hence accessibility was a key to developing
the bulk of trades, and the Netherlands was hugely advantaged by location. This
was also because of the multiple sources of supply. Although they shipped
different kinds of grain, the Dutch could obtain the product from Poland (rye)
or England (barley and malt); German timber could substitute Scandinavian or
Baltic. This provided powerful downward pressure on commodity prices and the
ability of suppliers to cream off rents. Similarly, some of the core products for
industrial processes – such as the woodash alkalis used in textile bleaching,
soapmaking, glassmaking and ceramics – had to be produced in remote areas,
where rents were low enough (or negligible) to allow for massive consumption
of wood, but also where the labour costs were extremely low. The highly refined
products, as little as a thousandth of the weight of the initial inputs, could then
bear the costs of transport (Radkau 2007, Warde forthcoming). The Netherlands
was furthermore advantaged by the nature of its own geography, especially the
westernmost and heavily industrialized province of Holland. Most Dutch
commercial and industrial activity was packed into an area around the size of
modern greater London, and much of this landscape could be easily traversed by
lakes, rivers and canals. The early modern Dutch economy was almost an example
of walking on water (de Vries and van der Woude 1997). 
The persistence of difference: labour, capital and rents
One might expect that such an extensive range of interaction would eventually
prove beneficial to the Netherlands’ trading partners. Integration would lead to
wage levelling and competitive pressures to specialization. Dutch knowhow,
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technology and capital could become disseminated around northern Europe.
High Dutch productivity would shift the terms of trade, thus ‘exporting’ some of
the benefits of productivity gains to trading partners, through relatively higher
prices for their goods. Yet this did not occur on a scale sufficient to shake the
predominance of the core. Wages in Stockholm and Danzig remained rooted at
around 50–60 percent of the Dutch level after 1550, and after 1620 Polish wages
suffered further relative decline. Neither did Norwegian or German wages show
any catch-up before the nineteenth century. Growth in northern European
economies was swallowed (literally, to a large degree!) by rapid population
growth after 1750. In these circumstances, averting real wage decline was an
achievement (Allen 2001, Malanima 2002, van Bochove 2008).
In many of the peripheral regions, economic activity remained dominated by
the subsistence sector, and suppliers of natural resources made up only a small
part of the labour market. In Norway, where timber generated 20–25 percent of
export revenue, the industry probably employed no more than 3,000 workers
out of a population of 600,000 (van Bochove 2008). Work in many trades
remained highly seasonal and tied to the agricultural economy. In the case of the
grain and wood byproducts trades, many tens of thousands of workers must have
been employed supplying the Dutch across swathes of eastern Europe.
Nevertheless, their activity often represented only a part of their otherwise
subsistence-orientated work; and many remained bound by feudal ties that
limited the possibility of accumulation (Kula 1976, Topolski 1974). While the
initial stages of potash or tar production were often undertaken by peasants, easy
entry into the market probably kept returns depressed, and generally widespread
and persistent underemployment probably explains some of the unresponsive-
ness of peripheral wage levels to core demand throughout the resource sector
(van Bochove 2008, Warde forthcoming). Hence resource extraction proceeded
under conditions of low labour productivity but equally low labour costs that did
not create incentives for capital investment.
Resource extraction also did little to develop transferable skills. Flows of
workers with expertize in copper-mining, sawmilling and mercantile activity
tended to come from the Netherlands or central Europe, drawn by the high skill
premiums and rents granted by monarchs eager to draw on their expertise. These
ties were frequently essential for cementing commercial links and opening up
sources of supply to Dutch markets, but after creating the initial ‘vent’ they did
not produce an ongoing dynamic of development (Lindblad 1982). In turn, the
Dutch drew large numbers of unskilled workers into their own labour markets,
undoubtedly thereby retaining international competitiveness for longer, and
preventing actual population shrinkage, with high rates of Dutch male emigra-
tion to the colonies. In the first half of the seventeenth century some 6–8 percent
of the Dutch population had been born abroad, and in the province of Holland,
this reached some 12–18 percent by 1650, where it may have accounted for half
the male workforce. This made the Dutch economy more resistant to the labour
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shortage and upward real wage pressure that struck much of Europe as a result
of demographic losses during the seventeenth century (Lucassen 2000, van
Lottum 2008).
Neither did the primary products trade encourage significant amounts of
capital or technological transfer, despite the fact that they could entail heavy
capital investment. Wood-related trades tied up capital for very long periods of
time, covering felling at the stump, initial processing, seasoning, transport from
remote locations, auction and processing into retail products. Although the
limited information on profit margins suggests that these could be similar across
each stage of this process, this inevitably meant much larger absolute returns to
those who controlled the final stages of freight, from seaports or major tranship-
ment centres on rivers such as Mannheim and Frankfurt – almost invariably
Dutch merchants, with access to large reserves of domestic capital at low interest
rates (Warde forthcoming). Such merchants could also determine the moment of
sale to maximize gains. Scope for producers to accumulate was thus limited, and
capital accumulation was enjoyed by those who already had relative advantages
in access to capital (cf. Krugman 1981). The northern resource extraction indus-
tries and trades relied on complex multilateral trading arrangements, often finally
settled by bills of exchange drawn on Amsterdam, which also retained a staple
function for colonial wares and other consumer goods until the latter part of the
eighteenth century. The profits and interest payments thus often returned
westwards, even when regions ran a trade surplus with the Dutch. Frequently,
however, the balance of trade ran in the Netherlands’ favour (Lindblad 1982,
Pourchasse 2006).
Conditions of underemployment, easy entry to the initial stages of extraction
and low returns to labour that were squeezed down to cover no more than the
costs of extraction also limited the spread of technology. This does not appear to
have resulted from problems with knowledge transfer. Wind-powered sawmills
sporting multiple blades, for example, spread rapidly after an explosion in their
use in the Netherlands in the 1590s. They could be found in Brittany by 1621,
Sweden in 1635, Manhattan in 1623, and soon after Cochin, Batavia and
Mauritius. Yet they were only widely adopted in Norway in the 1840s. Small-scale
production, low wages and high interest rates all militated against the adoption
of technology that had relatively high fixed costs (van Bochove 2008).
Technology was generally spread by migration of skilled craftsmen and
engineers, and this does not appear to have been a concern for Dutch authorities
before the 1750s. 
Dutch advantage in finance may also have hindered indigenous development,
though certainly not solely because of the weakness of indigenous institutions,
but more probably their domestic markets. Dutch capital was clearly an essential
part of the Baltic and German trades, while both the Swedish and Danish-
Norwegian Crown made use of Dutch financiers. Crown debtors were able to
obtain relatively favourable interest rates on Dutch markets (more favourable than
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private loanees) and the risk premium associated with lending to them does not
appear to have been large. But the ease with which the Danish monarchs could
raise credit in Amsterdam at low rates worked against the development of
secondary bond and capital markets in Copenhagen. Repayment of Crown debt
was frequently done by directly granting creditors the returns from extractive
industries (such as copper mines) or the agricultural sector (Lindblad 1982, van
Bochove 2008). Indeed, throughout northern and central Europe a standard
procedure for rulers to extract rents from natural resources was to receive large
loans from western merchants, who were repaid through licenses to extract
resources, and who could do so in a highly destructive fashion (Mager 1960,
Warde forthcoming). Nearly all the credits that went eastwards functioned as
debt rather than equity instruments, which again removed the possibility of
peripheral debtors profiting from the transaction (van Bochove 2008).
But rulers did, of course, benefit from rents, as did the great feudal magnates
of the east, who provided ash, tar, pitch and resin. But they did so at the least
profitable stage of the supply chain, in a market with large numbers of suppliers
and at times where the extractive process was difficult to monitor: hence an
effective ‘open-access’ situation could prevail (see Barbier 2005). These factors
discouraged a careful harbouring of resources, and indeed created an incentive
to exploit as far as was possible the use of unfree labour and feudal services,
pushing capital costs in agriculture, for example, onto unfree tenants (Kula 1976,
Mager 1960, Wallerstein 1980). Those rents that were obtained were generally
dissipated in political competition, and indeed in many cases were committed to
military or court expenditure as soon, if not before, they came in. Resource
extraction certainly did not create such institutional habits, and governments of
the core were little different in their behaviour. But governments in the core
existed in the context of more highly developed factor markets, where funded
debt could facilitate, rather than hinder, capital investment. Resource extraction
thus continued with low levels of labour productivity, also encouraging a contin-
ually expanding frontier towards more remote and less rentable districts, rather
than seeking better management of resources and capital investment.
Governments were not entirely inert in response to these trends. Legislation
to regulate alleged deforestation, for example, was widespread, if weakly
enforced and often amounting to rent-seeking on the part of the authorities (but
most prominently in reserving expensive construction timber to the Crown). The
Danish-Norwegian Crown set sawmilling quotas and restricted lumber exports in
the 1680s to maintain price levels (Tweite 1961). Similarly, the wood byproduct
trade from the Swedish Crown was held as a monopoly by Stockholm. More
strikingly, after 1724 Sweden followed a strongly mercantilist path of fostering
import substitution through export quotas, targeted tariffs, a restrictive shipping
policy that permitted countries only to ship their own (or their colonies’)
products into Swedish ports to break the Dutch staple, and easy credit for
domestic producers. To some degree these measures achieved their aims, with the
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primary beneficiaries being the Swedish carrying trade and domestic textile
production, although this increasingly relied on imported raw materials. But
these protection measures could not alter the fact that the primary profits in the
carrying trade and finishing processes utilizing tar, pitch and iron were still
obtained in the west. Production quotas must also have limited the already
meagre upward pressure on producer wages (Lindblad 1982, Müller 2006). Both
private and state-led sectors (to the degree to which they can be clearly distin-
guished) had limited opportunities, or indeed incentives, for capacity-building
when the capacities that most pressingly mattered to the powerful were military
prowess (at least the ability not to be overawed by neighbours) and successful
commercial and financial linkages with the core. Sweden enjoyed a famously
high literacy rate by early modern standards without reaping the benefits until
later in the nineteenth century.
The Netherlands thus demonstrated that growth was possible without a
generous local resource endowment. But this was not a ‘dematerialized’
economy. A series of crucial linkages between the high productivity of their
shipping sector, dominance in the carrying trade, the ability to obtain cheap raw
materials, highly capitalized processing and manufacturing industries, high skill
levels, and low interest rates consolidated and extended their advantage. Whether
it was shipbuilding, linen bleaching, distilling, or armaments manufacture, the
Dutch long enjoyed success, and thus the producers of timber, potash, flax, grain
or copper were shunted towards further specialization, with less scope for
avoiding high marginal costs and thus persistently low productivity. It is hard to
avoid focusing upon the extraordinary advantages of the location of the northern
Netherlands, where its only abundant natural resource might be said to be the
sea-lanes: drawing wool, tin and lead from the west; linens, timber and oxen
from Germany; fish, copper, iron and wood products from Scandinavia; and
wood, ash, hides and grain from the east. Equally a buoyant regional consumer
market in the cities of the north-west compounded the advantages of economic
density: factors that no supplier of raw materials could hope to emulate.
Indigenous energy resources and growth: British economic pre-eminence
English development showed many of the characteristics that aided the ‘Golden
Age’ economy of the Netherlands, and England too was heavily dependent on the
import of naval stores, timber, ash and metals from the Baltic. These linkages
spanned not just the northern seas, but the entire Atlantic world: every machete
wielded by Jamaican slaves had been made in the great Swedish ironworks of
Dannemora, far in the north (Evans and Rydén 2007). The role of international,
and especially colonial, trade in English development remains controversial
(O’Brien 1982, Pomeranz 2000, Wrigley 2006), and this chapter will certainly
not attempt to give a complete account of English economic growth. But English
per capita income, probably not far behind Dutch by the late seventeenth century,
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Figure 9.1 Energy carrier share in total consumption, England and Wales, 1560–2000 
Source: Warde (2007)
surged ahead to reach new milestones before the end of the eighteenth: $2,000 
(1990 Geary-Khamis dollars (G-K$)) before 1800 and $3,000 by 1850, marked 
by an especially rapid acceleration in the middle of the nineteenth century 
(Warde and Lindmark 2006). By this time, the dynamic period of Dutch growth 
appears to have been ended, and the eighteenth century was a time of stagnation 
in per capita income, as recognized by the contemporary Adam Smith who 
postulated an effective ceiling on development (de Vries and van der Woude 
1997). While the rate of English growth is now generally thought to have been 
slower and more incremental than in traditional narratives of ‘Industrial 
Revolution’, the levels achieved by the nineteenth century were nonetheless 
unprecedented (Crafts 1985, Crafts and Harley 1992). This income level was 
accompanied by unprecedented levels of energy consumption. ‘Organic’ 
economies outside the Scandinavian north do not seem to have been able to 
breach a ceiling of around 20 gigajoules (GJ) per capita being consumed each 
year. By the early eighteenth century, over half of the energy consumed in 
England was supplied by coal, and per capita annual consumption had reached 
30 GJ. A century later, coal supplied over 75 percent of England’s energy, and per 
capita consumption reached 50 GJ (Warde 2007).
Coal and alternative energy supplies
Was growth without coal possible? The alternative source of thermal energy was 
wood (sometimes processed into charcoal). Coal use had already outstripped 
wood use by around 1620 (see Figure 9.1), but this does not mean that wood 
supply could not have been sufficiently elastic if necessary. Whether the advance
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Figure 9.2 Relative price of coal and firewood, London, 1560–1730
Source: Beveridge (1939), Hatcher (1993)
of coal was an ‘induced innovation’ caused by shortages of wood has been widely 
debated among historians (Flinn 1959, 1978, Hammersley 1973, Thomas 1986, 
Hatcher 1993, Allen 2003, 2009). For our purposes, it is not essential to answer 
the question of why a transition to coal occurred, but only what its economic 
consequences were. There are two price comparisons to be made, which allow us 
some sense of the elasticity of supply of possible fuel substitutes: between the 
prices of firewood and coal, and charcoal and coal. Charcoal rather than wood 
was required for heat-intensive processes, such as the early modern ‘heavy 
industry’ of metal smelting, where the risk of chemical impurities also had to be 
minimized. As more labour was involved in charcoal production than provision 
of firewood production, its price was less sensitive to wood scarcity than the ‘raw 
material’, because a large proportion of the price was in the processing costs. 
In the south-east of England, wood prices diverged from coal prices from 
roughly 1570 until 1620, but afterwards their ratio remained quite stable (see 
Figure 9.2). Thermal energy from coal was cheaper to freight than wood 
(because of higher energy content by volume). Thus, any rise in capital and 
labour costs made wood disproportionately more expensive as transport costs 
rose. Before 1570 coal and firewood cost roughly the same per British Thermal 
Unit (BTU) but firewood was much cheaper per ton, while by the 1620s both 
fuels were roughly equal in price per ton, but coal was less than half the price 
per BTU (see cf. Hatcher 1993). As getting the coal from pithead to a metropol-
itan consumer may have cost 80 percent of the retail price, the equalization of 
price per weight over time probably to a large degree represented an equalization 
of the combined freight and rental costs for each fuel, given that extraction was 
largely performed by labourers with low capital costs, and wage rates would
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presumably not have widely diverged between miners and woodcutters. Coal
supply was clearly elastic and the rents to be obtained per unit were low. As wood
prices ran ahead of rises in wage rates until the middle of the seventeenth
century, the firewood must either have been fetched from further afield or
commanded a higher rent, or both: an indicator of rising relative scarcity. One
pressure on wood prices from the ‘organic economy’ may also have been rising
agricultural rents during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, both
increasing the cost of the products of the land and creating a disincentive to
invest in greater wood output (Allen 1999). Wood prices in London rose by a
factor of ten between 1530 and 1730, when the overall price level rose by less
than a factor of three, and wages by a factor of four, but the national wood supply
remained almost static. London coal prices rose by around a factor of six in the
same period, and coal supply rose by a factor of eighteenth. Coal supplies were
clearly highly price elastic and wood supplies highly inelastic. The price of
charcoal, being sensitive to processing costs, was driven up particularly by wage
increases in the 1640s. 
By 1800 Britain consumed around 15 million tons of coal, the equivalent of
roughly 75 million cubic metres of wood. Domestic wood production was
probably never much more than 4 million cubic metres per annum, and we have
seen that domestic supply was highly inelastic, so a similarly energy-intense
wood economy would have had to import around 95 percent of its needs. Even
were such vast quantities of wood available in near markets, a fleet many times
the size of Britain’s early nineteenth century merchant marine would have been
required to transport this. One does not have to go far into the counterfactuals to
recognize that Britain substituting wood for its globally exceptional level of coal
consumption at any point in this period would be utterly implausible (Warde
2007, for a less plausible view, see Clark and Jacks 2007). 
Energy and growth in industrializing Britain
England’s per capita energy consumption was clearly unusually high: but was it
essential for growth? Domestic hearths were the largest single consuming sector,
accounting for nearly half the total in 1700, and still 35 percent in 1830 (Flinn
1985). Clearly, the availability of coal made for much lower fuel costs than would
otherwise have been the case, but it is also true that this made domestic energy
consumption, by western European standards, unusually high. Thus, while the
relative cheapness of fuel helped to keep down wages for employers and boosted
real income for consumers, it may primarily have contributed to greater comfort,
although this in itself might have had other spillovers in consumption habits.
Adam Smith commented in the 1770s that the location of the textile industries
was driven by the availability of coal, because the long sedentary hours working
indoors required higher levels of warmth than in households dominated by
outdoor labour in agriculture (Smith 1776). 
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Industrial consumption was distributed among many branches, and iron
only became dominant during the 1820s (Flinn 1985, Church 1986). But
unusually for the industrial sector, coal represented a natural resource with no
opportunity cost: almost all other inputs were land based and thus competed
with other land uses, increasing rent to the agricultural sector. But the provision
of energy itself is free. Land-based sources of energy command a rent because
there are alternative uses to which the land can be put, and equally, there is a limit
to the flow of energy that can be drawn from the land. This is not true of coal
mines or oil wells, unless suppliers can command some kind of monopoly or
oligopoly by which to extract income. Humans do not have to labour to produce
energy, but only to extract it, and thus the only limit on the expansion on energy
use is the capital accumulation required for that extraction. In the case of capital
and labour most of their cost is a payment for the reproduction of the factor.
Energy by contrast is a ‘free gift’ of nature and users do not bear the costs of its
reproduction. Any sector where mineral energy is of greater relative importance
than capital, labour or ‘organic’ economy thus has much greater potential for
rapid and lasting growth. Because of the favourable proximity of coal reserves to
the surface in England, this meant that a dramatic expansion in coal use could
occur without pushing up marginal costs, and the benefits could accrue to the
industrial and commercial sectors. In turn, this could lead to a major expansion
of energy-intensive industry in coal-producing areas, of which England had
many, especially in the north and Midlands. But even widely distributed indus-
tries, such as lime-burning, brewing or brick-making, could expand their
operation greatly in one place. 
Hence the early modern period saw a dramatic relocation of industry, above
all energy-intense industry towards coalmining districts. By the nineteenth
century some of these coalfields also turned out to be fortuitously located close
to ore reserves in South Wales or Teeside. The three centuries after 1600 also saw
a huge redistribution of the national population towards the coal counties and
London, which had become a coal-based city from an early date through imports
from the northeast that occupied a very considerable proportion of the nation’s
merchant marine (Davis 1962, Wrigley 2008). Thus, coal could allow a dramatic
expansion of glassmaking, copper and (primarily after 1780) iron production.
These sectors by themselves may have contributed a fairly small share of national
income growth, but growth in ‘traditional’ sectors, such as building or brewing,
also made extensive use of cheap fuel. In turn, all of these brought multiplier
effects in the largest sectors of agriculture and textiles. Iron was a key component
of much equipment and capital investment and saw a 60 percent fall in price
(and more relative to the general price level) between 1770 and 1830, thanks to
the development of the puddling and rolling process, at a time when prices of
nearly all other industrial products, save cotton, grew (Hyde 1977, Crafts 1985).
After 1740, the domestic fuel demand occasioned by rapid population increase
was almost entirely met by coal. Of course, fossil fuel was not the prime mover
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Figure 9.3 Labour and energy prices, southern England, 1560–1860
Source: Warde (2007)
Note: 1700 = 100, nominal prices
in all economic change, but it provided a centripetal force, which allowed Britain 
to benefit from indigenous consumption of its resources. The key advantages 
were threefold: first, extensive linkages between the resource sector and other 
dynamic sectors; second, the development of locality-specific skills, especially in 
smelting, that could only be transferred through relocation of the labour force 
itself (Evans and Ryden 2007); and, third, widespread spillovers.
Yet before 1830 this growth could only be incremental, because coal 
primarily provided thermal and not kinetic energy. In most parts of the country, 
energy was not cheap relative to wages, because most of the price of energy 
consisted of freight charges, which were largely reliant on the ‘organic’ economy 
and wind power. Unsurprisingly, the price of energy and labour moved closely 
in step over most of the land (see Figure 9.3). 
The railways provided the essential breakthrough, at roughly the same time 
that the use of steam power became generalized in the textile industry. This 
caused an epoch-making plummet in the relative price of energy in districts away 
from the coalfields themselves. Indeed, in nominal values, coal was no more 
expensive in the 1930s than it had been in the 1830s, and in real terms coal 
remains much cheaper than in the 1830s today. In fact, London coal prices did 
not return to their nominal 1800 level until 1947! It was thus in the middle 
decades of the nineteenth century that we see a step change in per capita energy 
consumption (see Figure 9.4), and also a take-off in wages in and GDP per capita 
(Warde 2007). 
This was an epochal shift, because it marked a long-term divergence of 
wage levels and energy costs that has led to persistent efforts to raise labour
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Figure 9.4 Per capita energy consumption, England and Wales, 1560–2000 (GJ) 
Source: Warde (2007)
productivity over and above efficiency savings in energy use (although there have 
been plenty of the latter) (Warde 2007, Fouquet 2008). Energy-intense sectors 
still only employed around 10 percent of the workforce, but their multiplier 
effects were enormous. Lower transport costs did not encourage a dispersal of 
economic activity, as factor endowments and regional linkages remained 
operative. Cheap transport could, however, encourage the development of 
specialization in non-energy-intense sectors supplying industrial customers and 
each other – a shift given an international complexion by the development of 
steamships and bulk transport of agricultural products across the world’s oceans 
from the 1860s.
The role of coal thus provided large gains for Britain across all sectors, not 
simply energy-intense ones. Before the 1830s, the advantages of cheap coal 
brought a degree of industrial and population concentration, but enduring 
transport constraints did not lead to a resource-based export boom. Benefits 
accrued to the tradeable and non-tradeable sectors alike, and did not skew the 
pattern of investment. The real income gains from the railways and the enduring 
cheapness of coal certainly prompted large amounts of capital investment in 
industry and rapid productivity gains, which may match a phenomenon claimed 
for twentieth-century economies that energy services (i.e., the energy that 
actually does useful work) are highly complementary to capital stocks (Ayres et 
al. 2003, Ayres and Warr 2006, 2009, Kander and Schön 2007). Energy-intense 
development effectively enjoyed increasing returns to scale, because of the ability 
to supply coal at ever greater quantities at no greater marginal cost, something 
difficult to achieve with most other inputs, although much of the output of
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energy-intensive industries was intermediary products, which required further 
processing or retailing. The shift in relative prices in favour of the non-tradeable 
sectors (before c.1870 being agriculture and services, which could not directly 
exploit cheap energy) attracted investment and meant that productivity rates also 
expanded and remained high (Crafts 1985). This helps explain why the returns 
to investment across the whole economy could remain relatively even, as coal use 
and the railways expanded, and refutes the argument that the ‘normal’ rate of 
return in railways or the coal industry indicated that they were not essential for 
growth, as capital could have been just as productively invested elsewhere (Fogel 
1964, Crafts 2003). Such rates of return also occurred under conditions of highly 
elastic supply, with the share of capital stock invested in railways shifting from 
zero (obviously) to 30 percent by 1855 (Matthews et al. 1982). Of course, one 
could argue that, given the essentially static or even slightly declining level of per 
capita income in pre-modern economies, simply the achievement of rates of 
growth that did not tend to diminishing marginal returns was itself a profound 
break with the past (van Zanden 2004).
Over time, a coal-based and steam-powered model of development was 
exported to other countries. Belgium developed more in parallel to Britain, 
having large indigenous reserves of coal. More generally, however, more 
widespread use of coal had to await the fall in transport costs effected by the 
railways and steamships, that dramatically reduced the cost of bulk freight (above 
all, coal). Yet the ‘latecomers’ could not replicate the ‘British’ model, because 
competitive success still relied on cheap coal, and this still required domestic 
coalfields. Nations entirely dependent on imports tended to import capital 
equipment made in the more dynamic regions of the industrial economy, and 
imported the fuel to run those machines, driven by steam engines. But overall 
the share of coal in their total energy consumption remained low, and a ‘modern’ 
energy regime only came to predominate later, with the widespread adoption of 
electricity (in Scandinavia, using hydropower) or even later still, oil in 
Mediterranean Europe, largely after World War II. Thus there was no dissemina-
tion of a common model of development, but rather a new international division 
of labour that favoured countries with good access to mineral resources: Britain 
and Belgium, and later Germany and the United States. 
Conclusions
This chapter has described the possibility of ‘two kinds of growth’ (Wrigley 
2004) and their relationship with natural resources. The Dutch case did not 
require a broadly based natural resource endowment. Capital and skill made the 
Dutch more productive. Yet this capital and skill was developed in the context of 
a particular locational nexus that gave them access to a wide variety of key 
resources at relatively low cost (albeit at much higher cost than the regions of 
supply). Location and the ‘endowment’ of a plenitude of water relative to land
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promoted leadership in the carrying trade. Also essential to Dutch success was
proximity to consumer markets. In contrast, regions of supply, while developing
trade on the basis of relative resource endowments that encouraged the exploita-
tion of wood, and other land-based and mineral resources, found in the Dutch a
‘vent for surplus’ that, however, left little room for the accumulation of rents, and
that generally entailed low-skill employment with few, if any, spillovers into
general development. The inherently long chains of supply and processing
involved in the organic economy that both tied up capital for extended periods
of time and channelled supply through a limited numbers of sea and river ports,
also favoured those who initially had capital to invest. There can be little doubt
that rents were dissipated by wasteful governmental expenditure and military
adventure. Equally, suppliers of food and raw materials sought in the long term
to maintain an adventitious place on the market, by using bonded labour and
institutional rent-seeking, though this in itself reflects their inability to corner
large rents by virtue of the resource endowment itself; the relative homogeneity
of ‘organic’ economies means, in turn, that no one polity is likely to have
exclusive control over a widely demanded good. But there is little evidence that
it was the core-periphery trades of the early modern era that themselves
generated backward institutions, or particularly expanded their capacity much
beyond what they might otherwise have been. In the case of the relative success
story of the Swedish bar iron industry, it is arguable that the coordinating efforts
of the Crown, an output quota system, and the fortunate conjunction of two key
resources (fuel and ore) meant that Sweden did not fall relatively further behind,
unlike its eastern neighbours. 
In contrast, England benefited strongly (but by no means solely) from its
resource endowment. It was an essential characteristic of the burgeoning coal
economy that it permitted ‘punctiform’ growth, with strong linkages and
complementarities between sectors, including with the ‘organic’ economy in
which it was for so long embedded. But this expansion could be built around
some of the benefits also enjoyed (and to some degree derived from) the Dutch:
relatively high skill levels, proximity to consumers, maritime location, and
developed factor markets. But, clearly, transport constraints for a long time acted
to restrict the degree to which these benefits could be generalized to allow for
relatively rapid advances in income levels. The long view of British history
suggests there has been a relatively close, if variable relationship between energy
services (work done), capital formation and GDP. Before the 1880s this was
primarily expressed through simply increasing energy inputs at declining levels
of efficiency, but with a highly elastic supply of coal. The modern era of growth
– which post-dates the appearance of the railways – was more capital-intensive,
and from the 1880s has been increasingly energy efficient. This last fact has
disguised the fact that it has been accompanied by a relatively consistent ratio of
energy services to capital and GDP, at least until the 1970s (Ayres et al. 2003,
Ayres and Warr 2006, 2009, Kander and Schön 2007, Warde 2007).
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Natural resource dependency is not necessarily a boon, but nor is it a curse.
The character of development, and its relation with resources, is seen in these
historical cases to relate closely to the ability to control circuits of capital, employ
location-specific skills, and access to consumer markets. 
Whilst institutions may shape these factors, in the long term it also appears
that ‘good’ institutions do not by themselves cause either success or failure; and
‘bad’ institutions may well reflect the weakness of the resource-exporting
economy, rather than being the cause of relative backwardness, via rent-
seeking by elite groups and a neglect of the local tradeable sector. The availability
of substitutes on international markets depressed prices and rents. In other
words, the Golden Age Dutch did not export the ‘Dutch disease’, but neither 
did they export a Dutch cure. The northern Netherlands was, under particularly
favourable circumstances, able to take economic leadership, despite a heavy
dependency on imports for nearly all natural resources excepting fuel (though
even here coal imports became significant) and on the sea that brought resources
to their doorstep. On the other hand, whilst the discussion of English growth
presented here is necessarily very partial, and while that economy displayed 
some of the characteristics of its near neighbour, native energy reserves seem 
to have been a key aspect of its success. Crucial here was the escape from depend-
ency on organic resources, and the lack of competition with other land uses 
(and hence low opportunity costs). If the resource base of the future is going 
to shift back towards land-intensive uses (such as biofuels, with attendant
demands on water, as well as competition for space and fertilizer), it is going to
have major price effects on all potential uses of that land. Equally, if the environ-
mental costs of energy-intense fossil fuel-based development, and its character-
istically low transport costs, have been a key aspect of modern growth, is it
possible to imagine a world where transport becomes again a relatively more
expensive enterprise? One might expect older patterns of trade and relative
fortunes to reassert themselves, with an attendant pattern of beneficiaries and
‘backwardness’.
It is possible of course to model the effects of international trade and differ-
ential resource endowments on economic development, and learn much from
this. But it remains the case that the development of actual economies is highly
contingent and difficult to replicate. Economies do not tread model or standard
paths, in part because of well-known effects of being a ‘pioneer’ or ‘latecomer’ in
the adoption of technology, but also because the constellation of historical
circumstances at each point in space and time are different. This was true of
Dutch success as a trading economy, and English success built largely (if by no
means solely!) on domestic resources and technology. There is little evidence, for
example, that French inventiveness or indeed institutions for promoting research
and development were deficient to Britain’s in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. But French inventiveness and its skill base were not directed towards
technology that would employ the coal so cheaply available in England. In
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Britain’s case the new economy had globally transformative effects. France simply
gained a lead in a few specialist sectors (Allen 2009). Similarly, England’s coal
would have been of little advantage without an elastic supply of engineering
skills and the proximity of capital and consumer markets. Like politics, economic
development must be the art of the possible at a particular point in time.
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Special rights in property: 
why modern African economies are
dependent on mineral resources
Keith Breckenridge
Historians have explained the importance of mining in Africa in many different
ways. The most important – and most common – of these has been the specula-
tive rewards offered by the investment markets in London, or, in relation to oil,
the global commodity markets. In these accounts, the undeniable attractions of
metropolitan profits have motivated and sustained investors, managers and
governments in the pursuit of African mineral resources. Other scholars have
focused on the strategic importance of resources like uranium, gold or oil to
account for the determination of the British, French and American governments
to secure access to African mineral resources. Looking for local determinants,
many historians have pointed to the neat fit between the labour requirements of
mining and the labour mobilizing powers of indirect rulers. More recently
scholars have shown how the systems of oscillating long-distance migrant labour
have drawn upon, and reproduced, the gendered household roles and expecta-
tions (Ally 1994, Harries 1994, Moodie 1994, Hecht 2002). All of these expla-
nations have real explanatory power, but in this chapter I want to draw attention
to another feature of mineral resources which distinguishes them from the other
assets in the continent’s economy: the simplicity, precision and consistency of
property rights in mineral resources. 
In this chapter, I first consider whether mineral resources are, in fact, very
important in the workings of modern African economies, weighing them up
against the other, much more popular, domains of economic activity. I then turn
to a history of mining development, offering a five-stage periodization in order
to account for the special place of mining in many African economies. The
chapter tries to show that the developmental benefits of mining, such as they are,
have been restricted to a special kind of metal mining, and that diamond and oil
extraction are unlikely to repeat them. But I do also offer a wider conceptual
explanation for the importance of mining in many African economies. Running
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through all of these stages of mining history is, I think, a much simpler and more
definite form of property than is otherwise available in Africa. I argue that it is
this special form of property right that has sustained mining as the dominant
source of foreign investment in many African economies.
The significance of mineral resources in African economic history
The current UNCTAD World Investment Report makes the point succinctly:
almost all of the $36 billion that African economies attracted in Foreign Direct
Investment in 2006 was directed at the exploitation of ‘oil, gas and mining’
resources. The 2006 figure is more than double the total for 2004, and it reflects
global corporate interest in the mineral resources of the continent. One striking
feature of these current capital flows is the unprecedented involvement of Asian
corporations who make up a quarter of the spending; another is the investment
of some $8 billion in the mining resources of the poorest countries on the
continent. Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Zambia, Uganda,
Burundi, Madagascar and Mali all attracted ‘investors seeking new mining
locations in response to rising global demand and high commodities prices’
(UNCTAD 2007). Yet the problem of African economic dependence on minerals
is more paradoxical than it first appears.
Foreign investment is a fickle indicator of the key characteristics of national
economies. This current round of global interest in the mining assets on the
continent dates only from the turn of the current century, and it marks a very
welcome end to the long commodities slump that began for most industrial
metals in the mid-1970s, and for gold and oil a decade later. That slump, as
Ferguson has shown for the Copperbelt, was experienced by many people
employed in the largest mining industries in Zambia, Congo, Namibia and South
Africa as a traumatic failure of the ‘plotline of development’. We would, I suspect,
have been worrying about a very different problem of dependency just ten years
ago when copper (and many other commodity) prices had hit their historical
nadir, and thousands of urban Zambians were returning to the countryside
(Ferguson 1999: 256).
The geology of Africa is also misleading. In his 1986 economic history of the
continent, Wickins warned of the false promise of the mineral remedy,
reminding us that of all the countries on the continent only a quarter have
valuable mineral reserves, and ‘fewer than a tenth have considerable deposits of
oil’ (Wickins 1986: 310). The geological picture for oil has changed a little with
the discovery of new fields in Chad, Equatorial Guinea and tiny Sao Tomé and
Principe, but Wickins’ point retains its essential power. In Sub-Saharan Africa the
oil fields are concentrated in the Gulf of Guinea, a tight band of mostly offshore
fields from Cabinda, the Angolan exclave province that collars the Congo, to the
Niger Delta. Similarly, mining investment has been overwhelmingly concentrated
in southern Africa and in the Central African copperbelt (Frankel 1969). There
History, historians and development policy244
Bayly 10_Tonra 01  21/06/2011  10:57  Page 244
Why modern African economies are dependent on mineral resources 245
are countries – such as Angola and Nigeria – that have valuable mining and oil
reserves, but most African countries have neither.
The predominance of mineral resources in the investment (and export)
figures for the continent reflects the fact that the most important economic
activity – subsistence farming – is officially insignificant. The absence of invest-
ment, or significant exports, from farming, which employs three-quarters of the
people on the continent and contributes only a third of GDP, reflects farmers’
pervasive withdrawal from the market (World Bank 2007: 3). As Berry has
demonstrated, the economically defensive stance that most African farmers
assume is the product of a century of systematic uncertainty and indecision in
the state’s attitude to agriculture (Berry 1993). The recent World Bank decision to
focus on a green revolution in Africa is correct and laudable, but it also risks
adding yet another episode of official interference to a century of confusion
(World Bank 2007).
Informal trade is the other key area of economic activity on the continent
and, by definition, it rarely features in official economic statistics. Yet there can
be little doubt that trade, much of it illegal, is more significant for the real
workings of African economies, and their citizens, than mining (MacGaffey
1991). Measuring economic activity that often seeks to exploit the value-gaps
created between states is no simple matter; ‘national frontiers in Africa’, Ellis and
Macgaffey observe, ‘may themselves be considered a resource’ (Ellis and
MacGaffey 1996: 32). Yet trade is undeniably critical across the continent. The
ubiquitous opportunities for subsistence trading contribute to the flimsy hold
that farmers maintain over their labourers (and their family members) (Berry
1993). Illegal trade is also closely bound to the wholesale looting of state assets
that has been common across the continent: Bayart has correctly observed that
official corruption and illegal trade are ‘indivisible spheres’ of the same activity
(Bayart 1993: 237). The very worthlessness of national currencies provides a
compelling imperative for increased trade, as traders must carry goods on both
legs of their desired exchange (Ellis and MacGaffey 1996). Viewed across the
half-millennium, trade (in gold, slaves and ivory) has always provided the most
important opportunities for accumulation on the continent (Curtin 1984,
Thornton 1992). Yet, in the modern era, what is striking about the illegal trade
is how much of the high-value, and politically significant, trade is conducted in
mining products (consider the significance of the illegal diamond trade for
Mobuto, Savimbi and Taylor).
The importance of mineral products in African trade is not new; gold long
defined the continent’s integration into the world economy. Some of the gold
coins minted in Egypt in the first and second centuries BC had their origin in
gold mines in the Sudan and, after the expansion of camel trading two hundred
years later, gold from West Africa began to make its way into the Roman
monetary system. By the sixth century we can speak of a ‘flourishing gold trade’
across the Sahara (Garrard 1982: 446–7, 452). When the Portuguese first began
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to seek out Sub-Saharan ports in the fourteenth century they famously sought the
source of the African gold trade in order to circumvent the Arab monopoly on
the desert trade; the initial object of their search was the Senegal, the River of
Gold (Thornton 1992: 28–30). It was gold that both drew the Europeans to West
Africa, and provided the means for the development of some of the largest West
African states, like the Asante (McCaskie 1983: 26, Wilks 1977). In the centuries
after the initial Portuguese contact it was the slave trade, and slavery, that
dominated trade, and transformed African societies, but in the era of colonial
rule, from 1880 to the end of the 1950s, mining came to occupy the centre stage
of the African economy.
The thesis of Frankel’s comprehensive 1939 survey of capital investment in
Africa was that ‘mining has been the touchstone of economic development in
most of Africa’. Writing from Johannesburg during the boom brought on by 
the abandonment of the Gold Standard in 1933, his survey stressed the
Witwatersrand’s comparative success in alleviating the poverty of the region. 
For Frankel, the harnessing of European capital, and science, to the massed labour
of Africans, held out the promise of a great social transformation of the
continent: the areas of the continent ‘most advanced economically are those
whose main activities rest on mineral exploitation’. He had in mind here the
region running from the Congo to the Cape, but he also highlighted the signifi-
cance of mine exports from Sierra Leone (diamonds), Nigeria (tin) and the Gold
Coast (gold). 
The key to African development for Frankel, partly in agreement with W.
Arthur Lewis, was the displacement of the ‘money crops for export’ with heavily
capitalized mineral extraction. In an interesting reverse on the current concern
about mineral resources, mining was the obvious remedy to the market vulner-
ability and glacial economic progress of what he called the agricultural ‘mono-
cultures’. He was optimistic of the prospects for mining investment as the engine
of development. As things turned out, the overall project of colonial development
was a failure; the officials who were responsible for the plans, and the funding,
in London (and Paris) began to realize that the costs of colonial social welfare
would greatly exceed the returns. Frankel’s study was written at the beginning of
the crisis of decolonization, a process that would see the European powers
abandon their hold on the continent ‘in a single generation’ (Frankel 1969: 210,
214–15, Cooper 1996: 395–6). He was dumbfounded (as he noted in the
second edition published in 1969) by the rapidity of the decolonization process
but in one respect he was correct: mining resources throughout the continent
continued to attract large investments between 1940 and the late 1960s, and both
the colonial and the post-colonial states adopted his idea that mineral exploita-
tion could serve as the engine of development.
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Periodizing the developmental character of mineral exploitation
Over the course of the last century the character of mining capital in Africa, and
its political relationship with the state, has undergone some startling changes. Let
me list them schematically now: mining exploitation started out as the province
of merchants; between the De Beers launch in 1886 and the First World War,
African mining projects were sucked into the speculative markets of the City
often without real production of any kind. In the same period, enormous capital
flows and the special conditions on the Witwatersrand prompted the develop-
ment of massive vertically integrated industrial corporations; outside of South
Africa these corporations worked with the colonial state in the 1920s to drive the
developmental project of a stabilized African proletariat. This developmental
emphasis was adopted by the post-colonial states with a growing preoccupation
after 1970 with Africanization and nationalization; by the end of the 1980s a
new era of enclave mining had become entrenched, where the development of
mineral resources was radically isolated from the wider economy and society. 
I think these shifts are intrinsically interesting, and that they help to make
sense of the resilience and flexibility of mining capital in Africa, but I want to
examine them now to make a different analytical point: what distinguishes
mineral investment in Africa, running like a thread through all of the different
forms that mining capital has taken over the last century, is the centrality of an
uncontested property right (or concession or license) to the profitability of
investment. This ability to define, hold and sell a special kind of legal right in land
over the course of the century is, I think, unique in Africa outside of South Africa.
From the days of the Chartered Companies to the current oil multinationals, what
distinguishes mining investment from almost all other forms of investment in
Africa was the ability unambiguously to identify, commoditize and secure
property rights. Often mining investment has consisted of nothing other than the
securing of those rights.
For the twenty years after the discovery of the diamonds in Kimberley,
mining investment lay in the hands of merchant capital. Initially the diamond
fields lay formally beyond the legal boundaries of the two white states, so the
adventurers who began to pour in to the river and dry diggings (like prospectors
everywhere else) drew up their own rules for the ownership of mining claims.
The initial camps were chaotically settled but the two later (and more significant)
farms on which diamonds were discovered were carefully pegged out by a Free
State land surveyor into hundreds of claims measuring exactly 31 feet squared.
The diggers resolved that natives could not own claims, that no digger could own
more than one claim and that the claim would be forfeited if it was not worked
for eight consecutive days, but these regulations were withdrawn by the new
British administration in October 1871 (Smalberger 1976: 421–2, Worger 1987:
17). Within months the growing technical difficulties of mining small adjacent
properties at depth, the rapidly increasing cost of claims and then the declining
price of diamonds began to move the fields into the hands of wealthier
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merchants (see also Turrell 1982: 51–3). By the middle of the 1870s very large
investments by London-based diamond merchants in the Kimberley claims
precipitated the consolidation of ownership that led to the formation of the De
Beers monopoly (Worger 1987: 35).
Key to this process was an already existing, and very vigorous, market in land
in the Cape, a market that was, as Keegan shows, assiduously nurtured by
reforming colonial administrators after 1820. The substitution of a system of
quit-rent freehold properties for the old loan farm systems that the Dutch East
India Company1 had used in a largely vain attempt to regulate settler property
was the first step in this process. The establishment of a Land Board in 1828, and
the appointment of properly qualified land surveyors, marked the beginning of
a period of land speculation that led to ‘a fully fledged settler capitalism that was
to spread well beyond the original settler nucleus in Albany district’ (Keegan
1996: 57, 101, 168). This market, and the activities of the merchant investors,
extended into the comparatively disheveled economy of the Transvaal Republic as
early as the 1850s, when speculators based in the Cape had bought up the huge
lands handed out gratis to Boer settlers (Delius 1983: 128–30).
A different kind of merchant capital dominated mining rights beyond the
borders of the white colonies. In places like Nigeria and Zambia the effort to
survey, register and secure property was simply beyond the means of imperial
administrators. The chartered companies formed at the end of the nineteenth
century, modeled in name at least on the seventeenth century monopolies, were
initially given extravagant rights of sovereignty over huge territories. The British
companies – Royal Niger Company, British East African Company, and Rhodes’
British South Africa (BSA) Company – all quickly found themselves caught
between the rock of their London investors’ expectations and the hard place of
profitability in the ceded territories in Africa. Towards the end of the century the
Colonial Office also began to see the dangers of designing states around the
expectations of London investors and, after allowing the East African company to
collapse, both the Niger Company and the BSA Company lost their inflated rights
of sovereignty in exchange for a set of claims over land and mineral rights (Slinn
1971: 365–82, Vail 1976, Freund 1981: 32, Young 1994: 61).
Over the course of the twentieth century these mineral rights were to prove
immensely profitable for the shells that remained of the chartered companies.
Both companies were granted the right to impose an (almost entirely unearned)
royalty on the profits of mining that would make them famously profitable right
in to the 1960s. What is interesting about these royalty rights is the way in which
the Colonial Office maneuvered to defend them – often against the will of their
local officials, white settlers and anointed African leaders. In marked contrast to
the almost open-ended disputes about land ownership that the system of indirect
rule encouraged (Berry 1993), officials in London responded to the claims of the
Lozi paramount in 1921 that ‘whatever happens we cannot throw doubt on the
validity of the concessions’. This determination to protect the legitimacy of the
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royalty was repeated up until the very moment of independence. In Nigeria the
Niger Company exercised a similar property right over the large tin mines on the
Jos Plateau, allowing them to deduct fully half of all the revenues due to the
government up until the Second World War without making any significant
contribution to mining (Slinn 1971, Freund 1981: 32, 213–14). 
An important feature of this period of merchant dominance was the preoc-
cupation with the profits that could be earned in the City on the basis of the
(often fictional) promise of mining profits in Africa. Thousands of companies
were formed in London between 1880 and 1914 to exploit claims in South
Africa, Ghana and Nigeria, often with little more basis than a legal right to mine.
Over five hundred companies were established, with a nominal capital of £43
million, to exploit resources in West Africa only before 1904; at the time only
thirteen companies were producing ore (Frankel 1969: 162–3). A decade later a
similar frenzy of speculative investment struck the tin mining properties in
Nigeria – £10 million was invested in an industry that had a total annual product
of £650,000. By the start of the First World War this speculative period had
collapsed under the weight of unmet expectations; merchant capital would
survive in African mining through the entire century, but increasingly the power
to determine both the volume and the object of investment passed into the hands
of vertically integrated mining corporations, mostly based in Johannesburg.
Corporations (of the kind that Chandler has studied in the US) began to
displace the grip of speculative merchant capital on mining on the Witwatersrand
in the late 1880s. The early investors on the Rand were merchants, mostly from
the Eastern Cape, looking to repeat the great speculative success of Rhodes’ De
Beers flotation. They had a very weak understanding of both the geology and the
technology of deep level mining and very quickly faced bankruptcy (Webb
1981). It was the introduction of large numbers of American mining engineers,
mostly under the influence of Hamilton Smith and the Rothschild’s Exploration
Company – and massive investments of capital from Kimberley and London –
that changed the long-term character of mining gold and diamonds in South
Africa. By the start of the 1920s mining in South Africa was dominated by three
very large corporations – Rand Mines, Consolidated Gold Fields, and Anglo-
American – all of which were formed under the management of American
engineers (Marks and Trapido 1979, Turrell and Van Helten 1986, Katz 1999,
2005).
Key to this process of incorporation was the certainty of mining rights.
Twenty years later the key American engineers remembered the ‘liberal and
definite’ mining law of the old Transvaal in explicit contrast to the complex ‘Apex
Law’ that bedeviled property rights in the United States (Rickard 1922: 231). ‘A
striking feature of the mining [in the Transvaal] was the absence of litigation’, the
American consulting engineer for one of the key German investors remembered: 
The Witwatersrand mining area comprises a stretch of country now about 50 miles
long by 2 to 3 miles wide, covered from end to end with mining claims grouped
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into mining properties in active operation and often controlled by men of different
nationalities, yet a mining lawsuit is a practically unheard of thing, while those that
have occurred during the past twenty years can be counted on the fingers of one
hand. This is eloquent testimony to the practical efficiency of a mining law that limits
the four sides of a mining claim by vertical planes. (Rickard 1922: 264)
In this respect (and many others) the old Transvaal provided a laissez faire green-
house that fostered the new mining corporations. Ironically, the managers who
demanded that the Boer state change to a more thoroughly rationalized economy
would later look back to the 1890s with nostalgic regret.
A key feature of this era of corporate dominance of gold mining, which
clearly distinguishes it from the later periods, was a very ambitious project of
social transformation that the mining engineers, and their companies, demanded
from the Boer and British governments. Briefly, the (mostly American) managers
in charge of the new gold mining companies sought the establishment of a
properly capitalist agriculture and railways, an efficient and autonomous state,
and a set of coercive labour regulations (and policing institutions) designed to
bind the contracted workforce to their employers. Many of the demands made by
the mining industry were actually being met the State Attorney, Jan Smuts, as Sir
Alfred Milner determined to go to war with the Transvaal in order to secure them
(Chamber of Mines 1897, Marks and Trapido 1979).
The war between Britain and the Boer republics, devastating as it undeniably
was for the people of the platteland, formed an important part of this social
transformation. The British government spent extraordinarily lavishly in the
effort to defeat small numbers of highly mobile Boers. The £220 million spent
by the British government between December 1899 and May 1902 contrasts
eloquently with the £1 million annual budget for the entire empire under the
terms of the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act. Much of this huge sum
was spent in South Africa on provisioning and transportation but also on railway,
harbour and policing infrastructure (Worsfold 1913). After 1901 the boundary
problems that have confronted African states (Herbst 2000) for most of the last
century were incomprehensible in South Africa. Milner also spent heavily on the
extension of the railway system and the introduction of scientific agriculture and
irrigation systems. Some of the funding for this very expensive project came
from a low interest development loan of some £35 million but most was derived
from a new 10 percent profits tax on the mining industry (a precedent that
would serve as the basis of the South African government’s subsidization of local
industry and agriculture in the late 1920s) (Denoon 1973: 42).
There is, of course, a bundle of paradoxes here. Africans paid a heavy price,
politically and economically, for the new society. They were taxed heavily, and
received only a tiny proportion of that tax back in education subsidies or infra-
structure. Labour controls, segregation of the land and population growth
remorselessly weakened the basis of what, in the late nineteenth century, had
been vibrant peasant agriculture (Beinart 1982, Bundy 1988). By the end of the
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Depression (as the gold-mining industry inherited the unearned bounty from
the sterling devaluation and the new mines of the Orange Free State were being
opened up for development), the corporations exercised an almost uncontested
economic and political domination over the 400,000 migrants who worked in
the mines (Breckenridge 1995). After the 1922 strike African workers were
locked in to the least organized and skilled jobs. In the long run these constraints
on African economic activity doomed the prospects of growth. 
Yet it is also true that the developmental preoccupations of the South African
state between 1900 and 1950, reinvigorated by the Nationalists’ determination
to foster domestic industry in order to employ poor whites in the 1920s, made
it possible for the country partially to heal itself of the ‘Dutch disease’ (Feinstein
2005: 113–35). Gold-mining certainly funded much higher levels of imports
than would have otherwise been possible: through most of the twentieth century
gold earned between 40 and 75 percent of the country’s exports. But over the
long term – a process that took the better part of half a century – the resources
for the development of the country’s heavy industry came from the state revenues
derived from the gold mines (Yudelman 1983). This income from gold came in
part from mineral rights which retained the state’s ownership of gold-bearing
ore and required companies to purchase the right to mine through a system of
leases. The real revenue windfall followed the passing of the Excess Profits Tax in
1933 in the official reaction to the Hertzog government’s forced abandonment
of the Gold Standard (Katzen 1964: 55–60). Perhaps more important than
revenue, although much more difficult to measure, the establishment of the Wits
School of Mines, under the patronage of the American mining engineers,
produced hundreds of scientifically and technologically innovative engineers
whose work in the corporations, para-statals and universities secured the
diversity of South Africa’s industrial economy (Dubow 2006: 235–44).
In the rest of the continent, South African corporate power had less dramatic
but similarly complex effects on the economic place of mining. In Nigeria,
Consolidated Gold Fields was one of a small number of imperial mining houses
that set out to dominate a tin mining industry that employed nearly 100,000
workers by the 1940s. More importantly, it was the great financial success of the
South African companies, especially before 1914, that encouraged the flood of
speculative investment into the West African mining companies (Freund 1981:
30–8). In Zambia the boundary between the BSA chartered company and the
increasingly dominant South African corporations began to blur in the late 1920s
when Anglo, with the support of the American Newmont Corporation, became
the consulting engineers for the new copper mines and the dominant share-
holder in the chartered company (Gregory 1962: 384–412, Slinn 1971).
Something very similar occurred in the Nigerian tin-mining industry (Freund
1981: 222–3). Throughout this period, the managerial and research expertise of
the South African industry, and of the Chamber of Mines in particular, shaped
mining on the rest of the continent (Crisp 1983). The most important of the
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interventions of the South African mining corporations was clearly the string of
monopsonistic contracts set up by the De Beers corporation with the colonial
governments of Angola, Congo, Gold Coast, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika,
and Namibia. Again, the key to the success of these agreements was the legal form
of mineral rights in the colonies. ‘The production from the foreign countries,
such as Angola, Congo, and Sierra Leone’, Ernest Oppenheimer explained to the
board of the Diamond Producers’ association in 1934, ‘was completely
controlled by reason of the government concessions given to the companies in
respect of the whole of the territories concerned’ (Gregory 1962: 319, 329,
371–2). De Beers’ position as the monopoly wholesaler meant that outside of
southern Africa it had little interest in the organization of diamond production,
or its developmental costs and benefits (aside from the effort to curtail illicit
diamond mining and trading after 1960). In metal mining, especially on the
Rhodesian copperbelt, the situation was different.
Professions of the importance of the ‘cause of national development’ were,
interestingly, often matched by significant infrastructural investments outside of
mining in the period between 1940 and 1960. By the early 1950s, Anglo
American had consolidated its control of the Zambian copperbelt, which was
producing about 10 percent of the total global output in an industry that was
dominated by a small number of very large and powerful American corporations
(Schmitz 1986). Anglo moved the headquarters of its Central African subsidiary,
primarily to avoid British taxes, to the capital of the new Rhodesian Federation.
Sir Ernest Oppenheimer’s public promise that Anglo would ‘take a leading part in
assisting the progress of the Rhodesias’ was promptly fulfilled by the purchase of
£5,000,000 of rolling stock rented to the state railways and the provision of a
£20,000,000 loan, and a further £10,000,000 power surcharge levied on the
mines, for the financing of the Kariba hydro-electric dam (Gregory 1962:
461–6).
By the 1940s, mining had become the most important site (indeed often the
only site) of the colonial states’ new and concerted development effort. This
effort, as Fred Cooper has shown, was unlike the mainly infrastructural projects
planned by the American mining engineers on the Rand in the 1890s; it turned
– under the contradictory influence of Labour and social Catholic Party officials
in London and Paris, and workers in Africa and the West Indies – on the planned
implementation of welfare benefits aimed at the building of modern African
families (Cooper 1996). Key to this project was the ‘stabilized’ African workforce
of the mines and railways, and especially the social laboratory of the Central
African copperbelt. In both the Congo and the Zambian copperbelt the initial
system of labour migrancy, modeled on the tax and pass regimes of the
Witwatersrand, were abandoned in the 1920s for a permanent population of
workers and their families. In the Congo this involved comprehensive, and
invasive, medical interventions supported by the church and the mining corpo-
ration, Union Miniere du Haut Katanga (UMHK), in order to lower infant
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mortality (Hunt 1999: 251–3). On the Zambian copperbelt, the British govern-
ment’s search for a new kind of urban African family produced the Rhodes-
Livingstone Institute in 1940, one of the key sites for the production of social
scientific understandings of an emerging African industrial modernity.
The growing militancy and organization of mine workers in the British terri-
tories in the 1940s routinely complicated the plans carefully laid in the colonial
office, and the pressure to defuse workers’ protests led remorselessly towards
improved social benefits. Even the anemic gold mines in Ghana began to provide
subsidized housing and electricity, improved medical care, and a variety of sports
and recreation facilities under pressure from local officials (Crisp 1984: 72–5).
This welfarist slant to mining development continued apace through the 1950s
(and well in to the 1960s) as Cold War-inflated prices for metal commodities
gave the corporations and their host governments the resources to spend on
increased wages, pensions, housing, education and entertainment (Freund 1981:
218). In the copperbelt, government and mining companies funded the
construction of 100,000 houses between 1948 and 1864; in Eastern Nigeria the
new local ministers began a program of free, universal primary school education
(Berry 1993: 55, Ferguson 1999: 66). To help fund these interventions, the
Colonial Office at last bought out (at the expense of each colony) the licensing
revenues of the chartered companies in Southern Rhodesia, Nigeria and, at the
very last moment, Northern Rhodesia (Freund 1981: 213–14). 
In the wake of Mau Mau, the Colonial Office began to dwell on the arith-
metical implications of the social interventions being promoted in London and
Africa. As the prospects of sustaining locally administered and locally funded
welfare interventions darkened, officials began to view self-government as a way
out of an increasingly intractable mess. ‘The people are going to be disillusioned,’
the Governor-General of Nigeria wrote in 1955, ‘but it is better that they should
be disillusioned as a result of the failure of their own people than that they
should be disillusioned as a result of our actions’ (Cooper 1996: 393). It was not
long before the post-colonial states that inherited the new expenses of late-
imperial welfarism battened on to the resources, and particularly the precious
foreign exchange, offered by mineral exports.
A new era of nationalized mining began in 1959 when Nkrumah bought 
out six marginal gold mines and set up the State Gold Mining Corporation 
(Crisp 1984: 133). Towards the end of the decade, Kenneth Kaunda nationalized
51 percent of the equity of the two corporations, Zambian Anglo American and
Roan Selection Trust, on the copperbelt (Ferguson 2006: 197, Libby and Woakes
1980). The Zambian president hoped that by vesting mineral rights in his own
office he would be able to encourage the newly nationalized corporations to
increase investments and expand mining beyond copper. In 1973, Kaunda
announced a program of Zambianization to fill managerial positions, and the
positions of key decision makers, with nationals. At about the same time the
military governments in Ghana and Nigeria bought majority share holdings in
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the few remaining mining companies, and sought to implement programs of
‘indigenization’ (Freund 1981: 224, Tsikata 1997). In most of these cases, the
mining corporations seem not to have offered anything by way of significant
resistance.
In the Congo, the process of nationalization was much more ragged.
Immediately after Belgium had hastily granted the Congo its independence,
UMHK funded the three-year secession of the Shaba copperbelt region, earning
the enmity of the otherwise pro-capitalist dictator who seized power in 1965,
Mobuto Sese Seko. Mobuto seized UMHK on the first day of 1967, briefly
incurring the wrath of the International Association for the Protection and
Promotion of Private Foreign Investments and a team of US diplomats; two 
weeks later he accepted the advice of the US diamond merchant, Maurice
Tempelsman, to enter into negotiations with the Belgian company about the
terms of nationalization. What is striking about this period is that Mobuto,
despite the intense international competition in the copper industry, could find
no buyer for the expropriated assets of the corporation. Faced with the complete
withdrawal of skilled personnel from the copperbelt, rapid depletion of the
country’s foreign exchange and a global boycott of Congolese copper organized
by the Société General de Belgique, Mobuto was forced to allow UMHK to
continue operating the mines, stripped of their property rights in the subter-
ranean copper. It was only with the development of the Tenke Fungurume (TFM)
cobalt and copper mines in 1971 that Mobuto, and Tempelsman, were able to
achieve their aim of breaking UMHK’s stranglehold on the Zairian copperbelt
(Gibbs 1997).
An important, and easily forgotten, feature of this period of nationalist
economic policy was the massive investment that African governments made in
the effort to create new transport linkages. In Gabon, in 1972, President Bongo
commissioned a 650km railway line linking Libreville on the coast with the
mining district at Franceville on the eastern side of the country. Twelve years later
it was opened. The line, which cost the massive sum of $4 billion and requires
an operating subsidy of sum $60 million per annum, was built by some of the
largest rail contractors in Europe; to date it seems not to have had any measur-
able developmental benefit for non-mining regions it passes through (Reed
1987). On the other side of the continent, China provided an interest-free loan
and the contractors to build the Uhuru Railway connecting Dar-es-Salaam with
the copperbelt, allowing the Zambian mines to export without having to use the
Rhodesian and South African networks or the war-ravaged Benguela line. Here,
again, the massive investment in infrastructure has produced very little develop-
mental result. The Tazara line runs through vast tracts of Tanzania that have very
low population densities, and the railway has struggled to retain the expert
mechanical staff required to maintain diesel locomotives and the line itself. For
many years trains have run infrequently and very slowly (Due 1986). In Nigeria
the federal government spent lavishly on the building of all-weather roads in the
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middle of the oil boom. Road construction was famously subject to the special
‘40 percent’ enabling fees that became common in Nigeria in this period, but the
real problems were cost over-runs caused by inflation and the very large numbers
of new vehicles that were imported after the salary increases of the mid-1970s
(Freund 1978). Perhaps the most eloquent of the infrastructure projects of this
period was the Ingba dam scheme commissioned by Mobuto Sese-Seko to
provide electricity to the Shaba copperbelt mines. The cost of the dam, which was
built by American contractors, rose from an initial estimate of $260 million to
well over $1 billion seven years late. And the 1,800km transmission line, which
Mobuto sought to use to control the secessionists in Shaba, quickly fell prey to
scavengers looking for sources of high-quality scrap metal. With the exception of
the Tazara line, these projects were all built by the leading consulting firms in
Europe and America: no one seems to have mentioned that the financial and
managerial burden of maintaining the infrastructure was likely to exceed the
capacity of the new states (Young and Turner 1984).
The overtly developmental objectives of the nationalization period were, of
course, not met. Instead these continent-wide processes synchronized with the
resurgence of what Bayart has called ‘the politics of the belly’ (1993).
Nationalization of the mining companies in Ghana, Nigeria, Congo and Zambia
and the global decline in mining commodity prices usually (although not
always) resulted in a precipitous decline in production; everywhere it has
strengthened the politics of the gatekeeper state in the post-colonial period. This
process was double-sided. ‘If the state intrudes as a gatekeeper for the multi-
nationals,’ Bill Freund observed twenty-five years ago, ‘it does so as well for the
mass of Africans in the humbler pursuit of basic goods and services’ (1998:
247). For Bayart, the leveling features of the politics of the post-colonial state –
which sees the little men extracting concessions from the rich and powerful and
one political faction replaced by another without any meaningful prospect of
accumulated wealth and power for either – prevent him from viewing the
gatekeeper state as an instrument of exploitation. But he does acknowledge that
the importance of factional struggles in the period of nationalization underscores
the resurgence of a new kind of merchant capital in Africa, dominated by ‘a Bruce
Mackenzie or a “Tiny” Rowland in Eastern and Southern Africa, or of a Maurice
Tempelsman in Zaire or of a Jamil Said Mohammed in Sierra Leone’ (Bayart
1993: 216).
The period of nationalization in mining began to unravel quite rapidly
toward the end of the 1980s. With encouragement from the World Bank, thirty
African countries had changed their mining codes to allow for the return of
private foreign investment by 1987 (Reno 1997). Ghana was amongst the first
to begin this process of privatizing nationalized mineral assets, leading to the sale
of some 80 percent of the state’s equity in the Ashanti Goldfield Corporation in
1994, most of which went to Lonrho. In the Congo, Zambia and Tanganyika
private mining companies have begun to buy hundreds of mining leases or 
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state-owned properties. In the process a new kind mining development, heavily
influenced by the explosion of investment in off-shore oil drilling in Angola,
Equitorial Guinea, Gabon and Nigeria, seems to be taking shape.
The gold, cobalt and copper mines that are currently under development in
central Africa are unique historically owing to their enclave character. The new
very large gold mines in western Tanzania, for example, have almost no infra-
structural connection to the rest of the country. These mines have built their own
power generation, water supply, housing for skilled ex-patriots and airstrips. The
catering for the employees on some of the central African mines is arranged with
companies in South Africa who fly almost all the mine provisions from
Johannesburg. Aside from increased tax revenues (no small matter for many
African countries) it seems unlikely that this kind of mining will produce any of
the wider industrial or infrastructural benefits that followed in southern Africa in
the first half of the twentieth century. But what is striking in all of these cases is
the comparative simplicity, and certainty, of the mineral rights purchased by
these new mining companies, even, as has usually been the case, where hundreds
of nationals have been earning a subsistence income in artisanal mining. The
model of this new form of mining investment seems to be the massive off-shore
oil developments owned and often operated by the thirty-year-old Angolan oil
parastatal, Sonangol (de Oliveira 2007, Ferguson 2006: 194–210).
Conclusion
The importance of mineral extraction in twentieth-century African economies is,
obviously, a product of the relative formal weakness of the other forms of
economic activity on the continent. But the problem is not simply one of relative
economic significance; mining is qualitatively different to the other areas of
economic activity on the continent. Mines are important, especially to foreign
investors and African states, because it is very difficult to extract, and accumulate,
capital in agriculture, trade and industry. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that
mining worked in the twentieth century throughout much of Africa because, like
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century slavery, it was ‘the only form of private,
revenue-producing property in African law’ (Thornton 1992: 74).
Mining worked very well under the political economy of colonial rule. The
labour demands of mining synchronized much better with the politics of
indirect rule than the special skills of secondary industry or the coercive require-
ments of agriculture. Almost all of the continent’s mines raised their initial
workforce through the agency of African customary authorities working as
agents of the colonial state (Freund 1981: 55–7, 138). Mining, especially
compounded mining, fed off the gendered character of labour resources in
African households. At least before the 1970s, millions of African men sought
short-term opportunities to earn cash wages in the, often vain, hope of building
a more prosperous rural home. They traveled very great distances from their own
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home districts to secure these jobs (Gordon 1977, Beinart 1982, Harries 1994,
Moodie 1994). 
Mining was also well suited to the peculiar transport infrastructure of
colonial Africa; most colonial (and post-colonial) railway lines – Milner’s market-
oriented trunk lines are the exception here – run from a key regional port to the
source of the most valuable minerals. ‘All roads and railways led down to the sea’,
as Rodney noted in 1972. ‘They were built to extract gold or manganese or coffee
or cotton.’ The continued importance of mining, at least until the recent period,
reflected the enduring economic effects of that extractive transport infrastructure
(Rodney 1981: 209). For the gatekeeper state, under colonial rule and after-
wards, mining was an irresistible source of power and weakness (Cooper 2002:
156–90).
For over a century it has been the global commodity markets that have
periodically drawn foreign investors to African mineral resources. That is as true
today as it was in the 1890s. It is well to remember, as South Africa’s Finance
Minister Trevor Manuel noted in 2007, that the current mining boom, like the
others before it, is not ‘a permanent shift [but] a temporary opportunity’
(Manuel 2007). The history of the last century of mining in Africa also demon-
strates that the developmental benefits of mining have declined dramatically over
time. Perhaps it is time to apply the lessons of the security, simplicity and fungi-
bility of mineral rights to other forms of property, and other industries.
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COMMENTARY
Natural resources and development:
which histories matter?
Mick Moore
This volume is animated by a concern that history be taken properly into account
in the design of development policy. Paul Warde’s chapter on the history of
energy and natural resource use in Europe reverses the lens. Scholars have only
recently coined the term ‘resource curse’, and understood the extent to which,
in poorer countries over the past few decades, large-scale exploitation of natural
resources has had malign economic and political consequences. Warde tell us that
this new understanding is already changing the ways in which economic histo-
rians interpret the past:
To an earlier generation of economic historians, it was self-evident that modern
growth was predicated on favourable resource endowments and the technology to
exploit them. The precocious English use of coal and development of associated
technology such as the steam engine represented the exemplary case. Yet more recent
developments have shaken that belief. It has been a striking characteristic of recent
economic development and the international division of labour that economies
heavily dependent on natural resource exploitation and export suffered from
sluggish economic growth. One can speak now of a ‘resource curse’. Hence relative
natural resource abundance may now be viewed as detrimental to development …
while relative scarcity may actually prompt benefits through ‘induced innovation’
and substitution to less resource-dependent activities. (Warde, this volume, p. 221)
But how far does the experience of poorer countries in recent decades justify
a general re-evaluation of – and scepticism about – the benefits of natural
resource exploitation? The ‘resource curse’ is neither natural nor inevitable. It is
rather the contingent outcome of a set of economic and political conditions that
happen to have afflicted many poorer countries particularly intensely over recent
decades, especially the period since around 1970. These conditions include in
particular: (a) very high international income inequality between most (rich)
resource importing nations and most (poor) resource exporting nations; (b) the
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fact that certain types of natural resource exports (‘point resources’) have
generated very high rents (‘excess profits’), that have in turn generated political
competition and largely have accrued to people who wield political power in the
exporting nations; and (c) the fact that the polities of many of the exporting
nations were already fragile for other reasons.  
Explaining the resource curse1
It is reasonable to be concerned that, when a country begins to export large
quantities of phosphates (or coltan, copper, diamonds, oil, natural gas etc.), its
national currency is likely to appreciate in value on the strength of dollar exports
earnings, making life very difficult for other actual or potential export industries
and thereby leaving other sectors of the economy vulnerable to competition from
‘cheap’ imports. Countries can become locked in economically to a dominant
resource export activity. But these are not normally critical problems: export
earnings can be managed to promote the growth of other sectors. This so-called
‘Dutch disease’ mechanism provides no general justification for leaving the
resources unexploited underground – that would be a bit like arguing that any
gift or social security transfer to poor families inevitably will worsen their
poverty by reducing their incentive to work, when in reality it could help make
them fit and healthy enough to work, enable them to pay the bus fare to travel to
where the jobs are, ensure that they can set up the childcare arrangements needed
for regular employment, etc. 
The phrase ‘Dutch disease’ dates from the discovery of large natural gas fields
in Dutch territorial waters in the 1970s. Despite concerns expressed at the time,
the Dutch economy was not seriously afflicted in the long term. Yet other
countries came to be so visibly damaged by natural resource exploitation that we
now talk of a ‘resource curse’, and apply it as much to their polities as to their
economies. What happened to convert potential blessings into curses? Let us
begin with a distinction between ‘natural resources’ in general (including fertile
soil and balmy climates) and what are now usually labelled ‘point natural
resources’, i.e. resources like oil, gas, minerals and deep shaft diamonds.2 Point
natural resources are concentrated in one place, typically mined or pumped up
in large quantities by a small number of organizations that have made major
long-term investments. The extraction of point natural resources is ripe for more
or less monopoly control. And in practice, this monopoly control is exercized
either by parastatal companies or by private enterprises that work in close associ-
ation with government. Why do governments have so many fingers deep in these
pies? First because they can: the logistics of extraction, processing and transport
and the major long-term character of extraction investments make it easy for
governments to get in on the act in one way or another. More important, the
motivations to do so are very powerful. Large concentrated operations that
involve major flows of money and the extraction and export of the national
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patrimony seem to cry out for the state to extend a grasping hand. And the
material returns from bringing political and governmental power to bear on this
sector can be enormous, because the levels of profitability – and therefore the
scope to skim off super-profits (rents) – can be very high. The larger the natural
resource extraction sector compared with the rest of the economy, the higher are
the incentives for those in power to use it to extract such rents. So understood,
there is no mystery about why Norway has not succumbed to the resource curse.
It is not only that Norway’s efficient, democratic political and administrative
institutions were deeply ‘grounded’ long before the oil and gas was discovered.
In addition, the rents that might be appropriated from its energy industry
comprize only a small fraction of the national economy. Because of high extrac-
tion costs from deep under the North Sea, profitability per barrel is much lower
than in, for example, Libya or Saudi Arabia. And other productive activities
dominate the Norwegian economy. 
To more fully understand the political dynamics of the contemporary
‘resource curse’, we need to bring in a little schematic economic history. Until
the 1950s, industrialized (‘developed’) countries imported large quantities of
(mainly tropical) agricultural commodities from poor countries (sugar, coffee,
tea, cotton, rubber, cocoa, groundnuts, etc.), but collectively were largely self-
sufficient in point natural resource commodities, especially in energy resources
(mainly coal, with significant domestic oil production in the United States). The
rapid reduction in international transport costs from the 1950s made possible a
growing dependence on minerals extracted from many parts of the poor world
and, in particular, oil from the Middle East (and Venezuela). It was only in this
post-war period that ‘the South’ became a major source of point natural resource
commodities. The business was mostly new, and mostly very profitable. Global
demand has continued to expand, and grew especially fast since the turn of the
century when the Chinese and other Asian economies became big importers.
Time lags between identifying new reserves and bringing them on stream are
long. Processes fuelled by oil, gas and their derivatives are so economically
efficient that the incentive to use or develop substitute energy sources has been
limited. The coordinated supply restrictions first introduced by OPEC in 1973
complete the big picture: a very large proportion of export receipts from oil and
gas produced in poor countries – and, more variably, from other minerals – have
represented economic rents, i.e. returns well in excess of actual production costs.
Even today it costs only a few dollars to pump up a barrel of oil from under the
Libyan or Saudi deserts and deliver it for export. Market prices are many
multiples of that. The rents from oil, gas and mineral production have been
variable over time, but in those regions of the world lacking highly developed
agricultural, industrial or service sectors, they have in recent decades typically
accounted for a large proportion of total national income.3 This proportion has
tended to grow over time, especially in (West) Africa, which has become a major
oil, gas and mineral-producing region relatively recently. And governments and
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political elites have been busy helping themselves to these rents, sometimes
employing armed force against one another, generally using some of the loot to
buy off potential opposition leaders, and nearly always using a good part of it to
arm themselves. 
There is still more research to be done before we can talk confidently about
the precise causal mechanisms underlying the resource curse. Researchers are still
trying to fathom exactly why countries that began to exploit new point natural
resources on a large scale since the 1970s are likely to have experienced even less
economic growth than they could have expected without this ‘gift’, and to have
regressed toward – or failed to move away from – exclusive, authoritarian
government, arbitrary  policy-making and excessive military spending. There are
many potential pathways to these perverse outcomes; we have little detailed
insight into which of them really matter, and how they interact. And we have to
be very careful to point out that all these statistical patterns are not iron laws. We
know what is likely to happen when countries become exporters of point natural
resources, but, for individual countries, we cannot predict the outcomes with
certainty. 
Implications
From this perspective, we can be optimistic that Brazil – a big middle-income
country with an institutionalized democracy – will make relatively ‘good’ use of
its newly discovered oil and gas reserves.4 We cannot be as optimistic about
countries like Ghana and Uganda. They are characterized by much the same
conditions that have generated resource curses elsewhere over the last sixty years:
poverty; fragile polities; and rents from point natural resource extraction poten-
tially large enough to reshape the political and economic landscape. But that
combination of circumstances is historically specific. It was not widely found, for
example, in the European historical sequences that Warde discusses, where
energy resources were not easily monopolizable, and did not generate very large
rents. Neither is that combination guaranteed to persist in the contemporary
world for more than a few years into the future. The current excitement over the
potential for extracting natural gas from shale is likely much overblown. But it is
possible that, within a decade, the major energy importing regions of the world
– North America, Western Europe and China – might be producing enormous
quantities of natural gas very cheaply at home.5 Were that to happen, the rents
generated by oil and gas extraction elsewhere in the world might shrink, and that
particular resource curse might shrivel.
In recognizing with Warde that the political salience of particular natural
resource endowments is historically contingent, it is also important to apply the
same logic to understand how institutions emerge (or not) to manage natural
resource wealth. In his introductory paragraph cited above, Warde goes on to say:
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Hence relative natural resource abundance may now be viewed as detrimental to
development … while relative scarcity may actually prompt benefits through
‘induced innovation’ and substitution to less resource-dependent activities. A belief
in the fundamental substitutability of factors of production in the long-term has
shifted attention away from resources as a major developmental issue for many
economic historians. If factors are relatively easily substitutable, then relative
backwardness must be explained by variant institutions or preferences. (Warde, this
volume, p. 221)
Two rather large conclusions are embodied in this short quotation. We need to
be wary of both. One is summarized in the final sentence quoted: since natural
resource endowments per se allegedly explain less of the historical variation in
economic growth rates than was previously believed, we should give more
weight to an alternative perspective: the driving role of institutions. Like Warde,
I am suspicious for several reasons. The first, as I have argued above, is that the
prior conclusion reached by some researchers about downgrading the general
historical significance of natural resource endowments is not well founded. The
political economy of a given state’s primary source of revenue continues to
matter, especially so if that revenue comes from a resource readily able to be
controlled by unaccountable elites. 
A second lies in the ambiguity of the notion of ‘institutions’ as drivers of
economic growth, and the impossibility, to date, of testing that proposition such
that it can be distinguished from some version of ‘politics matters’ (Toye 1995,
Woodruff 2000). The most widespread operational definition of the proposition
that ‘institutions drive economic growth’ is some variant of the proposition that
it is property rights that do the work (Evans 2007). Yet this too is deeply
problematic. The concept of ‘property rights’ is amorphous. Some property rights
are always with us. It is not clear that they can unambiguously be added up such
that we can generally aggregate them on a ‘more-less’ scale, or that any particular
set of them are implicated in causing economic growth (Haggard et al. 2008). In
short, if we need to understand the political salience of natural resource wealth
historically, so too do we need to historicize the mechanisms by which a
prevailing set of ‘institutions’ for managing it emerged (or failed to emerge).
This point takes us finally to Keith Breckenridge’s chapter on mining in
Africa. I very much like the content, though I remain to be fully convinced that
it entirely demonstrates its title claim: namely, that contemporary African
economies are (excessively) dependent on mining because this is the only
economic sector that has enjoyed ‘strong’ property rights. Breckenridge explains
how the mining sector often has been very privileged in Africa, including
through major government investment in physical infrastructure. However, he
also talks of extensive nationalization, which is hardly a correlate of strong
property rights (but which nonetheless has been deployed rhetorically and
strategically by incumbent elites to attract foreign investors and ensure that elites
retain sole control over the lucrative rents that the mines generate). The history
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of mining in Africa is certainly driven by rents, including the political privileges
that they can buy and the political competition and conflicts that they generate.
It is not clear however, at least from the perspective of policy implications, that it
is a story about property rights and institutions, alone; it is also a story in which
such ‘property rights’ and ‘institutions’ are a product of privileges granted exclu-
sively to those international firms able to wield sufficient domestic political
influence. As such, historical scholarship can help illuminate the conditions
under which such influence is, and is not, able to be exerted and resisted. Hence,
there is no useful sense in which we can explain the expansion of mining in
Africa since the turn of this century in terms of the weakness of property rights
in other sectors of the economy. The drivers lie – as I suspect they always did, and
as Breckenridge’s analysis helps illuminate – more in the global political
economy than in domestic institutions. 
Concluding comments
Both Breckenridge and Warde frame their interpretations of economic history in
terms of the institutionalism that has come to dominate the study of contempo-
rary economic development, even as they seek to grapple with the historically
and politically contingent ways in which particular forms of natural resource
wealth have influenced, and been influenced by, the prevailing institutions for
managing that wealth. Sometimes the institutionalist label represents more a
change of packaging than of substance. Where it has substance, this often consti-
tutes an unwarranted faith in the power of some ambiguous concept labelled
‘property rights’. Economists should indeed learn from history. But history is not
a pristine discipline unaffected by contemporary developments in economics and
other social sciences. As in the real world of international trade, intellectual
imports, exports and re-exports among disciplines need to be encouraged but
also monitored for potential hazards. 
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Notes
1 There is an enormous literature on this topic. See for example Atkinson and Hamilton
(2003), Bornhorst et al. (2008), Bulte et al. (2005), Collier (2006), (2010), Collier
and Hoeffler (2005), Gervasoni (2010), Humphreys et al. (2007), Jensen and
Wantchekon (2004), Knack (2009), Neumayer (2004), Omgba (2009), Ross
(2008), Sachs and Warner (1995), Snyder (2006), and Torvik (2009).
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2 Stijns (2006) insists on the importance of this distinction, which was first formal-
ized in Isham et al. (2005). Some scholars fail to do so (e.g., Brunnschweiler 2008,
Lederman and Maloney 2008).
3 Data on estimated rents are now available from the World Bank. 
4 Indeed, one could argue that the world community has staked a considerable short-
term bet on this outcome, having had the confidence to stage both the 2014 World
Cup competition and the 2016 Olympic Games in Brazil.
5 See, for example,The Economist, 13 March 2010. 
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